

HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF

# MULTINATIONAL PEACEKEEPING

THIRD EDITION



TERRY M. MAYS

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# Historical Dictionary of Multinational Peacekeeping

*Third Edition*

Terry M. Mays

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For  
Angelo Frasier

A Friend



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## Editor's Foreword

There are many aspects to international organizations, but none of these has so captured the interest of the public as their role in multinational peacekeeping. Through it, these international bodies show that they are much more than a “talk shop” and that they can actually “do something” to help resolve serious conflicts or at least keep them more or less under control. Moreover, although once largely an activity of the United Nations, multinational peacekeeping is now being taken on or shared by such regional organizations as the African Union, European Union, Organization of American States, and Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Equally significant, while once dominated by the great powers, more and more of the work is now being done by an expanding circle of smaller countries around the globe. Over the years, the number of these operations has grown to several dozen at present, not counting several dozen more that have been wound down. Admittedly, these efforts do not always work, and we are immediately alerted to the failures in Rwanda, Somalia, and Bosnia, but the relative successes are much more numerous and show what can be achieved.

This is now the third edition of *Historical Dictionary of Multinational Peacekeeping*, and it is certainly useful to chart the progression of this activity since so much has occurred in the intervening years. New crises have erupted and are being contained by new peacekeeping operations, while some older ones have lapsed. More important in some ways, the focus of the operations has shifted, and the relevant bodies are adopting other strategies. This is all covered in the introduction and dictionary section, which has entries on all of the various operations, old and new; some of the more significant people involved; the more notable strategies; and, especially this time, entries on countries that have been the host of such operations more often over the years, noting the background, efforts, and successes or failures. The list of acronyms,

secondary for many other historical dictionaries, is a precious tool here, because so often it is the acronyms that are referred to, and it is hard to know all the players, they are so numerous. The literature on peacekeeping has also expanded rapidly, and the bibliography directs readers toward relevant books and articles.

This third edition, like the previous two, was compiled by Terry M. Mays, one of the few specialists to actually teach a course on multinational peacekeeping. This he does, along with other subjects, at The Citadel in Charleston, South Carolina. Professor Mays writes regularly on peacekeeping, and his works include *Africa's First Peacekeeping Operation: The OAU in Chad, 1981–1982*; *The 1999 United Nations and 2000 Organization of African Unity Formal Inquiries: A Retrospective Examination of Peacekeeping and the Rwandan Crisis of 1994*; and *Nigerian Peacekeeping Policy: The Application of Peacekeeping as a Foreign Policy Tool, 1960–1990*. He has also written numerous book chapters, academic journal articles, and conference papers on multinational peacekeeping. Professor Mays travels regularly to observe or research the phenomenon, his journeys taking him to Canada, Egypt, Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, Israel, Nigeria, Norway, and other places. He is also coauthor of *Historical Dictionary of International Organizations in Sub-Saharan Africa*. This certainly makes him one of the leading authorities in the field, and his ability to draw so many divergent strands into a comprehensive whole remains impressive.

Jon Woronoff  
Series Editor

## Preface

Multinational peacekeeping is increasingly being utilized as a tool in support of conflict management across the globe. Between December 2001 and January 2010, there have been at least 81 new missions that can be classified as peacekeeping or peace operations. For the first time since 1945, regional and subregional organizations mandated more of these missions than the United Nations (UN). During this eight-year period, new regional and subregional operations outpaced those of the UN by a two to one ratio. A third edition of *Historical Dictionary of Multinational Peacekeeping* became a necessity to keep up with the multitude of new operations as well as to track the multiple missions fielded in the same countries. In areas of prolonged conflict, multiple international organizations have fielded peacekeeping operations in the same country. At the same time, single international organizations have mandated numerous missions in one country. Seven peacekeeping operations have been fielded in Lebanon since 1958, nine in Haiti since 1993, eight in the Democratic Republic of the Congo since 1960, seven in Croatia since 1992, 10 in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1992, four in Angola since 1988, and four between Egypt and Israel since 1948. At one point, three different organizations fielded peacekeeping operations in Georgia at the same time. The organization of this book allows researchers to sort through these operations and gain a better understanding of how they are related. A new feature to this edition is the inclusion of entries devoted to tracing the history of multiple peacekeeping operations in the same country.

*Historical Dictionary of Multinational Peacekeeping* takes a broad definition of multinational peacekeeping to provide a basis for comparison and permit researchers to review operations labeled as “peacekeeping” by international organizations. Many scholars do not agree on a single definition of peacekeeping, and there are operations in this book

that some will argue are not peacekeeping. The purpose of this book is not to generate debate on what is and is not a peacekeeping operation. The goal of this work is simply to assist researchers and others to sort through the myriad of peacekeeping or peace operations since 1920 and think about some of the trends and issues behind these missions. Every operation listed in the dictionary has been declared a peacekeeping mission or peace operation by an international organization or a major research institute. A detailed examination of the multiple and changing definitions associated with peacekeeping is included in the introduction.

Much has changed in peacekeeping research since 1995, when the first edition of this book was released by Scarecrow Press. In the first edition, I note that the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) and the United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I) were probably the most heavily researched peacekeeping operations. Seven years later, and reflective of the changing course of peacekeeping, I argue in the second edition that the most heavily researched missions were the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), and the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). I taught an entire course on peacekeeping for the first time in 1992 at The Citadel and devoted three days to examining the issues associated with ONUC during that semester. American forces landed in Somalia to support UNOSOM during the last weeks of the semester. In 2009, I only mentioned ONUC in passing during the course and devoted four weeks to helping my students develop an understanding behind the issues associated with UNPROFOR, UNAMIR, and UNOSOM. Peacekeeping is a constantly evolving field, and today I would argue that these three operations are still the most heavily researched. At the same time, peacekeeping research has evolved from a majority of single case studies to works devoted to comparisons between multiple operations. More details on this evolution are included in the introductory essay for the bibliography.

In the second edition, I lamented the lack of research in regional and subregional organization mandated operations. While research in the latter peacekeeping missions is still lacking, there has been a small flurry of work on the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) missions in recent years. While UN operations remain a favorite among researchers, there is still a void among the small UN missions as scholars concentrate on the large

controversial forces. The success of a small UN operation can tell us as much about peacekeeping theory as the large controversial missions.

The goal of this book is not to write the complete history of every military operation referred to as “peacekeeping” by someone since 1920. Rather, the goal is to present enough information on the major multinational operations to allow readers to cut through any confusion and gain a better understanding of the many military missions fielded by international organizations since 1920. In the process, a few unilateral peacekeeping missions are also included in the dictionary section to allow readers an opportunity to compare these to multilateral operations.

This book is organized into several distinct categories. First, there is a list of acronyms and abbreviations. Like many military establishments around the globe, peacekeeping has a language of its own. Most missions have their own shortened names or acronyms that are more commonly heard than the actual name of the operation. In addition, although not covered in the list of acronyms, it should be noted that the UN and many regional organizations have a unique way of abbreviating the names of contingents assigned to the multinational operations. Peacekeeping units are normally built around battalion- or company-sized units. The UN tends to refer to these units based upon their size and origin; therefore, a battalion from Nigeria is referred to by the world body as NIGBATT. A country like France, which had four battalions in an operation such as UNPROFOR, had its units labeled as FREBATT1, FREBATT2, FREBATT3, and FREBATT4.

The next category in this book is a chronology of peacekeeping operations and related events since 1920. This list allows researchers to compare what is happening in the realm of peacekeeping at the same time around the globe. For instance, the UN mandated four different peacekeeping operations between April and May 1991. The chronology is followed by the dictionary itself. References are included for peacekeeping operations, key military and civilian individuals, political crises requiring intervention by peacekeeping operations, international organizations, and specific events during the multinational missions. The next category of the book is an appendix, with three examples of peacekeeping mandates. A select but comprehensive bibliography of peacekeeping follows the appendix. While there is considerable literature on peacekeeping in other languages, this work contains sources in English due to size limitations. Only foreign-language specialized works with inadequate English language coverage are included.



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## Acronyms and Abbreviations

AAM	Aceh Monitoring Mission
ACOTA	African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance
ACOTA	African Crisis Operations Training
ACRI	African Crisis Response Initiative
ADF	Arab Deterrent Force
ADL	Armistice Demarcation Line
AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
AMIB	African Mission in Burundi
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
AMISEC	African Union Mission for Support to the Elections in the Comoros
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
ANAD	Nonaggression and Assistance Accord
ANC	Congolese National Army
AOL	area of limitation
AOS	area of separation
AP	assembly point
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASF	African Stand-By Force
ASF	Symbolic Arab Security Force
AU	African Union
AULMEE	African Union Liaison Mission in Ethiopia–Eritrea
AUSTF	African Union Special Task Force
BINUB	United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi

BINUCA	United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic
BMATT	British Military Assistance Training Team
BMT	Bougainville Transition Team
BONUCA	United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic
BRA	Bougainville Revolutionary Army
BTT	Bougainville Transition Team
CAR	Central African Republic
CEEAC	Economic Community of Central African States
CEMAC	Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States
CEN-SAD	Community of Sahel-Saharan States
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CIVS	International Verification and Follow-Up Commission
CMF	Commonwealth Monitoring Force
CMO	chief military observer
COMESSA	Community of Sahel-Saharan States
CPF	Collective Peacekeeping Forces
CPLP	Community of Lusophone Countries
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organization
DOMREP	Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC	The Democratic Republic of the Congo
EC	European Community
ECMM	European Community Monitoring Mission
ECOFORCE	Economic Community of West African States Force in Cote d'Ivoire
ECOMICI	Economic Community of West African States Mission in Cote d'Ivoire

ECOMIL	Economic Community of West African States Mission in Liberia
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EIMAC	Egypt–Israel Mixed Armistice Commission
EIPC	Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities
ELN	National Liberation Army
EU	European Union
EUBAM	European Union Border Mission to Moldova and Ukraine
EUBAM RAFAH	European Union Border Assistance Mission at Rafah
EFAO	Éléments français d’assistance opérationnelle
EUFOR ALTHEA	European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina
EUFOR CONCORDIA	European Union Military Operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
EUFOR RD CONGO	European Union Force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
EUFOR TCHAD/RCA	European Union Force Chad/Central African Republic
EUMM	European Union Monitoring Mission
EUNAVFOR SOMALIA	European Union Naval Force Somalia
EUPAT	European Union Police Advisory Team
EUPM	European Union Police Mission
EUPOL	European Union Police Mission
EUPOL AFGHANISTAN	European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan
EUPOL COPPS	European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories
EUPOL KINSHASA	European Union Police Mission in Kinshasa

EUPOL PROXIMA	European Union Police Mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
EUPOL RD CONGO	European Union Police Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
EURORECAMP	European Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix
EUSEC RD CONGO	European Union Advisory Assistance Mission for Security Reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo
EUTM SOMALIA	European Union Training Mission Somalia
FAWEU	Forces Answerable to the West European Union
FC	force commander
FIA	Inter-African Force
FMP	Multinational Protection Force
FMR	Force Mobile Reserve
FNLA	Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola/ National Front for the Liberation of Angola
FOMUC	Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States Multinational Force in the Central African Republic
FPA	Nonaggression and Assistance Accord Peace Force
FPU	Formed Police Unit
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GA	General Assembly
GPOI	Global Peace Operations Initiative
HNP	Haitian National Police
IAF	Inter-African Force
IAF	Inter-American Force
IAPF	Inter-American Peace Force
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICCS	International Commission of Control and Supervision

ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IFOR	Implementation Force
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGASOM	Intergovernmental Authority on Development Peace Support Mission in Somalia
IJMAC	Israel–Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission
ILMAC	Israel–Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission
IMATT	International Military Assistance Training Team
IMEF	Interim Multinational Emergency Force
IMP	Initial Monitoring Presence
IMT	International Monitoring Team
IMU	International Monitoring Unit
INTERFET	International Force in East Timor
IPF	Indian Peacekeeping Force
IPMT	International Peace Monitoring Team
IPTF	United Nations International Police Task Force
IPU	Integrated Police Unit
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISF	International Security Forces
ISMAC	Israel–Syria Mixed Armistice Commission
JTF	Joint Task Force
KFOR	Kosovo Force
KSOR	Collective Rapid Reaction Force
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam
MAC	Military Armistice Commission
MAES	African Union Electoral and Security Assistance Mission in Comoros
MAPP/OEA	Mission to Support the Peace Process in Columbia

MFO	Multinational Force and Observers
MICIVH	International Civilian Support Mission in Haiti
MICOPAX	Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in Central Africa
MIF	Multinational Interim Force
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MINUCI	United Nations Mission in Cote d'Ivoire
MINUGUA	United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala
MINURCA	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic
MINURCAT	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad
MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MINUSAL	United Nations Mission in El Salvador
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MIPONUH	United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti
MISAB	Inter-African Force in the Central African Republic
MNF	Multinational Forces
MNF-I	Multinational Force in Iraq
MOG	Military Observer Group
MOMEPE	Mission of Military Observers Ecuador–Peru
MONUA	United Nations Observer Mission in Angola
MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MOT	Military Observer Team

MPLA	Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola/Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
MSC	Military Staff Committee
MTC	mission training cells
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NMOG	Neutral Military Observer Group
NNSC	Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission
NTM-I	North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission in Iraq
OAS	Organization of American States
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OAUPKF	Organization of African Unity Peacekeeping Force
ODD	Observer Detachment Damascus
OECS	Organization of East Caribbean States
OGB	Observer Group Beirut
OGE	Observer Group Egypt
OGG	Observer Group Golan
OGG-D	Observer Group Golan-Damascus
OGG-T	Observer Group Golan-Tiberias
OGL	Observer Group Lebanon
OIC	Organization of the Islamic Conference
OLMEE	Organization of African Unity Liaison Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea
OMIB	Organization of African Unity Mission in Burundi
OMIC	Organization of African Unity Observer Mission in the Comoros
OMIK	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Mission in Kosovo
ONUB	United Nations Operation in Burundi
ONUC	United Nations Operation in the Congo
ONUCA	United Nations Observer Group in Central America
ONUMOZ	United Nations Operation in Mozambique



ONUSAL	United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador
ONUVEH	United Nations Observer Group for the Verification of the Elections in Haiti
ONUVEN	United Nations Observer Mission to Verify the Electoral Process in Nicaragua
OOTW	Operations Other Than War
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PAPF	Pan-African Peacekeeping Force
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organization
PMG	Bougainville Peace Monitoring Group
PNG	Papua New Guinea
POLISARIO	Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguila el-Hamra y de Rio de Oro
PRC	Peoples Republic of China
QRF	Quick Reaction Force
RAMSI	Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands
RECAMP	Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix
ROE	Rules of Engagement
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
RRG	Rapid Reaction Group
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
RV	rendezvous point
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAM	Sanctions Assistance Mission
SAPSD	South African Protection Support Detachment
SASF	Symbolic Arab Security Force
SC	Security Council
SFM	Sinai Field Mission
SFOR	Stabilisation Force
SG	secretary-general

SGTM	Standardized Generic Training Modules
SHIRBRIG	Stand-By Forces High-Readiness Brigade
SLMM	Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SPPKF	South Pacific Peacekeeping Force
SWAPO	Southwest African People's Organization
TES	Training and Evaluation Service
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
TIPH	Temporary International Presence in Hebron
TMG	Bougainville Truce Monitoring Group
TNG	Transitional National Government
TONGA	Combined Joint Task Force
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNAMET	United Nations Mission in East Timor
UNAMI	United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq
UNAMIC	United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia
UNAMID	United Nations–African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda
UNAMIS	United Nations Advance Mission in Sudan
UNAMSIL	United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone
UNASOG	United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group
UNAVEM	United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNCCP	United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine

UNCIP	United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan
UNCIVPOL	United Nations Civilian Police
UNCK	United Nations Commission on Korea
UNCRO	United Nations Confidence Restoration Mission in Croatia
UNDOF	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
UNEF	United Nations Emergency Force
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNGCI	United Nations Guards Contingent in Iraq
UNGOMAP	United Nations Good Offices in Afghanistan and Pakistan
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNHUC	United Nations Suboffices and Humanitarian Centers
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNIIMOG	United Nations Iran–Iraq Military Observer Group
UNIKOM	United Nations Iraq–Kuwait Observation Mission
UNIOGBIS	United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea–Bissau
UNIOSIL	United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone
UNIPOM	United Nations India–Pakistan Observation Mission
UNIPSIL	United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone
UNITA	União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola/National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UNITAF	Unified Task Force
UNMEE	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea

UNMIBH	United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
UNMIH	United Nations Mission in Haiti
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMIN	United Nations Mission in Nepal
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNMISET	United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor
UNMIT	United Nations Integrated Mission in Timore-Leste
UNMOGIP	United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNMOP	United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka
UNMOT	United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire
UNOGIL	United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon
UNOMIG	United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia
UNOMIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
UNOMSA	United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa
UNOMSIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
UNOMUR	United Nations Observer Mission Uganda–Rwanda
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNOWA	Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa
UNPA	United Nations Protected Areas
UNPF	United Nations Peace Forces

UNPF-HQ	United Nations Peace Forces Headquarters
UNPOS	United Nations Political Office for Somalia
UNPREDEP	United Nations Preventive Deployment Force
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNPSG	United Nations Police Support Group
UNRCCA	United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia
UNSAS	United Nations Stand-By Arrangements System
UNSCO	Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East
UNSCOB	United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans
UNSCOL	Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon
UNSF	United Nations Security Force
UNSMIH	United Nations Support Mission in Haiti
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAES	United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistance Group
UNTCOK	United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea
UNTEA	United Nations Temporary Executive Authority
UNTMIH	United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization

UNV	United Nations Volunteers
UNYOM	United Nations Yemen Observation Mission
URNG	Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca
USMNF	United States Multinational Forces
USSSM	United States Sinai Support Mission
WEU	West European Union



## Chronology

**1920 January:** League of Nations Plebiscite Forces provide security in Schleswig and then Upper Silesia. **10 January:** League of Nations is established. **July:** League of Nations Plebiscite Forces provide security in Allenstein and Marienwerder. **October:** League of Nations plebiscite Forces provide security in the Klagfurt Basin. **21 November:** Council of the League of Nations proposes the establishment of an international force to oversee the Vilna plebiscite. **16 December:** Lithuania, due to Russian pressure, withdraws its acceptance of the League of Nations Vilna International Force.

**1934 5 December:** Saar International Force is officially proposed at a meeting of the Council of the League of Nations. **22 December:** The majority of the Saar International Force is in place in the Saar.

**1935 13 January:** Saar plebiscite is held. **28 January:** Saar International Force completes its withdrawal from the Saar.

**1945 22 March:** League of Arab States is established. **26 June:** United Nations (UN) Charter is signed.

**1948 20 January:** UN mandates the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP). **21 April:** UN mandates the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). **30 April:** The Organization of American States (OAS) is founded. **21 May:** The Truce Commission requests military personnel to assist in the supervision of the truce between the Israelis and their Arab neighbors.

**1949 11 August:** UN mandates the Mixed Armistice Commissions in the Middle East.

**1950 2 November:** First use of the United for Peace Resolution.



**1951 30 March:** UN votes to retain UNMOGIP following a cease-fire in the Kashmir region.

**1953 27 July:** The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) is mandated.

**1954 1 March:** India, citing a perceived lack of U.S. neutrality, orders the removal of American observers assigned to UNMOGIP.

**1956 5 November:** UN mandates the United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I). **15 November:** The first elements of UNEF I arrive.

**1958 11 June:** UN mandates the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL). **12 June:** UNOGIL begins arriving in Lebanon. **9 December:** UNOGIL departs.

**1959 December:** General P. S. Gyani of India becomes the first officer from a third world state to command a UN peacekeeping operation (UNEF I).

**1960 12 July:** President Joseph Kasavubu and Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba of the Congo request UN military assistance. **14 July:** UN mandates the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC). **15 July:** ONUC begins deploying.

**1961 26–28 April:** Forty-eight ONUC peacekeepers are massacred in Port-Francqui. **10 June:** Kuwait achieves independence. **20 July:** League of Arab States pledges assistance to guarantee Kuwait's independence. **12 August:** The agreement establishing the Arab League Force for Kuwait is signed. **September:** Arab League Force begins deployment to Kuwait. **18 September:** UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld dies in a plane crash during a mission in support of ONUC. **3 October:** Arab League Force completes deployment to Kuwait. **11 November:** Italian peacekeepers assigned to ONUC are massacred at Kindu. **24 November:** UN Resolution 169 permits ONUC to use force in the removal of mercenaries from Katanga in the Congo.

**1962 21 September:** UN mandates the United Nations Security Force (UNSF). **1 October:** West Irian is transferred to the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA). **3 October:** UNSF begins its deployment.

**1963** **20 January:** ONUC peacekeepers enter the Kongolo Pocket. **February:** Arab League Force in Kuwait is withdrawn from Kuwait following the installation of a more moderate government in Iraq. **30 April:** UNSF withdraws. **1 May:** UNTEA transfers West Irian to Indonesia. **11 June:** UN mandates the United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM). **4 July:** UNYOM begins arriving in Yemen.

**1964** **4 March:** UN mandates the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). **13 March:** UNFICYP begins deployment to Cyprus. **30 June:** ONUC departs the Congo. **4 September:** UNYOM withdraws.

**1965** **28 April:** American forces intervene in the Dominican Republic. **14 May:** UN establishes the Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP). **23 May:** Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) begins arriving in the Dominican Republic. **20 September:** UN mandates the United Nations India–Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM). **23 September:** UNIPOM begins deploying.

**1966** **22 March:** UNIPOM is terminated. **21 September:** IAPF completes its withdrawal from the Dominican Republic. **22 October:** DOMREP departs the Dominican Republic.

**1967** **16 May:** Egypt orders UNEF I to withdraw.

**1973** **25 October:** UN mandates the United Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF II).

**1974** **31 May:** UN agrees to deploy the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF). **3 June:** UNDOF officially begins its mission.

**1975** **April:** Lebanese civil war erupts. **15 October:** League of Arab States meets in an extraordinary session to discuss the crisis in Lebanon.

**1976** **1 June:** Syrian armed forces intervene in Lebanon. **8 June:** League of Arab States votes to establish a Symbolic Arab Security Force (ASF) to replace the Syrians in Lebanon. **15 June:** Lebanon announces that it will accept the deployment of the ASF. **21 June:** ASF begins arriving in Beirut. **18 October:** Attendees at the Riyadh Summit Conference announce their desire to transform the ASF into the Arab

Deterrent Force (ADF). **26 October:** League of Arab States votes to transform the ASF into the ADF.

**1977 8 March:** Shaba I begins. **8 April:** Morocco dispatches troops with French assistance to counter rebels during Shaba I. **25 July:** Lebanese, Syrian, and Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) delegates sign the Chtaura Agreement.

**1978 19 March:** UN mandates the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Peacekeepers begin deployment the same day. **13 May:** Shaba II begins. **19–20 May:** French and Belgian soldiers intervene in Zaire during Shaba II. **4 June:** Inter-African Force (FIA) begins arriving to replace the French and Belgians in Zaire during Shaba II. **29 September:** UN mandates the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), a decade prior to its deployment. **15 October:** Beit-eddine Conference is convened.

**1979 March:** Gulf States threaten to terminate funding for the ADF. **7 March:** Nigerian soldiers deploy to Chad under a unilateral peacekeeping mandate. **4 June:** Nigerian soldiers withdraw from Chad. **24 July:** The mandate of UNEF II lapses. **15 November:** Lancaster House Agreement is signed, mandating the Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMF). **27 December:** CMF begins arriving in Zimbabwe.

**1980 6 January:** CMF in Zimbabwe completes the transportation of Patriotic Front armed personnel to assembly points. **18 January:** Congolese forces with the Organization of African Unity Peacekeeping Force in Chad I arrive in N'djamena. **24 January:** Commonwealth Observer Group arrives in Zimbabwe. **30 March:** Congolese forces of the Organization of African Unity Peacekeeping Force in Chad I withdraw.

**1981 15 November:** The Organization of African Unity Peacekeeping Force in Chad II begins arriving in N'djamena.

**1982 30 June:** The Organization of African Unity (OAU) withdraws the Organization of African Unity Peacekeeping Force in Chad II. **10 July:** France announces conditional willingness to deploy soldiers to Beirut. **15 August:** Israel agrees to accept an international peacekeeping force in Beirut to oversee the evacuation of the PLO. **19 August:** Lebanon officially requests soldiers from the United States, France, and Italy to form a peacekeeping operation to monitor the evacuation of

the PLO from Beirut. **25 August:** U.S. Marines arrive in Beirut for the Multinational Forces I (MNF I). **6 September:** Fez Summit Conference convenes. The League of Arab States officially terminates the ADF following a request from Lebanon. **10–12 September:** U.S., French, and Italian soldiers of MNF I depart Beirut. **20 September:** Lebanon asks the United States, France, and Italy to redeploy their peacekeeping forces to Beirut. **27–28 September:** U.S., French, and Italian soldiers of the Multinational Force II (MNF II) deploy to positions around Beirut. **20 December:** Great Britain announces that it will field a contingent with MNF II.

**1983** **1 February:** British forces arrive in Beirut for MNF II. **23 October:** Suicide truck bombers kill 241 U.S. Marines and 58 French soldiers of MNF II. **24 October:** U.S. and Organization of East Caribbean States (OECS) forces intervene in Grenada under an OECS mandate. **22 November:** U.S. forces hand security control on Grenada to the OECS contingents. **15 December:** U.S. forces depart Grenada.

**1984** **20 February:** Italy withdraws most of its soldiers assigned to MNF II. **21–26 February:** U.S. Marines of MNF II redeploy to ships off the coast of Lebanon. **22 March:** British contingent of MNF II is withdrawn from Lebanese waters. **31 March:** France removes its remaining soldiers assigned to MNF II from Beirut.

**1988** **9 August:** UN mandates the United Nations Iran–Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG). **19 August:** UNIIMOG begins deployment. **31 October:** UN mandates the United Nations Good Offices in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP). **10 December:** UN accepts the Nobel Peace Prize for its peacekeepers. **20 December:** UN mandates the United Nations Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I).

**1989** **1 April:** UNTAG begins deployment. **7 November:** UN mandates the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA). **7 December:** ONUCA begins arriving in Central America.

**1990** **15 March:** UNGOMAP is terminated. **21 March:** UNTAG withdraws. **1 May:** European Union (EU) enacts the Amsterdam Treaty. **6–7 August:** The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Standing Mediation Committee recommends the fielding of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia. **24**

**August:** ECOMOG begins arriving in Liberia. **10 October:** UN mandates the United Nations Observer Group for the Verification of the Elections in Haiti (ONUVEH).

**1991 9 April:** UN mandates the United Nations Iraq–Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM). **29 April:** UN mandates the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in the Western Sahara (MINURSO). **6 May:** UNIKOM is declared operational. **19 May:** The United Nations Guards Contingent in Iraq (UNGCI) begins arriving in Iraq. **20 May:** UN mandates the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL). **30 June:** UNAVEM I officially transforms into the United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II). **17 October:** UN mandates the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC). **21 December:** Former Soviet Republics form the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). **31 December:** UN modifies the mandate of ONUSAL to include cease-fire observation.

**1992 31 January:** UN Security Council requests Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to prepare what becomes known as *An Agenda for Peace*. **21 February:** UN mandates the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). **28 February:** UN mandates the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). **15 March:** UNPROFOR begins operations. **15 March:** UNTAC becomes operational and absorbs UNAMIC. **21 April:** UN mandates the United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I). **8 June:** UN votes to expand UNPROFOR and deploy an element in Bosnia and Herzegovina. **15 June:** An advance UNPROFOR team arrives in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Japanese Diet votes to allow Japanese soldiers to participate in UN peacekeeping operations. **19 June:** The West European Union (WEU) develops the Petersberg Declaration. **24 June:** South Ossetia Joint Force established. **1 July:** UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali delivers *An Agenda for Peace*. **August:** OAU deploys the Neutral Military Observer Group I (NMOG I). **17 August:** UN mandates the United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA). **14 September:** UNOSOM I begins arriving in Somalia. **December:** CIS deploys peacekeepers to Tajikistan. **3 December:** UN mandates the Unified Task Force (UNITAF). **9 December:** UNITAF begins arriving in Somalia.

**1993** **4 February:** The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) mandates its mission to Moldova. **5 April:** WEU finalizes an agreement with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania to enforce an embargo on Serbia. **4 May:** UNOSOM I transforms into the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II). **6 May:** UN establishes six safe areas for Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina. **5 June:** Twenty-four Pakistani peacekeepers of UNOSOM II are killed by forces loyal to Mohammed Farah Aidid. **August:** NMOG I is transformed into the Neutral Military Observer Group II (NMOG II). **18 August:** The United Nations Observation Mission in Uganda–Rwanda (UNOMUR) begins deploying. **24 August:** UN mandates the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). **22 September:** UN mandates the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). **23 September:** UN mandates the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). **24 September:** CIS mandates its Peacekeeping Forces in Tajikistan. **3 October:** UNITAF personnel clash with the forces of Aidid in Somalia. **5 October:** UN mandates the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR). **December:** CSCE votes to deploy observers to Nagorno-Karabakh. **1 December:** CSCE mandates its mission to Tajikistan. **7 December:** Eleven OAU members sign the Mechanism for the Prevention, Management, and Settlement of African Disputes. **10 December:** UNAMIR begins arriving in Rwanda.

**1994** **11 January:** North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members reach a compromise on air strikes in support of UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina. **18 February:** CSCE mission to Tajikistan begins operations. **31 March:** The Temporary International Presence Hebron (TIPH) is mandated. **15 April:** CIS mandates the CIS Peacekeeping Forces in Georgia. **25 May:** Presidential Decision Directive Twenty-Five is released. **23 June:** French military intervenes to protect civilians in Rwanda. **31 July:** UN authorizes the use of force to remove the military leaders of Haiti. **8 August:** TIPH departs Palestinian territory. **21 August:** French forces complete their withdrawal from Rwanda and surrounding states. **19 September:** U.S. forces intervene in Haiti. **3 October:** The South Pacific Peacekeeping Force (SPPKF) arrives on Bougainville. **5 October:** Personnel from Barbados, Belize, Jamaica, and Trinidad join U.S. forces in Haiti. **22 October:** SPPKF departs Bougainville. **4 November:** UN announces its intention to withdraw

the peacekeepers of UNOSOM II by the end of March 1995. **21–23 November:** NATO planes conduct their largest air strikes against Serb positions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. **21–30 November:** Serb forces detain several hundred peacekeepers to deter NATO air strikes in Bosnia and Herzegovina. **14 December:** UN mandates the United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT).

**1995 8 February:** UNAVEM II mission ends as the UN mandates the United Nations Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III). **17 February:** The Mission of Military Observers Ecuador–Peru (MOMEPE) is mandated. **31 March:** UN mandates the United Nations Confidence Restoration Mission in Croatia (UNCRO). UN mandates the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP). UN mandates UNPROFOR as a separate operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. **15 April:** UN mandates the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS). **8 December:** Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) mandates the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina. **14 December:** Dayton Accord signed and mandates the Implementation Force (IFOR). **20 December:** IFOR begins operations. **21 December:** UN mandates the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH).

**1996 1 February:** UN mandates the United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP). **18 April:** OSCE mandates the OSCE Mission to Croatia. **28 June:** UN mandates the United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH) to replace UNMIH. **20 December:** IFOR transforms into the Stabilisation Force (SFOR).

**1997 20 January:** UN mandates the United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA). **21 January:** TIPH is remanded. **25 January:** Bangui Agreements mandate The Inter-African Force in the Central African Republic (MISAB). **8 February:** MISAB deploys to the Central African Republic. **28 March:** UN endorses the Multi-national Protection Force (FMP). **15 April:** FMP arrives in Albania. **May:** The Nonaggression and Assistance Accord (ANAD) establishes the Nonaggression and Assistance Accord Peace Force (FPA). **17 May:** MINUGUA departs Guatemala. **25 May:** Nigeria reinforces its troops in Sierra Leone under the ECOMOG banner following a coup in Freetown on this day. **30 June:** UN mandates the United Nations

Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) as UNAVEM III ends its mission. **30 July:** UN mandates the United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH). **12 August:** FMP departs Albania. **30 September:** United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) departs Liberia. **November:** The Bougainville Truce Monitoring Group (TMG) is mandated. **6 November:** OAU mandates the Organization of African Unity Observer Mission in the Comoros Islands I (OMIC I). **28 November:** UN mandates the United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH). **19 December:** UN mandates the United Nations Police Support Group (UNPSG).

**1998** **11 March:** OSCE presence in Albania is remanded to monitor the border between Albania and Kosovo. **27 March:** UN mandates the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA). **30 April:** The Bougainville Peace Monitoring Group (PMG) is mandated and replaces the Bougainville TMG. **13 July:** UN mandates the United Nations Observation Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL). **22 September:** Southern African Development Community (SADC) peacekeepers enter Lesotho. **15 October:** UNPSG's mandate expires.

**1999** **26 February:** MONUA departs Angola. **28 February:** UN-PREDEP mandate not extended due to a Chinese veto. **March:** ECOMOG forces arrive in Guinea-Bissau. **14 May:** SADC forces depart Lesotho. **7 June:** ECOMOG forces depart Guinea-Bissau. **8 June:** OSCE mandates the Kosovo Task Force. **11 June:** UN mandates the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET). **12 June:** The Kosovo Force (KFOR) enters Kosovo. **17 June:** MOMEPEP departs Ecuador and Peru. **1 July:** OSCE mandates the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Mission in Kosovo (OMIK). **6 August:** UN mandates the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). **12 September:** The International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) is mandated. **20 September:** INTERFET arrives in East Timor. **22 October:** UN mandates the United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) to replace UNOMSIL. **25 October:** UN mandates the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET).

**2000** **28 February:** INTERFET transfers military operations to UNTAET. **15 May:** UNMOT ceases operations. **31 June:** UN mandates



the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE). **16 September:** CIS mandates the CIS Collective Peacekeeping Force. **15 October:** International Peace Monitoring Team (IPMT) is mandated. **9 November:** IPMT begins deploying to the Solomon Islands. **22 December:** European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM) becomes the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM).

**2001** **22 June:** The International Monitoring Team (IMT) is mandated. **15 August:** NATO mandates Operation Essential Harvest. **17 August:** Operation Essential Harvest arrives in Macedonia. **26 September:** NATO mandates Operation Amber Fox and terminates Operation Essential Harvest. **27 October:** South African peacekeepers begin arriving in Burundi. **1 November:** The South African Protection Support Detachment (SAPSD) begins its mission. **2 December:** Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) approves a peacekeeping operation for the Central African Republic.

**2002** **January:** OAU deploys the Organization of African Unity Observer Mission in the Comoros Islands II (OMIC II). **1 January:** International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) begins arriving in Afghanistan. **11 January:** OSCE mandates the OSCE Mission to Serbia and Montenegro. **16 January:** OAS mandates the OAS Special Mission for Strengthening Democracy in Haiti. **22 February:** The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) is established. **4 March:** CEN-SAD mandates the CEN-SAD Peacekeeping Operation in the Central African Republic. OAU establishes the Organization of African Unity Observer Mission in the Comoros Islands III (OMIC III). **28 March:** UN mandates the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). **17 May:** UN mandates the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET). **25 June:** IPMT departs the Solomon Islands. **July:** OAU becomes the African Union (AU). **September:** Operation Licorne deploys. **2 October:** The Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States (CEMAC) mandates the Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States Multinational Forces in the Central African Republic (FOMUC). CIS forms the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). **26 October:** ECOWAS mandates the Economic Community of West African States Mission in Cote d'Ivoire (ECOMICI). **15 December:** UNMOP is terminated. **16 December:** Operation Allied Harmony begins operations. **19 December:** CEN-SAD

Peacekeeping Operation in the Central African Republic is replaced by FOMUC.

**2003** **1 January:** European Union Police Mission (EUPM) arrives in Bosnia and Herzegovina and replaces the United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF). **3 January:** Economic Community of West African States Force in Cote d'Ivoire (ECOFORCE) contingents begin arriving. **4 February:** UN endorses ECOMICI and Operation Licorne. **12 February:** AU Cease-Fire Observer Mission in Burundi arrives. **7 March:** ECOFORCE evolves into ECOMICI. **17 March:** UN withdraws and remandates UNIKOM. **April:** The United States begins to assemble the Iraq Stabilisation Force. **1 April:** European Union Military Operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUFOR CONCORDIA) begins operations in Macedonia. **9 April:** First contingents of the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) join South Africans in Burundi. **12 May:** UN requests France and other states to form the Interim Multinational Emergency Force (IMEF). **13 May:** UN mandates the United Nations Mission in Cote d'Ivoire (MINUCI). **23 May:** Poland closes a conference that completes the international pledges for the Iraq Stabilisation Force. **30 May:** UN mandates the EU to form IMEF in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). **16 June:** IMEF arrives in the DRC. **23 June:** MINUCI begins arriving in Cote d'Ivoire. **30 June:** PMG is replaced by the Bougainville Transition Team (BMT). **2 July:** ECOWAS mandates the Economic Community of West African States Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL). **24 July:** The Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) deploys to the Solomon Islands. **1 September:** IMEF begins its departure. **19 September:** UN mandates the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). **29 September:** EU mandates the European Union Police Mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUPOL PROXIMA). **1 October:** UNMIL replaces ECOMIL. **15 December:** EUPOL deploys to Macedonia and replaces EUFOR CONCORDIA. **31 December:** BMT completes its mission.

**2004** **6 February:** OAS mandates the Mission to Support the Peace Process in Columbia (MAPP/OEA). **27 February:** UN mandates the United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI). **29 February:** UN authorizes the fielding of the Multinational Interim Force (MIF). **4 April:** MINUCI and ECOMICI become part of UNOCI. **30 April:** UN

mandates the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). **May:** EU deploys the EU Support to the AU Mission in Darfur. **15 May:** The Multinational Force in Iraq (MNF-I) replaces Combined Joint Task Force 7. **21 May:** UN mandates the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB). **31 May:** AMIB terminates its mission. **1 June:** AMIB becomes part of ONUB. MINUSTAH replaces MIF. **2 June:** AU mandates the AU Observer Mission in Darfur. **8 June:** UN mandates MNF-I and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI). **31 July:** Military component of RAMSI departs Solomon Islands. **October:** IMT deploys. **2 December:** European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR ALTHEA) replaces the UN in Macedonia.

**2005** **24 March:** UN mandates the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). **12 April:** EU mandates the European Union Police Mission in Kinshasa (EUPOL KINSHASA). **2 May:** EU mandates the European Union Advisory Assistance Mission for Security Reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUSEC RD CONGO). **15 August:** EU mandates the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM); Initial Monitoring Presence (IMP) forms. **31 August:** UN mandates the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL). **15 September:** AMM replaces the IMP. **7 October:** EU mandates the European Union Border Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM). **21 November:** EU mandates the European Union Border Assistance Mission at Rafah (EUBAM RAFAH). **30 November:** EUBAM commences operations. **14 December:** The European Union Police Advisory Team (EUPAT) in Macedonia replaces EUPOL PROXIMA. **31 December:** UNAMSIL ends its mission.

**2006** **1 January:** The European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) begins deploying. **21 March:** AU mandates the African Union for Support to the Elections in the Comoros (AMISEC). **18 April:** OSCE mandates the OSCE Mission to Croatia. **25 April:** UN mandates the EU to form the European Union Force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUFOR RD CONGO). **25 May:** UN mandates the ISF in Timor-Leste. **3 June:** OSCE mandates the OSCE Mission to Serbia and the OSCE Mission to Montenegro. **25 August:** UN establishes the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timore-Leste (UNMIT). **25 October:** UN mandates the United Nations

Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB). **9 November:** AU mandates the African Union Special Task Force (AUSTF). **18 November:** Combined Joint Task Force (Tonga) deploys. **30 November:** EUFOR RD CONGO ends its mission. **2 December:** Combined Joint Task Force (Tonga) begins withdrawing. **15 December:** AMM completes its mission. **31 December:** ONUB terminates its mission.

**2007** **23 January:** UN mandates the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN). **16 February:** UN mandates the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL). **21 February:** AU mandates the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). **9 May:** AU mandates the African Union Electoral Assistance and Security Mission in Comoros (MAES). **June:** EUPOL KINSHASA departs. **12 June:** EU mandates the European Union Advisory Assistance Mission for Security Reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUPOL RD CONGO). **15 June:** EU fields EUPOL Afghanistan. **31 July:** UN mandates the United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). **25 September:** UN mandates the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) and a predecessor operation that the EU deploys as the European Union Force Chad/Central African Republic (EUFOR TCHAD/RCA). **31 December:** UNAMID assumes the mission of the African Union Mission in Sudan.

**2008** **16 January:** SLMM is terminated. **25 March:** MAES invades Anjouan in the Comoros Islands. **2 June:** UN mandates the EU to form the European Union Naval Force Somalia (EUNAVFOR SOMALIA). **12 July:** Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in Central Africa (MICOPAX) replaces FOMUC. **4 August:** UN mandates the United Nations Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL). **15 September:** EU mandates EUMM in Georgia. **30 September:** UNIPSIL replaces UNIOSIL.

**2009** **14 January:** MINURCAT deploys. **9 March:** MINURCAT assumes the mission of EUFOR TCHAD/RCA. **31 December:** AUSTF concludes its mission. MNF-I ends its mission.

**2010** **1 January:** UN mandates the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) and the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA). BINUCA replaces the United Nations Peacebuilding Support

Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA). **12 January:** A devastating earthquake strikes Haiti, resulting in a tremendous loss of life, including the MINUSTAH head of mission. **25 January:** EU mandates the European Training Mission Somalia (EUTM SOMALIA). **1 July:** MONUC transforms into the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO).

# Introduction

As long as there have been wars, there have been peace processes to settle them. In the 12th century BC, the Egyptians and Hittites concluded one of the earliest peace treaties still in existence. The agreement ended the war between the two states and established conditions for cooperation in security issues. Before finalizing this treaty, the Egyptians and Hittites had to undergo a peace process that guided them from conflict to conflict management to conflict resolution. Modern conflicts require the same process to guide the belligerents from the battle field to mutual cooperation. This is certainly not a simple process and often results in conflict management without true conflict resolution. The brokering of a peace process requires various support methods to satisfy the security requirements of the belligerents undergoing the transition from conflict to conflict resolution, protect and assist noncombatants, and reestablish conditions for the rule of law.

Peacekeeping emerged as one of these tools to support the peace process between belligerents. Peacekeeping as understood as a modern concept emerged under the League of Nations after World War I. The league fielded many international military operations that were essentially deployments by the victorious Allied powers to oversee local plebiscites; however, two operations assumed a greater neutral international character. These were the planned but never deployed 1920 Vilna International Force and the 1935 Saar International Force. The United Nations (UN) fielded its first peacekeeping operation, the United Nations Military Observer Group in Indian and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), in 1948. The UN followed UNMOGIP with other observer groups and then the organization's first large interposition operation, the United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I), in 1956. As time progressed, the UN deployed peacekeeping operations at an ever-increasing frequency. In 1961, the League of Arab States fielded the first regional

peacekeeping operation with its Arab League Force in Kuwait. By 2010, regional and subregional organizations were annually mandating more peacekeeping operations than the UN by a 2 to 1 ratio. Other regional and subregional organizations that have fielded peacekeeping missions include the African Union (AU), Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States (CEMAC), Economic Community of Central African States (CEEAC), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Organization of African Unity (OAU), Organization of American States (OAS), and Southern African Development Community (SADC).

Peacekeeping operations have evolved to become essential elements in most international attempts to guide belligerents through a peace process; however, they are frequently unsuccessful, costly, politically divisive, and dangerous. Peacekeeping operations can be great examples of the international community cooperating to help settle a crisis. Many missions have been credited with saving noncombatant lives, ensuring the delivery of humanitarian supplies, escorting refugee populations, and providing the conditions and assistance that have contributed to conflict management in the peace process. Yet they can also be extensions of state foreign policy as countries manipulate them for their own gains. International organizations have become deadlocked as member states argued the merits of mandating operations and refused to fund them once deployed. Peacekeepers have been accused of taking sides in conflicts and operating their own illegal smuggling operations, brothels, and black market schemes. More than 2,700 UN peacekeepers have died in the line of duty since 1948, and this figure does not include operations mandated by other international organizations. Despite any problems, the world relies on them more heavily for their merits each decade to support conflict management.

What is peacekeeping and how can we categorize and compare these operations? These are not simple questions as one might think. Like the definitions for “power” or “terrorism,” every scholar, international organization, national government, and international institute seems to have a separate definition for peacekeeping. Fortunately, the differences between the definitions are usually minor. How can we

categorize and compare peacekeeping missions once we define them? Should researchers compare them by generational periods, mandating organizations, or functions? While some might argue vehemently for one over the other, it is a matter of choice based on the requirements of the project. First, it is important to compare and define the various terms associated with the subject.

## DEFINITIONS

What is peacekeeping? When researching peacekeeping operations, one should take the time to consider this question. There have been a multitude of military operations mandated by international organizations since 1945. Most are classified by the organizations as “peacekeeping,” a few are referred to as “collective security” or “peace enforcement,” and several seem to float between these extremes. Politics is often a factor in how a country or international organization labels an international mission. For example, how does one properly classify the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), led by the United States and mandated by the UN? Is it “peacekeeping” or what some refer to as “peace enforcement”? Few seem willing to accept the definitions offered by others. Due to the increasing complications associated with defining these missions, the term “peace operations” has evolved as an expression to cover all multinational and unilateral deployments associated with a peace process; however, “peacekeeping” is included in the title of this book due to its nearly universal recognition as a term that describes operations fielded in support of a peace process. *Historical Dictionary of Multinational Peacekeeping* utilizes a broad interpretation of “peacekeeping” to cover the many multinational operations that have been mandated since 1920.

It is not the purpose of this introduction to open a debate on the meaning of “peacekeeping” but rather to present a review of terminology and offer an understanding why various multinational operations are included in this book. The terminology within this field is still changing as new types of missions are added. To examine terminology, it is helpful to follow a structure, and the U.S. military has what is perhaps the most elaborate system for defining missions deployed for “other than war” scenarios.



## Stability Operations

Many scholars speak of “peace operations” as the highest category of military missions deployed in support of a peace process; however, the U.S. military considers “peace operations” as a subcategory of “stability operations.” The Department of Defense established the term “stability operations” and encoded it in several publications, including Department of the Army Field Manual 3-07 *Stability Operations and Support Operations* (February 2003), which essentially replaced Army Field Manual 100-23 *Peace Operations* (December 1994) and illustrates the changing ideas in the post–Somalia and post–Rwanda mind-set of the military. The 2003 Field Manual presented the U.S. Army’s concepts for describing operations in support of a peace process until updated in October 2008 with Department of the Army Field Manual 3-07 *Stability Operations*. This current document defines stability operations as an “overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.” The 2003 document outlines a structure that placed “stability operations” at the pinnacle of the field. There were six subcategories of stability operations, including peace operations, security assistance, humanitarian and civic assistance, counter drug operations, antiterrorism operations, and noncombatant evacuation operations.

The 2008 Field Manual takes a different approach to defining stability operations and lists support for a partner in peacetime military engagements, humanitarian-based interventions, peace operations, support for legitimate host-state governments during irregular warfare, major combat operations to establish conditions that facilitate post-conflict activities, and support in post-conflict environment following the general cessation of organized hostilities. One can clearly see the impact of post–2003 U.S. military operations in Iraq for helping redefine stability operations. Though there have been changes, peace operations remains a constant type of stability operation, as envisioned by the U.S. military.

## Peace Operations

Department of the Army Field Manual 3-07 *Stability Operations* (October 2008) presents the U.S. Army’s current structure for describ-

ing operations. Besides the title change from the 2003 document, the manual mentions peacekeeping and peace operations only as passing comments related to the UN. In the five-year interval between the two editions of Field Manual 3-07, the concepts of peace operations and peacekeeping have been shifted to the Joint (all service) level and are now outlined in United States Department of Defense Joint Publication 3-07.3 *Peace Operations* (October 2007). This document defines peace operations as a “broad term that encompasses multiagency and multinational crisis response and limited contingency operations involving all instruments of national power with military missions to contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and facilitate the transition to legitimate governance. Peace operations include peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peacemaking, peace building, and conflict prevention efforts.” Essentially, all operations listed in the dictionary section of this book fall under this peace operations category. Thus, the term “peace operations” is a very useful umbrella when comparing the different types of operations often referred to as peacekeeping in a generic sense.

## Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping is the most common term associated with the types of missions reviewed in this book. Peacekeeping is a broad term with a definition that has evolved over the years. It should be noted that peacekeeping is not mentioned in the charter of the UN but was interpreted as a function of the organization under Chapter Six. The term itself evolved in the 1950s to describe military forces mandated, normally by the UN, and deployed to perform duties related to the peace process between countries or within a single country. The name became quite popular in the academic literature beginning in the early 1960s to discuss such missions as the United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I) and the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC); however, many early scholars did not utilize the term when referring to such smaller observation missions as the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO).

United States Department of Defense Joint Publication 3-07.3 *Peace Operations* (October 2007) defines peacekeeping as “military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute,

designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease-fire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.” For clarity, this book utilizes this definition with an important caveat. It should be noted that there have been many small operations consisting of nonmilitary personnel that have and are performing missions, such as cease-fire observation, once delegated to strictly military personnel. An academic review of peacekeeping should not exclude these operations simply because they lack military personnel. The mandated mission, rather, whether the personnel wear or do not wear military uniforms, is the essential point.

UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and Peacekeeping* (1992), defined peacekeeping as the “deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well.” The UN definition highlights an important similarity to the one developed by the United States. Both definitions acknowledge that a peacekeeping mission is deployed into a situation where all of the “concerned” or “major” parties to the conflict accept the introduction and role of the international mission.

The current UN definition of peacekeeping, as outlined in *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines* of 2008, reads that it is an “action undertaken to preserve peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers.” It is interesting to note that the UN has removed language in the definition reference acceptance by the belligerents but does indicate there should be some type of cease-fire or cessation of hostilities in place prior to deployment.

Despite all of the definition changes and new categories of missions, “peacekeeping” as a term has endured as a generic description for missions related to the peace process in a country or between countries. The utilization of the term “peacekeeping” is similar to many commercial product categories that have generic names taken from a single product (in American culture, think of facial tissues and cola drinks that are often described as a generic term borrowed from one commercial item in the product line regardless of the actual product). Thus, many tend to

refer to all operations in support of a peace process as “peacekeeping,” and this term is nearly universally recognized.

The 1993 U.S. Department of Defense definition for “peacekeeping,” as listed in the *Report of the Bottom-Up Review*, included two subcategories that have been eliminated from more recent U.S. military definitions of the term but can be useful for understanding the field and categorizing operations. The subcategories separated missions that were accepted by the belligerents and those that were not welcomed by all of the belligerents and were granted the right to apply limited force to compel compliance to the peace process. The first was known as “traditional peacekeeping.” The official 1993 Department of Defense definition of “traditional peacekeeping” was the “Deployment of a UN, regional organization, or coalition presence in the field with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving UN, regional organization, or coalition military forces, and/or police and civilians. Noncombat military operations (exclusive of self-defense) that are undertaken by outside forces with the consent of all major belligerent parties, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce agreement in support of diplomatic efforts to reach a political settlement to the dispute.” Traditional peacekeeping operations are what some refer to as Chapter Six Peacekeeping and Chapter Six-and-a-Half Peacekeeping missions where belligerents have granted their consent to the deployment. The difference between the two involves the rules of engagement. Chapter Six-and-a-Half Peacekeeping operations have the authorization to utilize limited force in support of the mission or protection of civilians, while Chapter Six Peacekeeping missions are not permitted to use force, except in self-defense. The Department of Defense also correctly indicated that peacekeeping is not an attempt to settle a dispute. Peacekeeping is a tool to assist a separate negotiation process normally undertaken by the same international organization that mandated the neutral military operation.

The second subcategory in the 1993 document is “aggravated peacekeeping.” The Department of Defense defined the term as “Military operations undertaken with the nominal consent of all major belligerent parties, but which are complicated by subsequent intransigence of one or more of the belligerents, poor command and control of belligerent forces, or conditions of outlawry, banditry, or anarchy. In such

conditions, peacekeeping forces are normally authorized to use force in self-defense, and in defense of the missions they are assigned, which may include monitoring and facilitating implementation of an existing truce agreement in support of diplomatic efforts to reach a political settlement, or supporting or safeguarding humanitarian relief efforts.” “Aggravated peacekeeping” operations are Chapter Six-and-a-Half and some limited Chapter Seven peace enforcement missions where belligerent consent has eroded, rather than most Chapter Seven peace enforcement missions mandated specifically to force compliance on belligerents, such as the Korean War or Persian Gulf War. For example, the UN mandated the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) operations under Chapter Seven of the organization’s charter; however, the UN intended to provide UNOSOM II with the clear rules of engagement to protect civilians and defend its mission rather than engage a particular clan in combat to force its compliance with the ongoing peace process. Even though UNOSOM II and the Allied forces in the Persian Gulf War both operated under a Chapter Seven mandate, it’s clear they had very different types of missions. The old 1993 Department of Defense “aggravated peacekeeping” subcategory provided a means to distinguish between these very different types of Chapter Seven mandated operations. Department of the Army Field Manual 3-07 *Stability Operations and Support Operations* (October 2008) eliminated “traditional peacekeeping” and “aggravated peacekeeping” as terms to help understand different types of peacekeeping operations.

## **Peace Enforcement**

The U.S. Department of Defense views peace enforcement as one of six categories of peace operations. Department of Defense Joint Publication 3-07.3 *Peace Operations* (October 2007) defines peace enforcement as the “application of military force, or threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order.” The armed personnel of this type of operation would be allowed to go beyond the normal neutral stance of other peacekeepers and have permission to use force to restore a cease-fire or end a breach of the peace. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali of the UN called for the establishment of this category of operations in his *An Agenda for*

*Peace*. The definition of peace enforcement has evolved over the years. For example, the Department of Defense's October 1993 *Report of the Bottom-Up Review* defines peace enforcement as a "military intervention to compel compliance with international sanctions or resolutions designed to maintain or restore international peace and security." It is interesting to note that Department of the Army Field Manual 3-07 *Stability Operations* (October 2008) presents the U.S. Army's current structure for describing operations. Besides the title change from the 2003 document, the manual mentions peacekeeping and peace operations only as passing comments related to the UN. "Peace enforcement" as a term is not in the 2008 Army Field Manual. In the five-year interval between the two editions of Field Manual 3-07, the concepts of peace operations and peacekeeping have been shifted to the Joint (all service) level and are now outlined in Department of Defense Joint Publication 3-07.3 *Peace Operations* (October 2007).

### **Preventive Deployment**

UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali called for the establishment of this type of operation in his *An Agenda for Peace*. In theory, the fielding of this rapid deployment force would serve as a barrier and deter aggression and would deploy before a conflict erupted within a state. For this concept to be fully implemented by the UN, the global body would need to establish a standing army. The UN and NATO have deployed types of preventive deployment operations in Macedonia to ensure conflict did not spillover into the country. The United Nations Preventive Deployment Force is one example.

## **GENERATIONAL CATEGORIES**

Once defined, how can researchers categorize peacekeeping operations? One useful but increasingly outdated method is to utilize generational periods. John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra, in "Second Generation Multinational Operations" (1992) examine peacekeeping operations in terms of "first" and "second" generational missions. First Generation missions usually observed cease-fires between belligerents and were fielded sometime between 1956 and 1989. Second Generation

operations emerged in 1989 and carried more elaborate mandates, including election oversight, refugee assistance, disarmament, and other humanitarian tasks. If adopted as a means to categorize peacekeeping operations, this author would argue that a Third Generation of missions emerged after 1995, as the crises in Somalia, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia actually ended the optimistic Second Generation. The Third Generation represents a shift to Third World–dominated missions that are generally more cautiously deployed, at least by the UN. One could then argue that several trends are indicators of this new generation. These trends include fielding regional operations and then replacing them with UN missions manned by the same troops (for example, the Economic Community of West African States Mission in Côte D’Ivoire [ECOMICI] being replaced by the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire [UNOCI]); applying phased peacekeeper deployments into conflicts with questionable cease-fires (for example, the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo [MONUC]); and introducing hybrid operations jointly planned and mandated by at least two international organizations (for example, the United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur [UNAMID]).

Dividing peacekeeping missions into “first,” “second,” and even “third” generations does not solve every problem in the attempt to categorize peacekeeping operations, as Mackinlay and Chopra indicate. How should one distinguish between the First Generation operations UNEF I and the UNMOGIP? UNEF I was a large mission that physically separated Egypt and Israel through the establishment of a peacekeeper-manned neutral zone. UNMOGIP is a much smaller operation with a mission simply to observe and report violations of the cease-fire in the Kashmir region between India and Pakistan.

## FUNCTION

Peacekeeping operations can also be categorized by their functions. Why were they mandated? Mackinlay and Chopra offer nine categories of peacekeeping operations in their study, and other scholars apply their own multiple categories. While any of these can be useful, they can also be cumbersome as someone attempts to fit a peacekeeping mission

into one of nine or more diverse categories. For ease in classification attempts, this author prefers to utilize three simplified categories: “observation,” “interposition,” and “law and order.”

## **Observation**

Observation missions are mandated to oversee cease-fires between belligerents. The peacekeepers normally operate from both sides of the cease-fire line but have been known to only work from one side. Although they may patrol a neutral zone, the peacekeepers are not stationed within the area as a barrier between the opponents. UNMOGIP is a classic example of an observation force.

## **Interposition**

Barrier or interposition missions are peacekeeping operations mandated to physically enter a neutral zone between belligerents to form a “barrier” between them. One opponent can not attack the other without involving the neutral peacekeepers, thus helping to keep the peace while peace negotiations continue. UNEF I, the United Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF II), the United Nations Disengagement Observation Force (UNDOF), and the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) operations are classic interposition missions. Interposition operations have become less common as peacekeeping has shifted from interstate to intrastate conflict.

## **Law and Order**

Law and order operations include more elaborate mandates asking the peacekeepers to go beyond observing a cease-fire or stationing themselves between armed opponents. These missions perform a variety of functions, such as election oversight, disarmament, human rights monitoring, national military and police training, refugee and humanitarian assistance, and even monitoring the peacekeeping operations of other international organizations. The United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) is a classic example of a law and order operation. Law and order operations are probably the most common type fielded in recent years.



Some peacekeeping operations do not fit clearly into one of the three categories and seem to be mandated to function in multiple categories. For example, the placement of the ONUC (or MONUC) into a single category can be challenging. In such cases, there are alternative ways to compare such missions.

## MANDATING ORGANIZATION

Another method for categorizing peacekeeping operations is by comparing their mandating organizations. From where does the peacekeeping operation derive its legal basis for intervening in or between sovereign countries? The mandate provides this international legal authorization for military intervention in a conflict. Most peacekeeping operations have been mandated by the UN or some regional or subregional international organization; however, several internationally recognized peacekeeping missions have not been mandated by international organizations. A recent trend is for the UN to mandate the mission and permit a regional international organization to actually field it.

### League of Nations

The League of Nations ultimately failed in its goal to preserve the peace following World War I; however, the organization did mandate and field several international military operations to oversee plebiscites in areas claimed by more than one state after the war. Although the majority of these operations were manned exclusively by the victorious Allied powers that controlled the league, two missions reflected a greater degree of neutrality. The first, the Vilna International Force, was mandated and planned in 1920 but never fielded due to a direct threat of Russia, which feared having Allied troops on its western border. One must remember that the Allied powers intervened in Russia during the late stages of the war and did not leave until 1920 (and afterward, in the case of the Japanese). In 1935, the league mandated and fielded the Saar International Force. Although the Saar International Force is frequently not included in lists of multinational peacekeeping operations, it should be pointed out that its mandated mission would mirror many UN operations in recent post-conflict areas.

## United Nations

The UN has fielded more peacekeeping operations than all of the other international organizations combined, despite the fact that the body prefers regional and subregional organizations to solve crises before they are referred to the global organization. As such, the world body tends to receive the vast majority of attention by researchers in the field of peacekeeping. In fact, when people think of “peacekeeping” they probably automatically equate the term with the UN. It should be noted that since 2000, new regionally and subregionally mandated peacekeeping operations have outpaced new UN missions by a 2 to 1 ratio.

## Regional Organizations

Regional international organizations generally include members from a single continent or perhaps two continents. Examples of regional international organizations include the EU; the OAU and its successor, the AU; the OAS; the League of Arab States; and NATO. Several regional international organizations have fielded peacekeeping operations or have assisted the operations of other organizations. Only one regional peacekeeping operation, the League of Arab States Arab League Force in Kuwait, was fielded to separate two belligerent states in a classic barrier or interposition mission. All of the other regional operations deployed into civil war situations.

The League of Arab States deployed the first true regional peacekeeping operation after World War II with its Arab League Force in Kuwait in 1961. This was followed the next decade by the Symbolic Arab Security Force (ASF)/Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) in Lebanon. The OAU bowed to pressure and fielded two unsuccessful peacekeeping operations in Chad between 1980 and 1982. The next decade witnessed more successful small OAU observation missions. The AU has been more successful than the OAU at fielding peacekeeping operations, including the first African-mandated peace enforcement mission known as the African Union Electoral Assistance and Security Mission in Comoros (MAES). The EU, NATO, and the OSCE have turned their attention to European peacekeeping in recent years following the end of the Cold War. The CIS and OAS have deployed military operations

that many have declared to be peacekeeping; however, these operations tended to be dominated politically and militarily by a single state. The CIS has deployed two operations under its banner, each dominated by Russian political and military strategy. The OAS fielded the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) in the Dominican Republic. Although mandated by the OAS, the IAPF was also dominated by the United States. More recent smaller OAS operations such as the Mission to Support the Peace Process in Columbia are more Latin American in character and manpower composition.

As of the second edition of this book, there had been only one area noticeably without a regional international organization mandating peacekeeping operations—Asia. This area lacks a single regional-level international organization; however, the largest comprehensive international organization in Asia, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), has cautiously moved forward in this field since 2005 with the Aceh Monitoring Mission in cooperation with the EU. It should be noted that ASEAN is probably better described as a subregional rather than regional organization. It is included in this section since it is the largest comprehensive Asian international organization and does cooperate with other Asian states through the ASEAN Regional Forum and ASEAN Plus Three Forum.

### **Subregional Organizations**

Africa is the center of subregional international organization peacekeeping activities. A major reason for this was the reluctance of the regional organization, the OAU, to get involved in large peacekeeping operations following the failure of its multinational missions in Chad between 1980 and 1982. ECOWAS has deployed three of its Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) peacekeeping operations in West Africa; however, two of these missions (Liberia and Sierra Leone) are often argued to be more in line with peace enforcement missions than true peacekeeping. The SADC mandated a South African–proposed peace operation in Lesotho. Many other African subregional international organizations have added peacekeeping or peace support protocols to their charters; however, most have not fielded peacekeeping operations yet. African subregional organizations that have mandated their first peacekeeping operations

since the second edition of this book include the Community of Sahel-Saharan States, Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States, Economic Community of Central African States, and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (an operation mandated but never deployed).

The Organization of East Caribbean States (OECS) represents small island states primarily located in the eastern Caribbean. The OECS mandated the invasion of Grenada as a multinational peacekeeping mission, although it was actually overtly dominated by the United States, which is not a member of the organization.

### **State-Led Coalitions**

Although most peacekeeping missions are mandated by international organizations, a number of multinational operations have been state-led coalitions of willing participants that are endorsed by the UN. The French intervention in Rwanda is a classic example of such missions. Western states displayed reluctance at deploying contingents with a remandated United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) after the massacres in Rwanda. In response, France offered to field a military force to safeguard refugee camps in the country. While not mandated by the UN, the French operation received an official endorsement by the UN Security Council, giving the mission international legitimacy. France also performed a lead state function with its intervention in the Central African Republic as well as Operation Licorne in Côté d'Ivoire. The U.S.-led UNITAF in Somalia was another coalition of the willing, as was the Australian-led mission to assist the UN in East Timor.

### **International Treaties**

There are a small number of peacekeeping operations not mandated by international organizations nor formed as state-led coalitions under a UN endorsement. The Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai looks and acts like a traditional interposition peacekeeping mission; however, MFO is not mandated by an international organization but is the child of the United States. The basic mandate of the MFO was written into the Camp David peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. The

Australian and New Zealand–led peacekeeping operations in the South Pacific (Bougainville and Guadalcanal) were mandated by treaties negotiated with the conflict belligerents. Thus, each organization derives its international legitimacy from multilateral treaties.

### **Bilateral Arrangements**

There is one final, unique, category of operations. These were mandated by bilateral agreements between the contingent providing states and the host country. Multinational Force I (MNF I) and Multinational Force II (MNF II) fit into this category. For example, MNF II consisted of contingents from the United States, France, Great Britain, and Italy. Each contingent-providing state concluded a bilateral agreement with the Lebanese government permitting its troops to enter the country and occupy a specific zone or location. Although the four states nominally formed a single operation, legally they operated under bilateral agreements. The 2006 Combined Joint Task Force (Tonga) is a recent example of an operation mandated by a bilateral agreement between the troops contributing states and the host country.

## **PEACEKEEPING TRENDS**

Many peacekeeping trends can be identified between 1948 and 2010. Several are listed here for review. This section does not present a complete collection of trends but rather a representative selection to help develop an understanding of multinational peacekeeping operations.

### **Change in Contingent Providers**

Each generation of UN peacekeeping has been accompanied by a change in the main contingent providers. First Generation operations were dominated by the Nordic states (Norway, Sweden, and Denmark), South Asian countries (India, Pakistan, and later Bangladesh), and Western countries perceived as being neutral in most international relations (Ireland and Canada). The Cold War dominated this period of UN peacekeeping history. The Permanent Five (P5) members of the Security Council avoided participation in peacekeeping operations with

limited exceptions, including the United Kingdom in the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), France in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), and the United States in the UNTSO. Involvement of P5 states could taint a perception of neutrality for the peacekeeping operation.

The thawing of the Cold War led to the introduction of the P5 members of the Security Council to UN peacekeeping during the Second Generation. In fact, the P5 states of France, Great Britain, and the United States represented three of the top seven contingent providers to UN operations toward the end of the Second Generation. Russia provided only limited resources to UN peacekeeping after 1989 and concentrated its efforts within the CIS and bilateral peacekeeping among the states of the former Soviet Union. The People's Republic of China emerged as a major participant in UN operations since the second edition of this book and as of 2010 leads the other P5 countries, while ranking 14th compared to all UN members.

The transformation of UN peacekeeping to a Third Generation included another shift in participants. The P5 states turned their focus to non-UN operations, especially those mandated by the EU and NATO. The largest participants in UN Third Generation operations continue to be South Asian and African states. The six largest contributors to UN operations are from these two regions. The following tables illustrate the transition of contingent providers from the Second Generation to Third Generation UN peacekeeping operations (see tables I.1, I.2, and I.3).

**Table I.1. December 1993 (Second Generation)**

<i>Country</i>	<i>Number of Peacekeepers Provided to the UN</i>
France	6,370
India	5,904
Pakistan	5,089
Bangladesh	3,451
Italy	3,434
Great Britain	2,765
United States	2,622
Egypt	2,200
Canada	2,088
Nepal	1,992

**Table I.2. April 2003 (Third Generation)**

<i>Country</i>	<i>Number of Peacekeepers Provided to the UN</i>
Pakistan	4,245
Nigeria	3,316
India	2,735
Bangladesh	2,658
Ghana	2,060
Kenya	1,806
Uruguay	1,690
Jordan	1,611
Ukraine	1,611
Nepal	921

**Table I.3. April 2010 (Third Generation)**

<i>Country</i>	<i>Number of Peacekeepers Provided to the UN</i>
Bangladesh	10,852
Pakistan	10,733
India	8,783
Nigeria	5,837
Egypt	5,258
Nepal	5,186
Ghana	3,911
Jordan	3,769
Rwanda	3,663
Uruguay	2,516

(Source: United Nations, April 2010)

## **Increase in the Number of Peacekeeping Operations**

The number of peacekeeping operations has grown at a tremendous rate since 1988. Between 1948 and 1988, the UN mandated 15 peacekeeping operations (average of 1 mission every 3 years). This number increased to 39 new missions between 1989 and 2002 (an average of 3 missions every year). The end of the Cold War is one reason for the growth of peacekeeping operations since 1988. Missions can now be fielded in areas that were considered “off limits” to outside intervention during the Cold War. For example, during the early years of the Angolan civil war, Mozambican civil war, and Ethiopian–Somali conflict,

the superpowers were more concerned with assisting their proxies and protégés than bringing true peace, assisted by a peacekeeping operation, to the region. Nearly every regional and subregional peacekeeping operation has been fielded after 1988 for similar reasons. This trend has continued since the second edition of this book in 2002. Between December 2001 and January 2010, there have been at least 81 new missions that can be classified as peacekeeping or peace operations. This is an average of approximately eight new operations annually compared to approximately three new operations annually between 1989 and 2002.

### **Increase in the Number of Participants in Each Peacekeeping Operation**

Before 1989, most UN peacekeeping operations included contingents from a small number of states. For example, the initial fielding of UNEF I consisted of personnel from 11 states, the UNFICYP initially included peacekeepers from 10 countries, and the United Nations India–Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM) was formed with peacekeepers dispatched by 10 members. Most Second Generation and Third Generation missions have many more contingents, although the individual contingents are often smaller in size. UNTAG consisted of peacekeepers from 51 countries, the United Nations Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III) included personnel from 39 states, the UNOSOM II numbered 35 UN member states within its ranks, and UNAMID boasts personnel from 48 countries.

### **Shift to Regional and Subregional Organizations**

Originally, the UN mandated more peacekeeping operations than all other international organizations combined; however, there has been a noticeable increase in regional and subregional missions with UN encouragement. If one counts the OECS-mandated military intervention in Grenada and the OAS-mandated military intervention in the Dominican Republic, there were six peacekeeping operations mandated by regional or subregional international organizations during the 40-year period between 1948 and 1988. In the 11-year period between 1989 and 2002, there were a minimum of seven peacekeeping missions mandated by this group of organizations. This trend exploded between the second



and third editions of this book. Between December 2001 and January 2002, there have been 45 new regional or subregional peacekeeping missions and 23 new UN operations. Thus, since the end of 2001, new regional and subregional operations have outpaced new UN missions by a 2 to 1 ratio.

### **Shift from Interstate to Intrastate Conflict**

During the First Generation of UN peacekeeping, the organization tended to deploy operations in support of attempts to resolve interstate conflict (wars between two or more sovereign states). This trend changed as the Second Generation of peacekeeping emerged in 1989. Intrastate conflicts (war/rebellion within a single sovereign state) became the main focus of peacekeeping missions. This new trend continued into the Third Generation. During the First Generation (1948–1988), the UN fielded peacekeeping operations after 10 interstate conflicts and five intrastate conflicts. The Second Generation and Third Generation (1989–2002) have witnessed three UN peacekeeping operations after interstate conflicts and 39 missions during intrastate conflicts. One reason for this reversal is an increase in global intrastate conflict. A second and related reason results from the end of the Cold War. This trend continued between 2002 and 2010. Of the 23 new UN peacekeeping-related operations fielded during this period, all involved intrastate conflict.

### **Integrated Peacekeeping Units**

Many states have shown reluctance in recent years to become involved in peacekeeping operations due to the problems experienced in Rwanda, Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, and Sierra Leone. A solution has been to field smaller units that are integrated with those of other countries to form composite formations. The Nordic states led the way with their innovative integrated units dating back to the First Generation of UN peacekeeping. The Czech Republic and Slovakia have fielded a unit comprising a contingent from each state. The Irish integrated their company in the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) with the Netherlands. Western states offering to participate in UN peacekeeping operations but not wanting to field battalion-sized

units have been urged to combine their contingents. This trend is likely to continue and become more popular as more states opt to provide small units for peacekeeping operations.

### **Phased Deployments**

Reaction to the failure of belligerents to adhere to cease-fires in Somalia, Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, and Sierra Leone led to the development of a new deployment strategy for UN peacekeeping operations in the Third Generation. Instead of fielding all of the assigned contingents at the same time, the UN now utilizes a phased deployment schedule in many of its mandates. The belligerents have to demonstrate their seriousness in accepting the cease-fire and negotiation requirements (such as disarmament or troop withdrawals) throughout a series of stages. As the belligerents demonstrate their commitment to the peace process, UN peacekeepers deploy to help stabilize the situation. For example, the deployment of peacekeepers with the UNMEE and MONUC was based on three phases. UNMEE began with UN liaisons in each belligerent's capital. As the belligerents in each conflict demonstrated serious commitment to the peace process, the UN increased the number of peacekeepers and provided them with more comprehensive mandates.

### **Increase in Single State-Led Coalitions**

There has been a small but noticeable increase in single state-led coalitions with the endorsement of international organizations in lieu of peacekeeping operations mandated by the same organizations. This occurs when the member states of the organization demonstrate reluctance to mandate and field a peacekeeping operation into a potentially dangerous conflict. However, a single member may have particular interests in the conflict and be willing to militarily intervene. The international organization then endorses the operation, providing it with international legitimacy. What would have once been seen as a unilateral military intervention then becomes an internationally sanctioned peace operation. France has launched such operations in Rwanda, the Central African Republic, and Côté d'Ivoire; the United States in Somalia; Australia in East Timor; Great Britain in Sierra Leone; and South Africa in Burundi.

## NOTABLE EVENTS IN PEACEKEEPING SINCE THE SECOND EDITION

### Introduction of the EU to Peacekeeping

The EU launched its first peacekeeping operation, the European Union Force Concordia, in 2003 following delays within the organization. Since 2003, the EU has emerged as the most active regional or subregional organization in terms of mandating peacekeeping operations. Between 2003 and 2010, the EU deployed 18 operations that fall into the category of peacekeeping as defined by this book.

### NATO and EU “Out of Area” Operations

After years of debating, NATO and the EU fielded peacekeeping operations outside of the European continent. While NATO technically mandated the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 2001, the operation is partially in response to the organization’s declaration that the United States had been attacked on 11 September 2001, and should be assisted under the mutual defense provisions of the organization treaty. However, NATO deployed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission in Iraq in 2004 to support the UN-mandated efforts to help rebuild the military and police forces of Iraq following the U.S. invasion of 2003.

The EU deployed its first “out of area” operation in 2003 with the French-led Interim Multinational Emergency Force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This was followed in 2005 with the European Union Border Assistance Mission at Rafah (EUBAM RAFAH), the European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS), and the European Union Police Mission in Kinshasa (EUPOL KINSHASA).

### First Hybrid Operations

The UN and AU fielded the first true hybrid mission, the UNAMID in the Darfur region of Sudan. UNAMID is a jointly mandated operation that rehatted AU peacekeepers from the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to UN troops assigned to UNAMID. In previous situa-

tions, regional peacekeepers simply rehatted to a UN mandated operation. It can be argued that the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) is a hybrid mission of the EU and ASEAN.

### **First AU Chapter VII Peace Enforcement Operation**

The AU mandated the MAES on 9 May 2007. Following a challenge to its sovereignty on Anjouan Island, the government of the island state requested increased assistance from the AU. The regional body altered the mandate of the operation to include a peace enforcement mission. Despite political differences among member states over this change in mandate, the AU authorized the deployment of MAES to restore order on Anjouan in March 2008. This action represents the first the time the AU or its OAU predecessor mandated a peace enforcement operation to compel compliance.

### **Increased Civilianization of Operations**

More than one international organization has shifted to fielding some operations with a greater number of civilian compared to military personnel or deployed operations that consist exclusively of civilians. In many cases, the civilians in these operations are performing missions once conducted only by military personnel. Many of these civilians can be categorized as uniformed police, but others are political specialists. The UN, EU, and OSCE have fielded several operations since 2002 that fit this category. Examples include the (EUBAM RAFAH), the (EUPOL KINSHASA), and the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UN-MIN). While some scholars might argue that these civilian operations are not in the category of peacekeeping, their international composition and mandates place them within the definition of the term and illustrate a continuous change in the field.

### **Increased Number of Police-Based Operations**

Related to the civilization of operations is a trend in the number of police-based missions. Since 2003, the EU has fielded numerous operations manned exclusively or almost exclusively with police personnel and mandated to conduct police-related training and/or assistance to

states undergoing a peace process. The UN mandated the United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF) in 1996 and United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti in 1997; however, the EU has served as the primary organization for deploying police-based operations since 2003, when the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) replaced the IPTF. The EU has fielded six additional police-based operations between 2003 and 2010.

### **First Movement of ASEAN toward a Peacekeeping Capability**

Although the ASEAN has yet to officially mandate and field its own peacekeeping operation, the organization cooperated with the EU in 2005 with the fielding of the AMM in Indonesia. Hindsight may show this action to be the first step in an ASEAN peacekeeping capability in support of the organization's charter, which calls for the peaceful settlement of disputes among and within members.

## **PEACEKEEPING ISSUES**

Many issues have divided peacekeeping contingent providers, international organizations, or academic scholars over the years. A few are provided here for consideration.

### **Third World Demand for Increased Western Participation**

Western aversion to peacekeeping operations on the African continent emerged following the problematic UN missions in Somalia and Rwanda. Western peacekeepers were the targets of one or more factions in both operations despite their humanitarian mandate. Peacekeepers assigned to United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I) faced kidnapping and sniper attacks, prompting an armed intervention by U.S. and Allied forces under the UNITAF banner. The Rwanda crisis of 1994–1995 proved to be as troublesome for the UN as its peacekeepers, small in number and, citing their mandate, did not intervene to prevent massacres throughout the country. Western states turned away from participating in UN operations as a result of these problems. A frustrated Secretary-General Kofi An-

nan referred to the U.S. and European reluctance to participate in a renewed United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda II (UNAMIR II) as “the post–Somalia syndrome.” Many Third World states have criticized the West for its willingness to commit Third World soldiers to conflict areas but not their own, which are reserved for NATO or EU missions within Europe.

## FINANCING

Most UN peacekeeping operations are financed by all organizational members based on a scale. This system has led to considerable controversy over the years. The United States has complained that it pays an unfair share of the financial burden, while economically strong states such as Saudi Arabia are still included in lower brackets and paying a much smaller percentage of operational costs. At various times, the United States has withheld its payments to the UN. The United States has also criticized the organization in the past for not counting U.S. airlift resources toward its financial contributions to peacekeeping operations. The refusal of major states, including the Soviet Union and France, to pay for such controversial operations as the ONUC nearly collapsed the UN during the “Article 19 Crisis.” The UN has paid for a limited number of operations via its regular budget. In other words, the peacekeeping mission is added to the budget in a similar fashion as regular needs for daily operation. The UNFICYP has been paid by voluntary contributions in the past, and the ONUC was partially paid with bond sales.

Many regional and subregional international organizations face similar financial problems. The OAU failed to persuade its members to deliver on promised financial support to cover the costs of its peacekeeping mission in Chad, leaving the contingent providers to pay their own expenses and request assistance from Western states. The AU faces the same challenges as its OAU predecessor. Western states helped pay for the ECOMOG mission in Liberia and Sierra Leone. One should note that outside financial resources in peacekeeping operations often ride on the coattails of outside political influence. As an African scholar once pointed out to the author regarding African peacekeeping, “He who pays the piper calls the tunes.”

## Casualties

Casualties have been an issue of contention in many UN and regional/subregional peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping has proven to be a dangerous endeavor. Any time a soldier steps between two or more belligerents, a life is placed on the line. As of April 2010, 2,790 UN personnel (military and civilian) have lost their lives while assigned to peacekeeping operations. This is a substantial increase from 1,817 fatalities as of April 2003. Approximately 300 UN peacekeepers died between the release of the first edition of this book and the completion of the second edition, while 973 UN peacekeeping personnel died between the second and third editions. Many of these deaths are the result of accidents, but many more died at the hands of the belligerents they intended to separate and aid as part of a peace process. The total number of deaths in operations such as those fielded by the ECOWAS and the CIS may never be known due to the desire of contingent-providing states to maintain the wrap of secrecy around casualty figures. The author arrived in Nigeria in 1991 to research the issues behind Nigeria's participation in the ECOMOG mission in Liberia. An interesting media battle developed between the relatively free Nigerian press and the authoritarian government over casualty figures. While it was later proven that the press estimates were inflated and the government figures underreported, the intense fight demonstrated the political sensitivity of governments about casualty figures. This debate renewed itself in 2002, when a former Nigerian ECOMOG commander claimed to have secretly buried hundreds of Nigerian casualties from Liberia.

The most dangerous UN peacekeeping operation for nearly five decades was ONUC. UNIFIL replaced ONUC by 2006, and the casualties associated with this operation continue to climb. The five highest casualty figures for UN operations, as of April 2010, are as follows (see table I.4):

## Third World Resources

The withdrawal of Western states from deployment with UN peacekeeping missions in the Third World has placed a greater burden on Third World states to provide their own contingents. For example, African states are willing to participate in UN peacekeeping operations

**Table I.4. The Five Highest Casualty Figures for UN Operations**

<i>Operation</i>	<i>Fatalities</i>
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)	285
United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC)	249
United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)	213
United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)	192
United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)	180
United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM)	160

(Source: United Nations, April 2010)

within their own continent; however, they often lack the resources required for peacekeeping, and the UN is financially strapped to meet all of its requirements. Western aid often arrives reluctantly and slowly. Despite U.S. and EU training programs for African states, many contingent providers firmly believe that the West is not providing enough support for their contingents in UN operations. They view the West as being ready to commit Third World soldiers to conflicts where they do not want to venture, and the Third World soldiers are sent without the equipment they require to be successful. On the other hand, Western states have complained that Third World countries often dispatch their contingents without any equipment, including items readily available in their home states. There have been many cases of Third World contingents arriving with nothing more than the clothes on their backs and asking for the UN to provide everything for them, including weapons and underwear.

### **The Role of International Organization Member States**

Who organizes multinational peacekeeping operations? While we tend to look to the international organizations that mandate them, these organizations do not have a life of their own. Decisions within international organizations are the products of the collective membership. A UN peacekeeping operation is mandated because the majority of the Security Council approved it, without a veto by one of the P5. (There have been at least three exceptions to this rule utilizing the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace Resolution.) This is how the UN can remandate UNAMIR in Rwanda, yet months tick by and Rwandan



deaths continue before UN member states agree to provide contingents. Although paying for UN peacekeeping operations is theoretically mandatory, contributing contingents to the missions is totally voluntary. The SADC mandated a peacekeeping operation in Lesotho because a majority of its members backed the South African proposal; however, the SADC did not mandate an operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo when a majority of the members narrowly defeated a proposal from Zimbabwe.

### **The First Peacekeeping Operation**

Canadian Lester Pearson received the 1956 Nobel Peace Prize for his concept of a neutral barrier force to separate the Israelis and Egyptians after the 1956 Suez War. Many writers point to this mission, UNEF I, as the birth of peacekeeping. If this is the case, how should we describe the planned League of Nations operation in Vilna (1920), the league mission deployed to the Saar (1935), UNTSO (1948), and UNMOGIP (1949)? The latter two peacekeeping operations are still in place. Some writers have implied that the international units fielded by the Concert of Europe in the 19th century were forms of peacekeeping. It is not the purpose of this book to enter this controversial debate; however, this book does recognize the League of Nations missions as legitimate peacekeeping operations with the understanding that some scholars will not agree with this point. Readers are encouraged to make their own decisions after reviewing the cases.

## **FACTORS FOR SUCCESS**

Many scholars have offered factors for success for peacekeeping operations. Several factors considered essential by this author are listed in this section.

### **Effective Cease-Fire and Acceptance by the Belligerents**

Perhaps the greatest problem faced by peacekeepers is the refusal of belligerents to honor cease-fire agreements and peace negotiations. The UN's most troublesome peacekeeping operations in Africa, including

the Congo, Somalia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone, have faced breakdowns in cease-fires resulting in the deaths of UN peacekeepers and civilians. The collapse in the Congo faced by ONUC resulted in the withdrawal of UN peacekeeping from Africa for a 25-year period. The failure of belligerents to adhere to cease-fires in Somalia and Rwanda abruptly ended the post-UNTAG Second Generation of UN peacekeeping and initiated a Third Generation.

The effectiveness of peacekeeping is in correlation with the acceptance of the belligerents to the peace process. In cases where all of the belligerents genuinely accepted the peace process and deployment of peacekeepers, the peacekeeping missions have been very successful. UNTAG, possibly the most successful UN peacekeeping operation ever fielded, benefited immensely from the cooperation of the belligerents. The UN observer mission in the Aouzou Strip between Chad and Libya needed only 15 personnel to fulfill its mandate and withdraw on schedule thanks to the cooperation of the belligerents.

When the belligerents refused to adhere to negotiated cease-fires, peacekeepers have frequently found themselves targets or watching helplessly as civilians were murdered. Somalia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone emerged as three of the most controversial peacekeeping operations fielded by the UN after belligerents turned on the peacekeepers. Peacekeepers have three options when this situation occurs. First, they can simply stand aside or withdraw, as in Rwanda. Second, member states can field a relief mission, normally with UN blessing but separate from the peacekeeping mission. Two examples include the British paratroopers rushing to aid United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) peacekeepers and the American intervention in Somalia on behalf of UNOSOM I. Third, the UN peacekeepers can convert their mission to one of peace enforcement, as with ONUC.

## Neutrality

Peacekeepers must remain neutral in the conflict. If any of the belligerents perceive the peacekeepers as favoring the other party, the impartiality of the peacekeepers is destroyed and their mission in jeopardy. India perceived the United States as favoring Pakistan in their conflict. In response, the Indian government ordered the United States to remove its peacekeepers from UNMOGIP. As a result of the neutrality issue,

Sweden, Ireland, India, and Pakistan emerged as major contingent contributors during the First Generation of UN peacekeeping, since they were viewed as politically neutral in conflicts across the Cold War–dominated globe. Peacekeepers in ONUC lost their impartiality as a result of turning to assist the Congolese government against rebellious provinces; however, despite provocations from both sides, the OAU peacekeepers in Chad surprisingly remained highly neutral while fielded. The Chadian government expressed frustration with the OAU's neutrality and refusal to help fight the rebels. At the same time, the rebels counted on the OAU's neutrality to stabilize the southern front while they turned their forces against the government in the northern area of the country.

## **Mandate**

A mandate provides three important items for a peacekeeping operation. First, it declares the basis for the international legitimacy of what is essentially a military intervention. Second, it states the mission of the peacekeeping operation. These mission statements can be very clear and to the point, allowing the force commander to successfully interpret his mission and organize his operations; however, some are vague and leave too much room for interpretation. This type of mandate is often written to satisfy arguing belligerents who refuse to agree on the details of a peacekeeping mission. The international organization provides a vague statement of purpose, allowing each belligerent independent interpretation of the mission. This, in turn, leads to trouble on the ground, as a force commander is not sure what he should do. An action acceptable to one belligerent is perceived as a violation of neutrality by another. The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina regularly faced these problems. Also, the mandated mission can be too restrictive and demand exact compliance by the force commander. Such mandates tie the hands of the force commander. UNAMIR contingents argued that their mandate did not include a mission to prevent mass acts of violence in Rwanda.

Third, the mandate should provide an exit strategy. The peacekeepers are withdrawn when certain events occur or a time frame is completed. For example, peacekeepers could be withdrawn after the completion of

national elections or belligerents are disarmed, or they may be in the country for a specific period of time, such as one year. Examples of peacekeeping mandates are included in the appendix of this book.

### **Status of Forces Agreement**

Status of forces agreements are usually negotiated between the mandating international organization and the host country before a peacekeeping operation is fielded. The agreements provide the legal provisions concerning the soldiers assigned to the peacekeeping operation. The documents include such issues as mail, identification of peacekeepers, international transit, importation of supplies, evacuation of casualties and fatalities, application of local laws to the peacekeepers, and many other provisions. In one unique case, the UN did not negotiate a status of forces agreement with Egypt for UNEF II but rather utilized the UNEF I agreement. These agreements are important for all peacekeeping missions. Without them, the mandating international organization leaves the peacekeepers subject to local laws and potential problems with local officials in the host state.

## **RULES OF ENGAGEMENT**

Rules of engagement provide peacekeepers with their guidelines on when and when not to use force and how much force can be utilized in a given situation. Theoretically, peacekeepers should not have to use force, but we live in an imperfect world. Rules of engagement must be clear and permit peacekeepers the range of actions required for the particular situation. Too liberal rules of engagement can result in the loss of peacekeeper neutrality, while too restrictive rules can prevent the peacekeepers from providing required protection for themselves or others. Generally, rules of engagement always permit self-defense; however, controversy often erupts when the rules of engagement are vague regarding the protection of others. Some UNAMIR contingents argued that their rules of engagement did not permit the physical protection of Rwandan civilians during the outbreak of genocide in that country.

## **Intelligence**

Peacekeepers require solid intelligence on the conflict and belligerents when they deploy to an area. For example, in intrastate conflict situations, peacekeepers need information on all of the belligerents, their leaders, and their intentions. Western states often have the best intelligence-gathering assets. Some Third World states have complained that their peacekeepers are not provided the information collected by Western states in the host state. One example of this problem occurred in Sierra Leone when arriving UN contingents stated that Western states were reluctant to share their intelligence on the rebel forces in the field.

### **CAN PEACEKEEPING MAKE A DIFFERENCE?**

Many peacekeeping missions seem to have been fairly successful, while many others have tragically collapsed and failed, leading to considerable controversy and criticism. Can peacekeeping missions make a difference, and are they worth their costs?

#### **Peacekeeping Can Save Lives**

The presence of peacekeepers has prevented violence against individual civilians during missions. For example, despite the problems faced by the UN contingents in Rwanda, there are documented cases of peacekeepers saving the lives of Rwandan civilians. Despite criticism against their governments, many Belgian and Senegalese peacekeepers heroically protected Rwandan civilians under their immediate care until given direct orders to abandon them to their fate.

#### **Peacekeeping Can Stabilize a Crisis**

The presence of peacekeepers can be instrumental in stabilizing a crisis. The introduction of UN observer missions in Liberia, the Central African Republic, and Sierra Leone were instrumental in providing stability during the withdrawal of African-mandated operations following negotiations with the belligerents. UN peacekeepers also provide a “face saving” service when they are utilized in conjunction with a neu-

tral zone to separate two warring states as classically demonstrated by the UNEF II. The mere presence of neutral peacekeepers offers a symbolic barrier between the armed belligerents that should not be crossed.

### **Peacekeeping Can Prevent the Spread of Conflict to Neighboring States**

The presence of peacekeepers has played a factor in preventing the spread of conflict to neighboring states, although this can be difficult to prove if successful. The United Nations Observer Mission in Uganda–Rwanda (UNOMUR) watched the border between the two states to prevent the smuggling of weapons into Rwanda. Although Rwanda would later erupt into a situation of genocide, UNOMUR did help slow the cross-border flow of weapons while it was deployed. MONUC was an attempt to bring order to a conflict that has involved many Central African states and has threatened to spread to Angola and Burundi and other countries.



# The Dictionary

– A –

**ABIN, MAJOR-GENERAL RAIS.** Abin, a citizen of **Indonesia**, served as the **force commander** of the **United Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF II)** between December 1976 and the operation's successful termination in September 1979. Abin was the only non-Scandinavian Force Commander of UNEF II.

**ABKHAZIA.** *See* GEORGIA.

**ACEH MONITORING MISSION (AMM).** Aceh is a province located on the northwestern tip of Sumatra in **Indonesia**. The **European Union (EU)**, with non-EU states, agreed to field monitors as of 15 August 2005 in the peace process associated with the Aceh–Indonesia dispute. The monitors, known as the **Initial Monitoring Presence (IMP)**, were followed by a larger operation on 15 September 2005 known as the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM). The AMM's mandated mission included monitoring the disarmament and demobilization of the Free Aceh Movement, observing compliance regarding human rights, ruling on disputed amnesty cases, handling complaints and alleged violations of the memorandum of understanding, and maintaining liaison with both parties. The AMM consisted of approximately 80 unarmed monitors from EU and non-EU countries as well as members of the **Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)**. The ASEAN members participating in the AMM included Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, and the non-EU states in the operation included Norway and **Switzerland**. The AMM completed its mission on 15 December 2006. It was the first EU-led mission in Asia and cost approximately 15.3



million euros. Some sources refer to this operation as the European Union Monitoring Mission in Aceh; however, the official name is the Aceh Monitoring Mission because of the large non-EU presence, especially from ASEAN members.

**ACHESON PLAN.** *See* UNITING FOR PEACE RESOLUTION.

**ACLAND, MAJOR-GENERAL J. H. B.** Acland, a British officer, commanded the **Commonwealth Monitoring Force in Zimbabwe**. In his position, he also served as the chair of the **Commonwealth Cease-Fire Commission** that oversaw the peace and disarmament process. Acland assumed the difficult role of “neutral middleman” as the Patriotic Front soldiers left the bush and entered camps organized by the Commonwealth Force. His job included protecting Patriotic Front soldiers from possible retribution by white Rhodesians, as well as ensuring that the former entered the **rendezvous points** and **assembly points** peacefully.

**ADVISORY COMMITTEE.** The **United Nations (UN)** Security Council established the Advisory Committee in November 1956 to assist **Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld** with the development of the **United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I)** deployed to the Middle East. The committee consisted of Brazil, Canada, Sri Lanka, Colombia, **India**, Norway, and **Pakistan**. Canada was an important player in the group, since it was **Lester B. Pearson**, a Canadian, who developed the idea for UNEF I, which became the first **interposition force** deployed by the UN. The secretary-general served as the chairman of the committee. The committee handled such issues as the regulations behind UNEF I’s operations, rules of engagement, and issuing of medals. Minutes of the committee’s proceedings were maintained but considered confidential. The Security Council granted the committee the authority to convene the General Assembly. *See also* COMMITTEE OF THREE; UNITING FOR PEACE RESOLUTION.

**AFGHANISTAN.** Several **peacekeeping** missions have deployed to Afghanistan. In 1988, the **United Nations (UN)** fielded the **United Nations Good Offices in Afghanistan and Pakistan** to facilitate

and verify the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. After the World Trade Center terrorist attack of 11 September 2001, an international coalition of forces, led by the **United States**, assisted the Afghan Northern Alliance in removing the Taliban government from power in Afghanistan. The United States formed the **International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)**, under the command of the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)**, to assist with the rebuilding and training of a new Afghan army and police force. The UN mandated the **United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan** in 2002 to lead that body's efforts to promote peace and security in Afghanistan. In 2007, the **European Union (EU)** fielded the **European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan** to assist with the establishment of a sustainable and effective civilian police force.

**AFRICAN CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS TRAINING AND ASSISTANCE (ACOTA).** African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) is a U.S. program that replaced the **African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI)** in 2004. ACOTA is primarily a “train-the-trainer” program, where U.S. military and civilian specialists train senior military personnel in 21 African countries who then serve as trainers for personnel in their military forces to support **peacekeeping** duties. The **United States** budgets approximately \$15 million annually for ACOTA, which is then funded via the **Global Peace Operations Initiative**. *See also* ENHANCED INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING CAPABILITIES (EIPC).

**AFRICAN CRISIS RESPONSE INITIATIVE (ACRI).** In November 1995, the **United Nations (UN)** called for the international community to place a greater emphasis on solving crisis situations before they had to be debated by the global organization. At the same time, the Western powers were searching for alternatives to sending their peacekeepers into such explosive situations as **Somalia** and **Rwanda**. The **United States** developed the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) as a means of training African military units for the rigors of peace operations on the African continent. ACRI was first proposed in September 1996, and the training of the first African battalion under the program commenced in 1997. Small teams of special forces soldiers conducted training for troops in Benin, **Côte d’Ivoire**,

Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, **Nigeria**, Senegal, and Uganda. ACRI was a type of **stand-by force** arrangement involving African contingents with Western equipment and financial backing. The **African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA)** program replaced ACRI in 2004. *See also* ENHANCED INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING CAPABILITIES (EIPC); GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS INITIATIVE (GPOI); RENFORCEMENT DES CAPACITÉS AFRICAINES DE MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX (RECAMP).

**AFRICAN MISSION IN BURUNDI (AMIB).** In October 2001, the South African government deployed a **peacekeeping** operation, known as the **South African Protection Support Detachment (SAPSD)**, to support the peace process in **Burundi**. The Tutsi government concluded a cease-fire with the main Hutu group in 2003. The 2003 cease-fire presented the government with the option of calling for **United Nations (UN)** or **African Union (AU)** peacekeepers. The AU mandated a peacekeeping operation to support the peace process in Burundi on 2 April 2003, and, the force, the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB), began operations in the country that same month, since South African troops were already there as the SAPSD. The mandate included overseeing the cease-fire, supporting the disarmament and demobilization process, establishing favorable conditions for a UN peacekeeping mission, contributing to political and economic stability, serving as a liaison between the various groups, facilitating the free movement of civilians, assisting with the delivery of humanitarian aid, and providing protection for important leaders.

African Mission in Burundi **rules of engagement** permitted the use of weapons for self-defense and the protection of civilians under imminent danger. The operation consisted of approximately 3,128 troops and 200 civilians. **South Africa**, Ethiopia, and Mozambique provided the majority of the personnel assigned to AMIB. Troops from Ethiopia and Mozambique did not join those of South Africa until September and October 2003. Smaller numbers deployed from Burkina Faso, Gabon, Mali, Togo, and Tunisia. The AU, not able to provide a complete logistics package to support AMIB, asked each state to supply its detachment for the first two months of deployment, contributing to the delay of Ethiopia and Mozambique. The

AU requirement has been repeated and is sometimes known as the **Burundi Model**. These two states finally deployed in September and October 2003, after receiving external financing from the **United States** (Ethiopia) and **Great Britain** (Mozambique). The annual cost of AMIB totaled \$134 million. The AU terminated AMIB on 31 May 2004, and the African peacekeepers merged into the **United Nations Operation in Burundi**. *See also* CEASE-FIRE OBSERVER MISSION IN BURUNDI.

**AFRICAN STAND-BY FORCE (ASF)**. The **African Union (AU)** proposed the establishment in 2002 of an African Stand-By Force (ASF). The body of troops would be a type of **Rapid Reaction Force** of African states. The AU would mandate a **peacekeeping** operation and call upon member states to deploy military units in support of the mission based on a regional system. The units could also be designated as part of an AU operation. The AU established five geographical zones under which an international organization assumes responsibility for forming and training troops within a brigade-sized concept for its particular area. The organizations holding responsibility in the zones are: EAST (Intergovernmental Authority on Development); SOUTH (**Southern African Development Community**); WEST (**Economic Community of West African States**); CENTRAL (Economic Community of Central African States); and NORTH (North African Regional Capability, a new organization established to support the ASF due to the lack of consensus of North African states for military cooperation within existing organizations). *See also* EUROPEAN UNION RAPID REACTION FORCE; NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO) RAPID REACTION FORCE; UNITED NATIONS STAND-BY ARRANGEMENTS SYSTEM (UNSA).

**AFRICAN UNION (AU)**. The **Organization of African Unity (OAU)** officially transformed into the African Union (AU) in July 2002. The AU consists of 53 states located on the continent and among its offshore islands. Morocco is the only country on the continent that is not a member of the AU. The AU Constitutive Act reserves the right of the organization to “intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely

war crimes, genocide, and other crimes against humanity.” In other words, the act authorizes the AU to militarily intervene in such situations as the genocide in **Rwanda** even if the host government refuses permission for the deployment. The members established a Peace and Security Council in 2004 to provide a forum for handling security-related issues. The rotating 15-member body is similar in style to the Security Council of the **United Nations (UN)**.

The AU developed an **African Stand-By Force (ASF)** for **peace-keeping** operations under AU mandates. ASF permits the AU to mandate and deploy operations or request African subregional organizations to perform the task. The AU, like its predecessor, faces problems, including funding and logistics, when considering peacekeeping operations. In addition, most African states have military forces that are not trained for peacekeeping-related duties. Often, those states with better-prepared soldiers lack the political will to deploy soldiers with an operation supporting a peace process lacking an effective cease-fire. To help counter some logistical problems, the AU developed the **Burundi Model**, calling for deploying contingents to supply themselves for an initial period of time. In addition, the **United States, France, Great Britain**, and the **European Union** have been active in training, funding, and supporting AU missions. Despite these issues, the AU has been more effective than the OAU at mandating, fielding, and sustaining peacekeeping operations on the continent, although preferring to rely on the subregional peacekeeping system it established under the ASF concept.

In 2004, the AU deployed the **African Union Mission in Sudan** to support the peace process in **Sudan** and followed this with the **African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)** in 2007. AMISOM has engaged in combat to defend the government of **Somalia** in accordance with its mandate but not engaged in offensive operations. In 2008, the AU mandated the organization’s first **peace enforcement** mission when it redirected the **African Union Electoral Assistance and Security Mission in Comoros** to engage in a combat operation in the **Comoros** to restore that country’s sovereignty over one of its islands. *See also* AFRICAN MISSION IN BURUNDI (AMIB); AFRICAN UNION LIAISON MISSION IN ETHIOPIA–ERITREA (AULMEE); AFRICAN UNION MISSION FOR SUPPORT TO THE ELECTIONS IN COMOROS (AMISEC); AFRICAN

UNION SPECIAL TASK FORCE (AUSTF); UNITED NATIONS–AFRICAN UNION HYBRID MISSION IN DARFUR (UNAMID).

**AFRICAN UNION (AU) CEASE-FIRE OBSERVER MISSION IN BURUNDI.** The **African Union (AU)** operation to oversee the ceasefire in **Burundi** actually consisted of two missions. The first, the **African Mission in Burundi (AMIB)**, provided the security for the second, the African Union Cease-fire Observer Mission in Burundi, which technically monitored the cease-fire itself. The AU mandated the latter mission on 3 February 2003 to monitor the 2002 cease-fire accords in the country. The two operations consisted of 2,645 personnel with 43 of these soldiers deployed as military observers. AMIB included peacekeepers from **South Africa**, Ethiopia, and Mozambique while the cease-fire observers arrived from Benin, Burkina Faso, Gabon, Mali, and Tunisia. The **United Nations (UN) Operation in Burundi (ONUB)** replaced both AU missions on 1 June 2004.

**AFRICAN UNION ELECTORAL AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE MISSION IN COMOROS (MAES).** The **African Union (AU)** mandated the African Union Electoral Assistance and Security Mission in Comoros (MAES) on 9 May 2007. MAES served as the fifth African-mandated **peacekeeping** operation deployed to the **Comoros**. The first three operations were mandated by the **Organization of African Unity (OAU)** and, the fourth, known as the **African Union Mission for Support to the Elections in the Comoros (AMISEC)**, by the AU. Under the Union Constitution of the Comoros, the presidency of the country would rotate every four years between the presidents of the major islands comprising the state. The island of Anjouan attempted to secede from the Comoros in 1997, and the crisis continued until 2001, when the islands agreed to the Fomboni Accord, granting autonomy to the various islands, with the country governed by the rotating presidency. The Comoros set 10 June 2007 for presidential elections for each major island in the union. President Mohammed Bacar of Anjouan refused to step aside and permit elections. The national government appointed an interim president for Anjouan in May 2007, leading to armed groups on the island attacking national offices.

The AU mandated MAES to provide security for a fair election on each island. MAES deployed to Grande Comore and Moheli while the national government delayed the elections by one week; however, Bacar maintained the original schedule and claimed a victory in an election deemed illegal by the international community. The MAES mandate provided for an initial 300 peacekeepers for the mission. **France** transported the detachments, which were partially funded by the **League of Arab States**.

Negotiations and AU sanctions against Anjouan failed to persuade Bacar to adhere to the Union Constitution, and the Comoros officially requested AU assistance to restore its sovereignty over the island. At this point, the mandate of MAES was transformed from election security to a **Chapter Seven peace enforcement**-style operation to assist the Comoros in restoring sovereignty over Anjouan. **South Africa** argued that the AU had not given enough time to peaceful negotiations and withdrew its troops due to the new mandate. Approximately 500 troops from Tanzania joined approximately 750 soldiers from Senegal and Sudan for a military operation with the army of the Comoros to secure Anjouan. Libya provided logistical support, and France handled transportation for the new mission, which has been called Operation Democracy in the Comoros.

The invasion occurred on 25 March 2008, and the troops of MAES and the Comoros secured Anjouan by the end of the day. The additional troops flown into the Comoros for Operation Democracy in the Comoros departed after the conclusion of the invasion, leaving approximately 470 peacekeepers from Tanzania (150), Senegal (120), and Sudan (200) in the country at the end of 2008. Essentially, MAES evolved into a separate peace enforcement mission from the original peacekeeping mission to oversee the elections. It is yet to be seen whether the AU will eventually officially recognize it as one or two operations. The OAU set a precedent for the latter by officially noting that its peacekeepers in the Comoros between January and May 2002 were actually part of two separate operations under different mandates. *See also* ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY OBSERVER MISSION IN THE COMOROS ISLANDS I (OMIC I); ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY OBSERVER MISSION IN THE COMOROS ISLANDS II (OMIC II); ORGANIZATION

## OF AFRICAN UNITY OBSERVER MISSION IN COMOROS ISLANDS III (OMIC III).

**AFRICAN UNION LIAISON MISSION IN ETHIOPIA–ERITREA (AULMEE).** Upon the official establishment of the **African Union (AU)** in 2002, the **Organization of African Unity Liaison Mission in Ethiopia–Eritrea (OLMEE)**, fielded since 2000, became the African Union Liaison Mission in Ethiopia–Eritrea. With this automatic conversion, African Union Liaison Mission in Ethiopia–Eritrea (AULMEE) emerged as the first **peacekeeping** mission under the auspices of the AU. AULMEE continued the basic mandate of OLMEE, which included assisting the **United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)** in maintaining security in the security zone between Ethiopian and Eritrean troops and monitoring the implementation of the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities. AULMEE provided direct **Organization of African Unity** coordination with UNMEE and the governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea. AULMEE consisted of approximately 37 personnel with an annual budget of approximately \$3 million. Both Ethiopia and Eritrea offered varying degrees of cooperation with UNMEE, the main peacekeeping mission along their shared border. Increasing lack of cooperation from Eritrea resulted in the withdrawal of UNMEE in July 2008 and negated the need for AULMEE.

**AFRICAN UNION MISSION FOR SUPPORT TO THE ELECTIONS IN COMOROS (AMISEC).** The **African Union (AU)** mandated and deployed the fourth African-mandated **peacekeeping** operation destined for the **Comoros** in 2006. The first three missions were mandated by the AU's predecessor, the **Organization of African Unity (OAU)**. Some sources refer to the fourth operation as the African Union Mission to Secure Elections in Comoros; however, the AU mandate, the AU Peace and Security Council Resolution PSC/PR/Comm.1 (XLVII) of 21 March 2006, officially names the operation as the African Union Mission for Support to the Elections in the Comoros (AMISEC). Under the Union Constitution of the Comoros, the presidency of the country rotates every four years between the presidents of the major islands comprising the state. The mandate of



the AMISEC called for the mission to observe and provide security for the primary and election process on the island of Anjouan, which had earlier attempted to secede from the country. The mission then transferred to the islands of Grande Comore and Moheli to observe and provide security for the national election. Due to the complexities of the delicate union, the AU peacekeepers essentially ensured that national and local island security forces remained out of the elections. **South Africa** provided approximately 341 of the 462 personnel mandated for the mission. Madagascar, Mozambique, and **Rwanda** deployed the rest of the personnel assigned to the mission. The AMISEC departed the Comoros in June 2006, after the inauguration of the national president, and did not suffer any casualties. The AU returned a peacekeeping operation to the islands in 2007, with the **African Union Electoral and Security Assistance Mission in Comoros**. *See also* ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY OBSERVER MISSION IN THE COMOROS ISLANDS I (OMIC I); ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY OBSERVER MISSION IN THE COMOROS ISLANDS II (OMIC II); ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY OBSERVER MISSION IN THE COMOROS ISLANDS III (OMIC III).

**AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN SOMALIA (AMISOM).** **Somalia** remained in a state of political chaos following the withdrawal of the **United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II)** in 1995. Between 2002 and 2007, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and **African Union (AU)** discussed fielding an African-mandated **peacekeeping** operation in Somalia to support the peace process. IGAD assumed the lead in fielding the operation, which was referred to as **Intergovernmental Authority on Development Peace Support Mission in Somalia (IGASOM)**, but it never deployed despite a specific **United Nations (UN)** authorization in December 2006 to boost the mission's legitimacy. IGAD efforts continued until 19 January 2007, when the AU assumed the mandate and responsibility for deploying the peacekeepers. The UN provided a new specific authorization for the AU efforts on 21 February 2007, and the AU fielded the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in March 2007. By this time, Ethiopian troops had intervened in the Somali civil war, adding a new complication to peace efforts. Despite

pledges from several African states, only troops from Uganda initially deployed under the AMISOM mandate. Troops from **Burundi** joined the Ugandan peacekeepers by the end of December 2007.

AMISOM peacekeepers, mandated to support the peace process, including assisting humanitarian operations, protecting government officials, training a new national army, and other duties, essentially served to protect the nominal national government headquarters against an offensive by an Islamic fundamentalist alliance after the departure of Ethiopian troops that had been assisting the national government. The number of peacekeepers increased to more than 5,000 troops; however, other African states that had pledged to deploy soldiers continued to lack the political will to become involved in the chaos. Mortar, roadside explosives, and suicide bomber attacks resulted in the deaths of more than 50 AMISOM peacekeepers by the end of 2009. An antigovernment offensive in Mogadishu commenced in March 2010, with AMISOM peacekeepers providing defensive armor support for government forces whenever the fighting neared the presidential quarters. AMISOM is funded by the **United States** and **European Union** states.

**AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN SUDAN (AMIS).** The **African Union (AU)** and **European Union (EU)** dispatched monitors to Darfur in **Sudan** during May 2004 as conflict observers in support of the April 2004 cease-fire process. The AU mission included 60 observers and 300 soldiers to protect them; however, they accomplished little other than filing reports of Janjaweed attacks. The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) emerged from the AU monitor efforts and an October 2004 expanded mandate. The **United Nations (UN)** urged the Sudanese government in September 2004 to fully implement the cease-fire or face international sanctions. The following month, the AU mandated an expansion of the small force in Darfur to approximately 3,000 personnel. Violence did lessen in early 2005, and by April 2005, the number of AMIS peacekeepers increased to approximately 7,000 as peace negotiations continued. The AMIS mandate included observation duties as well as protection of civilians under attack. The operation faced many problems, including insufficient funding and logistical support, as well as too few numbers to cover such an extensive area as Darfur.

Despite any hope of progress, the conflict continued and even increased, with AMIS peacekeepers kidnapped and killed by groups on each side of the crisis. One of the worst attacks occurred in September 2007, when Sudan Liberation Army elements attacked an AMIS base, killing at least 10 peacekeepers. AMIS cost an estimated \$600 million annually, which was primarily paid by North American and European states. A total of approximately 30 African countries provided manpower for AMIS, with some of the major contributors being **Nigeria, Rwanda**, Ghana, Senegal, Botswana, **Egypt**, Mali, and **South Africa**. At least 33 AMIS peacekeepers died during the mission. It should be noted that while AMIS operated in Darfur, a UN **peacekeeping** operation, the **United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)**, conducted operations in southern Sudan in support of the peace process for that separate conflict in the country.

AU and UN discussions resulted in the mandating (Security Council Resolution 1769 of 31 July 2007) of the **United Nations–African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)**, often described as a hybrid mission of the two organizations. The UN envisioned UNAMID fielding up to 26,000 troops and police in support of its mission, with the troops of AMIS being absorbed into it. UNAMID would be primarily African manned but under a UN mandate and funding with non-African logistical support. AMIS officially terminated on 31 December 2007, as UNAMID assumed its mission. Some sources, including official EU publications, separate AMIS into AMIS I and AMIS II after the mandate expansion of October 2004. Although the size and mandate of AMIS altered in October 2004, the AU does not separate AMIS into distinctive time periods with different names. *See also* EUROPEAN UNION SUPPORT TO THE AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN DARFUR.

**AFRICAN UNION MISSION TO SECURE ELECTIONS IN THE COMOROS (AMISEC).** *See* AFRICAN UNION MISSION FOR SUPPORT TO THE ELECTIONS IN COMOROS (AMISEC).

**AFRICAN UNION SPECIAL TASK FORCE (AUSTF).** The **United Nations (UN)** deployed the **United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB)** on 31 May 2004, to replace the **African Mission in Burundi (AMIB)** in support of a cease-fire in the country. As the

peace process progressed in **Burundi**, the UN withdrew ONUB on 31 December 2006; however, troops from **South Africa** remained in Burundi under an **African Union (AU)** mandate as the African Union Special Task Force (AUSTF). South Africa's initial contingent numbered 1,100 troops with the mission to protect the various faction and government leaders of Burundi.

The AUSTF also assumed some missions originally assigned to ONUB, including the protection of armed faction assembly areas, disarmament of the combatants, storage of weapons collected at disarmament points, protection of demobilization centers, and transportation of disarmed fighters. The AU officially mandated the AUSTF on 9 November 2006, as ONUB prepared to depart Burundi. The final South African soldiers departed Burundi, signaling the termination of AUSTF, on 31 December 2009. *See also* SOUTH AFRICAN PROTECTION SUPPORT DETACHMENT (SAPSD).

**AGGRAVATED PEACEKEEPING.** The **United States** Department of Defense originally adopted this term in the early 1990s for **peacekeeping** operations deployed in areas where the neutral forces may be required to use force to carry out their mandate. The Department of Defense defined the term as “Military operations undertaken with the nominal consent of all major belligerent parties, but which are complicated by subsequent intransigence of one or more of the belligerents; poor command and control of belligerent forces; or conditions of outlawry, banditry, or anarchy. In such conditions, peacekeeping forces are normally authorized to use force in self-defense, and in defense of the missions they are assigned, which may include monitoring and facilitating implementation of an existing truce agreement in support of diplomatic efforts to reach a political settlement, or supporting or safeguarding humanitarian relief efforts.” Aggravated peacekeeping operations are **Chapter Six-and-a-Half** and some **Chapter Seven** missions where belligerent consent has eroded, rather than Chapter Seven missions mandated specifically to force compliance on belligerents, for example the **Korean War** or **Persian Gulf War**. Department of the Army Field Manual 3-07 *Stability Operations and Support Operations* (October 2008) presents the U.S. Army's current guidance on stability operations, including peacekeeping. The term “aggravated peacekeeping” has been phased

out but is still useful along with the term “**traditional peacekeeping**” for understanding the differences between missions undertaken with the consent of the belligerents and those with nominal consent of the belligerents.

**AGREEMENT ON DISENGAGEMENT BETWEEN ISRAELI AND SYRIAN FORCES.** This document, signed in May 1974, provided for the disengagement of **Syria** and **Israel** after the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The protocol of this agreement called for the deployment of a neutral **peacekeeping** operation to separate the belligerents and oversee the disengagement process. This operation became known as the **United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)**. **Lieutenant-General Ensio P. H. Siilasvuo**, the **force commander** of the **United Nations Emergency Force II** in the Sinai, witnessed and signed the document on behalf of the **United Nations**.

**AGWAI, MARTIN.** Agwai, a citizen of **Nigeria**, has served in a number of significant positions within **United Nations (UN) peacekeeping** operations on the African continent. He served as the deputy force commander of the **United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone** from 2000 to 2002 and **force commander** of the **African Union Mission in Sudan** from May 2007 to December 2007, when he then became the first force commander of the **United Nations–African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur** until 2009.

**AHTISAARI, MARTTI.** Ahtisaari, a native of Finland, filled the position of **special representative** during the long negotiations for Namibian independence and the operations of the **United Nations Transition Assistance Group** between July 1978 and March 1990. Following Namibian independence, Ahtisaari became the undersecretary for Administration and Management. In this position, he exercised considerable influence during the development of the leadership structure for the **United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)**. Because of his frustration with a military deputy while in Namibia, Ahtisaari recommended that the **United Nations** alter the leadership structure being established for the Western Sahara. Due to the personal intervention of Ahtisaari and the opposition of the secretariat, the organization accepted a

plan with one undersecretary-general and two assistant secretaries-general. One of the latter would be a civilian position titled the deputy special representative and the other a military position known as the **force commander**.

**AIDID, MOHAMMED FARAH.** Aidid, a Soviet-trained general in the army of **Somalia** and leader of the Haber Gedir subclan, ousted President Siad Barre of Somalia in 1991. Aidid is noted for his opposition to the **United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I)** and **United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II)**. When forces loyal to Aidid ambushed a **United Nations (UN)** patrol in Mogadishu, killing 24 Pakistani soldiers, the organization placed a bounty on his head and ordered his arrest. Continuing confrontation between the UN troops, especially soldiers from the **United States**, and Aidid led to a series of bloody clashes resulting in Washington, DC, reexamining its objectives in the **peacekeeping** operation.

**AKASHI, YASUSHI.** Akashi, a native of **Japan**, served as the **secretary-general's special representative** for the **United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)**. The **United Nations (UN)** has been accused of selecting Akashi as a means of ensuring Japanese monetary contributions to the operation. Akashi arrived in Cambodia on 17 March 1992. Prior to his selection to head the **peacekeeping** mission in Cambodia, Akashi was the UN undersecretary-general for Disarmament Affairs. Akashi often criticized his country for not participating in UN peacekeeping operations; however, as the UN special representative in Cambodia, Akashi had to defend his countrymen in their first peacekeeping mission. Japanese soldiers were accused of deserting their posts during hostile conditions, and four were even reported to have taken their vehicles and driven to Thailand, where they showed up at the Japanese embassy in Bangkok. Other contingents also questioned the lavish facilities the Japanese government built for their soldiers in Cambodia. Akashi referred to the incidents as "teething experiences." Following the assignment in Cambodia, the secretary-general named Akashi as the special representative with the **United Nations Protection Force** and then the follow-on **United Nations Peace Forces**. In this capacity, Akashi was in the shadow of the military commanders in **Bosnia and Her-**

**zegovina** who tended to criticize the UN and Secretary-General **Boutros Boutros-Ghali** for the shortcomings of the mission. In his position as special representative, Akashi had to be in agreement with the military commander before the secretary-general would authorize air strikes in support of the peacekeepers by aircraft of the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization**.

**ALBANIA.** *See* MULTINATIONAL PROTECTION FORCE (FPM); ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE PRESENCE IN ALBANIA.

**AMSTERDAM TREATY.** **European Union (EU)** members enacted the Amsterdam Treaty on 1 May 1999. The document applied the **Petersberg Missions** of the **West European Union** to the EU. The latter organization utilized this new mandate for crisis management, including **peacekeeping**, and to develop plans for the **European Union Rapid Reaction Force**. Title V of the Treaty lists the provisions of a common foreign and security policy for the EU. The EU assumed the Petersberg Missions in Article 17 of Title V. The opening of Article 17 states the following:

1. The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions relating to the security of the [European] Union, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, in accordance with the second subparagraph, which might lead to a common defence, should the European Council so decide. It shall in that case recommend to the Member States that adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. The Western European Union (WEU) is an integral part of the development of the [European] Union providing the [European] Union with access to an operational capability notably in the context of paragraph 2. It supports the Union in framing the defence aspects of the common foreign and security policy as set out in this Article. The Union shall accordingly foster closer institutional relations with the WEU with a view to the possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union, should the European Council so decide.

2. Questions referred to in this Article shall include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management in the field of armaments.
3. The [European] Union will avail itself of the WEU to elaborate and implement decisions and actions which have defence implication.

**AN AGENDA FOR PEACE.** The **United Nations (UN)** Security Council requested **Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali**, on 31 January 1992, to prepare this document as a report to the Security Council not later than 1 July 1992. The name, *An Agenda for Peace*, derives from the title of Section X of the document. The document recommended numerous changes to UN **peacekeeping** operations. The secretary-general called for the following:

1. The establishment of peacekeepers for “**preventive deployment**” to areas prior to the outbreak of hostilities
2. The use of **demilitarized zones** in the “preventive deployment” of peacekeepers
3. The establishment of a new category of peacekeeping force to be known as “**peace enforcement**” operations
4. The establishment of a **standing army** for the United Nations
5. The setting up of a \$50 million revolving peacekeeping reserve fund
6. Improved training, especially language enhancement, for peacekeeping personnel
7. Prepositioning of basic peacekeeping equipment

**ANGOLA.** The Angolan civil war erupted upon achieving independence from Portugal in 1975, when various factions turned on each other for control of the government. During the 1950s and 1960s, the Angolans formed several groups to resist the domination of Portugal. The largest of these were the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Despite uneasy relations between the three groups,



they were able to achieve limited successes against the Portuguese government and military. In April 1974, a coup in Portugal brought a leftist-oriented government to power, which made the decision to free the state's colonial possessions in Africa. An attempt at reconciliation between the three major resistance groups failed, and independence dawned amidst civil war conditions as the transitional government collapsed. The MPLA, with Cuban and Soviet support, seized the capital of Luanda and held it against the other groups. The Soviet Union increased military aid to the MPLA, and the Cubans dispatched combat units to Angola. Meanwhile, UNITA and FNLA received increased CIA-supplied aid, while **South Africa** intervened militarily on their behalf. The civil war settled into a conflict between the MPLA and its Cuban allies and UNITA (with the support of South African military raids). By 1986, the **United States** began to openly channel military supplies to UNITA. A military stalemate resulted in an agreement for the withdrawal of Cuban and South African forces from Angola and the South African acknowledgment of independence for Namibia. In 1989, the **United Nations (UN)** fielded the **United Nations Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I)** in response to this peace process. UNAVEM I transitioned to the **United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II)** in 1991 to help prepare the country for national elections. Failure of the belligerents to accept the results of the elections prompted the formation of the **United Nations Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III)** in 1995, following a new peace agreement. The **United Nations Observer Mission in Angola** replaced UNAVEM III in 1997 and remained in the country until 1999.

**ANJOUAN.** *See* COMOROS, THE.

**ANNAN, KOFI.** Annan, a native of Ghana, served as the **United Nations (UN)** assistant **secretary-general for peacekeeping** from February 1992 to December 1993 and undersecretary-general for peacekeeping from March 1993 to December 1996, with a brief break in between during which he served as the **special representative** to the former **Yugoslavia**. Annan was a vocal advocate of maintaining an U.S. presence in the **United Nations Operation in Somalia I**. He oversaw the attempt to make a major overhaul of

how the UN coordinates peacekeeping operations and was an avid supporter of the calls for the establishment of a **stand-by force**. Annan openly criticized states, especially the **United States**, for their failure to pay peacekeeping dues to the UN. He has been quoted as reminding states that peacekeeping is “cheaper than war.” He served as secretary-general of the UN from January 1997 to January 2007. **Bernard Miyet** replaced Annan as undersecretary-general for peacekeeping in January 1997.

**ANTICIPATORY PEACEMAKING.** *See* PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENT.

**ARAB DETERRENT FORCE (ADF).** In October 1976, the **Symbolic Arab Security Force (ASF)** faced difficulties in **Lebanon**. The civil war had intensified, the Syrian army was on the offensive, and the Arab Force was too small and lacked the mandate to contain the spread of hostilities. In response, Saudi Arabia called **Syria**, **Kuwait**, **Egypt**, **Lebanon**, and the **Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)** to a meeting in Riyadh during October 1976. The six parties agreed at the **Riyadh Summit Conference** to transform the Arab Force into a larger **peacekeeping** organization with more authority to act in countering hostilities. The resulting **Riyadh Resolution** was accepted by the **League of Arab States** at the **Cairo Summit Conference** held during the same month. The states elected to increase the size of the mission to 30,000 soldiers, with the majority being Syrian. The new Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) would oversee a cease-fire in Lebanon, disengage the belligerents, and deter any violation of the former two points. The Lebanese president became the overall commander of the multinational operation, and he selected the military commander.

On 5 November 1976, President Ilyas Sarkis selected Colonel Ahmed al-Hajj, a Lebanese officer, as the first commander of the league’s peacekeeping mission. President Sarkis also determined the size of each participating contingent. Over the objections of the PLO, he requested the Syrians to contribute 25,000 soldiers to the force. Egypt refused to participate, and Syria vetoed a contingent from the PLO. Libyan (700 soldiers), Saudi Arabian (1,200 soldiers), and Sudanese (1,000 soldiers) units assigned to the ASF were incorporated

into the new operation. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) provided 1,000 soldiers, and South Yemen fielded 700 troops.

Units of the ADF, led by Syrian soldiers, deployed across Lebanon in an attempt to curb hostilities. They were prevented from entering southern Lebanon due to the presence of Israeli military units and eastern Beirut by Christian forces. The ADF could not move south of the **Litani** River, known as the **red line**, due to **Israel's** opposition to having a large Arab army so close to its border. Periodically, the league's troops used force, including heavy shelling of such villages as **Zahle**, to force belligerents to halt their fighting. The deployment of the **United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon**, in March 1978, introduced a political problem for the ADF. Syria regarded the **United Nations (UN)** peacekeeping operation as a challenge to the league's mission. In the eyes of Damascus, the deployment of the globally mandated operation indicated that the UN viewed the league's mission as being too weak to curb hostilities across Lebanon.

As the civil war continued, contingent providers began to question the wisdom of fielding military units with the ADF. As early as November 1976, Libya withdrew its soldiers from the operation. South Yemen brought its soldiers home in December 1977. Sudanese troops departed in February 1979. Saudi Arabian forces left in March 1979, and the UAE contingent withdrew in April 1979. The departure of the three contingents left Syria as the sole supplier of military units for the operation, thus underscoring the lack of confidence displayed by league members in the operation.

The league's Gulf states provided the majority of funding for the ADF. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia each paid 20 percent of the tab, while the UAE and Qatar contributed 15 percent and 10 percent, respectively. Despite the uneasiness of the Gulf states toward the force, they continued to fund it due to the lack of alternatives. Lebanon took the first step toward dismantling the ADF by requesting the termination of the force's mandate (which had not been renewed after its expiration on 27 July 1982) at the **Fez Summit Conference** in September 1982. A compromise with Syria, now engaged in an undeclared war with Israel in Lebanon, allowed for the termination of the mandate but did not order the immediate withdrawal of Syrian forces; however, the Gulf states announced that they would not fund the Syrian units since the peacekeeping mandate was officially terminated. The

possible vacuum in Beirut was filled by the troops assigned to the **Multinational Forces I** peacekeeping operation, while Syrian soldiers remained unilaterally in eastern Lebanon. Some have called the operation controversial because it moved from being a mandate of peacekeeping (ASF) to one of **peace enforcement** (ADF).

**ARAB LEAGUE.** *See* LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES.

**ARAB LEAGUE FORCE IN KUWAIT.** In 1961, the Council of the **League of Arab States** requested its **secretary-general** to organize a multinational operation to preserve the independence of Kuwait. Iraq had threatened to invade Kuwait, and the league wanted to replace the small British unit that was attempting to guarantee the independence of the new state. The league passed a resolution on 20 July 1961, calling for the removal of British troops from Kuwait and offering assistance from the organization to guarantee the independence of the new state. The league did, however, state in the same resolution that it would support any decision of Kuwait to voluntarily merge with any other member (i.e., Iraq). The Iraqi delegation walked out of the meeting, and the organization pressed forward with the preparations for a **peacekeeping** force.

The regional body signed an agreement with Kuwait on 12 August 1961, establishing the status of the proposed force. Libya and **Lebanon** declined invitations to contribute contingents, while the United Arab Republic (**Egypt** and **Syria**), Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Jordan, and Tunisia agreed to provide units to the mission. The force consisted of 3,300 troops, with the majority coming from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic. Each promised 1,200 soldiers. Jordan eventually fielded more than 1,000 soldiers, while Sudan provided 400 and Tunisia moved 200 to the Kuwait border. A special fund was established to finance the operation, with Kuwait providing most of the monetary resources. Major-General Abdullah Al-Isa of Saudi Arabia was selected as the **force commander**. The contingents began arriving in September, and the deployment was complete by 3 October 1961. The United Arab Republic quickly elected to withdraw from the operation after the last British soldiers departed Kuwait. The losses were replaced by Jordan and Saudi Arabia. The total numbers were increased to approximately 5,000 troops but were reduced in

December 1962. A February 1963 coup brought a more moderate government to power in Iraq, and the remaining contingents of the force were withdrawn during the same month.

**ARAB LEAGUE FORCE IN LEBANON.** *See* ARAB DETERRENT FORCE (ADF); SYMBOLIC ARAB SECURITY FORCE (ASF).

**AREA OF LIMITATION (AOL).** The Area of Limitation (AOL) extends from both sides of the **Area of Separation (AOS)** on the Golan Heights between the military forces of **Israel** and **Syria**. Each AOL is divided into three zones. The first zone extends outward from the AOS for 10 kilometers. Within this zone, the opponents may station up to 6,000 soldiers, 75 tanks, and 36 artillery pieces. The second zone runs from the 10-kilometer mark out to 20 kilometers from the AOS. In this zone, a state may post a maximum of 450 tanks and 162 artillery pieces. The third zone runs from 20 to 25 kilometers beyond the AOS. Each side is not allowed to post military units within this third zone. Beyond the 25-kilometer limitation, each side may keep whatever forces it desires. Although the **United Nations Disengagement Observer Force** patrols the AOS, the AOL is watched by personnel assigned to the **United Nations Truce Supervision Organization**.

**AREA OF SEPARATION (AOS).** In generic terms, an area of separation (AOS), sometimes known as a buffer zone, is a neutral band of territory established to separate belligerents. **Peacekeeping** forces often move into an AOS to help guarantee that each belligerent will remain on its side of the zone. In more specific terms, the neutral barrier zone between the forces of **Israel** and **Syria** on the Golan Heights is known as the Area of Separation. This neutral territory marks the disengagement line established between the two belligerents after the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The **United Nations Disengagement Observer Force** maintains positions within and patrols the AOS. *See also* AREA OF LIMITATION (AOL).

**ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINE (ADL).** The Armistice Demarcation Line (ADL) is the “border” surveyed between **Israel** and its neighbors following the 1948 War of Independence. The line is

observed by peacekeepers assigned to the **United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)**. The name derives from the fact that Israel has not signed peace treaties with all of its neighbors. Israel is officially in an armistice with the states of **Syria** and **Lebanon**. Despite Israel's peace treaty with **Egypt**, UNTSO observers still maintain posts along the common border of the two states in cooperation with the **Multinational Force and Observers** peacekeeping operation.

**ARTICLE 19 CRISIS.** This crisis evolved from the refusal of several states, including the Soviet Union and **France**, to pay their share of the **peacekeeping** assessments for early **United Nations (UN)** operations, including the **United Nations Truce Supervision Organization**, **United Nations Emergency Force I**, and **United Nations Operation in the Congo**. Article 19 of the UN Charter declares that if a state is behind in its dues to an amount equivalent to two years of regular contributions, its vote can be suspended in the General Assembly. The Soviet Union threatened to withdraw from the UN if its ability to vote in the General Assembly was suspended. The **United States** brought the crisis to an end by offering a compromise that permitted the states in arrears to decide which portions of the UN budget they would fund and which they would not pay. In turn, the United States also declared that it would adopt the same procedures. The United States still reserves the right to deny funding for UN actions with which it does not agree.

**ARTICLE 43 FORCES.** This is a term derived from Article 43 within the **United Nations (UN)** Charter, which discusses the use of military force to accomplish goals of the organization. The charter implies that the permanent members of the Security Council would provide the bulk of the military personnel in Article 43 Forces, as they did during the **Korean War** and **Persian Gulf War**; however, early **peacekeeping** operations did not abide by this concept. The permanent members of the Security Council were excluded from participation in most of the missions until the late 1980s. French involvement in the **United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon** and British participation in the **United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus** are notable exceptions; however, other than the **United**

**Nations Truce Supervision Organization** and other limited exceptions, U.S., Chinese, and Soviet personnel were excluded from UN peacekeeping operations until the end of the **Cold War**.

**ASSEMBLY POINT (AP).** Assembly point (AP) was the name given to collection areas for armed elements of the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army and the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army during the peace process in Zimbabwe from December 1979 to March 1980. The **Commonwealth Monitoring Force in Zimbabwe** planned to manage 16 APs during this period; however, the tactical situation allowed the force to open only 14 APs. Each contingent was responsible for the operation of at least one location (**Great Britain** five, **Australia** four, New Zealand three, Kenya one, and Fiji one). Normally, Patriotic Front troops reported to **rendezvous points** located primarily along Zimbabwe's borders with Zambia and Mozambique. After a brief stay, they were then bused to the APs, which were better equipped to handle large numbers of individuals; however, some Patriotic Front units reported directly to the APs due to their close proximity to the secondary locations. All Patriotic Front soldiers were scheduled to be moved to the APs by 5 January 1980. Numbers in each camp ranged greatly, from 30 to more than 6,000. By 9 January 1980, approximately 20,600 soldiers had reported to the APs, and the total rose to more than 22,000 by the time the commonwealth peacekeepers ended their mandate in March.

**ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN).** Originally founded in 1967 with five members, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) consists of 10 Asian countries. Members initiated formal cooperation in security-related areas in 1996 and on 1 March 2009, signed the ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint, which outlines greater cooperation in the fields. While the document does not establish an ASEAN **peacekeeping** force, the wording could permit this type of operation on an ad hoc basis. ASEAN cooperated with the **European Union** in the formation and deployment of the **Aceh Monitoring Mission** in September 2005.

**AUSTRALIA.** In March 2003, Australia ranked 12th among all **United Nations (UN)** members for the deployment of personnel with **UN peacekeeping** missions. By January 2010, it ranked 76th. One important reason for this is the increase in Australian participation in non-UN operations across the Pacific region. Australia emerged during the past decade as the **lead state**, along with New Zealand to a lesser degree, for deploying peacekeepers in the southern half of the Pacific. *See also* BOUGAINVILLE PEACE MONITORING GROUP (PMG); BOUGAINVILLE TRANSITION TEAM (BMT); BOUGAINVILLE TRUCE MONITORING GROUP (TMG); COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE (TONGA); INTERNATIONAL FORCE IN EAST TIMOR (INTERFET); INTERNATIONAL PEACE MONITORING TEAM (IPMT); INTERNATIONAL SECURITY FORCES (ISF) IN TIMOR-LESTE; REGIONAL ASSISTANCE MISSION IN THE SOLOMON ISLANDS (RAMSI); SOUTH PACIFIC PEACEKEEPING FORCE (SPPKF); UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN EAST TIMOR (UNAMET); UNITED NATIONS MISSION OF SUPPORT IN EAST TIMOR (UNMISSET).

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**BACELLAR, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL URANO TEIXEIRA DE MATTA.** Lieutenant-General Urano Bacellar, a citizen of Brazil, served as the **force commander** of the **United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti** from September 2005 until his suicide in January 2006. His death shocked the international community. Bacellar is the highest-ranking officer to have died while serving in a **United Nations peacekeeping** operation.

**BARIL, MAJOR-GENERAL MAURICE.** A Canadian officer, Baril served as a military adviser to the **United Nations** for **peacekeeping** operations. He was selected for the position in 1992 based partially on his peacekeeping experience as a regimental commander with the **United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus**. In 1994, Baril was named as the commander of the **United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda**.



**BARREL INCIDENT.** **United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)** personnel assigned to Jerusalem regularly inspected Israeli supplies being transported through a neutral zone to Mount Scopus, a Jewish enclave. During one inspection, a test rod being run into a barrel of oil touched a metal object. UNTSO inspectors demanded the removal of the barrel from the truck and further inspection to determine if weapons were being smuggled into Mount Scopus in violation of the cease-fire agreement. The drivers backed their trucks out of the neutral zone and then demanded the return of the barrel since they were no longer in a neutral zone patrolled by the **United Nations**. Lieutenant-General William E. Riley, the chief of staff of UNTSO, agreed to the request. This incident confirmed the Israeli assertion that peace observation and inspections by the UNTSO depended on the consent of the parties involved.

**BARRIER FORCE.** *See* INTERPOSITION FORCE.

**BASIC LAW.** The Basic Law is a term applied to the German Constitution written after World War II. The Basic Law contained a provision limiting the use and overseas deployment of military forces by **Germany**. The German government used the Basic Law to justify its decision not to contribute soldiers to **United Nations peacekeeping** operations. Further interpretations of the Basic Law after German reunification reversed the decision, and German soldiers deployed to **Somalia** with the **United Nations Operation in Somalia II**.

**BEITEDDINE CONFERENCE.** The Beiteddine Conference was a meeting of all troop-contributing states and/or financial backers of the **Arab Deterrent Force (ADF)** and the host state, **Lebanon**. The conference, convened on 15 October 1978, included the foreign ministers of **Syria**, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Kuwait, as well as representatives from Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and **Sudan**. The meeting called for the strict adherence to the **Riyadh Resolution** and Cairo Resolution, the curbing of “armed manifestations,” and the collection of all weapons retained contrary to the Cairo Agreement. The agreement also requested the ending of “information campaigns” and the prohibition of illegal radio and television broadcasts and newspapers. The ADF would assume limited responsibilities for monitoring

the latter provision. The conference also realigned some units of the ADF stationed in Beirut. *See also* CHATAURA AGREEMENT.

**BELGIUM.** *See* FRANCE; INTER-AFRICAN FORCE (IAF); UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA (UN-AMIR); UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN THE CONGO (ONUC).

**BERNADOTTE, COUNT FOLKE.** Count Bernadotte of Sweden served as mediator with the **United Nations Truce Supervision Organization** from May to September 1948. On 17 September 1948, Jewish terrorists assassinated Bernadotte in Jerusalem. He was replaced by **Ralph J. Bunche**, who assumed the title of acting mediator.

**BEST PRACTICES UNIT.** The Best Practices Unit, also known as the Best Practices Section, assists in the planning, conduct, management, and support of **United Nations (UN)** peacekeeping operations by tracking “lessons learned” from past missions and helping transfer these lessons to future missions.

**BIHAC.** The town of Bihac and its surrounding area in **Bosnia and Herzegovina** was a **safe area** of the **United Nations (UN)**. Muslim refugees were flowing into Bihac as a result of a local Serb offensive. Serb aircraft attacked Bihac on 18 November 1994. **North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)** aircraft struck a Serb airfield located in a **United Nations Protected Area** within **Croatia** in retaliation for the air strike against Bihac. Serb forces shelled Bihac on 25 November 1994 and eventually seized high ground overlooking the town. A stand-off in the area continued until the signing of the Dayton Accords in 1995. *See also* SREBRENICA.

**BIR, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL CEVIK.** Bir, a native of Turkey, was selected as the first **force commander** of **United Nations Operation in Somalia II** in 1993. A major factor in the selection of Bir, who had experience as a senior commander for the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization**, revolved around the refusal of the **United States** to place its soldiers under the command of officers from other

states. The United States did agree to place their forces under Bir as long as a U.S. officer would serve as his deputy. Bir complained in October 1993 that the contingents under his command reported to their home countries prior to carrying out his orders. He completed his tour of duty in January 1994.

**BLUE BERETS.** *See* BLUE HELMETS.

**BLUE HELMETS.** This was a nickname given to **United Nations (UN)** peacekeepers because of the blue paint applied to their helmets for identification as neutral soldiers. UN peacekeepers are also issued blue berets and are thus called “Blue Berets.” Peacekeepers first used the blue helmets during the **United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I)** following the Suez Crisis in 1956. **Egypt** noted its concern that the Canadians looked like the British soldiers who had invaded the Suez Canal area. In addition, many of the other UNEF I contingents wore uniforms manufactured in the **United States**. The UN needed to develop a clothing plan that would allow belligerents to be able to immediately recognize the neutrality of the peacekeepers. Arm bands and patches were ruled out since they could not be identified except at close range. The group working on the problem first thought of dyeing berets light blue; however, berets that could be properly dyed and retain the light blue color were not available. In response to the next day departure of peacekeepers assigned to UNEF I, the UN elected to use surplus U.S. helmet liners that could be easily painted blue. The solution to UNEF I’s problem has become a regular practice in UN **peacekeeping**, and now all assigned personnel are provided with blue helmets and blue berets.

**BONEO, HORACIO.** Boneo held two critical positions in **United Nations peacekeeping** operations. He served as the deputy chief of election observers for the United Nations Observation Mission to Verify the Electoral Process in Nicaragua and later as the chief of election observers for the **United Nations Observer Group for the Verification of the Elections in Haiti**.

**BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA.** In the 1980s, **Yugoslavia** began showing serious strains between the various ethnic groups compris-

ing the state. In June 1991, **Croatia** and Slovenia declared their independence from Serb-dominated Yugoslavia. The Serb minorities in the new states called for assistance and fighting erupted. The European Community and **West European Union** failed in their efforts to halt the conflict, and the **United Nations (UN)** became actively involved in September 1991. The UN mandated the **United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)** in February 1992 and deployed the operation by the summer of 1992. Hostilities continued and spread to Bosnia and Herzegovina, another territorial entity of Yugoslavia that declared its independence in 1992. UNPROFOR expanded its operations from Croatia to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The UN distinguished its peacekeepers in Bosnia and Herzegovina by renaming them the **United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina** in 1993.

In April 1993, the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)** agreed to enforce a no-fly zone over Bosnia and Herzegovina for the UN. In February 1994, NATO members, with the endorsement of the UN, authorized the organization to conduct air strikes in support of UNPROFOR. NATO conducted a short air campaign in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the summer of 1995. Following a series of crises, including the massacre at **Srebrenica**, NATO agreed to assume the peacekeeper role in the country and deployed the **Implementation Force (IFOR)** in 1995. NATO replaced IFOR with the **Stabilisation Force (SFOR)** in 1996 after the signing of the Dayton Accords peace process. The UN fielded the **United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina**, along with its associated **United Nations International Police Task Force**, to support the NATO peacekeeping effort. The **European Union (EU)** fielded the **European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina** in 2002, the **European Union Police Mission** in 2003, and the **European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina** in 2004. The **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe** established the **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina** in 1995.

**BOUGAINVILLE.** *See* SOLOMON ISLANDS.

**BOUGAINVILLE PEACE MONITORING GROUP (PMG).** A cease-fire agreement signed on 30 April 1998 led to the transition

of the **Bougainville Truce Monitoring Group** to the Bougainville Peace Monitoring Group (PMG). The PMG was mandated by the Lincoln Agreement and given the missions to monitor the compliance in the peace process, promote confidence among the groups, and provide the people of Bougainville with information on the peace process. The maximum authorized strength of the PMG was approximately 325 military and civilian personnel. **Australia** officially led the mission and provided 250 personnel. Additional personnel were dispatched by Fiji, New Zealand, and Vanuatu to serve in PMG. The peacekeepers were unarmed. Australia and New Zealand provided logistical assistance and training. The operation cost approximately \$13 million annually. In 2003, the **Bougainville Transition Team** replaced PMG. *See also* SOLOMON ISLANDS.

**BOUGAINVILLE TRANSITION TEAM (BMT).** The Bougainville Transition Team (BMT) provided a six-month transition after the completion of the **Bougainville Peace Monitoring Group's** mission. **Australia** and the other states associated with the PMG established the BMT in June 2003. The small operation consisted of 22 military observers from Australia, Fiji, New Zealand, and Vanuatu at an estimated cost of \$2.9 million. The BMT assisted with the final transition in the process outlined in the 2001 Bougainville Peace Agreement and officially departed on 31 December 2003. *See also* SOLOMON ISLANDS.

**BOUGAINVILLE TRUCE MONITORING GROUP (TMG).** The northern Solomon island of Bougainville, part of Papua New Guinea (PNG), experienced political turmoil and an armed insurrection beginning in the late 1980s. Many islanders resented being part of PNG and preferred their own independent state. Another problem involved the attitudes of the islanders toward a large copper mine. Many believed that they should share more from the mine's profits and were concerned about the environmental and land damage caused by the mine's operation. The Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) emerged in 1988 and forced the mines closure. PNG removed its military forces from Bougainville in 1990 but returned them in 1991 and 1992. A 1994 peace conference was overseen by the **South Pacific Peacekeeping Force**. Continued discussions between PNG

and various Bougainville groups led to peace talks in Burnham, New Zealand. The Burnham Declaration, resulting from the November 1997 discussions, served as the mandate for a new peacekeeping operation to be known as the Bougainville Truce Monitoring Group (TMG). The peacekeepers arrived in December 1997.

TMG's mandate included the monitoring of the truce agreement signed in Burnham to promote an atmosphere for continued negotiations. A cease-fire agreement signed on 30 April 1998 led to the transition of the TMG to the **Bougainville Peace Monitoring Group**. The maximum authorized strength of the TMG was approximately 325 military and civilian personnel. The mission was officially led by New Zealand. Additional personnel were provided by **Australia**, **Fiji**, and **Vanuatu**. Australia and New Zealand provided logistical assistance and training. The peacekeepers were unarmed. The operation cost approximately \$4 million. *See also* BOUGAINVILLE TRANSITION TEAM (BMT); SOLOMON ISLANDS.

**BOUTROS-GHALI, BOUTROS.** Boutros-Ghali, a citizen of **Egypt**, served as the **secretary-general** of the **United Nations (UN)** from 1992 to 1995. His leadership was marked by controversy in the field of **peacekeeping**. He held the post of secretary-general during the difficult periods of the **United Nations Protection Force** in the Balkans, **United Nations Operation in Somalia**, and **United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda**. He has been criticized for shaming the West for its involvement in European peacekeeping and ignoring the Third World. He demanded the commitment of peacekeepers in **Somalia** despite the lack of an effective peace process. In turn, Boutros-Ghali is also seen as a victim of Western politics within the UN.

**BRAHIMI REPORT.** *See* PANEL ON UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS.

**BRIQUEMONT, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL FRANCIS.** Briquemont, a native of Belgium, served as the commander of the **United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)** element assigned in **Bosnia and Herzegovina** between June 1993 and January 1994. Briquemont replaced French general **Philippe Morillon** in June 1993 and faced the difficult task of maintaining the peace between

Muslim, Serb, Croat, and Bosnian Serb forces while ensuring the delivery of humanitarian aid to civilians trapped during the civil war. **Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali** requested the replacement of Briquemont due to the latter's criticism of the **United Nations**. Briquemont reportedly declared that the organization needed more action in Bosnia and Herzegovina and fewer resolutions. He stated that there was a gap between the resolutions of the Security Council, the will to execute the resolutions, and the means available to commanders to carry out resolutions. He also referred to Bosnia as a soldier's nightmare and commented that peacekeepers assigned to the region felt humiliated at not being able to complete their mission. British Lieutenant-General **Michael Rose** officially replaced Briquemont in January 1994. *See also* COT, GENERAL JEAN.

**BRITISH METHOD.** The **rules of engagement** in the first half of the 20th century were utilized by the British army when assisting civilian governments. The British Method, adopted by the **Saar International Force** in 1935, involved maintaining highly visible military patrols before trouble erupted. When tensions increased, the military forces were hidden from view but kept in a large mobile reserve, while local police attempted to maintain order. *See also* CONTINENTAL METHOD; GREAT BRITAIN.

**BUFFER ZONE.** *See* AREA OF SEPARATION (AOS).

**BULL, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL ODD.** Bull, a Norwegian officer, was the "executive member in charge of military observers" for the **United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon** during its brief tenure of June to December 1958. In this capacity, Bull performed the same job that came to be titled **chief military observer** in future **peacekeeping** operations. He was also the chief of staff of the **United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)** from June 1963 to July 1970. Bull's seven-year position as commander of the mission is unique for the operation as well as for peacekeeping in general. Usually, the **United Nations (UN)** replaces its commanders within three years, and many commanders serve for approximately one year. Bull was chief of staff during the Six-Day War in 1967, when **Israel** denounced all of the **Mixed Armistice Commissions**

manned by UNTSO personnel. He faced the delicate task of persuading the belligerents to accept peacekeepers along the cease-fire line at the conclusion of hostilities.

**BUNCHE, RALPH J.** Bunche, a former U.S. diplomat, fulfilled the role of acting mediator for the **United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)** after the murder of **Count Folke Bernadotte** of Sweden on 17 September 1948. Bunche held this position until August 1949. He was also the first **special representative** of the **United Nations Operation in the Congo**. He served in this post from July to August 1960. In February 1963, Bunche, now an undersecretary, flew to Yemen to see firsthand the crisis in that state following an **Egyptian**-backed coup against the Saudi-supported royalist government. Bunche's work helped result in the establishment of the **United Nations Yemen Observation Mission**. Bunche received the **Nobel Peace Prize** in 1950 for his negotiation of the truce between **Israel** and the Arab states in 1949.

**BUNIA.** *See* INTERIM MULTINATIONAL EMERGENCY FORCE IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO.

**BURNS, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL E. L. M.** Burns, a native of Canada, served as the chief of staff of the **United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)** from August 1954 to November 1956. Immediately following this assignment, Burns became the first **force commander** for the **United Nations Emergency Force I** and held that position until December 1959. He was selected for the latter assignment due to his experience with UNTSO, immediate availability, and knowledge of the area and issues. In addition, Burns had earned the respect of the military commanders of **Israel** and **Egypt** while serving with UNTSO. **France** and **Great Britain** also respected the Canadian since he had been a senior Allied officer during World War II and had worked with fellow officers from both states.

**BURUNDI.** Conflict between the Hutu (85 percent of the population) and Tutsi (15 percent of the population) raged in Burundi since independence in 1962. Despite continued negotiations, successful



cease-fires eluded the belligerents. In February 1994, the **Organization of African Unity** dispatched **Organization of African Unity Mission in Burundi** to monitor the situation in the country and watch for conflict spillover from **Rwanda**. At a regional conference in Arusha, Tanzania, in June 1996, the government of Burundi requested a larger foreign military intervention to accompany the peace negotiation process. A technical meeting in July 1996 reaffirmed the request, and the **United Nations (UN)** endorsed the efforts; however, further discussions between the contingent pledging states and the belligerents failed to secure agreement on a mandated mission for the proposed operation, which collapsed before it was ever fielded. Five years later, **South Africa** heeded a second call for an international **peacekeeping** force and deployed a 700-man contingent to Burundi known as the **South African Protection Support Detachment**. Following a breakdown in the peace process, the government and rebels signed a new cease-fire in December 2002. This agreement resulted in the formation of two separate peacekeeping operations to oversee the new peace process. The first was an expansion of the South African unilateral peacekeeping mission to include troops from Ethiopia and Mozambique known as the **African Mission in Burundi**. While these three states provided the security needed to ensure that the peace process worked, the second peacekeeping mission actually oversaw the cease-fire itself and was known as the **African Union Cease-fire Observer Mission in Burundi**. The UN deployed the **United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB)** on 31 May 2004 to replace the two AU operations in support of a cease-fire in the country. ONUB withdrew on 31 December 2006, following successful progress in the peace process. South African troops remained in Burundi as the **African Union Special Task Force** until 31 December 2009. The UN replaced ONUB with the **United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi**, a political mission rather than a peacekeeping force administered by the UN's **Department of Peacekeeping Operations**. *See also* BURUNDI MODEL.

**BURUNDI MODEL.** The **African Union (AU)** faced considerable problems in offering member states immediate financial compensation and logistical support if they deployed troops in support of the **African Mission in Burundi (AMIB)**. In response, the AU

requested each country to deploy its peacekeepers and self-supply them for two months. Most African countries find this a tremendous challenge and can only accomplish it with financial and logistical support from outside the continent. The AU has repeated this formula in other operations, and it has become known as the Burundi Model and sometimes as the AMIB Concept.

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**CAIRO SUMMIT CONFERENCE.** The Cairo Summit Conference, held on 25–26 October 1976, examined the unanswered question of funding for the **Arab Deterrent Force (ADF)** that was to be fielded in **Lebanon**. The resolution resulting from the meeting called for the establishment of a special fund. Each member of the **League of Arab States** would pay an unspecified amount into the fund, which would be supervised by the president of Lebanon, in consultation with the **secretary-general** of the league and the states that contributed at least 10 percent of the total. The conference granted the fund a six-month renewable mandate. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait contributed 20 percent apiece, the United Arab Emirates offered to fund 15 percent, and Qatar pledged to pay 10 percent of the costs. The remaining league members did not offer to fund the upkeep of the force, leaving Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to pay the balance. The attendees, with the exception of **Iraq**, also approved the resolutions and statements issued by the parties at the **Riyadh Summit Conference** on 18 October 1976. This action officially granted league endorsement to the decisions made at the Riyadh Summit, which included the transformation of the **Symbolic Arab Security Force** into the ADF.

**CALLAGHAN, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL WILLIAM.** Callaghan, a native of Ireland, was the acting chief of staff (while in the grade of colonel) of the **United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)** from April 1978 to June 1979. He held the position of **force commander** of the **United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon** from February 1981 to May 1986. In 1982, Callaghan arranged an agreement between **Israel** and its opponents in **Lebanon** that stated that each party would show the maximum restraint when

confronting a breach in the cease-fire. Following this assignment, he became the chief of staff of UNTSO and remained in that post until June 1987.

**CAMBODIA.** *See* UNITED NATIONS ADVANCE MISSION IN CAMBODIA (UNAMIC); UNITED NATIONS TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY IN CAMBODIA (UNTAC).

**CARLSSON REPORT.** *See* INDEPENDENT INQUIRY INTO THE ACTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS DURING THE 1994 GENOCIDE IN RWANDA.

**CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (CAR).** The Central African Republic (CAR) achieved its independence from **France** in 1960 and quickly became an unstable state as faction leaders struggled for leadership. French-backed David Dacko emerged as head of state in the country. A 1965 coup brought Jean-Bédél Bokassa to power. In 1976, Bokassa declared himself an emperor and renamed the country as the Central African Empire. A French-supported coup ousted Bokassa in 1979 and returned Dacko to power. André Kolingba ousted Dacko via another coup in 1981. Kolingba, under international pressure, held a presidential election in 1993, which was won by Ange Félix Patassé. Lengthy economic problems, including the failure to pay salaries, helped fuel domestic unrest and a series of military mutinies against the government. The presidents of Burkina Faso, Chad, Gabon, and Mali secured a truce between progovernment and rebel forces in the state. On 25 January 1997, the belligerents signed the Bangui Agreements as a step toward a political settlement. The agreements called for the fielding of a joint French–African **peace-keeping** operation known as the **Inter-African Force in the Central African Republic (MISAB)** that deployed to the CAR on 8 February 1997. The **United Nations (UN)** recognized the inability of the African states in MISAB to continue the operation after the pending withdrawal of French troops and logistical support and mandated the **United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA)** to replace MISAB. The global organization fielded MINURCA in April 1998, and the operation successfully helped oversee the election process in the country before departing by the end of

June 2000. The UN replaced MINURCA with the **United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA)**, a field office of the Department of Political Affairs. BONUCA provides UN presence for the coordination of the global organization's multiple efforts in the CAR, as well as a liaison with other international organizations working in the country.

In May 2001, elements of the army mutinied again and attacked the presidential palace. Patassé remained in power thanks to the timely arrival of Libyan soldiers, Chadian troops, and rebel soldiers of Jean-Pierre Bemba's Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC), who crossed the border to aid their ally. Libyan soldiers remained in the CAR and countered a November 2001 coup attempt. Libyan political and economic interests in the CAR prompted the state to persuade the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) to allow it to organize a peacekeeping mission for the CAR known as the Community of Sahel-Saharan States Peacekeeping Force in the Central African Republic. CEN-SAD members mandated the mission in March 2002. Opposition by neighboring states to the Libyan military presence in the CAR resulted in replacement of the CEN-SAD mission by the **Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States Multinational Force in the Central African Republic (FOMUC)** on 19 December 2002. An offensive of troops supportive of former CAR general Francois Bozize in March 2003 resulted in a quick overthrow of Patassé while the latter attended a CEN-SAD summit. Upon assuming power in the CAR, Bozize requested that FOMUC not only remain in the country but also that it be increased in size. Violence across the border in **Sudan** began spilling over into neighboring countries. In response, the UN officially mandated a temporary operation to provide security along the borders of Sudan with Chad and the CAR. The **European Union (EU)** agreed to assume responsibility for this mission and named its operation the **European Union Force Chad/Central African Republic (EUFOR TCHAD/RCA)**. EU military personnel began arriving in the area on 28 January 2008. Seven months later, FOMUC transitioned to the **Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in Central Africa (MICOPAX)** on 12 July 2008. The UN mandated a new peacekeeping operation, the **United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT)** to replace the

temporary EU mission. MINURCAT officially assumed the EUFOR TCHAD/RCA's mandate on 9 March 2009, terminating the latter operation. *See also* ELEMENTS FRANCAIS D'ASSISTANCE OPERATIONELLE (EFAO).

**CHAD.** The country of Chad has suffered from civil conflict since its independence in 1960. Several major factions were in competition for control of the Chadian government by the late 1970s. The turmoil in Chad attracted several external countries, including **France**, the former colonial power, and Libya, both of which militarily intervened in Chad. As the civil strife continued and repeated attempts at a peaceful settlement failed, **Nigeria** persuaded the major belligerents to accept a unilateral **peacekeeping** operation comprising its soldiers. This 1979 unilateral attempt at Nigerian peacekeeping failed. The **Organization of African Unity**, with Nigerian prompting, agreed to discuss the possibility of mandating a multinational peacekeeping operation for Chad. The organization fielded one contingent of the **Organization of African Unity Peacekeeping Force in Chad I** in 1980. Upon the withdrawal of that contingent, the organization planned and fielded the **Organization of African Unity Peacekeeping Force in Chad II** from 1981 to 1982. The main rebels simply ignored the presence of the peacekeepers and overthrew the government. In 1994, the **United Nations (UN)** fielded the **United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group** to oversee the withdrawal of Libyan military forces from the Aouzou Strip in northern Chad.

Civil conflict continued in Chad and later became more directly linked to strife in **Sudan**. The Darfur region of Sudan has been a favorite sanctuary for Chadian rebel groups for decades. In 2008, the **European Union** deployed the **European Union Force Chad/Central African Republic (EUFOR TCHAD/RCA)** to protect refugees who had fled to the two countries from the violence in Sudan. The UN replaced EUFOR TCHAD/RCA with the **United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad** in 2009.

**CHAND, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL DEWAN PREM.** Chand, a citizen of **India**, was the **force commander** of the **United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus** between December 1969 and De-

ember 1976. He was named the force commander designate for the **United Nations Transition Assistance Group** in Namibia in January 1980. He held that position until March 1989, when he assumed the title of force commander upon the deployment of the **peacekeeping** mission. He held the latter post during the duration of the operation, which ended in March 1990.

**CHAPTER SEVEN PEACE ENFORCEMENT.** The **United Nations (UN)** Charter does not specifically provide a provision for the mandating of **peacekeeping** operations. Chapter Seven of the UN Charter allows the international organization to conduct collective security military operations; however, the UN did mandate the **United Nations Operation in Somalia II** under Chapter Seven to ensure that the peacekeepers had the authorization to defend themselves and carry out their humanitarian mission. Since 2000, the UN has increasingly utilized Chapter Seven for mandating operations to give the mission personnel clearer authority to use force to protect themselves, their equipment, and others. *See also* CHAPTER SIX-AND-A-HALF PEACEKEEPING; CHAPTER SIX PEACEKEEPING.

**CHAPTER SIX-AND-A-HALF PEACEKEEPING.** The **United Nations (UN)** Charter does not specifically provide a provision for the mandating of **peacekeeping** operations. “Chapter Six-and-a-Half Peacekeeping” is a term sometimes applied to peacekeeping operations that go beyond the simple separation of belligerents following a successful cease-fire and have to use some type of force to ensure mission accomplishment. *See also* CHAPTER SEVEN PEACE ENFORCEMENT; CHAPTER SIX PEACEKEEPING.

**CHAPTER SIX PEACEKEEPING.** The **United Nations (UN)** Charter does not specifically provide a provision for the mandating of **peacekeeping** operations. In response, the Security Council has tended to mandate these missions, especially those sometimes referred to as **first generation peacekeeping**, under Chapter Six of the UN Charter, which provides for the “*pacif settlement of disputes.*” *See also* CHAPTER SEVEN PEACE ENFORCEMENT; CHAPTER SIX-AND-A-HALF PEACEKEEPING.

**CHARDIGNY COMMISSION.** *See* VILNA MILITARY COMMISSION.

**CHATAURA AGREEMENT.** The Chataura Agreement, concluded on 25 July 1977, involved representatives from **Lebanon, Syria,** and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). The agreement added new responsibilities to the **Arab Deterrent Force (ADF)** deployed in Lebanon. The document placed restrictions on the Palestinians by persuading them to comply with earlier agreements that limited their possession of weapons and presence in southern Lebanon. The ADF was given the authorization to collect Palestinian heavy weapons, banned by the Cairo Agreement, and launch unannounced inspections of Palestinian camps. The **League of Arab States** did not endorse the agreement, but it was generally accepted since the president of Lebanon, responsible for overall command of the ADF in accordance with the **Riyadh Resolution,** and the **force commander,** were present for the negotiations. *See also* BEITEDDINE CONFERENCE.

**CHIEF MILITARY OBSERVER (CMO).** This title is given to the military commander of a **United Nations** observation mission. This term should not be confused with **force commander,** although they perform similar duties.

**CHINA.** The People's Republic of China (PRC) played a very minimal role in multinational **peacekeeping** until the first decade of the 21st century. During the **Cold War,** all five of the permanent members of the **United Nations (UN)** Security Council participated in few peacekeeping operations to reduce tensions during conflicts in which they had interests. At the same time, the PRC viewed many peacekeeping operations as instruments of Western foreign policy and declined to deploy contingents with them. After the Cold War, the attitude of the PRC toward UN peacekeeping softened, but the state still did not deploy a large contingent with an operation. The PRC did dispatch small numbers of military observers with various missions. In January 2000, the PRC ranked 42nd compared to other countries for the deployment of personnel with UN peacekeeping operations. In March 2010, the PRC ranked 14th and is the most active of the

Security Council permanent members. The other four permanent members tend to be more active in regional peacekeeping missions, while China concentrates on UN peacekeeping due to the few missions fielded in Asia.

**CIVILIANIZATION OF PEACEKEEPING.** *See* PRIVATIZATION OF PEACEKEEPING.

**COALITION PEACEKEEPING FORCE.** *See* COLLECTIVE PEACEKEEPING FORCE.

**COLD WAR.** During the Cold War, the permanent members of the **United Nations (UN)** Security Council played minimal roles in the deployment of troops in support of the organization's **peacekeeping** operations. This was due to many reasons, including the need to reduce perceptions of peacekeeper impartiality among belligerents and the desire to avoid large power confrontation in Third World conflicts. The permanent members are **France, Great Britain, China, Russia** (Soviet Union), and the **United States**. After the end of the Cold War, around 1990, each state, with the exception of China, increased its direct participation in UN peacekeeping; however, by 1996, each state was concentrating more on regional peacekeeping missions rather than those of the UN, and by 2009, China rose to be the most active of the permanent members in UN peacekeeping.

**COLLECTIVE PEACEKEEPING FORCE.** “Collective Peacekeeping Force” is the generic term of the **Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)** and is applied to any temporary coalition of military units mandated and fielded by the organization as a **peacekeeping**-type operation. The term “Coalition Peacekeeping Force” is also utilized by some sources. One of the challenges of reviewing CIS or Russian peacekeeping operations is the establishment of names for the missions. Non-Russian sources tend to have different names for the same mission partly due to translation variations.

**COLLECTIVE RAPID REACTION FORCE (KSOR).** *See* COLLECTIVE SECURITY TREATY ORGANIZATION (CSTO).



**COLLECTIVE SECURITY TREATY ORGANIZATION (CSTO).**

Several members of the **Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)** formed the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) on 2 October 2002. Current CSTO membership includes **Russia**, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, **Tajikistan**, and Uzbekistan. The CSTO emerged from the 1992 CIS Collective Security Treaty. Some signatories of the 1992 agreement opted out of the CSTO, which is viewed by many as a means to legitimize Russian security interests in the territory of the former Soviet Union. On 4 February 2009, CSTO members agreed to form a Collective Rapid Reaction Force (KSOR) that can be deployed for a variety of security missions, including **peacekeeping** operations. Uzbekistan did not formally sign the document establishing the CSTO but does cooperate with the CSTO in matters related to the KSOR.

**COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE–HAITI.** *See* MULTINATIONAL INTERIM FORCE HAITI.

**COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE (TONGA).** Prodemocracy demonstrations erupted on Tonga in November 2006. At least six people died in the riots that followed, and it is estimated that more than half of the downtown area in the capital suffered severe damage. The government requested assistance from New Zealand and **Australia**. New Zealand led the operation, simply referred to as the Combined Joint Task Force. The mission, mandated by a bilateral request between Tonga with each state rather than an international organization, deployed on 18 November 2006. The mission included opening Tonga's airport and supporting the Tongan defense forces as they restored order. New Zealand contributed approximately 71 troops and 45 police, while Australia deployed approximately 50 troops and 61 police. Personnel assigned to the operation began withdrawing on 2 December 2006; however, a small number of police from New Zealand remained on Tonga until March 2007.

**COMBINED MARITIME FORCE (CMF).** The Combined Maritime Force (CMF), also known as Combined Task Force 150, is a multinational task force of naval vessels assigned to support antiterrorist operations in the Arabian Sea and western Indian Ocean. Headquartered

in Djibouti and formed after 11 September 2001, the CMF consists of approximately 15 ships with overall command rotating between participant states. In 2004, the CMF merged with **Combined Task Force 151** and added antipiracy operations off **Somalia** as one of its responsibilities.

**COMBINED TASK FORCE 150.** *See* COMBINED MARITIME FORCE (CMF).

**COMBINED TASK FORCE 151.** Combined Task Force 151 was a multinational task force of naval vessels assigned to support antipiracy operations off the coast of **Somalia** between 2002 and 2004. In 2004, the task force merged with Combined Task Force 150, which is also known as the **Combined Maritime Force**.

**COMBINED TASK FORCE 158.** Combined Task Force 158 is a multinational task force consisting of naval vessels from the **United States, Australia, and Great Britain** working to help train Iraqi sailors and patrolling the northwestern end of the Persian Gulf. The most notable incident involving Combined Task Force 158 occurred in 2007, when Iran seized 15 British sailors, claiming they had strayed into its territorial waters.

**COMMITTEE OF THIRTY-FOUR.** *See* UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.

**COMMITTEE OF THREE.** The **League of Nations** appointed the Committee of Three to develop recommendations in reference to the functions, composition, organization, and financing of the **Saar International Force**.

**COMMONWEALTH.** The Commonwealth, also known as the Commonwealth of Nations, is a free association of sovereign states that include former British colonies, **Great Britain**, and current British dependencies. The organization, established in 1931, currently includes 54 members. The purpose of the organization is to promote trade and other forms of cooperation among the member states. The Commonwealth does not have a defense protocol but has organized

under British leadership to field one **peacekeeping** operation known as the **Commonwealth Monitoring Force in Zimbabwe**. *See also* COMMONWEALTH CEASE-FIRE COMMISSION; COMMONWEALTH OBSERVER GROUP; ORGANIZATION OF EAST CARIBBEAN STATES (OECS).

**COMMONWEALTH CEASE-FIRE COMMISSION.** The Commonwealth Cease-Fire Commission, chaired by **Major-General J. H. B. Acland**, examined breaches of the cease-fire in Zimbabwe. The group also included a Rhodesian general, a Rhodesian Air Force officer, General Dabengwa of the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army, and General Nhongo of the Zimbabwe National Liberation Army. The commission met every two weeks during the mandate of the **Commonwealth Monitoring Force in Zimbabwe**. Major-General Acland requested and received permission to use the commission to tour the **assembly points** to ensure that all of the armed groups understood the necessity of cooperation during the tense early period of the peace process.

**COMMONWEALTH MONITORING FORCE IN ZIMBABWE (CMF).** Zimbabwe, known as Rhodesia prior to gaining full independence in 1980, faced an internal conflict that began when white settlers refused to allow **Great Britain** to implement a program for majority rule in the territory. When negotiations between Great Britain and the settler regime, led by Ian Smith, collapsed, the latter announced a unilateral declaration of independence in November 1965. The **United Nations (UN)** placed economic sanctions on Rhodesia, but they were ineffective due to the assistance provided to Smith by **South Africa** and Portugal. The two major African parties, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), declared a war of independence against the Smith regime in April 1966. As early as December 1966, Great Britain attempted to negotiate with Smith to peacefully implement a plan for majority rule in Rhodesia. The settler regime refused to budge, and the conflict intensified. The two African nationalist groups formed the Patriotic Front in 1976 to coordinate their military campaign and provide a united front for negotiations. In 1978, Smith signed an internal settlement as a last attempt to preserve white rule

in Rhodesia. Bishop Abel Muzorewa won a majority in the parliament, but the Patriotic Front refused to accept the settler-dictated internal settlement and increased their offensive operations. Muzorewa did not implement expected internal reforms in the country and never exercised control of the armed forces.

Both parties in the conflict were persuaded to attend an independence conference in London. This led to the signing of the Lancaster House Agreement, which ended the conflict and established the Commonwealth Monitoring Force in Zimbabwe (CMF) to oversee the transitional process. The **Commonwealth** states agreed to field a multinational **peacekeeping** force, officially named the Commonwealth Monitoring Force in Zimbabwe, to assist in the disarming of the armed opponents in the conflict. The CMF was mandated by Annex E of the Lancaster House Agreement. Annex E also stated that the cease-fire would become effective at midnight on 21 December 1979. At this time, all military movement would cease and, at midnight on 28 December 1979, all hostilities would cease. Rhodesian Security Forces were to regroup under the authority of the new British-selected governor, and Patriotic Front units were to move to **rendezvous points** manned by the CMF. All Patriotic Front forces would then be transported to **assembly points (APs)** by midnight on 4 January 1980. The Patriotic Front demanded that the CMF be comprised of Commonwealth and not only British soldiers. The Patriotic Front felt that its soldiers would be too vulnerable gathered in large camps and also wanted a large multinational unit to guarantee their security. The British originally envisioned deploying approximately 300 of their own soldiers. In compliance with this Patriotic Front request, the Commonwealth built the force around 1,250 British soldiers but also added approximately 300 troops from other members of the organization. The states volunteering to participate in the peacekeeping mission included **Australia** (150 soldiers), New Zealand (74 soldiers), Kenya (50 soldiers), and Fiji (24 soldiers).

Great Britain financed the entire CMF, including the needs of the other contingents. London also provided the majority of the logistics and transportation. The **United States** offered assistance in the movement of the peacekeepers to Zimbabwe. The British built their element around Headquarters 8 Field Force, named **Major-General J. H. B. Acland** as the overall military commander, and nicknamed

the mission Operation Agila. The CMF established its headquarters in Salisbury, the capital of Zimbabwe, and dispatched its teams to more than 100 locations, including 16 Assembly Points and 22 Rendezvous Points, scattered across the country. The peacekeepers eventually set up only 14 APs, of which four were operated primarily by Australians, three by New Zealanders, and one each by Kenya and Fiji. To distinguish themselves as peacekeepers and not Rhodesian forces, the Commonwealth troops flew large British Union Jacks, used loudspeakers and bright lights, and wore white armbands. The Patriotic Front also stationed liaison officers at each Commonwealth location to ensure that their soldiers did not mistake the area as being hostile.

The CMF faced great difficulties in accomplishing its tasks. It frequently experienced tense encounters as Patriotic Front soldiers reported to the camps. Each side was nervous and suspicious of the other. Many of the camps lacked adequate water sources, which tested the logistical system of the Commonwealth soldiers. In addition, the countryside still harbored uncharted mines that occasionally took their toll on vehicles operated by the peacekeepers. Despite the logistical difficulties in caring for and transporting more than 22,000 former guerrilla soldiers between December 1979 and March 1980, the CMF has been credited with completing its mission in a highly successful manner. *See also* COMMONWEALTH OBSERVER GROUP; UNITED NATIONS ZIMBABWE FORCE.

**COMMONWEALTH OBSERVER GROUP.** The Commonwealth established the Observer Group to oversee the election process in Zimbabwe. The observers arrived in Zimbabwe on 24 January 1980. The group, chaired by Rajeshwar Dayal of **India**, consisted of 11 senior advisers and 22 assistant advisers. The senior advisers were selected from the Commonwealth states of **Australia**, Bangladesh, Barbados, Canada, Ghana, Jamaica, **Nigeria**, Papua New Guinea, **Sierra Leone**, and Sri Lanka. Each senior adviser formed a team with two of the assistant advisers. The teams were sent to observation locations on an ad hoc basis to ensure that all parties in the peace process followed the rules of the election process. At one point, the group caught a Rhodesian air unit dropping anticommunist leaflets in a remote rural area. The group is noted for being the first Common-

wealth election observation group to work alongside a **peacekeeping** organization, in this case the **Commonwealth Monitoring Force in Zimbabwe**. The Commonwealth Observer Group unanimously declared that the elections in Zimbabwe were free and fair.

**COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES (CIS).** The former Soviet republics formed the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) on 21 December 1991, in conjunction with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The organization, originally comprising all of the former republics of the former Soviet Union, except Georgia (which later joined the organization in 1993 following the introduction of **Russian** soldiers in the Georgian civil war and then withdrew after the August 2008 conflict with Russia), Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, was established as a military and economic umbrella organization and has its coordination center (headquarters) in Minsk. All of the CIS member states, except Turkmenistan, signed an agreement on “Groups of Military Observers and Collective Peacekeeping Forces in the CIS” in March 1992. The Ukraine did reserve the right to review each peacekeeping operation on a case-by-case basis. In 2002, seven CIS members formed the **Collective Security Treaty Organization**, under which much of the Russian-led multinational security planning occurs.

The CIS has officially mandated and deployed peacekeepers to two areas of the former Soviet Union, although it can be easily argued that the international units are actually carrying out Russian foreign policy along its periphery. Several CIS members, including the Ukraine, have objected to Russia’s interventions in the name of peacekeeping despite the March 1992 agreement. Marshal Evgenii Shaposhnikov, the former commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces General Staff, commented in December 1992 that the CIS needed to show greater coordination in security issues, especially **peacekeeping**, to ensure that the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization** did not adopt a position of establishing peacekeeping operations along Russia’s borders. In December 1993, the **Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe** voted to deploy 1,000 military observers to Nagorno-Karabakh. Since then, the **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe**, the **European Union**, and the **United Nations** have fielded observer operations to countries that

once comprised the Soviet Union. One of the challenges of reviewing CIS or Russian peacekeeping operations is the establishment of names for the missions. Non-Russian sources tend to have different names for the same mission partly due to translation variations. For the purposes of this book, the CIS operations are referred to as the **Commonwealth of Independent States Peacekeeping Forces in Georgia (Abkhazia)** and the **Commonwealth of Independent States Collective Peacekeeping Force (Tajikistan)**. *See also* COLLECTIVE PEACEKEEPING FORCE.

**COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES COLLECTIVE PEACEKEEPING FORCE (TAJIKISTAN).** In 1993, **Tajikistan** and **Russia** signed an agreement permitting Russian soldiers to deploy along the former's border with Afghanistan following a period of postindependence instability. On 24 September 1993, the **Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)** mandated the Commonwealth of Independent States Collective Peacekeeping Force (also known as the CIS Tajikistan Buffer Force). The operation consists of 6,631 soldiers from Russia and Kazakhstan. It is interesting to note that the operation officially commenced in August 1993, a month prior to the mandate. The formal CIS mandate expired on 16 September 2000. The Russian 201st Motorized Rifle Division has remained to continue the mission without an official CIS mandate but under a bilateral agreement between Russia and Tajikistan. Fatalities have not been openly reported, and the cost of the operation is difficult to determine. One of the challenges of reviewing CIS or Russian peacekeeping operations is the establishment of names for the missions. Non-Russian sources tend to have different names for the same mission partly due to translation variations. This operation is also referred to as the **Collective Peacekeeping Force**, the **Coalition Peacekeeping Force**, and the **Commonwealth of Independent States Tajikistan Buffer Force**.

**COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES PEACEKEEPING FORCES IN GEORGIA (ABKHAZIA).** **Georgia** faced an attempt by Abkhazia to separate itself from the country soon after independence following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Abkhazia is located in the northwestern part of the country. The unrest

devolved into open fighting by the summer of 1992, after Georgia deployed 2,000 soldiers to the region. **Russia** negotiated a cease-fire agreement between the two parties on 2 September 1992. The agreement collapsed on 1 October 1992, and Abkhazia allied itself with elements in Russia who sought political autonomy from that state. The **United Nations (UN)** became involved in the conflict resolution process, along with the **Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe**, later renamed the **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe**. On 27 July 1993, the belligerents agreed to sign a new cease-fire document. The agreement called for the deployment of international observers to monitor the cease-fire. The UN Security Council mandated the **United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia** with Resolution 850 (1993) on 24 August 1993. The purpose of the operation is to verify the cease-fire of 27 July 1993, between the government of Georgia and the rebel province of Abkhazia, as well as monitor the **Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) peacekeeping** operation. The CIS peacekeepers in Georgia, actually 1,700 Russian troops, were under a CIS mandate from 15 April 1994 and arrived in June 1994. Following the 2008 conflict between Russia and Georgia, the former recognized Abkhazia as a sovereign country and terminated the peacekeeping mission as of 1 October 2008. The CIS formally ended the mission a year later, in September 2009; however, Russian troops remained under a bilateral agreement with Abkhazia. Thus, Russian troops simply “changed hats” from CIS peacekeepers to soldiers deployed to a neighboring state under a bilateral defense arrangement. One of the challenges of reviewing CIS or Russian peacekeeping operations is the establishment of names for the missions. Non-Russian sources tend to have different names for the same mission partly due to translation variations. Minor variations to the name utilized in this book can be found in other sources. *See also* EUROPEAN UNION MONITORING MISSION IN GEORGIA; SOUTH OSSETIA JOINT PEACEKEEPING FORCE; UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN GEORGIA (UNOMIG).

**COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES TAJIKISTAN BUFFER FORCE.** *See* COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES COLLECTIVE PEACEKEEPING FORCE (TAJIKISTAN).



**COMMUNITY OF LUSOPHONE COUNTRIES (CPLP).**

The Community of Lusophone Countries (CPLP) is an international organization grouping Portugal and former Portuguese colonies (**Angola**, Brazil, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and Sao Tome and Principe). In May 1999, CPLP defense ministers agreed to establish a mechanism for mandating and fielding a CPLP **peacekeeping** force when required. The mechanism included provisions for the joint training of national military units as a single peace force capable of conducting humanitarian operations. The CPLP holds small annual peacekeeping-type exercises within a member state. The CPLP has not fielded any peacekeeping missions under its own mandate.

**COMMUNITY OF SAHEL-SAHARAN STATES PEACEKEEPING MISSION IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC.**

In May 2001, the **Central African Republic (CAR)** faced a crisis as elements of the army mutinied and attacked the presidential palace. President Ange Félix Patassé remained in power thanks to the timely arrival of Libyan soldiers, Chadian troops, and rebel soldiers of Jean-Pierre Bemba's Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC), who crossed the border to aid their ally. Libyan soldiers remained in the CAR and countered a November 2001 coup attempt. Libyan political and economic interests in the CAR prompted the state to persuade the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) to allow it to organize a **peacekeeping** mission for the CAR. A CEN-SAD subcommittee mandated the CEN-SAD peacekeeping force for the CAR on 3 December 2001, followed by approval of the entire organization on 4 March 2002.

Although limited troops from **Sudan** and Eritrea deployed under the mandate, the operation was essentially a means to provide international legitimacy for the Libyan military intervention in the CAR. As a result, the **African Union (AU)**, **United Nations (UN)**, and **Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States (CEMAC)** refused to provide CEN-SAD with approvals for the peacekeeping mandate and deployment. The AU called for a UN peacekeeping operation; the UN responded that the various African organizations needed to coordinate their efforts and solve the controversy; and CEMAC eventually mandated its own replacement for the CEN-SAD operation of approximately 300 peacekeepers funded by

Libya. Local and international pressure finally persuaded Libya, as well as Sudan and Eritrea, to withdraw their troops upon replacement by the **Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States Multinational Force in the Central African Republic (FOMUC)** in December 2002. Although the last Libyan troops departed the CAR at the end of December, Tripoli officially announced that the transition occurred on 19 December 2002. FOMUC would be later replaced by the **Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in Central Africa**.

**COMOROS, THE.** The Comoros Islands lie off the eastern coast of Africa. Separatists on two islands, Anjouan and Moheli, attempted to secede in 1997. The **Organization of African Unity (OAU)** quickly stepped in and offered to mediate the crisis. The OAU mandated the **Organization of African Unity Observer Mission in the Comoros I (OMIC I)** to support its efforts. OMIC I arrived in 1998 and departed the following year. After the departure of the small OAU force, the organization continued to threaten Anjouan with a more robust military force to compel it to move toward complete secession. The Comoros held a referendum on the issue and presented a new Union Constitution that provided Anjouan with greater self-rule while remaining a part of the country. The OAU readmitted the Comoros to the organization following its removal in 1999, after a military seizure of the government. The OAU mandated a small observer team in December 2001, known as the **Organization of African Unity Observer Mission in the Comoros II (OMIC II)**, and deployed it in January 2002. OMIC II's official mission ended in February 2002, and the operation evolved into the **Organization of African Unity Observer Mission in the Comoros III (OMIC III)** in March 2002. OMIC III provided election supervision and security duties in the country and departed in May 2002.

The OAU evolved into the **African Union (AU)**, which mandated the **African Union Mission for Support to the Elections in the Comoros (AMISEC)** in March 2006. AMISEC withdrew from the Comoros in June 2006, following the conclusion of the election process. AU peacekeepers returned to the Comoros the following year to support new elections in an operation known as the **African Union Electoral and Security Assistance Mission in Comoros (MAES)**.

President Mohammed Bacar of Anjouan refused to cooperate in the election process. In accordance with a request from the Comoros, the AU provided MAES with a new mandate authorizing the use of force to settle the crisis. Troops from the Comoros and MAES invaded and seized control of the island in March 2008.

**CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE (CSCE).** The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) consisted of the European states, the **United States**, Canada, and the former Soviet Union. In 1992, the body sent 20 observers to the Serbian province of Kosovo but withdrew them when the Serbs ordered the group to depart the state. The CSCE established Sanctions Assistance Missions in the countries bordering the Federal Republic of **Yugoslavia** to assist with the sanctions imposed by the **United Nations (UN)**. In 1994, the CSCE transformed itself into a more permanent body known as the **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe**.

**CONFERENCE FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE MISSION TO GEORGIA.** *See* ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE MISSION TO GEORGIA.

**CONFERENCE FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE MISSION TO MOLDOVA.** *See* ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE MISSION TO MOLDOVA.

**CONFERENCE FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE MISSION TO TAJIKISTAN.** *See* ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE MISSION TO TAJIKISTAN.

**CONFERENCE FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE SPILLOVER MONITOR MISSION TO SKOPJE.** *See* ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE SPILLOVER MONITOR MISSION TO SKOPJE.

**CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE.** The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) received independence under the name Republic of the Congo in 1960. Belgium did not properly prepare the country for independence compared to the transition established by **Great Britain** for its African colonies. The new government of the Republic of the Congo emerged with Patrice Lumumba as prime minister and Joseph Kasavubu as president. A political confrontation between the two men quickly developed, and the ensuing problems attracted the attention of neighboring African states as well as countries external to the continent, including the **United States** and Soviet Union. The situation worsened as Katanga Province launched an attempt to secede from the country. The political and humanitarian problems attracted the attention of the **United Nations (UN)**, which mandated the **United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC)** to support the peace process. The mandate for ONUC altered more than once, moving the operation into playing an active military role in holding the country together as a single entity. ONUC departed in 1964.

In 1977 and 1978, dissidents launched operations into Shaba Province of the country, now known as Zaire. **France**, and later Belgium, helped organize international efforts each year to protect Western civilians and economic assets. In 1978, the **Inter-African Force (IAF)** deployed to Zaire to replace French and Belgian troops.

Political problems continued to grow in the country. In 1996, a regional conflict erupted as neighboring countries intervened in the civil strife, resulting in a change of government and a new name, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in 1997. The conflict flared again in 1998, and the government called for UN support for a peace process. In response, the UN Security Council mandated the **United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)** on 6 August 1999. Fighting continued in the eastern regions of the country, taxing the efforts of MONUC to support a peace process. The **European Union (EU)** fielded the **Interim Multinational Emergency Force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo** in June 2003 to support MONUC. The force departed in September 2003. In December 2004, the EU mandated the **European Union Police Mission in Kinshasa (EUPOL KINSHASA)** to support the national elections process in the country. The EU established

the **European Union Advisory Assistance Mission for Security Reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo** on 2 May 2005, to provide security assistance advice. The **European Union Force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo** arrived in the DRC and Gabon prior to the July 2006 national elections and departed the area by the end of November. The EU mandated the **European Union Police Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo** on 12 June 2007, to replace EUPOL KINSHASA that same month. All of the EU missions operated in the DRC simultaneously with MONUC. On 1 July 2010, the UN replaced MONUC with the **United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)**. The latter is essentially a slightly smaller MONUC. DRC opposition groups claimed that the government needed MONUC to remain in power and that the operation's continued presence signaled that there had been no progress in the peace process. The renaming and slight remandating of MONUSCO by the UN followed demands by the DRC government to decrease MONUC and do something that demonstrates peace progress. In reality, the change is an alteration of the name and a 10 percent reduction in manpower.

**CONTADORA GROUP.** This informal group was formed in 1983 by Columbia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela. The group, later joined by Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, developed the Procedure for the Establishment of a Firm and Lasting Peace in Central America in August 1987. The agreement paved the way for joint cooperation by the **United Nations** and the **Organization of American States** and the eventual deployment of the **United Nations Observer Group in Central America**.

**CONTINENTAL METHOD.** This method describes the **rules of engagement** for working with civilian governments generally practiced by states on the European continent during the first half of the century. The practice involved displaying a large military presence at all times when assisting civilian authorities in maintaining order. *See also* BRITISH METHOD.

**COSTA DEL SOL DECLARATION.** The Costa del Sol Declaration, also known as the Tesoro Beach Agreement, resulted from a meeting

of representatives of Costa Rica, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua with the **secretary-general** of the **United Nations (UN)** on 8 February 1989. The declaration dealt with coordination of the technical aspects behind supporting the Procedure for the Establishment of a Firm and Lasting Peace in Central America. The UN eventually deployed the **United Nations Observer Group in Central America** to monitor the peace process in Central America.

**COSTA RICA.** *See* INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SUPPORT AND VERIFICATION.

**COT, GENERAL JEAN.** Cot, a citizen of **France**, filled the position as **force commander** of the **United Nations Protection Force** between July 1993 and March 1994. **United Nations (UN) secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali** requested the removal of Cot following the latter's criticism of the international organization in January 1994. Cot called for the use of **North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)** aircraft in a close support role when needed by peacekeepers in **Bosnia and Herzegovina**. After NATO authorized the use of its aircraft in support of the **peacekeeping** operation, Cot asked Boutros-Ghali to request air strikes to protect peacekeepers in Sarajevo. In both cases, Boutros-Ghali did not forward the request to NATO authorities. Cot compared the peacekeeping force in Bosnia to a "goat tethered to a fence" and criticized Boutros-Ghali for not acting on his promises to call upon NATO air support when requested by the force commander. In response, Boutros-Ghali delegated the political authority to seek NATO air support to **Yasushi Akashi**, the secretary-general's **special representative** in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and then asked France to replace Cot before the end of March 1994. *See also* UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA.

**COTE D'IVOIRE.** Côte d'Ivoire proved to be a showcase for political stability after independence in 1960 under the leadership of President Felix Houphouët-Boigny and security of the French army. Instability struck the country following the death of Houphouët-Boigny in 1993. In 1999, General Robert Guei led a coup that ousted President Henri Konan Bédié. Discussions over a national presidential election

in 2000 led to confrontations between supporters of the leading candidates—General Guei and Laurent Gbagbo. A strong economy compared to most West African states between 1960 and 1993 attracted many immigrants to the country who now faced questions about their status and voting rights in the country. Gbagbo won the election but still faced considerable political opposition. The various political factions formed a government of national unity in August 2002. The next month, elements of the army mutinied, supposedly over their pending demobilization from military service. President Gbagbo was in Italy at the time, and General Guei died during the fighting. Claims and counterclaims place Guei as a leader of the revolt and an innocent victim. By the end of the month, rebel forces held the northern half of the country, and two new armed groups emerged claiming to avenge General Guei. In response, **France** deployed its soldiers based in the country to protect foreign citizens, and both parties in the conflict claimed that the French supported the other side. The French military effort evolved into a peacekeeping operation known as **Operation Licorne**. In October 2002, the **Economic Community of West African States** mandated the **Economic Community of West African States Mission in Côte D'Ivoire (ECOMICI)**. The **United Nations** mandated a political mission, the **United Nations Mission in Liberia**, in May 2003 to support the peace process in the country. This operation evolved into a **peacekeeping** mission, the **United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI)**. In April 2004, peacekeepers deployed with ECOMICI merged into UNOCI.

**CROATIA.** In the 1980s, **Yugoslavia** began showing serious strains between the various ethnic groups comprising the state. In June 1991, Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence from Serb-dominated Yugoslavia. The Serb minorities in the new states called for assistance, and fighting erupted. The European Community failed in its efforts to halt the conflict, and the **United Nations (UN)** became actively involved in September 1991. The UN mandated the **United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)** in February 1992 and deployed the operation by the summer of 1992. Hostilities continued and even spread to other areas of the former Yugoslavia. As UN peacekeepers expanded their presence across the region, the UNPROFOR mission in Croatia shifted to a new operation in 1995,

known as the **United Nations Confidence Restoration Mission in Croatia (UNCRO)**. In 1996, UNCRO's mandate ended, and the UN replaced it with the **United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka** and the **United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium**. The UN also mandated the **United Nations Police Support Group** in 1997 to perform the police-related duties for the latter mission. In 1996, the **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Mission to Croatia** deployed to the country and remained there until 2007, when it was replaced by the **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Office in Zagreb**.

**CYPRUS.** *See* UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS (UNFICYP).

– D –

**DALLAIRE, BRIGADIER-GENERAL ROMEO A.** Dallaire, a Canadian officer, was selected as the **chief military observer** of the **United Nations Observer Mission in Uganda–Rwanda** in 1993. He also became the **force commander** of the **United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda**. Dallaire, in a well documented case, attempted to warn the **United Nations** and the West that a potential massacre was brewing in **Rwanda**. He was ignored, and the resulting genocide took the lives of approximately 800,000 people.

**DARFUR.** *See* SUDAN.

**DAYAL, RAJESHWAR.** Dayal, a native of **India**, was selected as one of the three members of the Observation Group headquarters assigned to the **United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon** from June to December 1958. In addition, he served as the **special representative** of the **United Nations Operation in the Congo** from September 1960 to May 1961. He was the first non-American to hold this position. Dayal's selection displayed the concern of the **United Nations** with placing someone in the position who was from a neutral Third World state.



**DECLARATION OF SAN ISIDRO DE CORONADO.** Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua issued the Declaration of San Isidro de Coronado on 12 December 1989. The five states requested an extension of the mandate for the **United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA)**. The states asked the **United Nations** to verify both the cessation of hostilities and the demobilization of irregular forces throughout Central America. The task required the addition of combat units to ONUCA. The Security Council responded by passing Resolution 650 (1990) on 27 March 1990. In response, ONUCA, using a combat battalion deployed from Venezuela, demobilized Nicaraguan resistance members located in Honduras in April 1990.

**DEMILITARIZED ZONE.** An area, normally linear, in which the military forces of belligerents are forbidden to enter. In **peacekeeping** operations, the multinational soldiers normally operate within these established zones, if they have been established. *See also* INTERPOSITION FORCE.

**DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (DRC).** *See* CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE.

**DEPARTMENT OF FIELD SUPPORT (DFS).** The **United Nations** established the Department of Field Support in 2007. The organization, originally part of the **Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)**, developed from the need to have a more robust staff supporting **peacekeeping** missions in the field, while DPKO continued to provide expertise in other areas associated with the planning and development of missions. The organization has approximately 460 permanent personnel and is headed by an individual holding undersecretary-general level rank.

**DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS (DPKO).** The **United Nations (UN)** established the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in 1992 to serve as a permanent office within the organization for the planning and oversight of **peacekeeping** missions. The DPKO is headed by an undersecretary-general of the UN. The organization includes an Office of Operations, Office of the

Rule of Law and Security Institutions, Office of Military Affairs, and a Policy, Evaluation, and Training Division. The UN has a separate **Department of Field Support**.

**DIBUAMA, MAJOR-GENERAL TIMOTHY K.** Dibuama, a native of Ghana, was the military adviser to the **secretary-general** of the **United Nations** between 1977 and 1992. He headed a military group assigned to travel to the Western Sahara to gather information for the development of the **United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara**. On 12 July 1992, Dibuama assumed command of the **United Nations Iraq–Kuwait Observation Mission**.

**DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.** *See* INTER-AMERICAN PEACE FORCE (IAPF); REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC (DOMREP).

– E –

**EAST TIMOR.** *See* INDONESIA.

**ECONOMIC AND MONETARY COMMUNITY OF CENTRAL AFRICAN STATES (CEMAC).** Cameroon, the **Central African Republic (CAR)**, Chad, Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon formed CEMAC in 1999 to promote a common currency (the CFA franc) and economic integration. The organization fielded the **Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States Multinational Force in the Central African Republic (FOMUC)** in December 2002 in the CAR.

**ECONOMIC AND MONETARY COMMUNITY OF CENTRAL AFRICAN STATES MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (FOMUC).** Libyan soldiers intervened in the **Central African Republic (CAR)** in May 2001 and November 2001 to maintain President Ange Félix Patassé in power, prompting the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) to mandate the **Community of Sahel-Saharan States Peace-keeping Mission in the Central African Republic**. The **Economic**

**and Monetary Community of Central African States (CEMAC)** mandated its own peacekeeping operation on 2 October 2002 to replace the CEN-SAD mission and force the removal of the Libyan soldiers from the CAR. International and local pressure persuaded Libya to accept the CEMAC replacement operation. The Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States Multinational Forces in the Central African Republic (FOMUC) officially replaced the CEN-SAD operation on 19 December 2002. Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, and Congo-Brazzaville deployed peacekeepers under the FOMUC mandate, while monetary and logistical assistance came from **France, the European Union, and China.**

An offensive of troops supportive of former CAR general Francois Bozize in March 2003 resulted in a quick overthrow of Patassé, while the latter attended a CEN-SAD summit. With the president out of the country, peacekeepers from Gabon and Equatorial Guinea did not intervene to halt Bozize, since the former's life was not in danger; however, the soldiers from Congo-Brazzaville, assigned in a different location, were not sure how to interpret the mandate and offered brief resistance resulting in the deaths of at least three peacekeepers. CEMAC adopted the original CEN-SAD mandate of protecting the CAR's president. Upon assuming power in the CAR, Bozize requested that FOMUC not only remain in the country but also that it be increased in size. As a result, Chad, a CEMAC member and supporter of Bozize, dispatched a contingent. By May 2003, FOMUC consisted of approximately 200 soldiers from Gabon, 200 from Congo-Brazzaville, 100 from Chad, and 30 from Equatorial Guinea, supported by a French military deployment of approximately 200 men. FOMUC became more active in providing security within the CAR after a mid-2005 modification of the mandate and participated with French troops in some small operations in the northern part of the country. FOMUC later transitioned to the **Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in Central Africa** on 12 July 2008. *See also* EUROPEAN UNION FORCE CHAD/CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (EUFOR TCHAD/RCA); UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC AND CHAD (MINURCAT); UNITED NATIONS PEACEBUILDING SUPPORT OFFICE IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (BONUCA).

**ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES (ECOWAS).** The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is a subregional organization in Western Sub-Saharan Africa. The organization, established in 1975, has 15 member states (membership tends to fluctuate based on suspensions by the organization after coups). The basic purpose of the group is to liberalize trade between the members and establish a common market. The members signed a mutual defense protocol in 1981. This document was used to justify the mandating of subregional **peacekeeping** operations. ECOWAS was quite active in the deployment of peacekeeping operations in the decade of the 1990s but has mandated fewer missions since 2000. This is partially due to the recent increase in **United Nations (UN)** peacekeeping operations in West Africa, often following ECOWAS missions. ECOWAS oversees West Africa under the **African Stand-by Force** arrangement of the **African Union**.

ECOWAS missions have been hampered by funding and logistical issues as well as accusations that the peacekeepers were more interested in making illegal profits from the deployments than in serving as neutrals in support of the peace process. The **Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group in Liberia** carried the standard ECOWAS acronym of ECOMOG; however, many individuals commented that the ECOMOG acronym stood for “Every Car and Other Moving Object Gone” due to charges of looting by Nigerian officers. Reports claim that Nigerian naval vessels returning from Liberia carried Mercedes and other high end vehicles looted from the country. Other reports charge Nigerian peacekeepers with looting “blood” diamonds from Sierra Leone.

Due to ongoing funding and logistical challenges, ECOWAS missions are often followed by operations mandated by the **United Nations (UN)**. The new mission carries UN funding and logistical support but is heavily manned by the peacekeepers transferred by the replaced ECOWAS mission and troops from other African states. Two examples include the **Economic Community of West African States Mission in Côte d’Ivoire**, followed by the **United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire** and the **Economic Community of West African States Mission in Liberia**, and its replacement, the **United Nations Mission in Liberia**. *See also* ECONOMIC

COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES MONITORING GROUP IN GUINEA; ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES MONITORING GROUP IN GUINEA-BISSAU; ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES MONITORING GROUP IN SIERRA LEONE.

**ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES FORCE IN COTE D'IVOIRE (ECOFORCE).** *See* ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES MISSION IN COTE D'IVOIRE (ECOMICI).

**ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES MISSION IN COTE D'IVOIRE (ECOMICI).** The **Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)** convened an emergency summit on 29 September 2002, following the collapse of **Côte d'Ivoire** into political chaos. A follow-on meeting of the ECOWAS Defense and Security Commission recommended the deployment of a **peacekeeping** operation to support the peace process. ECOWAS mediators persuaded the belligerents to agree to a cease-fire on 17 October 2002. President Gbagbo requested **France** to officially assign elements of its army to provide security until the arrival of the ECOWAS force. The French peacekeeping effort is known as **Operation Licorne**. ECOWAS approved a more formal proposal for peacekeeping troops on 26 October 2002, with a mandate to monitor the cessation of hostilities; facilitate the restoration of public services and the free movement of goods and services; make a general contribution to the peace process; and guarantee the safety of observers, humanitarian aid personnel, and insurgents. ECOWAS member states did not immediately contribute troops for the operation due to logistics and financial issues, necessitating that French troops cover the entire cease-fire line. ECOWAS troops began arriving in January 2003, to support the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. Originally, the West African operation was known as the Economic Community of West African States Force in Côte d'Ivoire (ECOFORCE) to distinguish it from the earlier Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group missions. Later, ECOWAS officially altered the operation name to the Economic Community of West African States Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (ECOMICI).

Benin, Ghana, Niger, Senegal, and Togo deployed personnel for ECOMICI. The operation consisted of approximately 1,500 soldiers and 70 civilian police (50 from Niger and 20 from Togo) at an annual cost of approximately \$23.6 million. The **United States** contributed half of the budget. **United Nations (UN)** Security Council Resolution 1464 of 4 February 2003 endorsed the dual efforts of ECOWAS under ECOMICI and France under Operation Licorne and provided the global organization's mandate, which mirrored the one originally outlined by ECOWAS. In February 2004, the UN agreed to form the **United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI)**, a peacekeeping mission to replace its political predecessor known as the **United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire**. In April 2004, the ECOWAS peacekeepers of ECOMICI officially transferred into UNOCI.

**ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES MISSION IN LIBERIA (ECOMIL)**. Conflict between the government of Charles Taylor, the main rebel leader in Liberia, and the opposition factions in **Liberia** intensified in 2003, resulting in negotiations and a June 2003 cease-fire. The **United States** dispatched 2,300 marines on three vessels following international political pressure for U.S. action to stabilize Liberia. The U.S. government proved reluctant to introduce troops into Liberia, where they could become targets for factional forces. As a result, the United States persuaded **Nigeria** and the **Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)** to assume the mission of providing a **peacekeeping** force for Liberia. U.S. forces landed in Liberia in small numbers, often referred to as Joint Task Force Liberia, as a quick reaction force until the arrival of Nigerian soldiers beginning on 4 August 2003. The Nigerians officially intervened with two battalions as the vanguard of an ECOWAS peacekeeping operation known as the Economic Community of West African States Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL). The United States provided logistical support for the operation.

ECOMIL consisted of approximately 3,800 troops from Benin, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, and Togo at an annual cost of \$4.1 million. The mandate of the operation, as outlined in **United Nations** Security Council Resolution 1497 of 2003, included monitoring the disengagement of armed factions, obtaining

information on the activities of the armed factions, establishing the conditions for successful disarmament and demobilization activities, ensuring the security of senior political and military leaders, protecting personnel associated with the peace process, and monitoring the collection and storage of weapons. The **United Nations Mission in Liberia** absorbed the personnel of ECOMIL on 1 October 2003, effectively terminating the latter mission after three months on the ground as an ECOWAS operation. ECOMIL suffered four fatalities during its short duration.

**ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES MONITORING GROUP IN CÔTE D'IVOIRE.** *See* ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES MISSION IN CÔTE D'IVOIRE (ECOMICI).

**ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES MONITORING GROUP IN GUINEA.** Conflict in **Liberia** and **Sierra Leone** continued to spillover into Guinea. The **Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)** fielded the **Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group in Liberia** and the **Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group in Sierra Leone** in attempts to halt the spread of the civil conflict. In 1994, more than 50,000 refugees had fled to Guinea from Liberia. At the same time, Guinea provided training bases for groups who were fighting Charles Taylor, the main Liberian opposition figure. By 1998, there were more than 297,000 refugees from Liberia and Sierra Leone in Guinea, and in 1999, reports indicated that the Guinean army was operating within the territory of Liberia and Sierra Leone. Liberia retaliated and raided villages in Guinea. To halt the spread of the regional conflict, ECOWAS proposed the mandating of a **peacekeeping** operation for deployment to Guinea, a member of the organization. The ECOWAS states mandated the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group in Guinea and agreed to deploy 1,700 peacekeepers, most of them from **Nigeria**, in February 2001; however, February arrived and the peacekeepers were not able to deploy due to reluctance on the part of Guinea to allow them to enter its territory. ECOWAS continued negotiations with Guinea throughout much of 2001, but the state refused to permit the

introduction of the peacekeepers on its soil. The peacekeepers never deployed to Guinea.

**ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES MONITORING GROUP IN GUINEA-BISSAU.** Elements of the military rebelled against the government of Guinea-Bissau in June 1998. In response, Senegal dispatched 2,500 soldiers, and Guinea sent 500 troops to the country in support of the government. Both countries acted out of concern for their national interests and did not deploy under an international **peacekeeping** mandate. In November 1998, the belligerents signed a peace agreement that called for a cease-fire, the departure of the troops from Senegal and Guinea, and the introduction of a peacekeeping operation from the **Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)**.

Senegalese and Guinean troops departed the country in March 1999 as peacekeepers of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group in Guinea-Bissau arrived to replace them. On 6 April 1999, the **United Nations (UN)** endorsed the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) operation. ECOMOG's mandate included providing security at the international airport, assisting with humanitarian aid deliveries, and disarming the belligerents. ECOMOG departed following the ouster of Guinea-Bissau's president by the rebel forces despite the cease-fire. The last ECOMOG forces left the country by 7 June 1999. The maximum strength of ECOMOG in Guinea-Bissau was 712 peacekeepers from Benin, Gambia, Niger, and Togo.

**ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES MONITORING GROUP IN LIBERIA.** The **Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)** Standing Mediation Committee met between 6 and 7 August 1990, to examine alternatives for settling the civil war in **Liberia**. The committee recommended the establishment of an ECOWAS monitoring group to oversee a cease-fire in Liberia. The Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) would consist of contingents from the committee members (Gambia, Ghana, Mali, **Nigeria**, and Togo), as well as Guinea and **Sierra Leone**. Officially, ECOMOG would supervise the implementation and compliance with a cease-fire by all parties until a freely elected



government could be installed. The committee also recommended that ECOWAS set up a special emergency fund to finance ECOMOG. Mali and Togo backed out of the operation prior to its arrival in Liberia by sea on 24 August 1990. Ghana selected the **force commander**, Lieutenant-General Arnold Quainoo, to lead the 3,500 peacekeepers who initially comprised the operation.

Charles Taylor, the main rebel leader in Liberia, refused to accept ECOMOG's mission and declared that the peacekeepers were not neutral in the conflict. He attacked the ECOMOG forces in Monrovia, forcing the contingents to move from a pure **peacekeeping** mission to one more in line with **peace enforcement**. Nigeria charged that Quainoo was too conservative in using force and unilaterally replaced him with Major-General Joshua Dogonyaro. After Dogonyaro established control in Monrovia and its hinterland, the civil war settled into a stalemate of intermittent cease-fires between the belligerents and ECOMOG. Senegal joined ECOMOG in 1991, and Mali did the same the following year. By August 1992, ECOMOG's strength stood at approximately 9,000 soldiers. The next month, Taylor launched a major offensive against ECOMOG. The peacekeepers counterattacked with ground troops and air power. Senegal, disillusioned and suffering several fatalities, elected to withdraw from ECOMOG during January 1993. Estimates placed the strength of ECOMOG at approximately 12,000 after Senegal's withdrawal. At this time, the **United Nations (UN)** recognized that Taylor would probably never view ECOMOG as a neutral tool for peace and increased its own deliberations on the subject of settling the civil war.

The belligerents signed what is known as the Cotonou Peace Agreement on 25 July 1993. This document called for a new cease-fire and proposed the introduction of military observers from the UN. Discussions at the UN led to the mandating of an all-African peacekeeping operation to assist ECOMOG and meet Taylor's demands for a truly neutral military force prior to free elections. This operation, known as the **United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia**, deployed to Liberia in 1993. The Liberian civil unrest spread to Sierra Leone and Guinea as rebels crossed the border into each state. After many false starts, a peace process finally brought elections to Liberia. Taylor won the election for the presidency. ECOMOG departed Liberia by mid-1999 but did leave a small number of troops in

the country to watch the border with Sierra Leone. The financing of ECOMOG by ECOWAS proved to be a failure. The member states refused to contribute to the operation, and diplomats were not successful in their original attempts to secure cash at the UN. Nigeria paid the vast majority of the ECOWAS tab. Later, the **United States** began contributing a small sum annually to assist ECOMOG.

**ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES MONITORING GROUP IN SIERRA LEONE.** Civil war erupted in **Sierra Leone** in March 1991 as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), with assistance from rebels in **Liberia**, attempted to overthrow the government. The **Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group in Liberia** dispatched an element of peacekeepers, led by **Nigeria**, to assist the government in Sierra Leone. The peacekeepers contained the RUF with the assistance of Sierra Leone's military, which later overthrew the government on 29 April 1992. The Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group in Sierra Leone can be seen as this deployment, as well as a reinforcement of Nigerian troops in 1997. In 1996, following the country's first democratic elections since 1967, President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah signed a peace agreement with the RUF. On 25 May 1997, the military launched another coup, toppling President Kabbah, and then formed an Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) under Major Johnny Koroma. The AFRC invited the RUF to join it. Although Koroma remained the nominal head of government, the RUF essentially wrestled control of the government from the AFRC. Nigerian soldiers were already in Sierra Leone under a bilateral agreement at the time of the May 1997 coup. Nigeria quickly reinforced its soldiers in Sierra Leone and actively engaged the AFRC forces. Guinean troops assisted Nigeria, but those of Ghana chose to withdraw, declaring that they preferred a negotiated settlement. Nigeria found itself in a tough situation, and many of its soldiers were taken hostage by the AFRC. Some **Economic Community of West African States** member states criticized Nigeria for acting without a mandate from the organization at that time; however, by late 1997, Nigerian actions in Sierra Leone were being endorsed by the **Organization of African Unity**, the **Commonwealth**, and the **United Nations (UN)** as appropriate responses to military officers who had overthrown a democratically elected government.

In February 1998, a Nigerian-led Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) offensive forced the AFRC and RUF to abandon Freetown, and President Kabbah returned to power in Sierra Leone. Fighting in the rural areas continued. The UN Security Council mandated the **United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL)** on 13 July 1998, with Resolution 1181, to assist with the disarming of combatants and restructuring the military of Sierra Leone. UNOMSIL included an authorized 70 military observers and approximately 120 other personnel; however, the operation was slow in being manned and fielded, and approximately half of its mandated strength was actually on the ground by the middle of 1999. In December 1998, RUF forces infiltrated into Freetown, initiating the heaviest fighting in the country's civil war. ECOMOG regained the upper hand by late January 1999. UNOMSIL personnel evacuated Sierra Leone and traveled to Guinea during this period.

On 7 July 1999, the belligerents signed the Lomé Accord. This agreement called for a cease-fire and disarmament/demobilization to be overseen by a new UN **peacekeeping** operation. On 22 October 1999, the Security Council mandated the new peacekeeping operation, the **United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)**, and ordered that the new organization absorb the mission and personnel of UNOMSIL. By early 2000, UNAMSIL absorbed the ECOMOG forces in Sierra Leone, and the African mission was phased out. The RUF forces did not completely adhere to the terms of the Lomé Agreement, prolonging the civil war.

It has been estimated that the maximum strength of ECOMOG forces in Sierra Leone stood at approximately 15,000 soldiers—the majority being Nigerian. Total ECOMOG fatalities in Sierra Leone have not been released and are still controversial in Nigeria, where civilian groups claim that the government continues to cover up the total number of casualties. The total cost of the ECOMOG operation has also not been released since Nigeria funded much of the mission. It is known that the **United States** and other Western countries contributed cash to help pay for ECOMOG.

**ECUADOR.** See MISSION OF MILITARY OBSERVERS ECUADOR-PERU (MOMEPE).

**EGYPT.** Egypt has hosted several **peacekeeping** operations as a result of its conflicts with **Israel**. In 1948, Egypt and several other Arab states attacked Israel after the latter's declaration of independence. Following the war, the **United Nations (UN)** deployed observers of the **United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)** along Israel's borders. In 1956, Israel attacked Egypt, in cooperation with **Great Britain** and **France**, across the Sinai Peninsula. In response, the UN deployed the **United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I)**, the organization's first largescale peacekeeping mission. In 1967, Israel attacked Egypt, Syria, and Jordan in what is often referred to as the Six-Day War. UNTSO observers shifted to the area along the Suez Canal. The 1973 Yom Kippur War resulted in the return of a large UN peacekeeping operation known as the **United Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF II)** along the cease-fire line with Egypt. Negotiations led to a 1979 peace treaty that replaced UNEF II with the **Multinational Force and Observers**, which monitors the border between Egypt and Israel. Israeli confrontations with Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, which borders Egypt, have resulted in the **European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories** and the **European Union Border Assistance Mission at Rafah**.

**ELÉMENTS FRANÇAIS D'ASSISTANCE OPÉRATIONNELLE (EFAO).** **France** has maintained permanent military garrisons in Africa since the end of the colonial period. These troops, known as *Eléments français d'assistance opérationnelle (EFAO)*, are based primarily in **Côte d'Ivoire**, Djibouti, Gabon, and Senegal. France has utilized the EFAO to protect its interests in Africa and maintain friendly governments in power. On two occasions, the EFAO stabilized a crisis situation and then handed the security duties to a French-organized **peacekeeping** operation fielded with African contingents. The first occurred in Zaire during 1978, when the EFAO was replaced by the **Inter-African Force**. The second incident happened in 1997, when the **Inter-African Force in the Central African Republic** assumed security from the French. In 2002, the EFAO, with reinforcements from France, commenced a mission known as **Operation Licorne** with the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group in Côte d'Ivoire during the civil crisis in

Côte d'Ivoire; however, prolonged problems in securing a cease-fire delayed its withdrawal.

**ELISABETHVILLE.** Elisabethville, a town in secessionist Katanga province of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, was a center of opposition to the **United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC)**. **United Nations (UN)** Security Council Resolution 169 (1961) of 24 November 1961 authorized ONUC to use force in the removal of mercenaries in Katanga. On 28 November 1961, two UN officials were beaten. Over the next few days, several peacekeepers assigned to ONUC and based in Elisabethville were abducted and beaten. Other peacekeepers were killed or wounded in ambushes. ONUC peacekeepers in Elisabethville managed to hold on until 14 December 1961, when reinforcements were brought in to assist them. On 15 December 1961, the peacekeepers in Elisabethville were of sufficient strength to launch their own offensive.

**EL SALVADOR.** *See* UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN EL SALVADOR (ONUSAL).

**ENCLAVES.** *See* SAFE HAVENS.

**ENHANCED INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING CAPABILITIES (EIPC).** The Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC) served as a “train-the-trainer” program to help prepare soldiers across the globe for **peacekeeping** duties. EIPC provided training for senior military personnel in 31 countries. These individuals then served as trainers for personnel in their military forces. Although heavily funded by the **United States**, EIPC was a global program that began in 1998. The **Global Peace Operations Initiative** replaced EIPC in June 2004. *See also* AFRICAN CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS TRAINING AND ASSISTANCE (ACOTA); AFRICAN CRISIS RESPONSE INITIATIVE (ACRI).

**ERITREA.** *See* AFRICAN UNION LIAISON MISSION IN ETHIOPIA–ERITREA (AULMEE); UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA (UNMEE).

**ERSKINE, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL EMMANUEL A.** Erskine, an army officer from Ghana, was the first African to command a **United Nations (UN) peacekeeping** operation fielded outside of the African continent. He was the chief of staff of the **United Nations Truce Supervision Organization** in the Middle East from January 1976 to April 1978 and from February 1981 to May 1986. He also served as the first **force commander** of the **United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon** from March 1978 to February 1981. Erskine was originally named as the first commander of the **Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group in Liberia**; however, he did not take command of this operation. The reason for this change is not clear.

**ETHIOPIA.** *See* AFRICAN UNION LIAISON MISSION IN ETHIOPIA–ERITREA (AULMEE); UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA (UNMEE).

**EUROPEAN COMMUNITY.** *See* EUROPEAN UNION (EU).

**EUROPEAN COMMUNITY MONITORING MISSION (ECMM).**  
*See* EUROPEAN UNION MONITORING MISSION (EUMM).

**EUROPEAN RENFORCEMENT DES CAPACITÉS AFRICAINES DE MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX (EURORECAMP).** European Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix (EURORECAMP) replaced the **Reinforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix** program of **France** on 21 November 2007. The program coordinates Europeanwide assistance for the training of African peacekeepers, particularly under the **African Stand-by Force** system. EURORECAMP provides training, financial, and logistical assistance. *See also* AFRICAN CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS TRAINING AND ASSISTANCE (ACOTA); AFRICAN CRISIS RESPONSE INITIATIVE (ACRI); ENHANCED INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING CAPABILITIES (EIPC); GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS INITIATIVE (GPOI).

**EUROPEAN UNION (EU).** The European Union (EU) unites 27 European states into a close economic, political, and social union,

although some individual countries do not participate as fully as others. The EU evolved from the European Community on 1 November 1993, and members have a Common Foreign and Security Policy framework. Within this framework, the EU began discussing the deployment of **peacekeeping** operations. Since 2002, the EU has become quite active in the deployment of peacekeeping-related missions. EU missions have deployed not only in Europe, in particular within countries that were once part of the former **Yugoslavia**, but also in Africa and Asia.

In 2005, The EU mandated and deployed a joint peacekeeping operation with the **Association of Southeast Asian Nations**. The operation, known as the **Aceh Monitoring Mission**, followed the temporary **Initial Monitoring Presence in Indonesia**. This represents the first official EU mission mandated and deployed as a joint operation with another international organization. Previous EU missions have been mandated by the **United Nations (UN)** and/or cooperated with operations deployed by other international organizations but have not been organized as joint missions. During the same year, the body mandated two operations to support the peace process and state building in Palestine. These operations are the **European Union Border Assistance Mission at Rafah** and the **European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories**. The latter operation is also one of several exclusive police missions fielded by the EU in recent years. Many peacekeeping operations have traditionally included police elements, but the EU has mandated several that were developed solely to support police-related duties. Other examples include the **European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan**, **European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina**, and **European Union Police Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo**. The **European Union Support to the African Union Mission in Darfur** is another interesting EU operation. The organization deployed this small mission to coordinate its support for the **African Union Mission in Sudan**, which had the mandate to support the peace process in **Sudan**. See *also* AMSTERDAM TREATY; EUROPEAN UNION ADVISORY ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR SECURITY REFORM IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (EUSEC RD CONGO); EUROPEAN UNION BORDER MISSION TO MOLDOVA AND UKRAINE (EUBAM); EUROPEAN

UNION FORCE CHAD/CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (EUFOR TCHAD/RCA); EUROPEAN UNION FORCE CONCORDIA; EUROPEAN UNION FORCE IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (EUFOR ALTHEA); EUROPEAN UNION FORCE IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (EUFOR RD CONGO); EUROPEAN UNION MONITORING MISSION IN GEORGIA; EUROPEAN UNION NAVAL FORCE SOMALIA (EUNAVFOR SOMALIA); EUROPEAN UNION POLICE ADVISORY TEAM IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA; EUROPEAN UNION POLICE MISSION IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA (EUPOL PROXIMA); EUROPEAN UNION POLICE MISSION IN KINSHASA (EUPOL KINSHASA); EUROPEAN UNION RAPID REACTION FORCE; EUROPEAN UNION SUPPORT TO THE AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN DARFUR; EUROPEAN UNION TRAINING MISSION SOMALIA; INITIAL MONITORING PRESENCE (IMP); INTERIM MULTINATIONAL EMERGENCY FORCE IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO; NICE TREATY; PETERSBERG MISSIONS.

**EUROPEAN UNION ADVISORY ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR SECURITY REFORM IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (EUSEC RD CONGO).** The **European Union (EU)** established the European Union Advisory Assistance Mission for Security Reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUSEC RD CONGO) on 2 May 2005 under Council Joint Action 355 following an official request from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to the **United Nations** for security assistance. EUSEC RD CONGO's mission includes providing support to the integration of the DRC's army and its good governance in the field of security and assisting with the EU's coordination and cooperation with the DRC in the field of military security. EUSEC RD CONGO consists of approximately 60 personnel with an annual budget of 10.9 million euros.

**EUROPEAN UNION BORDER ASSISTANCE MISSION AT RAFAH (EUBAM RAFAH).** The **European Union (EU)** mandated the European Union Border Assistance Mission at Rafah (EUBAM



RAFAH) and the **European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories** in 2005 to assist the Palestinian Authority in providing efficient police services within the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The EU mandated EUBAM RAFAH on 21 November 2005 in support of the Agreement on Movement and Access signed between **Israel** and the Palestinian Authority on 15 November 2005. The agreement called upon a “third party” to monitor the Rafah crossing point between **Egypt** and the Gaza Strip. The EU deployed 44 civilian policemen and 10 staff members at an annual cost of \$14 million. Palestinians politically fractured in 2007, with Gaza coming under the control of Hamas, a more radical group, and the West Bank remaining under the control of President Mahmoud Abbas of the Palestinian Authority, which was more conciliatory toward Israel than Hamas. Increased violence and the closure of the crossing point led to the withdrawal of EUBAM RAFAH. It should be noted that the EU has continued to extend the mandate of EUBAM RAFAH, awaiting a time when the organization can return to monitor the crossing. Officially, the EU states it can reactivate the mission with 24 hours’ notice.

**EUROPEAN UNION BORDER MISSION TO MOLDOVA AND UKRAINE (EUBAM).** Tensions in the Transdneister region of Moldova erupted following the breakup of the Soviet Union and culminated in a brief internal conflict in 1992 that attracted fighters from Romania, **Russia**, and Ukraine, as well as the Russian army. Russia and Moldova agreed to the establishment of an international operation known as the **Joint Control Commission Peacekeeping Force** to help oversee the area. In June 2005, the presidents of Moldova and Ukraine requested **European Union (EU)** assistance with efforts to monitor the border between Ukraine and the Moldovan region of Transdneister. The EU signed a memorandum of understanding with the two countries on 7 October 2005 and commenced operations with the European Union Border Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) on 30 November 2005. EUBAM’s mandate includes advising officials from Moldova and Ukraine and reinforcing the capacity of both countries to monitor their common border, especially in the Transdneister region. The mission consists of approximately 200 civilian personnel, with 129 being EU members and the others

being members of the **Commonwealth of Independent States**. The approximate annual cost of EUBAM is 10.1 million euros. *See also* ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE MISSION TO MOLDOVA.

**EUROPEAN UNION FORCE CHAD/CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (EUFOR TCHAD/RCA)**. The civil conflict in Darfur in western **Sudan** erupted into full-scale violence in early 2003, with the Sudan Liberation Army and the Justice and Equality Movement engaging the Sudanese government. The instability in Darfur generated nearly 300,000 refugees who fled to **Chad** and the **Central African Republic (CAR)**. Another 180,000 Chadians were internally displaced due to the civil war in their own country. Civilians suffered from cross-border attacks, prompting the **United Nations (UN)** to seek the means to secure the refugee and internally displaced person camps within Chad and the CAR. The UN officially mandated a temporary operation to provide security along the borders of Sudan with Chad and the CAR in Security Council Resolution 1778 of 25 September 2007. The EU agreed to assume responsibility for this mission and named its operation the European Union Force Chad/Central African Republic (EUFOR TCHAD/RCA).

The EU forces deployed to eastern Chad and northeastern CAR with a mandate to protect all civilians, including locals, refugees, and internally displaced persons; facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid; protect UN personnel and equipment; and ensure freedom of movement for all UN personnel. EU military personnel began arriving in the area on 28 January 2008, and the organization declared the mission as operationally capable on 15 March 2008. Major contributors of the 3,700 personnel to EUFOR TCHAD/RCA included **France**, Ireland, Poland, Sweden, Austria, Romania, Italy, and Belgium. France provided more than half of the military personnel and most of the air assets (helicopters). The non-EU countries of Albania, **Croatia**, and **Russia** deployed personnel and/or assistance to the mission. It should be noted that Ireland, despite domestic outcries that EU military cooperation threatens the country's neutrality, deployed the second largest military contingent and provided the EU operation commander for the mission. France selected one of its generals as the **force commander**.

The most significant incident during the mission's 15-month deployment occurred in March 2008, when French soldiers strayed into Sudan, resulting in an armed confrontation and the death of one peacekeeper. The estimated annual budget of EURFOR TCHAD/RCA was 119.6 million euros. The UN continued planning its own **peacekeeping** mission to replace EUFOR TCHAD/RCA and mandated the new operation, the **United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT)**, in the same resolution, authorizing EUFOR TCHAD/RCA but approving MINURCAT's deployment on 14 January 2009 with Security Council Resolution 1861. MINURCAT officially assumed the EUFOR TCHAD/RCA's mandate on 9 March 2009, terminating the latter operation. *See also* EUROPEAN UNION SUPPORT TO THE AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN DARFUR.

**EUROPEAN UNION FORCE CONCORDIA.** The **North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)** deployed **Operation Amber Fox** to **Macedonia** on 26 September 2001. The **European Union (EU)** planned to mandate and field its first **peacekeeping** operation to replace NATO's Operation Amber Fox; however, the EU was not ready to assume the peacekeeping mission at the conclusion of Operation Amber Fox's mandate, prompting NATO to mandate **Operation Allied Harmony** to replace the former while awaiting EU preparations. Operation Allied Harmony initiated its operations on 16 December 2002 while awaiting an EU replacement mission. The EU officially launched the European Union Force Concordia on 31 March 2003 to replace Operation Allied Harmony. The EU mandate included providing the security that would permit the continued implementation of the August 2001 agreement between the parties within Macedonia (officially known at the time as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia). Concordia consisted of approximately 400 troops, with **France** assuming primary leadership of the mission for the EU. Six non-EU countries (all NATO members) participated in the operation, including the Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland, and Turkey. The EU terminated the operation on 15 December 2003 and replaced it with the **European Union Police Mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia**.

**EUROPEAN UNION FORCE IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (EUFOR ALTHEA).** The **North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)** officially passed responsibility for the **peacekeeping** mission in **Bosnia and Herzegovina** to the **European Union (EU)** on 2 December 2004. In response, the EU deployed the European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR ALTHEA) to replace NATO's **Stabilisation Force**. The initial EU deployment consisted of 6,300 troops with a mandated mission of ensuring compliance with the Dayton Accord and contributing to a safe environment within the country. EUFOR ALTHEA currently consists of approximately 1,953 personnel from 20 EU countries, as well as the non-EU states of **Albania**, **Chile**, the Former Yugoslav Republic of **Macedonia**, **Switzerland**, and **Turkey**. Major troop contributors include **Bulgaria**, **Germany**, **Hungary**, **Italy**, **Poland**, **Spain**, and **Turkey**. EUFOR ALTHEA has an integrated police unit with it. The **Kosovo Force** of NATO as well as European troops in their home countries are officially designated as reinforcements for EUFOR ALTHEA in the event of a breakdown in the peace process within Bosnia and Herzegovina. The annual cost is 71.7 million euros. EUFOR ALTHEA works closely with the **European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina**.

**EUROPEAN UNION FORCE IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (EUFOR RD CONGO).** As the July 2006 Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) national elections approached, the **United Nations** provided the **European Union (EU)** with a mandate in Security Council Resolution 1671 on 25 April 2006 to deploy a multinational force to provide any required security support for the **United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)**. The mission consisted of 2,275 military personnel from 21 EU members, and **Turkey** contributed with a budget of \$20.9 million. Approximately 1,075 personnel deployed to Kinshasha and 1,200 members of the force to Gabon so that it could move rapidly into the DRC in support of MONUC if required. **France** allocated 1,500 soldiers as a strategic reserve that could be airlifted from Europe to reinforce EUFOR RD CONGO in an emergency. The short mission officially ended on 30 November 2006. *See also* OPERATION ARTEMIS.

**EUROPEAN UNION MONITORING MISSION (EUMM).** The European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM) deployed to the Western Balkans in July 1991, following the outbreak of violence as the Federal Republic of **Yugoslavia** began to break up. The Council of the **European Union (EU)** passed a resolution on 22 December 2000 to convert the ECMM to the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM). The change in name reflects the earlier conversion of the European Community to the EU. The EUMM monitored the political and security developments in Albania, **Bosnia and Herzegovina**, **Croatia**, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of **Macedonia**. The EUMM consisted of approximately 120 international civilian monitors and 75 local civilians. The mission headquarters was in Sarajevo and was funded by the European Commission. Over time, the name “EUMM” evolved into a generic term applied to specific operations as the EU increased its deployment of **peacekeeping** missions.

**EUROPEAN UNION MONITORING MISSION IN ACEH.** *See* ACEH MONITORING MISSION (AMM).

**EUROPEAN UNION MONITORING MISSION IN GEORGIA.** Poor relations between **Georgia** and **Russia** over the issues of South Ossetia and Abkhazia extend to the breakup of the Soviet Union. In August 2008, the two countries engaged in a brief armed conflict. The fighting began in South Ossetia but shifted as Russian troops, deployed as the **South Ossetia Joint Peacekeeping Force**, moved into Georgia with reinforcements. The **European Union** helped mediate a cease-fire between the belligerents. The body mandated a civilian monitoring mission, the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia, on 15 September 2008. The mission mandate includes monitoring the implementation of the agreements between Russia and Georgia, contributing to the stabilization of the situation, overseeing the deployment of Georgian military and police units, and observing human rights compliance by all parties to the conflict. The mission consists of approximately 340 civilian personnel, with 200 of these serving as monitors and the remainder as staff in the headquarters and field offices. The annual budget is 49.6 million euros. *See also* COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES PEACEKEEP-

ING FORCES IN GEORGIA (ABKHAZIA); UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN GEORGIA (UNOMIG).

**EUROPEAN UNION NAVAL FORCE SOMALIA (EUNAVFOR SOMALIA).** Increased piracy off the coast of **Somalia** prompted the **United Nations (UN)** Security Council to mandate an international effort to police the waters and protect shipping with Resolution 1816 on 2 June 2008. The **European Union (EU)** accepted the mission and established the European Union Naval Force Somalia (EUNAVFOR SOMALIA). The mandate for the mission, often called Operation Atlanta, includes the protection of vessels chartered by the World Food Program as well as other merchant vessels sailing to or near Somalia. At least 20 EU naval vessels serve with EUNAVFOR SOMALIA. Non-EU participation includes Norway. The operation extends south from the Red Sea, to the Gulf of Aden, and eastward to the Seychelles Islands. EUNAVFOR SOMALIA cooperates with other vessels performing similar missions. Countries providing the latter vessels include the **United States, Russia, India, Japan, Malaysia, and China.** The EU mission also supports the movement of ships supplying the **African Union Mission in Somalia.** The annual budget is 8.3 million euros.

**EUROPEAN UNION POLICE ADVISORY TEAM IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA.** Upon the termination of the **European Union Police Mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia** on 14 December 2005, the **European Union (EU)** established a follow-on operation known as the European Union Police Advisory Team in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. **Macedonia** was officially known as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia during this time. The European Union Police Advisory Team (EUPAT) consists of approximately 30 police specialists mandated to assist the government with monitoring and mentoring the country's police force in matters of border policing, public accountability, and anticorruption. The estimated EUPAT budget is 1.5 million euros every six months.

**EUROPEAN UNION POLICE MISSION (EUPM).** The **European Union (EU)** mandated the European Union Police Mission (EUPM)

to replace the **United Nations International Police Task Force** and **United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina**. As the EU planned the deployment of police operations in other countries, the term “EUPM” evolved into a generic name applied to many missions. Thus, what was originally known as EUPM evolved into the **European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina**.

**EUROPEAN UNION POLICE MISSION FOR THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES (EUPOL COPPS)**. The **European Union (EU)** mandated the European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) and the **European Union Border Assistance Mission at Rafah** in 2005 to assist the Palestinian Authority in providing efficient police services within the West Bank and Gaza Strip. EUPOL COPPS emerged from an agreement between the EU and Palestinian prime minister Ahmed Qurei in April 2005. The parties envisioned EUPOL COPPS as an organization to support the Palestinian Civil Police for immediate operational priorities and longer-term transformational change; provide liaison between the Palestinian police force and countries offering financial assistance; and offer advice to the Palestinian chief of police and his commanders.

The EU mandated the mission in November 2005 and fielded the participants beginning in January 2006, with a vision of reaching approximately 33 policemen and civilian policing experts. EUPOL COPPS originally established a headquarters in Ramallah in the West Bank with a satellite office in Gaza. Palestinians politically fractured in 2007, with Gaza coming under control of Hamas, a more radical group, and the West Bank remaining under the control of President Mahmoud Abbas of the Palestinian Authority, which was more conciliatory toward **Israel** than Hamas. After the split, EUPOL COPPS continued reduced operations within the West Bank with approximately 11 personnel at an annual cost of \$4.8 million. *See also* PALESTINE.

**EUROPEAN UNION POLICE MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN (EUPOL AFGHANISTAN)**. Following the 2001 U.S. military intervention in **Afghanistan** and removal of the Taliban from power in the country, a growing international effort emerged to assist the

new Afghan government. The European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL AFGHANISTAN) is one form of multinational assistance. The **European Union (EU)** fielded the operation beginning on 15 June 2007 for the purpose of assisting Afghanistan with the establishment of sustainable and effective civilian policing arrangements. Personnel assigned to the mission monitor, advise, and train Afghan civilian police from the district to the national level. Nineteen EU member states contribute police and/or criminal justice experts to the mission. The non-EU states of Canada, **Croatia**, New Zealand, and Norway have also deployed personnel with the operation. The annual budget is 64 million euros, and the staff consists of approximately 400 foreign specialists and locals. *See also* INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE (ISAF).

**EUROPEAN UNION POLICE MISSION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (EUPM).** The **European Union (EU)** authorized the European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM) on 11 March 2002 to assist **Bosnia and Herzegovina**. The EU mission replaced the **United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF)** on 1 January 2003. EUPM oversees 16,000 police officers in the country's two autonomous regions—the Muslim–Croat federation and the Serb Republic. The organization also has oversight responsibilities for the state border service and the Central Security Ministry. EUPM originally consisted of 500 personnel, with approximately 80 percent of those coming from EU states and the remaining officers being drawn from non-EU European countries and Canada. Over time, these numbers were reduced to approximately 167 policemen and 28 civilian staff. The annual budget is approximately \$16.1 million. EUPM works closely with the **European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina**.

**EUROPEAN UNION POLICE MISSION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (EUPOL RD CONGO).** In December 2004, the **European Union (EU)** mandated the **European Union Police Mission in Kinshasa (EUPOL KINSHASA)** to support the 2006 national elections process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The EU mandated the European Union Police Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUPOL RD CONGO)



on 12 June 2007, to replace EUPOL KINSHASA that same month. EUPOL RD CONGO officially deployed in July 2007. The small operation consists of approximately 53 international policemen and civilian staff, as well as 15 local staff members. Six EU countries and **Angola** contribute to the mission, which has an annual budget of 6.02 million euros. The personnel assigned to EUPOL RD CONGO are police and criminal justice experts mandated to support police and criminal justice reform in the DRC and provide coordination with the **United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo** and **European Union Advisory and Assistance Mission for Security Reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo**. *See also* EUROPEAN UNION FORCE IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (EUFOR RD CONGO).

#### **EUROPEAN UNION POLICE MISSION IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA (EUPOL PROXIMA).**

The **European Union (EU)** mandated the European Union Police Mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUPOL PROXIMA) on 29 September 2003 and officially fielded it in **Macedonia** on 15 December 2003, upon the termination of the **European Union Force Concordia**. EUPOL PROXIMA grew to include approximately 184 policemen from 26 EU and non-EU countries at an estimated annual cost of \$6.8 million. The mission worked closely with the **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Spillover Mission in Skopje**. Personnel assigned to the operation monitored, mentored, and advised the civilian police force of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. One interesting aspect of the mandate included assisting the country to move closer toward EU integration. EUPOL PROXIMA officially terminated its mission on 14 December 2005 and was replaced by the **European Union Police Advisory Team in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia**.

**EUROPEAN UNION POLICE MISSION IN KINSHASA (EUPOL KINSHASA).** In December 2004, the **European Union (EU)** mandated the European Union Police Mission in Kinshasa (EUPOL KINSHASA) and officially fielded the operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) on 12 April 2005, although a small contingent did initially arrive in February 2005. The mandate of the

mission aimed to support the DRC's Integrated Police Unit (IPU), a more than 1,000-person police unit that provided special security during the 2006 national election process. The EU mission trained and advised the IPU and provided a coordination base with other security elements during the election period. Originally, the personnel numbered 29 foreign police specialists from **France**, Portugal, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, and the non-EU countries of Canada and Turkey. Later, the EU doubled the mission size by adding personnel from Denmark, **Great Britain**, **Angola**, Mali, and Rumania. The EU set the annual budget at 4.3 million euros. The mission officially departed in June 2007 and was replaced by the **European Union Police Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo**. *See also* EUROPEAN UNION ADVISORY AND ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR SECURITY REFORM IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (EUSEC RD CONGO); EUROPEAN UNION FORCE IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (EUFOR RD CONGO); UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION MISSION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (MONUC).

**EUROPEAN UNION RAPID REACTION FORCE.** The **European Union (EU)** asked its members to designate military units for inclusion in an EU Rapid Reaction Force. The 20,000 troops are designated, trained, and maintained by the member states for short-notice deployments under an EU mandate. The force also serves as the organization's response during the fielding of a **peacekeeping** operation when a quick deployment is needed. Each state has the right to refuse inclusion of its troops in any operation. *See also* AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE; NICE TREATY; NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION RAPID REACTION FORCE; UNITED NATIONS STAND-BY ARRANGEMENTS SYSTEM (UNASAS).

**EUROPEAN UNION SUPPORT TO THE AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN DARFUR.** In 2004, the **African Union (AU)** fielded the **African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS)**, and the **European Union (EU)** dispatched advisers and monitors to assist AMIS in its support of the peace process in Darfur, **Sudan**. Officially, the EU refers to its small assistance mission as the European Union Support to

the African Union Mission in Darfur rather than assigning a specific operation name and acronym. AU and EU monitors began arriving in May 2004 to support an April 2004 cease-fire process. The support mission provided civilian and military assistance to AMIS. Through the support mission, the EU provided equipment as well as planning and technical assistance. The EU operation included approximately 30 police specialists, 15 military advisers, and two military observers in its mission to support AMIS. The EU mission officially terminated in December 2007, when AMIS merged into the **United Nations–African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur**. It should be noted that while AMIS operated in Darfur, a **United Nations peacekeeping** operation, the **United Nations Mission in Sudan**, conducted operations in southern Sudan in support of the peace process for the separate conflict in the country.

**EUROPEAN UNION TRAINING MISSION SOMALIA.** The **European Union (EU)** mandated the European Union Training Mission Somalia on 25 January 2010, with a start date of 7 April 2010. The mission, under Spanish command, consists of approximately 100 soldiers with a mandate to train 2,000 soldiers loyal to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of **Somalia**. The regional organization established Uganda as the training location, where EU soldiers were already working with Somali troops. The EU mandate brings the **United Nations, African Union, and United States** into the program as partners, including assisting with funding.

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**FEZ SUMMIT CONFERENCE.** The **League of Arab States** convened the Fez Summit Conference on 6 September 1982. During the meeting, the Lebanese officially requested the termination of the mandate of the **Arab Deterrent Force (ADF)**. A compromise with **Syria** allowed its soldiers—who were fighting Israeli forces—to remain in Lebanon following the end of the mandate. At the same time, the Gulf state members, who contributed 65 percent of the funding, agreed to cease all financial contributions to the Syrian forces in **Lebanon**. The conference marked the official death of the

ADF, a **peacekeeping** operation that had generated a great deal of controversy as it moved into the category of **peace enforcement** in Lebanon. *See also* CAIRO SUMMIT CONFERENCE; RIYADH SUMMIT CONFERENCE.

**FIRST GENERATION PEACEKEEPING.** “First Generation peacekeeping” is a term sometimes applied to early **United Nations peacekeeping** operations that involved simply separating two belligerents following a cease-fire. These operations have also been called **traditional peacekeeping**. *See also* SECOND GENERATION PEACEKEEPING.

**FORCE COMMANDER (FC).** This term is applied to the military commander of a **United Nations (UN) peacekeeping** mission other than an observation force. This title should not be confused with **chief military observer**, even though the two perform similar duties. Chief military observers command smaller contingents than a peacekeeping force commander (FC). **Secretary-General U Thant** clarified the role of a force commander when he wrote in his aide-memoire that the “commander of the force, who is responsible to the secretary-general, receives, as appropriate, directives from the secretary-general on the exercise of his command and reports to the secretary-general. The executive control of all units of the force is at all times exercised by the commander of the force.” In more recent years, the UN secretary-general has often assigned a civilian **special representative** to represent him on the ground. In these cases, the FC commands the military element of the peacekeeping operation and reports directly to the special representative.

**FORCE MOBILE RESERVE (FMR).** The Force Mobile Reserve (FMR) evolved from the necessity to have highly mobile reserve units ready to assist peacekeepers assigned to the **United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)**. Originally, each contingent’s battalion provided its own reserve force. Early in 1987, UNIFIL underwent a major redeployment of its units, during which the FMR was established as a permanent organization, drawing its assets from seven of the nine UNIFIL contingents. Each contributed contingent provided one platoon. The seven platoons—six mechanized

infantry and one for administration—were organized into a mechanized company of approximately 175 soldiers. The FMR maintained one platoon on alert at all times, which was ready to move from its base in less than 15 minutes. The remaining five combat platoons had 30 minutes to mobilize and depart their base. Due to its base location, the FMR should have been able to reach any location within the UNIFIL area of operation within one hour. The FMR with UNIFIL evolved over time in terms of size and manning based on requirements. In later years, most of the larger **United Nations (UN) peacekeeping** operations formed FMRs based on the lessons of UNIFIL. The mission of each FMR is to perform reconnaissance on all potential trouble spots, map routes to potential trouble spots, demonstrate a high state of readiness, provide teams for patrols and escort duty, and operate as an integrated unit when required for missions.

**FORCES ANSWERABLE TO THE WEST EUROPEAN UNION (FAWEU).** The **West European Union's (WEU) Planning Cell** maintained a list of conventional military forces available for use by the organization for **peacekeeping**, humanitarian operations, and peace-making. These operations were named after their authorizing document and were often known as **Petersberg Missions**. The WEU referred to the list as the Forces Answerable to the West European Union.

**FORMED POLICE UNIT (FPU).** Formed Police Units (FPUs) are units of police personnel who train together and deploy with a **peacekeeping** operation in a similar manner as a military formation. In the past, most police personnel deployed to peacekeeping missions as individuals. They frequently did not know each other prior to the deployment and often received different types and levels of training. With the introduction of FPUs, the peacekeeping police commissioner now has unit-sized assets with the same training who can also be utilized for such larger missions as combating transnational crime. Some operations, including the **United Nations Mission in Liberia**, have all-female FPUs to assist in countering and providing training and public awareness about crimes targeting women.

**FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA.** *See* MACEDONIA.

**FOURTH COMMITTEE.** The Fourth Committee is one of six main committees of the **United Nations** General Assembly and is also known as the Special Political and Decolonization Committee. The **Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations** reports to the General Assembly through the Fourth Committee.

**FRANCE.** France, as a permanent member of the **United Nations (UN)** Security Council, rarely participated in **peacekeeping** operations mandated by the global body during the **Cold War**. The **United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)** represents one notable exception. After the end of the Cold War, France became more active in UN peacekeeping. In 1993, Paris was ranked first among all UN members for manpower contributions to peacekeeping operations deployed by the global organization. In 2001, France ranked 28th and in 2010 16th in the contributions of personnel for UN operations when compared to all members of the organization. As of 2010, France is the second largest contributor of peacekeepers among the permanent Security Council members. France is better known for its manpower and logistical assets provided to peacekeeping operations fielded by other organizations or unilateral missions. The state, which once held extensive colonies across northern, western, and central Africa, still maintains a military presence on the continent. The French military has soldiers based in Djibouti, Senegal, **Côte d'Ivoire**, the **Central African Republic (CAR)**, and Gabon, as well as a **Rapid Deployment Force** in southern France. France has frequently used its military forces on the continent for unilateral interventions in support of governments considered friendly toward Paris; however, the country has led several multinational military interventions that are considered in some circles to be peacekeeping operations. These missions include two in Zaire (currently the Democratic Republic of the Congo [DRC]) and one in **Rwanda**. The first operation in Zaire, often known as Shaba I, occurred in 1977.

On 8 March 1977, Zairian dissidents based in **Angola** entered Zaire's Shaba province, where government forces proved to be ineffective in offering resistance. President Sese Seku Mobutu of Zaire appealed for Western assistance before his military collapsed. King Hassan II of Morocco responded by dispatching 1,500 troops, with the first contingent arriving on 8 April 1977. The French provided

logistical assistance to the Moroccans, who were then able to stabilize the situation in Shaba. On 13 May 1978, the Zairian rebels returned to Shaba and attacked the city of Kolwezi, a mining center with a considerable expatriate population of Westerners. The French responded to the crisis by deploying legionnaires to Kolwezi on 19 May 1978. Belgium joined the military effort and dispatched a military unit the next day. After securing their immediate objectives, the French and Belgians extracted themselves from the conflict by introducing an **Inter-African Force** to replace them.

The French initiated a third multinational mission on 23 June 1994, in Rwanda. This operation, launched with the blessings of the UN and led by Commander Marin Gillier, included a mission of providing humanitarian assistance following the resumption of ethnic violence between the Hutus and Tutsi of Rwanda. The Tutsi rebellion against the Hutu-dominated government of Rwanda led to a series of massacres across the state. The **United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda** was not able to halt the hostilities and was encountering difficulty in protecting refugees from the fighting. The UN opted to increase its operation with peacekeepers from African states, but the mission faced difficulties in getting off the ground. In response, the French moved in its force to assist in the protection of civilians. The French operation consisted of 2,500 legionnaires and marines flown in from bases in other African states. The African response to the French intervention has been mixed. Uganda, Tanzania, and **Burundi** denied the French permission to stage military operations from their territory. Zimbabwe declared that the French actions endangered the All-African Force being considered for Rwanda. On the other hand, Zaire granted France permission to use its territory, and **Egypt** pledged a military contingent to aid the French effort. Senegal dispatched 300 soldiers to join the French military units in Rwanda.

Since 2002, France has been very active in organizing non-UN peacekeeping missions and fielding soldiers to support regional peacekeeping operations in Africa and other areas. In 1997, France organized the **Inter-African Force in the Central African Republic** to help restore order in the CAR. At the end of 2002, French soldiers stabilized Côte d'Ivoire following an outbreak of civil war in that state. France established a neutral zone between government and rebel forces with its troops in **Operation Licorne** to promote

the peace process and prepare for the arrival of the **Economic Community of West African States Mission in Côte d'Ivoire**. In May 2003, the UN requested France to help organize an international operation to restore order in the DRC. This operation, led by France and known as the **Interim Multinational Emergency Force**, evolved into the first **European Union** deployment of military forces outside of Europe. France also deployed logistical personnel in 2003 to support the **Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States Multinational Force in the Central African Republic**. French forces participated in the **Multinational Interim Force Haiti** between February and June 2004 and assumed the **lead state** role in the 2008 **European Union Force Chad/Central African Republic**. *See also* ELÉMENTS FRANÇAIS D'ASSISTANCE OPÉRATIONNELLE (EFAO); RENFORCEMENT DES CAPACITÉS AFRICAINES DE MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX (RECAMP).

**FRENCH OPERATIONAL ASSISTANCE UNITS (EFAO).** *See* ELÉMENTS FRANÇAIS D'ASSISTANCE OPÉRATIONNELLE (EFAO).

– G –

**GAMBIEZ, COLONEL GERARD.** Gambiez, a citizen of France, was appointed by **United Nations (UN) secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali** in January 1993 to lead a team of diplomats attempting to secure pledges of military personnel and equipment for a **stand-by force** for **peacekeeping** operations fielded by the international organization. Traditionally, the UN must request military contingents from member states each time it fields a peacekeeping operation. Boutros-Ghali's plan was to establish a pool of military units and personnel from which the UN can call upon without having to request pledges. The personnel would remain in their home countries but would be ready to deploy on short notice upon receiving a request from the secretary-general. This would save time in actually deploying the peacekeeping mission and would only be used for operations termed as **traditional peacekeeping**. Gambiez and six assistants traveled to approximately 50 countries and contacted 130



other states in their efforts to secure the equipment and personnel for the international organization. The team concluded its work in April 1994 and reported that they had received pledges from at least 15 states, totaling approximately 54,000 soldiers and technical experts, such as logisticians. Although impressive in numbers (the UN had 70,000 peacekeepers in the field in early 1994), the total was short of the goal of 100,000 personnel envisioned by Boutros-Ghali. The **United States** declined to earmark military forces for the UN.

**GAZA.** *See* EUROPEAN UNION BORDER ASSISTANCE MISSION AT RAFAH (EUBAM RAFAH).

**GEORGIA.** Georgia declared its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 as the latter state collapsed. The new country then moved into a period of civil war followed by disagreements with the residents of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, who did not want to be part of an independent Georgia. The **Commonwealth of Independent States Peacekeeping Forces in Georgia** deployed to oversee a cease-fire in Abkhazia, while the **South Ossetia Joint Peacekeeping Force** moved into South Ossetia. Both operations were essentially military interventions by **Russia**. The **United Nations (UN)** fielded the **United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia** to help monitor the cease-fire between Georgia and Abkhazia. The **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Mission to Georgia** arrived to assist with border issues between the various political entities. In August 2008, additional Russian troops moved into South Ossetia and conducted a brief military campaign against Georgia. The **European Union (UN)** helped mediate a cease-fire and deployed the **European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia**.

**GERMANY.** Germany contributed additional funds beyond its assessments to support **United Nations (UN) peacekeeping** for many years; however, the country, citing its **Basic Law**, did not field personnel with the missions. Legislative re-interpretation of the Basic Law permitted Germany to deploy peacekeepers in limited situations after the **Cold War**. Germany currently contributes to UN, **European Union (EU)**, and **North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)** peacekeeping missions, with greater emphasis on non-UN

operations. In 2001, Germany ranked 27th among UN members for the contribution of peacekeepers to operations deployed by the global organization. This figure dropped to 45th in 2010, as the country increased its support to EU and NATO missions.

**GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS INITIATIVE (GPOI).** The Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) is a Group of Eight (G8) program that replaced the **Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC)**. The G8 states officially agreed to back the program in June 2004, during their summit in the **United States**. GPOI's purposes include providing training and equipping military forces across the globe for peacekeeping duties. GPOI also provides for the sharing of **peacekeeping**-related information among the G8 states; assistance in the development of transportation and logistical assets for peacekeepers; development of police programs to support the peace process in a country; and promotion of self-sustainment by peacekeeping forces when they deploy. In terms of its primary objective, GPOI's goal is to prepare a minimum of 75,000 troops for peacekeeping duties by 2010. As of October 2009, the United States announced that GPOI had trained 87,000 peacekeepers. In October 2009, GPOI shifted to a five-year program that now places greater emphasis on peacekeeper sustainment development goals. *See also* AFRICAN CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS TRAINING AND ASSISTANCE (ACOTA); AFRICAN CRISIS RESPONSE INITIATIVE (ACRI).

**GOMES, BRIGADIER-GENERAL PERICLES FERREIRA.** Gomes, a Brazilian officer, served as the only commander of the **United Nations Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I)** beginning in December 1988. Gomes held the title of **chief military observer**. From 3–23 September 1989, Gomes, while still assigned to UNAVEM I, led a reconnaissance mission for the **secretary-general** to Central America. His report, accepted by the secretary-general, recommended the immediate deployment of the **United Nations Observer Group in Central America**.

**GOOD FAITH AGREEMENT.** This agreement, developed by **United Nations (UN) secretary-general Dag Hammarskjöld**, confirmed

the willingness of **Egypt** to accept the **United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I)** on its territory. The UN operates under a principle that a **host state** must agree to allow a **peacekeeping** mission to be stationed on its territory. Egypt later requested the removal of UNEF I in 1967. The UN reluctantly complied with the request, and the Six-Day War erupted following the withdrawal.

**GORAZDE.** *See* SAFE AREAS.

**GORGE, REMY.** Gorge, a Swiss diplomat, was the acting **special representative** for the **United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus** between December 1977 and April 1978. This was an unusual selection, since **Switzerland** held observer rather than full-member status in the **United Nations** and did not contribute military elements to **peacekeeping** operations.

**GOULDING, MARRACK.** Goulding, a citizen of **Great Britain**, served as the undersecretary-general for **peacekeeping** in the **United Nations (UN)** from 1986 until March 1993. When he first assumed the title after replacing the retiring **Brian Urquhart**, the position was known as the undersecretary-general for special political affairs. Goulding initiated the efforts to improve UN coordination of peacekeeping operations, which have been continued by his successor, **Kofi Annan**. He personally represented the secretary-general in a fact-finding mission to the Middle East to determine the fate of American lieutenant-colonel William Higgins, who was kidnapped and murdered in **Lebanon** despite his assignment as a peacekeeper with the **United Nations Truce Supervision Organization**. Goulding held the post of “senior peacekeeper” when the UN peacekeepers were awarded the **Nobel Peace Prize** in 1988. He moved from his peacekeeping position to the post of undersecretary-general for political affairs in 1993. Between 1979 and 1983, Goulding represented his country in the UN and presided over the Trusteeship Council for a year.

**GREAT BRITAIN.** Great Britain participated heavily in the various **League of Nations** multinational missions after World War I, including the **Saar International Force**. The state, as one of the Permanent

Five members of the **United Nations (UN)** Security Council, played a minimal role in UN **peacekeeping** operations during the **Cold War**, with the exception of the **United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus**. The British held Cyprus as a colony prior to its independence and still maintained military bases on the island that could be utilized for logistics. After the Cold War, Great Britain increased its role in UN peacekeeping operations but in recent years has tended to participate more heavily in non-UN missions. Great Britain tends to provide more troops for **North Atlantic Treaty Organization** missions rather than those of the UN and the **European Union**. London provided the **lead state** role in organizing and deploying a military operation to counter rebels in **Sierra Leone** who were harassing and kidnapping peacekeepers with the **United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone**. In 1993, Great Britain ranked sixth among UN members for manpower contributions to the peacekeeping operations deployed by the global organization. By 2001, Great Britain ranked 24th and in 2010 ranks 46th. *See also* BRITISH METHOD.

**GREECE.** *See* UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE BALKANS (UNSCOB).

**GREEN LINE.** The Green Line is a narrow boundary and neutral zone in the city of Nicosia on the island of Cyprus. The zone is patrolled by elements of the **United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus**. The line separates the Turkish Cypriots, who control the northern areas of Nicosia, and the Greek Cypriots, who inhabit the southern regions of the city. The British military stationed on Cyprus originally established the Green Line. In some locations, the neutral zone marked by the Green Line is only meters wide. *See also* RED LINE.

**GRENADA.** *See* ORGANIZATION OF EAST CARIBBEAN STATES (OECS).

**GRIENDL, MAJOR-GENERAL GUNTHER G.** Griendl, a native of Austria, served as the **force commander** of the **United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)** between April 1979 and February 1981. Like his predecessor, Major-General Hannes Philipp of Austria, Griendl arrived as a colonel and was promoted directly to

the rank of major-general. The passing over of the rank of brigadier-general for both men may have been due to the requirement that the force commander be a major-general. The two brigadier-generals who commanded the operation held the titles of “interim” and “acting” force commander. Griendl moved from the UNDOF position and became the force commander of the **United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus** in March 1981. He held that position until April 1989. Griendl later held the position as the first force commander of the **United Nations Iraq–Kuwait Observation Mission** until July 1992. With the completion of this assignment, Griendl can claim more than 12 years of senior **United Nations peacekeeping** service.

**GUADALCANAL.** *See* SOLOMON ISLANDS.

**GUATAMALA.** *See* UNITED NATIONS VERIFICATION MISSION IN GUATAMALA (MINUGUA).

**GUEHÉNNO, JEAN-MARIE.** Guehénno, a French citizen, replaced **Bernard Miyet** as undersecretary-general for **peacekeeping** operations of the **United Nations** in 2000. Guehénno’s tenure included the introduction of peacekeepers to Darfur in western **Sudan**; allegations of illegal smuggling activities by peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; and the establishment of a separate **Department of Field Support** for peacekeeping with its own undersecretary-general. Guehénno served in the position until 2008, when **Alain Le Roy** assumed the title.

**GUINEA.** *See* ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES MONITORING GROUP IN GUINEA.

**GUINEA-BISSAU.** *See* ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES MONITORING GROUP IN GUINEA-BISSAU.

**GYANI, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL P. S.** Gyani, an army officer from **India**, served as the **force commander** for the **United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I)** from December 1959 to January 1964. At the same time, he also held the position of force commander of the **United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM)** from September to November 1963. In November 1963, the position

was “downgraded” to the term “chief of staff.” Briefly dual-hatting Gyani was not unusual, since UNYOM fell under UNEF I for logistical and personnel issues. In March 1964, Gyani, who held the position of **special representative** for the crisis on Cyprus since January, became the first force commander of the **United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus** and held that post until June 1964. Gyani had informed **Secretary-General U Thant** that he would only serve one three-month term in the position due to personal reasons.

– H –

**HAGGLUND, MAJOR-GENERAL GUSTAV.** Hagglund, an army officer from Finland, was the **force commander** of the **United Nations Disengagement Observer Force** from June 1985 to May 1986. Following this assignment, Hagglund became the force commander of the **United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon** and remained in this position until June 1988.

**HAITI.** Haiti has suffered from a poor economy and bad government throughout its modern history. National elections in 1990 brought Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power. The **United Nations (UN)** supported the election process with the fielding of the **United Nations Observer Group for the Verification of the Elections in Haiti**. The mission received little support from Haitians and departed in 1991. Aristide’s government attracted increasing discontent among Haitians, prompting a coup late in the year. Chaos continued in the country, provoking the UN to mandate the **United Nations Mission in Haiti** in 1993. Haitian opposition blocked the introduction of the peacekeepers, prompting the **United States** to lead the UN-mandated **Multinational Force in Haiti** in 1994. The coup leaders agreed to their departure and restored Aristide to power. In 1995, the Multinational Force in Haiti transferred the **peacekeeping** authority to the **United Nations Mission in Haiti**. In 1996, the latter operation transferred peacekeeping authority to the **United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH)**. Aristide left office during the same year. The **United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti** replaced the UNSMIH in 1997 and then departed before the end of the year upon the arrival of the **United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti**.

The country held new national elections in 2000, and Aristide again won the presidency as the opposition boycotted the process. Haiti suffered under increasing violence and political repression, prompting the **Organization of American States** to field the **Organization of American States Special Mission for Strengthening Democracy in Haiti** in 2002. A 2004 rebellion led to Aristide's departure from the country and the arrival of the **Multinational Interim Force Haiti** in February. In June 2004, the **United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)** replaced the latter operation. The massive 2010 earthquake in Haiti resulted in a new mission for MINUSTAH as the operation assisted humanitarian organizations in providing relief to the country.

**HAMMARSKJÖLD, DAG.** Hammarskjöld, a Swede, served as **secretary-general** of the **United Nations (UN)** from 10 April 1953 until his death on 18 September 1961. He held the position of secretary-general during two critical periods of **peacekeeping** history. First, he opted to utilize the **Uniting for Peace Resolution** to convene the General Assembly to mandate the **United Nations Emergency Force I** in 1956. Second, he was active in negotiations related to the Congolese civil war and the mission of the **United Nations Operation in the Congo**. Hammarskjöld died in a plane crash within the Democratic Republic of the Congo while on a peace mission.

**HONDURAS.** *See* INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SUPPORT AND VERIFICATION.

**HOST STATE.** The host state is the country in which a **peacekeeping** operation is actually based during its operation. An agreement is normally reached between the mandating international organization and the host state prior to the deployment of the neutral operation. *See also* GOOD FAITH AGREEMENT.

– I –

**IMPLEMENTATION FORCE (IFOR).** The various parties to the conflict in **Bosnia and Herzegovina** met in Dayton, Ohio, to dis-

cuss the provisions of a peace plan. The groups signed the General Framework for Peace on 14 December 1995. The document, known as the Dayton Accord, was negotiated in the **United States** but actually signed in **France**. The **United Nations (UN)** Security Council, with Resolution 1031 of 1995, endorsed the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)** as the security force to oversee the implementation of the agreement. The document provided NATO with a mission to provide a safe and secure environment, separating the opposing parties, overseeing the movement of military forces and heavy weapons to approved sites, conducting patrols along the demilitarized Inter-Entity Boundary Line, and inspecting weapons storage sites. The NATO mission, known as the Implementation Force (IFOR), replaced the **United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina**.

Officially, IFOR began operations on 20 December 1995, with a maximum allowance of 60,000 troops (50,000 were from NATO members, but 10,000 were contributed by 18 non-NATO states). Many of the latter, as well as some NATO forces, transferred from the **United Nations Protection Force** to IFOR. The NATO mission successfully carried out the mandate provided in the Dayton Accord. The operation provided the secure environment required for the first free elections held in Bosnia and Herzegovina (April 1996) since the end of the war. IFOR also helped provide the stability required for the September 1996 elections in the state. IFOR had a relatively short mandate of one year from implementation of the Dayton Accord to elections within the state. With IFOR's mandate completed, NATO members agreed to maintain a continued presence to oversee the peace process. The **Stabilisation Force (SFOR)** resulted from those meetings. NATO activated SFOR on 20 December 1996, the same date that IFOR's mandate expired. While IFOR *implemented* the peace, SFOR would *stabilize* the peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. IFOR was funded by NATO and the states that contributed contingents to the operation.

**INDEPENDENT INQUIRY INTO THE ACTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS DURING THE 1994 GENOCIDE IN RWANDA.** **United Nations (UN) secretary-general Kofi Annan** called for the **United Nations (UN)** to conduct formal reviews of the



**peacekeeping** failures in **Rwanda** and **Srebrenica**. The secretary-general's office opted to examine Srebrenica but chose to select an international panel for the Rwanda study. A secretary-general convening an independent inquiry into the operations of the UN is an unusual occurrence; however, the Security Council expressed its support for the proposal. In May 1999, Annan appointed Swedish prime minister Ingvar Carlsson as chair of the independent inquiry. Annan tasked Carlsson to investigate the events surrounding the genocide of the Rwandan Tutsi and the failure of the **United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda** to halt the massacres. Carlsson's specific mandate asked him to establish the facts related to the UN's response to the genocide in Rwanda. The other panel members included Han Sung-Joo, former foreign minister of the Republic of Korea, and Lieutenant-General Rufus Kupolati of **Nigeria**.

The final document produced by the panel, known as the Carlsson Report, faulted the global body, its secretariat, and the secretary-general, as well as many Western states, including the **United States**, **Belgium**, and **France**, for the failure to check the genocide in Rwanda. The panel issued the Carlsson Report in December 1999. *See also* INTERNATIONAL PANEL OF EMINENT PERSONALITIES TO INVESTIGATE THE 1994 GENOCIDE IN RWANDA AND THE SURROUNDING EVENTS.

**INDIA.** India is a major participant in **United Nations (UN) peacekeeping** operations as well as a host to missions related to its conflicts with **Pakistan**. In 1993, India ranked third among UN members for manpower contributions to the global organization's peacekeeping operations. In 2001, the country ranked fourth and third in 2010. **Great Britain** granted independence to India and Pakistan in 1947. The two states, divided by culture and religion, were in competition over the acquisition of the state of Jammu and Kashmir (often simply referred to as Kashmir). The latter held the right to join either of the two new states. A dispute over this issue erupted into open conflict at the end of 1947. The newly established UN attempted to help end the dispute. The **United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan**, established to examine the issues in the crisis, recommended the formation of the **United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan**. Following a brief conflict in 1965, the UN deployed the

**United Nations India–Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM)** until 1966. India has served as a major provider of contingents for UN peacekeeping operations for many years. India ranked second in 1993, fourth in 2001, and third in 2010 when compared to all contributors of manpower to UN missions.

India launched two unilateral military operations in South Asia that are often classified as being in the realm of peacekeeping. The first involved a July 1987 intervention in Sri Lanka. Although the majority of the Tamil subethnic group lives in India, approximately three million Tamils inhabit the island state of Sri Lanka, where they are a minority. The Sri Lankan Tamils revolted against the government in hopes of establishing a small independent Tamil state on the island. Sri Lanka requested the assistance of India, and the resulting agreement referred to the military aid as an “Indian Peacekeeping Contingent.” India dispatched 3,000 soldiers to Sri Lanka and then increased its personnel to more than 30,000 by the end of 1987. By 1988, the total number of Indian soldiers in Sri Lanka had grown to more than 50,000. The Indian military managed to regain limited control over the Tamil-dominated regions of Sri Lanka; however, in the process, India suffered more than 1,000 battle deaths. Non-Tamil governmental opposition demanded the removal of the Indian military. The government complied with the pressure, and the Indians withdrew by the end of March 1990. Following the departure of the Indian military, the Tamil rebels regained control over the northern and eastern regions of Sri Lanka until 2009.

The second peacekeeping operation evolved from an attempted coup by mercenaries in the state of the Maldives in November 1988. The government of the Maldives appealed for Indian assistance, and the latter state deployed approximately 1,000 paratroopers to counter the 200 mercenaries hired by a Maldivian businessman. The mission was a success. Both military operations were funded by the Indian government.

**INDONESIA.** Separatist movements in Indonesia have prompted the deployment of several **peacekeeping** operations mandated by a variety of organizations. A territorial dispute between newly independent Indonesia and the Netherlands, its former colonial power, over West Irian in Western New Guinea resulted in the **United Nations (UN)**

assuming temporary management of the area between 1962 and 1963 with the deployment of the **United Nations Temporary Executive Authority**. The UN transferred West Irian to Indonesia in May 1963.

In 1974, Portugal, the colonizer of East Timor, began preparations for the territory to determine its future status—an independent state or integration into Indonesia. Civil strife erupted between the opposing groups supporting the two options. The East Timorese are heavily Roman Catholic, and the Indonesians are predominantly Muslim. This cultural and religious difference helped fuel the conflict. In 1976, Indonesia unilaterally intervened with its military and annexed East Timor. The UN did not recognize this action. Continued discussions between Indonesia and Portugal led to an agreement on 5 May 1999 to allow the UN to conduct a referendum to determine the will of the East Timorese people. The Security Council mandated the **United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET)** in June 1999 to assist the peace process; however, increased violence resulted in UNAMET not being able to fulfill its mission, followed by UN negotiations with Indonesia to deploy an international military operation, known as the **International Force in East Timor**, to stabilize the situation. Further discussions among the UN, Indonesia, and Portugal resulted in the transfer of the territory to UN administration. The UN deployed the **United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor** to support its efforts. East Timor became an independent state on 20 May 2002, and the UN mandated the **United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISSET)** to provide assistance to the government during a transitional period. The UN replaced UNMISSET with a political mission, the **United Nations Office in Timor-Leste**, in 2005. In 2006, soldiers in the newly independent country of Timor-Leste (formally East Timor) mutinied, resulting in the deployment of the **International Security Forces in Timor-Leste**. Later in 2006, the UN mandated and fielded the **United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste**.

A long-simmering insurgency in Aceh, a province located on the northwestern tip of Sumatra, intensified in the late twentieth century with the formation of the Free Aceh Movement. By 2003, open warfare raged in Aceh and did not abate until the massive devastation of the December 2004 tsunami helped bring the belligerents together. In 2005, the **European Union (EU)**, with non-EU states and the As-

**sociation of Southeast Asian Nations**, deployed monitors, referred to as the **Initial Monitoring Presence**, to assist the peace process. A month later, the monitors were replaced by the **Aceh Monitoring Mission**.

**INITIAL MONITORING PRESENCE (IMP).** Aceh is a province located on the northwestern tip of Sumatra in **Indonesia**. A long-simmering insurgency in Aceh intensified in the late twentieth century with the formation of the Free Aceh Movement. In 2001, the government of Indonesia granted limited autonomy to the area, including permission to implement Islamic Sharia law. This measure did not end the issue, and open warfare erupted in 2003. Fighting continued up until the December 2004 tsunami that wrought considerable devastation to the Aceh. The ramifications of the disaster helped bring the belligerents together, and they signed a memorandum of understanding in Finland on 15 August 2005, which granted Aceh more autonomy and promised the withdrawal of government soldiers in exchange for the disarmament of the insurgents. The **European Union (EU)**, with non-EU states, agreed to field monitors as mandated through the signing of the memorandum of understanding between the parties. Eighty EU and **Association of Southeast Asian Nations** monitors deployed on 15 August 2005 upon the signing of the memorandum. These monitors provided the early assurance of an international commitment to the peace process and remained on the ground until 15 September 2005, when they were officially replaced by the **Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM)**. Personnel assigned to the Initial Monitoring Presence merged into the AMM upon the latter's official activation.

**INTER-AFRICAN FORCE (IAF).** Zairian dissidents crossed into Zaire's (currently the Democratic Republic of the Congo) Shaba province from **Angola** on 13 May 1978. The rebels attacked Kolwezi, a major mining center with more than 2,500 Belgian, French, and **United States** expatriates. **France** and Belgium responded by deploying military forces to Zaire. French troops began landing on 19 May 1978, and the Belgians followed the next day. After securing their immediate objectives of protecting Westerners, the two European powers needed a plan to allow them to depart Zaire while

still ensuring the protection of President Sese Seku Mobutu's government. The French solved the problem at the 1978 Franco-African Summit during the month of May. Morocco, Senegal, **Côte d'Ivoire**, Togo, and Gabon agreed to field contingents as part of an "Inter-African Force" (IAF) to replace the French and Belgian military personnel in Zaire. The IAF allowed the French and Belgians to depart while keeping the Zairian dissidents in check. Although unclear, the funding for the operation probably originated in France.

**INTER-AFRICAN FORCE IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (MISAB).** The **Central African Republic (CAR)** faced a political crisis in 1996, due to lengthy economic problems, including the failure to pay salaries. Segments of the military initiated a series of mutinies against the government. The presidents of Burkina Faso, **Chad**, Gabon, and Mali met the CAR leaders at the end of the year and secured a truce between progovernment and rebel forces in the state. On 25 January 1997, the belligerents signed the Bangui Agreements as a step toward a political settlement. Provisions of the agreements called for the fielding of a joint French–African **peacekeeping** operation known as the Inter-African Force in the Central African Republic (MISAB).

The agreements contained a provision for an international military force to oversee the peace process. The mandate of the MISAB included the restoration of peace and security by monitoring the implementation of the Bangui Agreements and disarming former rebels, militia, and other unlawfully armed groups. Thus, MISAB was not mandated by an international organization but by an international agreement. MISAB deployed to the CAR on 8 February 1997. The **United Nations (UN)** Security Council gave its approval to MISAB's operations in Resolution 1125 on 6 August 1997. The UN recognized the inability of the African states in MISAB to continue the operation after the pending withdrawal of French troops and logistical support. In response, the Security Council passed Resolution 1159 on 27 March 1998 and mandated the **United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic** to replace MISAB.

MISAB consisted of approximately 800 soldiers from Burkina Faso, Chad, Gabon, Mali, Senegal, and Togo. Gabon provided the military command structure for the operation, and **France** contrib-

uted logistical assistance. Approximately 1,000 French soldiers based in the CAR under a previous bilateral agreement provided support for MISAB. At one point, rebellious soldiers fired upon the African peacekeepers, prompting a French helicopter reprisal against the barracks housing the mutineers. France funded MISAB.

**INTER-ALLIED PLEBISCITE FORCES.** *See* LEAGUE OF NATIONS PLEBISCITE FORCES.

**INTER-AMERICAN FORCE (IAF).** *See* INTER-AMERICAN PEACE FORCE (IAPF).

**INTER-AMERICAN PEACE FORCE (IAPF).** In 1965, civil conflict in the Dominican Republic attracted the attention of the **United States**, which had not intervened militarily in Latin America since 1933. The United States deployed troops to the island state on 28 April 1965 to protect American lives and the lives other foreign nationals and escort them from the country. The **Organization of American States (OAS)** met to discuss the Dominican crisis and agreed to field an Inter-American Force (IAF) to replace the unilateral force from the United States. A committee later changed the name of the operation to the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF). The IAPF began arriving on 23 May 1965. The non-American participants were organized into a Latin American Brigade consisting of two battalions. The first, the Brazilian Army Battalion, was comprised of approximately 1,000 soldiers from that state. The other battalion, known as the Fraternity Battalion, included a Brazilian Marine Company (approximately 150 marines), Honduran Company (250 troops), Nicaraguan Company (164 troops), Paraguayan Company (178 troops), and Costa Rican Platoon (25 policemen). Costa Rica does not have armed forces and thus opted to participate through the use of policemen. The 22,000 U.S. troops on the island were reorganized under the title of United States Forces in the Dominican Republic and added to the IAPF as a separate unit from the Fraternity Battalion. A Brazilian, General Hugo Panasco Alvim, served as the **force commander**. Alvim assumed command on 31 May 1965, replacing American lieutenant-general Bruce Palmer Jr., who assumed the role of deputy commander and commander of the U.S. contingent.

The mandate of the IAPF called upon the force to assist in the “restoration of normal conditions in the Dominican Republic, in maintaining the security of the inhabitants and for inviolability of human rights, and in the establishment of an atmosphere of peace and conciliation that will permit the functioning of democratic institutions.” Alvim answered not to the **secretary-general** but to a committee comprising all of the contingent-contributing states, a common practice in early **United Nations** operations. Alvim exercised command over the contingents provided to the IAPF. General Alvaro Alves da Silva Braga of Brazil replaced Alvim on 17 January 1966, while American brigadier-general Robert R. Linvill succeeded Palmer on the same day. The IAPF began its withdrawal from the Dominican Republic on 28 June 1966, and the exodus continued until 21 September 1966, when the last contingent departed. The funding of the IAPF, as set by the OAS, called for voluntary contributions from members of the regional organization; however, Brazil and the United States were the only countries that actually provided funding for the mission. The former paid approximately 6 percent and the latter approximately 94 percent of the total IAPF budget. Although the IAPF has been referred to as a neutral **peacekeeping** operation, the deployed forces tended to support the American-favored belligerent in the conflict. In many ways, IAPF resembled a cross between peacekeeping and **peace enforcement**. *See also* MISSION OF THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC (DOMREP).

**INTER-ENTITY BOUNDARY LINE.** *See* STABILISATION FORCE (SFOR).

**INTERGOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY ON DEVELOPMENT PEACE SUPPORT MISSION IN SOMALIA (IGASOM).** **Somalia** remained in a state of political chaos following the withdrawal of the **United Nations Operation in Somalia II** in 1995. Between 2002 and 2004, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and **African Union (AU)** discussed fielding an African-mandated **peacekeeping** operation in Somalia to support the peace process and the new Transitional National Government (TNG) of Somalia during that period. Under the AU’s plans to divide continental peacekeep-

ing responsibility among five regional African organizations, IGAD held the security role for the Horn of Africa. IGAD officially agreed to assume responsibility for fielding the Intergovernmental Authority on Development Peace Support Mission in Somalia on behalf of the AU in March 2005. In March 2006, at least one IGAD official admitted the organization had failed to secure the conditions necessary for deploying peacekeepers to Somalia. These issues included a fragmented political approach, with the **United Nations (UN)**, AU, and IGAD disagreeing on aspects of the peace process, including the lifting of a UN-imposed arms embargo, the lack of funding, the failure to secure the consent of all the major belligerents, an overly ambitious mandate, and the lack of political will of IGAD members to deploy their troops into a hostile situation. The UN provided a specific authorization for the IGAD operation in December 2006 to boost the mission's legitimacy. IGAD efforts continued until January 2007, when the AU assumed the mandate and responsibility for deploying the peacekeepers. The AU fielded the **African Union Mission in Somalia** in March 2007.

**INTERIM MULTINATIONAL EMERGENCY FORCE IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO.** The 2002 Luanda Agreement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) included a provision for the withdrawal of the 7,000-man Ugandan army unit operating in the Ituri region of northeastern DRC. The **United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)** planned to move into the area when the Ugandans departed. As the Ugandan military left Bunia, local militias attempted to gain control over the town and the area. Civilians fled the town, and many sought security near MONUC bases, including that of a battalion from Uruguay. Most of the peacekeepers chose to remain neutral as the militia members began killing civilians and a few peacekeepers as well. The **United Nations (UN)** Security Council mandated a multinational force on 30 May 2003, with Resolution 1484 to assist MONUC with the deteriorating security situation in the country. The **European Union (EU)** agreed to field the operation in support of the UN mandate. **Operation Artemis** is the common name for this deployment of EU peacekeepers, but the Interim Multinational Emergency Force (IMEF) is the official name of



the operation, as listed in the UN mandate. Plans called for the IMEF to relieve the peacekeepers from Uruguay and secure the area until a larger detachment of MONUC peacekeepers could move into the area and assume the mission. The EU agreed to field peacekeepers under the UN mandate, and **France** assumed the lead in assembling the mission. The mandate of the IMEF included helping stabilize the security situation in Bunia, opening and securing the airport, securing the internally displaced person camps, and protecting UN personnel and the civilian population. The initial elements of the IMEF began arriving on 12 June 2003. Approximately 1,400 EU troops deployed as part of the IMEF, with nearly all of the combat forces coming from France. The non-EU countries of **Croatia**, Canada, and **South Africa** also contributed military forces to IMEF. The IMEF withdrew on 1 September 2003, as MONUC returned to the area. The IMEF was the first independent EU military mission deployed outside the European continent.

**INTERNAL PEACEKEEPING.** Internal **peacekeeping** involves an operation that is fielded in an attempt to help settle an internal conflict in a state. In other words, the peacekeepers do not separate two conflicting countries but are involved in a civil war situation. Internal peacekeeping operations have been the most difficult missions for international organizations to manage due to the nature of the conflict. Frequently, more than two belligerents are involved in civil wars, and arranging agreement between all parties is very difficult.

**INTERNATIONAL CIVILIAN SUPPORT MISSION IN HAITI (MICIVH).** The International Civilian Support Mission in Haiti (MICIVH) was a joint operation of the **United Nations (UN)** and the **Organization of American States (OAS)**. The UN General Assembly mandated MICIVH on 20 April 1993; however, monitors had deployed to **Haiti** as early as February 1993. MICIVH's mission included the verification of human rights in Haiti. The organization worked in very difficult political conditions. In late 2000, UN **secretary-general Kofi Annan** called on the global body to not remandate MICIVH after February 2001, due to continued political problems in the country and the refusal of the UN's members to increase funding for the verification mission. MICIVH consisted of

200 UN and 133 OAS staff members. The majority of the personnel were classified as international monitors. Many scholars do not consider MICIVH as a **peacekeeping** operation. The mission is included in this dictionary due to its mission, size, and arrangement as a joint UN/OAS operation.

**INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SUPPORT AND VERIFICATION.** The International Commission for Support and Verification involved a joint **Organization of American States (OAS)** and **United Nations (UN)** operation to oversee the disarmament and resettlement of the Contra armed group in Nicaragua in 1991. The UN held the responsibility for both military and nonmilitary activities in Costa Rica and Honduras. The OAS was responsible for nonmilitary activities of the commission in Nicaragua. The commission established security zones within Nicaragua to provide the returning Contras a safe location to gather and turn in their weapons. It took months of mediation to finally persuade the Contras to surrender their weapons, despite the fact that the Sandinistas had departed the government following their presidential electoral defeat to Violeta Chamorro.

**INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF CONTROL AND SUPERVISION (ICCS).** The 1973 Paris Accords, which allowed the **United States** to withdraw its forces from South Vietnam during the Vietnam War, included a provision for the establishment of the International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS). Although not a peacekeeping mission in the classic sense of the term, the ICCS operated along the lines similar to many later cease-fire observation missions fielded by the **United Nations (UN)**. The mission of the ICCS included oversight of the cease-fire. Four states participated in the commission, including Canada, **Indonesia**, Hungary, and Poland. The first two states favored the U.S. position, while the latter two were sympathetic toward North Vietnam and the Viet Cong. The composition of the ICCS allowed for a balance of states sympathetic toward the belligerents in the Vietnam War. Each state provided 290 observers, half of whom were military officers. Canada withdrew its observers at the end of 1973 due to the refusal of all belligerents to adhere to the cease-fire and was replaced by Iran. The mission of the

ICCS devolved into an exercise of providing verbal reprimands to both sides. The four main belligerents, the United States, South Vietnam, North Vietnam, and the Viet Cong, were supposed to pay for the ICCS; however, the latter two refused to provide funding when requested. The ICCS suspended its activities by the end of 1974, and the 1975 communist victory officially brought the organization to a conclusion.

**INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY (ICISS).** In September 2000, Canada announced that it would fund a study first proposed by **United Nations (UN) secretary-general Kofi Annan** in 1999. Annan alarmed many states when he declared that human rights should take precedent over national/state rights. In other words, the collective body of the UN members should have the right to intervene in a state without invitation to restore fragile democracies and protect human rights. Such an international authorization could permit the UN to field a **peace enforcement** operation in a state to halt acts of genocide without the invitation or approval of the recognized government. Opposition from many states within the UN prompted Canada to assume an independent lead in the body, known as the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). The commission consisted of an advisory board tasked to facilitate global discussion and build international support for the mission of the organization. The organization was headquartered at the offices of the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in Ottawa and financed by grants from the Canadian government as well as the Carnegie, MacArthur, and Rockefeller foundations. The ICISS was terminated in December 2001 upon completing and releasing its report titled *The Responsibility to Protect*.

**INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (ICC).** The International Criminal Court (ICC) began operations on 1 July 2002. The ICC, established by 139 states through the **United Nations (UN)**, is mandated to prosecute individuals suspected of war crimes committed anywhere in the world after 1 July 2002. It should be noted that the ICC is independent of the UN. The **United States** attempted to secure an exemption of ICC jurisdiction over Americans assigned to

international **peacekeeping** missions. The United States expressed concern that U.S. soldiers could be singled out for wrongful prosecution on political grounds. To make a point, the United States vetoed the mandate extension of the **United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH)**. U.S. allies criticized the move to tie the peacekeeping operation to the ICC debate. A compromise emerged on 12 July 2002. The Security Council unanimously approved a one-year temporary immunity for the peacekeepers of any country that did not sign the ICC treaty. The resolution permits the exemption to be renewed after each one-year expiration. Many states claimed that the compromise undermined the ICC. The controversy also affected the **United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka**, which received its funding from the UNMIBH budget. A temporary or permanent closure of UNMIBH would have actually impacted two peacekeeping operations.

The ICC has conducted investigations of individuals involved in the conflicts within Darfur in **Sudan**, northern Uganda, the **Central African Republic**, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo but did not initiate its first trial until January 2009. One of the more controversial issues associated with the ICC occurred on 4 March 2009, when the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. The Sudanese government refused to hand over the president, and other countries have ignored the arrest warrant during visits by al-Bashir.

#### **INTERNATIONAL FORCE IN EAST TIMOR (INTERFET).**

The **United Nations (UN)** Security Council mandated the **United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET)** on 11 June 1999, to help conduct a referendum in East Timor. Following an outbreak of violence on the island, UN negotiators met with Indonesian officials and signed an agreement on 12 September 1999, permitting the deployment of an international military force to assist in stabilizing the situation. The peacekeepers, known as the International Force in East Timor (INTERFET), arrived on 20 September 1999. Additional discussions between the UN, **Indonesia**, and Portugal resulted in the transfer of the territory to UN administration. The Security Council opted to replace UNAMET with a new operation, known as the **United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor**

(UNTAET). UNTAET was mandated on 25 October 1999, with Resolution 1272, to help the international organization administer the territory.

It should be noted that INTERFET was not a UN **peacekeeping** operation. The Security Council authorized **Australia** to organize INTERFET, with the participation of other countries, to provide security and help restore the peace. INTERFET peacekeepers arrived in East Timor on 20 September 1999. On 28 September 1999, Indonesia and Portugal agreed to transfer East Timor to UN administration while the territory prepared for independence. INTERFET, led by Australia, consisted of nearly 10,000 soldiers. Australia provided 5,000 peacekeepers, and 21 other states dispatched an additional 4,500 peacekeepers. INTERFET's mandate included the restoration of peace and security in East Timor, the protection of UNTAET personnel, and the facilitation of humanitarian operations. On 28 February 2000, INTERFET transferred command of military operations to UNTAET. Many of the INTERFET peacekeepers remained in East Timor as part of UNTAET. The East Timorese voted on a Constituent Assembly on 30 August 2001, which then drafted a new constitution on 22 March 2002. East Timor became an independent state on 20 May 2002. The Security Council mandated a new peacekeeping operation, the **United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor** on 17 May 2002, with a mandate to provide assistance to the government during a transitional period.

**INTERNATIONAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE TRAINING TEAM (IMATT).** The International Military Assistance Training Team (IMATT) in **Sierra Leone** emerged in 2000 from the British Military Assistance Training Team, a bilateral arrangement between **Great Britain** and the government of Sierra Leone. IMATT's mission is to train a new army for the latter country following years of civil war. There are approximately 100 personnel assigned to IMATT with plans to reduce this force by half before 2011. IMATT is essentially a British military operation in support of Sierra Leone with small numbers of personnel from **Australia**, Bermuda, Canada, Ghana, Jamaica, **Nigeria**, Senegal, and the **United States**. IMATT cooperated closely with the **United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)** before the termination of the latter

operation on 31 December 2005, and then continued working with UNAMSIL's replacements, the **United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone** and then the **United Nations Integrated Peace-building Office in Sierra Leone**.

**INTERNATIONAL MONITORING TEAM (IMT).** Moro separatists have fought a long struggle against the government of the Philippines based on the demand for an Islamic Moro state. The two sides signed a peace agreement in 1996 granting the establishment of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao; however, this did not satisfy the segments of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) fighters who still demanded their own sovereign country. The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) brokered continued negotiations. By 2004, the MILF opted to assist the government in its struggle against radical groups allied with Al-Qaida. This new cooperation helped bring the two sides closer in their discussions on Moro issues. Both accepted a proposal to establish the International Monitoring Team (IMT) under the auspices of the OIC.

The IMT's mandate is traced to the Tripoli Peace Agreement of 22 June 2001, but the force finally deployed in October 2004. The operation consists of approximately 29 observers, including 12 personnel from Malaysia, 10 from Brunei, six from Libya, and one socioeconomic expert from Japan. The monitors are not armed and must always be accompanied by personnel of the MILF or the government. The Philippines pays the logistics costs of the operation. In December 2009, the Philippines and the MILF agreed to expand the membership of the IMT to include such nongovernmental organizations as the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Mindanao People's Caucus.

**INTERNATIONAL MONITORING UNIT (IMU) (SUDAN).** The International Monitoring Unit (IMU) (SUDAN) is also referred to as the Sudan Verification Mission in some sources. The terrorist attack on the World Trade Center towers on 11 September 2001 prompted the **United States** and other countries to renew efforts to secure a cease-fire and successful peace negotiations in **Sudan**. Osama bin Laden and his followers utilized Sudan as a training base prior to 2001, and there was concern that the state could be a destination

for those terrorists escaping the 2002 Allied assault on Afghanistan. The Sudanese government has made pledges to not support terrorist organizations, and many Western governments viewed an end to that state's long civil war as one way to bring greater stability and ensure that terrorists did not return. In March 2002, the United States announced plans to deploy a small number of international monitors to observe a new cease-fire between the Sudanese government and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in the southern area of the state. IMU (Sudan) was the product of joint United States/Swiss mediation and deployed to the Sudanese Nuba Mountains in April 2002. The mission of IMU (Sudan) included observing the cease-fire, monitoring the disengagement of Sudanese and SPLA forces, and investigating violations of the cease-fire. Approximately nine countries provided 15 monitors to the operation. IMU (Sudan) was not mandated by an international organization but rather by an agreement known as the *Report of Sudan and SPLA Movement/Nuba* signed on 19 January 2002. The **United Nations Advance Mission in Sudan** replaced IMU (Sudan) in June 2004 and was itself followed by the **United Nations Mission in Sudan** in March 2005.

**INTERNATIONAL PANEL OF EMINENT PERSONALITIES TO INVESTIGATE THE 1994 GENOCIDE IN RWANDA AND THE SURROUNDING EVENTS.** In November 1997, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia proposed the establishment of a formal **Organization of African Unity (OAU)** inquiry into the Rwandan genocide to the Central Organ of the Organization for African Unity Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution. OAU **secretary-general** Salim Ahmed Salim endorsed the proposal and submitted it to various organs of the OAU for consideration. The 67th Ordinary Session of the heads of state and government voted in favor of the proposal in February 1998 and appointed Sir Ketumile Masire, the former foreign minister of Botswana, as the panel chair. The group consisted of seven members, three of whom were not African. The panel produced a detailed final report in July 2000. Many of its conclusions and lessons related to **Rwanda** and the lack of a speedy and coordinated global humanitarian response that mirrored those of the **Independent Inquiry into**

**the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda** prepared by the **United Nations**.

**INTERNATIONAL PEACE COOPERATION LAW.** After its entry into the **United Nations (UN)**, **Japan** did not deploy personnel with **peacekeeping** operations. The Japanese government cited its post–World War II constitution and declared that its military was permitted to only conduct self-defense missions. In 1992, three political opposition parties managed to persuade the legislature to pass the International Peace Cooperation Law, which permitted the use of Japanese military assets in peaceful endeavors outside of the country. The law outlines the following four conditions for the use of the Japanese military in peace operations:

1. There must be an existing cease-fire.
2. Belligerents must grant consent to the introduction of peacekeepers and specifically a Japanese contingent.
3. The peacekeeping operation must be impartial in the conflict.
4. The use of force must be either a last resort or self-defense.

**INTERNATIONAL PEACE MONITORING TEAM (IPMT).** The Townsville Peace Agreement, signed on 15 October 2000, ended hostilities on Guadalcanal in the **Solomon Islands** and established an international presence to monitor the cease-fire. The International Peace Monitoring Team (IPMT) resulted from the Townsville Peace Agreement, with **United Nations** support. The mandate of the IPMT was to collect and store weapons and build confidence among the parties for a peaceful settlement to the crisis. The personnel assigned to IPMT were unarmed civilians. The IPMT consisted of six teams—four on Guadalcanal and two on Malaita. In 2003, the IPMT transitioned to the **Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands**. The authorized strength of the IPMT was approximately 49 civilian monitors from **Australia**, the Cook Islands, New Zealand, Tonga, and Vanuatu.

**INTERNATIONAL POLICE TASK FORCE.** *See* UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL POLICE TASK FORCE (IPTF).



**INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE (ISAF).**

After the World Trade Center terrorist attack of 11 September 2001, an international coalition of forces, led by the **United States**, assisted the Afghan Northern Alliance to remove the Taliban government from power in **Afghanistan**. The ISAF is mandated by the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending Reestablishment of Permanent Governmental Institutions signed in Bonn, Germany, on 5 December 2001, between the Afghan Interim Authority and the states offering contingents. The document is also known as the Bonn Agreement. The new Afghan Interim Authority government assumed power on 22 December 2001. The Western powers organized the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to assist the interim government with military and police training, as well as with offering a measure of security for the new regime. ISAF is under the command of the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)** but has non-NATO members. A small reconnaissance team arrived in Afghanistan on 1 January 2002 and joined British forces earmarked for ISAF. The **United Nations** offered its backing for ISAF with Security Council Resolution 1386 on 20 December 2001. The mandate calls for ISAF contingents to train and conduct joint patrols in Kabul with the Afghan police, train units of the new Afghan National Guard, dispose of captured Taliban munitions, and provide humanitarian assistance. A Joint Coordinating Body provides for consultations between the contingent providers and the Afghan Interim Authority. In February 2002, the ISAF provided assistance following an avalanche that struck the Salang Tunnel, and in March 2002, it responded to a major earthquake in northern Afghanistan. By June 2002, the ISAF completed the training for the first new battalion in the Afghan National Guard. As of March 2010, there are approximately 90,000 personnel assigned to the ISAF from 45 countries. More than half of the personnel are from the **United States**. The ISAF is financed by the contingent providers.

**INTERNATIONAL SECURITY FORCES IN TIMOR-LESTE.** In

February 2006, soldiers in the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste (known as East Timor before independence from **Indonesia** in 2002) deserted their barracks. The soldiers, from a western enclave of **Timor-Leste**, complained that they faced discrimination compared

to soldiers from the rest of the small country. By April, the soldiers, who had officially been dismissed by the government, were protesting in the capital along with civilian supporters. Violence and further military and police defections continued into May. The **United Nations (UN)** did have a **peacekeeping** operation in the country. The **United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor** departed in May 2005 and was replaced by the **United Nations Office in Timor-Leste**, a political mission. On 24 May 2006, the country's foreign minister officially requested security assistance from **Australia**. Soldiers from four countries began arriving on 25 May 2006, and the UN Security Council endorsed the deployment of the International Security Forces in Timor-Leste, also known as **Operation Astute**, that same day with Resolution 1690. Approximately 1,300 Australian and 200 New Zealand troops initially deployed to the country.

On 25 August 2006, the Security Council established the **United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT)**, which included an authorized police presence of more than 1,600 personnel. The International Security Forces (ISF) civilian police forces officially transferred to UNMIT in September 2006. The ISF and UNMIT cooperated to restore stability, allowing the government of Timor-Leste to hold presidential and parliamentary elections in April and June 2007 in a largely peaceful atmosphere. In February 2008, a rebel group staged an unsuccessful attack against the president and prime minister. The ringleader was killed in the attack, and the majority of the rebels surrendered to the government in April 2008. The ISF continues to provide security in the country in cooperation with UNMIT, although its strength has been reduced since 2008. In February 2010, the operation reduced its size to approximately 550 personnel, including 400 from Australia and 150 from New Zealand. The annual cost of the mission is approximately \$121.4 million, and the ISF has suffered one fatality during its deployment.

**INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION AND FOLLOW-UP COMMISSION (CIVS).** The International Verification and Follow-Up Commission (CIVS), consisting of representatives of the **Organization of American States (OAS)**; the **United Nations (UN)**; the **Contadora Group**; five Central American states; and a support group of Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Uruguay, had the responsibility

of verifying and monitoring the terms of the Procedure for the Establishment of a Firm and Lasting Peace in Central America. The UN later deployed the **United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA)** to carry out these duties.

**INTERPOSITION FORCE.** An interposition force, also known as a barrier force, is a form of **traditional peacekeeping** in which a neutral military unit places itself physically between two belligerents. A **demilitarized zone** is normally established in the process, within which the peacekeepers base themselves. *See also* PEACEKEEPING.

**IRAN.** *See* UNITED NATIONS IRAN–IRAQ MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP (UNIIMOG).

**IRAQ.** The **United Nations (UN)** mandated the **United Nations Iran–Iraq Military Observer Group** in 1988 to help oversee a cease-fire in the eight-year war between Iraq and Iran. Following the conclusion of the **Persian Gulf War** in 1991, the UN deployed the **United Nations Iraq–Kuwait Observation Mission** along the Iraqi–Kuwaiti border and the **United Nations Guards Contingent in Iraq** to protect the Kurds in northern Iraq. Both missions withdrew in 2003 prior to the **U.S.** invasion of the country. The UN mandated the **Multinational Force in Iraq (MNF-I)**, primarily with U.S. troops, in 2004 to provide security for Iraq as a new government formed, as well as to help train the military and police forces of the state. MNF-I terminated at the end of 2009 and was replaced by bilateral agreements between Iraq and troop-contributing states. The UN Security Council mandated the **United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq** in 2004 to assist the government of Iraq. Also in 2004, the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization** established the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission in Iraq** to help equip and train the military and police forces of Iraq.

**ISRAEL.** The declaration of independence by Israel in 1948 resulted in a war with its Arab neighbors. A cease-fire the next year included the deployment of **United Nations (UN)** observers of the **United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)** along its

borders. In 1956, Israel attacked **Egypt**, in cooperation with **Great Britain** and **France**, across the Sinai Peninsula. In response, the UN deployed the **United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I)**, the organization's first large-scale **peacekeeping** mission. UNEF I peacekeepers were in the process of departing the Sinai when the 1967 Six-Day War erupted with Israeli strikes against Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. Following the war, UNTSO observers shifted to the area along the Suez Canal. The 1973 Yom Kippur War resulted in the return of a large UN peacekeeping operation known as the **United Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF II)** along the cease-fire line with Egypt and the **United Nations Disengagement Observer Force** with Syria. A 1978 Israeli invasion of **Lebanon** prompted the mandating and deployment of the **United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon**. Israel signed a peace treaty with Egypt in 1979, and the document included provisions for the replacement of UNEF II by the **Multinational Force and Observers**. Israeli confrontations with Palestinians within the Gaza Strip and West Bank have resulted in the deployment of the **Temporary International Presence in Hebron I**, **Temporary International Presence in Hebron II**, **European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories**, and **European Union Border Assistance Mission at Rafah**.

**ISRAEL–EGYPT MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION.** *See* MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSIONS.

**ISRAEL–JORDAN MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION.** *See* MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSIONS.

**ISRAEL–LEBANON MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION.** *See* MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSIONS.

**ISRAEL–SYRIA MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION.** *See* MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSIONS.

– J –

**JAPAN.** Japan has played a minimal role in **United Nations (UN)** **peacekeeping** operations for a country of its population size and

economic strength. For many years after World War II, Japan cited its constitutional clause prohibiting the use of the military for operations other than self-defense as the rationale for not deploying contingents with peacekeeping missions; however, the country did contribute additional money beyond its assessments to help fund UN missions. The passage of the **International Peace Cooperation Law** by the Japanese legislature in 1992 proved to be an important step in transforming Japan's role in peacekeeping missions. Tokyo took its first leap into peacekeeping with the fielding of a contingent with the **United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia**. The results of this Japanese experiment were mixed. Japan does contribute small numbers of personnel to a limited number of peacekeeping operations. In 2001, Japan ranked 58th among UN members for manpower contributions to operations deployed by the global organization. In 2010, Japan had dropped to 84th. *See also* AKASHI, YASUSHI.

**JETLEY, MAJOR-GENERAL VIJAY KUMAR.** Jetley, an Indian officer, served as the **force commander** of the **United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)** from December 1999 to September 2000. Jetley clashed with his deputies who were from other states contributing to the mission. Jetley accused the Nigerians in the operation of benefitting from the illegal mining of diamonds and establishing an independent relationship with the guerrilla forces in **Sierra Leone**. The **United Nations (UN)** opted to replace Jetley and his deputies to restore harmony to the operation. Reportedly, India demanded that the UN remove Jetley with dignity. The UN solved the situation by declaring that UNAMSIL needed to be commanded by a lieutenant-general due to its increased size, and Jetley held the rank of major-general.

**JOINT CONTROL COMMISSION FORCE.** *See* JOINT CONTROL COMMISSION PEACEKEEPING FORCE.

**JOINT CONTROL COMMISSION PEACEKEEPING FORCE.** Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, the former Soviet Republic of Moldova became an independent state. Many people living in the Transdneister region of the country are of Romanian descent and seek measures of autonomy from Moldova. **Russia** is sensitive

to insecurity within the former Soviet republics due the presence of ethnic Russians, economic connections, and the tendency of the crises to attract outside attention and interference. Under a bilateral agreement between Moldova and Russia signed on 21 July 1992, Russian troops still in the country assumed a **peacekeeping** role. The mission is known as the Joint Control Commission Peacekeeping Force and has also been referred to as the Moldova Joint Force and Joint Control Commission Force. One of the challenges of reviewing **Commonwealth of Independent States** or Russian peacekeeping operations is the establishment of names for the missions. Non-Russian sources tend to have different names for the same mission partly due to translation variations. The mission consists of more than 4,000 troops from Russia, Moldova, and Transdneister. The **Organization for Security and Cooperation Mission to Moldova** is also in the country, partially to observe the Russian operation. The number of fatalities and costs of the Russian operation are not openly reported.

**JOINT NORDIC COMMITTEE ON MILITARY UNITED NATIONS MATTERS.** This Scandinavian committee, representing Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden, is responsible for advanced **peacekeeping** training courses for member states preparing to support **United Nations** peacekeeping operations.

**JOINT TASK FORCE LIBERIA.** *See* ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES MISSION IN LIBERIA (ECOMIL).

**JOINT TASK FORCE PROVIDE PROMISE.** The **United States** applied this term to its support and participation in the **United Nations Protection Force in Macedonia**. The U.S. contribution to this operation included 300 infantry soldiers. The initial U.S. contingent originated from the soldiers assigned to the Berlin Brigade, which was being disbanded. American units were rotated in and out of **Macedonia** from the United States every six months.

**JOINT TASK FORCE SOMALIA.** The **United States** applied this term in November 1993 to its forces assigned with the **United Nations Operation in Somalia II**. The United States restructured its forces in **Somalia** following a series of confrontations with **Mohammed**

**Farah Aidid's** forces within Mogadishu. The restructuring involved the addition of mechanized vehicles and supporting forces, including marines located off shore. The move also led to the withdrawal of special operations units assigned to capture Aidid. U.S. forces also altered their mission in support of the **United Nations (UN)** operation and reduced their patrolling in Mogadishu. The United States assigned Major-General Carl F. Ernst to command the task force, which was still technically under the UN until withdrawn in early 1994.

**JORDAN.** *See* MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSIONS; UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION (UNTSO).

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**KARACHI AGREEMENT.** **India** and **Pakistan**, under the auspices of the **United Commission for India and Pakistan**, signed the Karachi Agreement on 18 July 1949. The agreement established a cease-fire line in the disputed territory of Kashmir and opened the possibility for the stationing of neutral **United Nations** peacekeepers with each belligerent to observe the cease-fire accord. The peacekeepers, 20 in number under the command of Lieutenant-General Maurice Delvoie of Belgium, were later dispatched to the cease-fire line. Subsequent additions to the agreement included a list of prohibited activities that would be reported to the peacekeepers, such as the crossing of the cease-fire line, any firing or use of explosives within five miles of the cease-fire line, the laying of new mines or wire along any positions, the reinforcement of any existing forward defense positions, the overflight of the cease-fire line by aircraft, and the forward movement of military personnel or equipment from Kashmir.

**KASHMIR.** *See* UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN.

**KASMIYAH BRIDGE.** The Kasmiyah Bridge, located near Tyre in **Lebanon**, was scheduled to be occupied by the French contingent of the **United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon** in 1978. The

Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) protested on the grounds that the area had not been occupied by Israeli forces during the latter's invasion and thus should not come under direct observation of peacekeepers. The **United Nations** agreed with the PLO claims and diverted the French units away from the bridge.

**KATANGA.** *See* UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN THE CONGO (ONUC).

**AL-KHATIB, LIEUTENANT-COLONEL SAMI.** President **Elias Sarkis** of **Lebanon** selected al-Khatib, a Lebanese officer, as the second commander of the **Arab Deterrent Force**. Al-Khatib assumed his post on 11 April 1977 and remained there until March 1983, when President Amin Gemayel eliminated the position following the deployment of the **Multinational Forces I** **peacekeeping** operation.

**KINDU.** Kindu, located in Kasai province of the Congo (currently the Democratic Republic of the Congo), was the site of a massacre of peacekeepers assigned to the **United Nations Operation in the Congo**. On 11 November 1961, a 13-man Italian crew flew a C-119 transport plane into Kindu airfield. The plane carried two armored cars for the Malayan contingent. Soldiers of the Congolese National Army seized the Italians and then murdered and dismembered them.

**KISSINGER, HENRY A.** Kissinger, the secretary of state during the Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford administrations of the **United States**, initiated what became known as shuttle diplomacy at the conclusion of the 1973 Yom Kippur War between **Israel** and **Egypt**, along with **Syria**. Kissinger's diplomatic negotiations helped lead to cease-fires between the belligerents and the introduction of two **peacekeeping** operations to the area. The first, the **United Nations Emergency Force II**, deployed between Egypt and Israel, while the second, the **United Nations Disengagement Observer Force**, separated Syrian and Israeli forces on the Golan Heights.

**KNOX-ARMEE.** Knox-Armee was the nickname given to the international police force recruited to assist in the monitoring of the civilian population during the **Saar Plebiscite**. The force, heavily recruited



from the ranks of retired British policemen, was named after Geoffrey Knox.

**KOKKINA.** Kokkina is a Turkish Cypriot enclave in the western Greek Cypriot area of Cyprus. In August 1964, Greek Cypriot forces attacked the Kokkina enclave, prompting a response by the Turkish Cypriot and Turkish government troops on the island. The Turkish government launched air strikes to support the Turkish Cypriot forces in the enclave. The **United Nations (UN)** Security Council debated the crisis, which was the worst cease-fire violation since the arrival of the **United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)**. On 11 August 1964, the Security Council bypassed the **secretary-general** and directly informed the UNFICYP commander, General Kodendera Subgayya Thimayya, to supervise the cease-fire around Kokkina and reinforce the UNFICYP units in the areas of recent military operations. By communicating directly with Thimayya, the Security Council was violating the normal UN chain of command for **peacekeeping** operations. Normally, the Security Council issued instructions via resolutions to the secretary-general, who then carried out the will of the body by contacting the **force commander**. *See also* MELOUSHA.

**KOLWEZI.** *See* FRANCE; INTER-AFRICAN FORCE (IAF).

**KOREAN WAR.** Although not an example of **peacekeeping**, actions of the **United Nations (UN)** during the Korean War illustrate how an international organization can mobilize at least some of its members under a declaration of collective security. The Korean War is an example of a type of **Chapter Seven peace enforcement** mission mandated by the UN. Despite **U.S.** dominance during the Korean War, the military actions were officially sanctioned by the UN, just as in the **Persian Gulf War** four decades later. North Korea crossed the border and invaded South Korea on 25 June 1950. On 27 June 1950, the United States persuaded the Security Council, thanks to a boycott by the Soviet delegation, to urge members to contribute assistance to South Korea. American ground and naval forces went into action the same day against North Korea. On 7 July 1950, the Security Council recommended that member states provide military assistance to

South Korea. Twenty states deployed military contingents of various sizes to assist the South Korean government. In all, 45 states sent some form of aid to South Korea based upon the resolution. The return of the Soviet delegate, and his assumption of the presidency of the Security Council, blocked further resolutions on the Korean War. In turn, the United States pushed the **Uniting for Peace Resolution** through the General Assembly on 2 November 1950. Also known as the Acheson Plan, the resolution provided a means of moving peace and security issues from a deadlocked Security Council to the General Assembly. The United States selected General Douglas MacArthur to command all UN forces during the Korean War. After stemming the North's offensive around what was known as the Pusan Perimeter, the UN forces counterattacked and launched an amphibious operation at Inchon. The successful UN drive ended when the Chinese intervened in large numbers on 25 November 1950. Following a withdrawal of UN forces, another offensive stabilized the lines roughly along the original border (38th parallel of latitude) between North and South Korea. The belligerents finally signed an armistice on 27 July 1953, which is still in place and technically overseen by **Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission**.

**KOSOVO.** Kosovo was a territorial entity within the former **Yugoslavia**. Serbia and ethnic Serbs dominated much of Yugoslavia, while the majority population in Kosovo is ethnic Albanian. Kosovo held considerable autonomy until 1989, when Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic brought the region under direct Serbian control. By 1998, tensions were increasing between the ethnic Albanian majority and Serbian minority within Kosovo, and fighting between the Yugoslavian army and the Kosovo Liberation Army became daily occurrences. A humanitarian crisis erupted as Serbians forced people to flee Kosovo. Yugoslavian authorities refused to abide by international demands to end the crisis, and the situation threatened to spread to other states in the region. On 13 October 1998, the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)** authorized air strikes to support diplomatic moves in forcing the Serbians to end the violence. The Serbs backed down, and the **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)** established its **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Kosovo Verification**

**Mission.** The mission encountered considerable difficulty and ended the following year as NATO deployed the **Kosovo Force (KFOR)** as a **United Nations (UN)**-backed **peace enforcement** mission. Later in 1999, the OSCE deployed the **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Kosovo Task Force** as a three-week transition operation until the fielding of the **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Mission in Kosovo**. In 1999, the UN mandated the **United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo**. Kosovo declared independence in 2008. *See also* ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE PRESENCE IN ALBANIA.

**KOSOVO FORCE (KFOR).** The **United Nations (UN)** Security Council, with Resolution 1244 on 10 June 1999, endorsed the deployment of a **North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)** ground force into **Kosovo** following a two-week air campaign. This operation, known as the Kosovo Force (KFOR), entered Kosovo on 12 June 1999, as the Serbs initiated a military withdrawal from the territory. The Serbian withdrawal was completed by 20 June 1999. KFOR is organized into five multinational brigades, and its original authorized full strength was set at 50,000 military personnel, with 40,000 of the troops initially deployed in Kosovo. As of March 2010, KFOR consists of approximately 12,600 troops from 24 NATO and eight non-NATO countries. It is interesting to note that **Switzerland**, a traditionally neutral state that is rarely seen in any capacity in **peacekeeping** operations, is a participant in KFOR. **Russia** also dispatched a contingent for KFOR, and tensions ran high during the initial deployment as Moscow and NATO found themselves in a race to gain control of the main airport. Kosovo declared independence on 17 February 2008. KFOR remained in the country with a new set of tasks, including helping demobilize the Kosovo Protection Corps and establishing the Kosovo Security Force and the civilian institutions to oversee it. KFOR also cooperates with the **United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo**.

**KUPOLATI, MAJOR-GENERAL R. M.** Kupolati, a Nigerian army officer, served in senior roles within two major non-**United Nations (UN)** **peacekeeping** operations. During 1981 and 1982, he was se-

lected as the Nigerian contingent commander in the **Organization of African Unity Peacekeeping Force in Chad II**. In this capacity, he also served as the overall chief of logistics in the **Organization of African Unity**–mandated operation. In 1991, Kupolati was selected as the **force commander** of the **Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group in Liberia**.

**KUWAIT.** *See* ARAB LEAGUE FORCE IN KUWAIT; UNITED NATIONS IRAQ–KUWAIT OBSERVATION MISSION (UNIKOM).

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**LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT.** The Lancaster House Agreement, signed in London on 15 November 1979, ended the conflict in Zimbabwe. The document included a provision that mandated the deployment of the **Commonwealth Monitoring Force in Zimbabwe** to oversee the peace process and collect Patriotic Front soldiers as they came in from the bush.

**LASSO, GALO PLAZA.** Lasso, a native of Ecuador, served as chairman of the **United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon** during its brief duration from June to December 1958. In this capacity, he carried out the duties attributed to the position now known as **special representative**. He later became the mediator for the **United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus** and held that post from September 1964 to December 1965.

**LEAD STATE.** “Lead state” is a term often applied to describe a single state that opts to assume leadership in deploying a **peacekeeping** operation on behalf of an international organization. Lead states provide the majority of the personnel as well as leadership in the operation and sometimes field the entire mission. Examples include **France** with the **Interim Multinational Emergency Force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo**; **Nigeria** with the **Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group in Liberia**; and **Italy** with the **Multinational Protection Force**.

**LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES.** The League of Arab States, also known as the Arab League, was established on 22 March 1945. The purpose of the league, consisting of 22 member states, is to promote Arab unity in political, economic, and social issues. A council consisting of all member states coordinates **peacekeeping** activities of the league. The League of Arab States fielded the first regionally mandated peacekeeping force in 1961, with its **Arab League Force in Kuwait**. The organization later mandated two operations in **Lebanon**, the **Arab Deterrent Force** and the **Symbolic Arab Security Force**.

**LEAGUE OF NATIONS.** The League of Nations was established on 10 January 1920. The membership numbered up to 65 states, although the **United States** never joined. The league was an organization of very broad scope intended to preserve the peace and improve human welfare. The body maintained a permanent headquarters in Geneva, **Switzerland**. The council of the organization, a precursor to the Security Council of the **United Nations**, handled security issues that can be categorized as early attempts at multinational **peacekeeping**. *See also* LEAGUE OF NATIONS PLEBISCITE FORCES; SAAR INTERNATIONAL FORCE; VILNA INTERNATIONAL FORCE.

**LEAGUE OF NATIONS PLEBISCITE FORCES.** The **League of Nations** supervised several plebiscites after World War I to settle territorial questions that had emerged with the demise, birth, and/or readjustment of European states. Although the military units fielded in support of these missions were multinational, they represented joint operations of the victorious Allied powers and are thus questionable as being representative of neutral **peacekeeping** forces. In 1920, 3,000 British and French soldiers provided security during a plebiscite to determine if Schleswig should be German or Danish. The **United States** originally committed a battalion to this operation but later withdrew its offer. In that same year, **Great Britain, France,** and Italy fielded more than 15,000 soldiers in support of a plebiscite in Upper Silesia between **Germany** and Poland. In October 1920, less than 100 British, French, and Italian military officers oversaw the plebiscite in the Klagenfurt Basin that determined the status of

the area as being Austrian and not Yugoslavian. Approximately 2,000 British, French, and Italian soldiers deployed to Allenstein and Marienwerder in 1920 during the plebiscite that determined whether these areas should be German or Polish. The league moved 450 soldiers from the international force in Upper Silesia to the Sopron region between Austria and Hungary. Following the plebiscite that transferred the area to Hungarian political control, the troops returned to duty in Upper Silesia. The League of Nations did propose one truly neutral plebiscite force to oversee the political process in Vilna. That operation, the **Vilna International Force**, was never fielded. In 1935, the league finally deployed a neutral peacekeeping operation, the **Saar International Force**, in the Saar region between France and Germany.

**LEBANON.** Lebanon has hosted numerous **United Nations (UN)**, **League of Arab States**, and independent **peacekeeping** missions after World War II. In 1948, following the war that erupted at Israeli independence, the UN fielded an element of the **United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)**, known as the **Observer Group Lebanon**, to monitor the cease-fire along the border between Lebanon and **Israel**. Internal conflict within the country prompted an armed intervention by the **United States** in 1958. The **United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon** replaced U.S. troops and departed before the end of that same year. A civil war between the culturally diverse groups comprising the Lebanese population prompted several peacekeeping operations to contain the violence. In 1976, the League of Arab States deployed the **Symbolic Arab Security Force**, which was replaced the same year by the more robust **Arab Deterrent Force**. Israel invaded Lebanon in 1978 to counter incursions launched from the latter state. In response, the UN fielded the **United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)**. A second Israeli invasion in 1982 resulted in the establishment of the **Multinational Forces I** and the **Multinational Forces II** the next year. UNTSO observers formed **Observer Group Beirut**. UNIFIL remained in Lebanon following the Israeli withdrawal and was reinforced following the 2006 conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in southern Lebanon.

**LEFKA.** Lefka, a town in western Cyprus, was the destination of five Swedish members of the **United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)** who were attempting to smuggle weapons to the Turkish Cypriots in September 1965. The three enlisted personnel were exonerated, and the two officers were returned to Sweden. The latter personnel were found guilty, removed from the military, and jailed. An earlier incident of arms smuggling to the Turkish Cypriots involved a British airman, although he was not assigned to UNFICYP. The Greek press used the incident to declare that the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization** was behind the gunrunning of **United Nations** contingents on Cyprus. It has been speculated that this incident resulted in the reassignment of the Swedish contingent from western to eastern Cyprus in December 1964.

**LE ROY, ALAIN.** Le Roy, a French citizen, replaced **Jean-Marie Guehénno** as **undersecretary-general** for **peacekeeping** operations of the **United Nations** in 2008.

**LESOTHO.** *See* SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY OPERATION IN LESOTHO.

**LESSONS LEARNED UNIT.** *See* BEST PRACTICES UNIT.

**LIBERIA.** Master Sergeant Samuel Doe came to power in Liberia in 1980, following a military coup against the government of President William Tolbert. In 1984, President Doe, who had survived numerous assassination attempts and coups d'états since 1980, charged his director of the General Services Agency, Charles Taylor, with embezzling \$900,000. When Taylor fled to the **United States**, the authorities arrested and held him in Massachusetts for extradition to Monrovia; however, Taylor escaped and made his way to **Côte d'Ivoire**, where he received sympathy and introduction to the leaders of Burkina Faso and Libya, who would later aid him in forming a guerrilla army. In January 1990, Taylor led his newly formed group into Nimba County, Liberia, from Côte d'Ivoire, and initiated his war against the government of President Doe. The conflict took a new twist when Prince Johnson, one of Taylor's commanders, formed his own guerrilla group and became Taylor's political and military rival.

While the civil war intensified and neared Monrovia, President Doe's government began to crumble as the Taylor forces defeated his army and his government ministers began fleeing the country.

The pending collapse of Doe and impact of the war on civilians, Liberian and non-Liberian, resulted in the mandating and fielding of the **Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia**. The **United Nations (UN)** mandated the **United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL)** in 1993 to assist ECOMOG in Liberia in its mission to support the Liberian peace process. UNOMIL departed in 1997, following the Liberian national elections, and ECOMOG left in 1999; however, Liberia remained politically unstable as various factions refused to recognize Taylor as the legitimate president of the country. Internal conflict continued to escalate, culminating in a 2003 European call for U.S. intervention to support the peace process. The United States proved reluctant to put troops on the ground within a destabilized Liberia, although marines were dispatched and primarily remained offshore. The United States persuaded **Nigeria** and the **Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)** to deploy a **peacekeeping** force for Liberia. Limited U.S. forces did land in Liberia in small numbers, often referred to as Joint Task Force Liberia, as a quick reaction force until the arrival of Nigerian soldiers beginning on 4 August 2003 as the vanguard of an ECOWAS peacekeeping operation known as the **Economic Community of West African States Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL)**. In September 2003, the UN mandated the **United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)**. ECOMIL peacekeepers merged into UNMIL in October 2003.

**LILJESTRAND, MAJOR-GENERAL BENGT.** Liljestrand, a native of Sweden, was the chief of staff of the **United Nations Truce Supervision Organization** between April 1974 and August 1975, when he was named as the **force commander** of the **United Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF II)**. He held that position until November 1976.

**LINE OF CONTROL.** The prime minister of **India** and the president of **Pakistan** established what is called the Line of Control in 1972, after agreeing to a cease-fire in a war that erupted between the two



states in 1971. This line follows, with a few minor deviations, the cease-fire line of the Karachi Agreement of 1949 in Kashmir. The **United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan** monitors the cease-fire along the Line of Control.

**LITANI.** The Litani River marks the northern boundary of the territory patrolled by the **United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)**. The Litani also marks the farthest point in the south that could be occupied by forces of the **Arab Deterrent Force**. In addition, Litani is the name of the official UNIFIL magazine published to boost the morale of the personnel assigned to the operation.

**LITHUANIA.** *See* VILNA INTERNATIONAL FORCE.

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**MACEDONIA.** In the 1980s, **Yugoslavia** began showing serious strains between the various ethnic groups comprising the state. In 1991, Macedonia declared its independence from Yugoslavia, which was dominated by Serbia. The country, known officially in many venues as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia due to the sensitivity of Greece, which also has a northern province known as Macedonia, hosted peacekeepers to ensure that the conflict did not spillover from other areas, especially **Bosnia and Herzegovina**. The **United Nations (UN)** deployed the **United Nations Protection Force** in the region in 1992, and this operation expanded to include the **United Nations Protection Force in Macedonia** in 1993. The UN replaced the latter operation with the **United Nations Preventive Deployment Force** from 1995 to 1999. During this period, the European Community sent its **European Community Monitoring Mission** to establish a presence in the area. In 1994, the **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe** mandated the **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje**, an expansion of the **Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe** mission in the state. Ethnic Albanians initiated a conflict with the Macedonian government in 2001, prompting the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)**

to field **Operation Essential Harvest** from August 2001 to September 2001. NATO followed this mission with **Operation Amber Fox** until December 2002, when a **European Union (EU)** mission had been scheduled to deploy to the country. The delay in this mission resulted in NATO fielding **Operation Allied Harmony** until April 2003, when the **European Union Force Concordia** arrived and remained on the ground eight months. In December 2003, the EU fielded the **European Union Police Mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia** until December 2005, when it was replaced by the **European Union Police Advisory Team in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia**.

**MACKENZIE, BRIGADIER-GENERAL LEWIS.** MacKenzie, a native of Canada, served the **United Nations (UN)** in a variety of positions as a peacekeeper. He served as the first commander of the **United Nations Protection Force** element assigned to **Bosnia and Herzegovina**. A controversial officer, MacKenzie was reportedly removed from command due to his open opinions about the mismanagement of the situation in the former **Yugoslavia** by the UN.

**MALCORRA, SUSANA.** Malcorra, a citizen of Argentina, became the first **United Nations** undersecretary-general of the **Department of Field Support** in May 2008.

**MALDIVES.** *See* INDIA.

**MARITIME OPERATIONAL GROUP.** *See* UNITED NATIONS TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY IN CAMBODIA (UNTAC).

**MARITIME TASK FORCE.** *See* UNITED NATIONS INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON (UNIFIL).

**MELOUSHA.** In July 1966, Greek Cypriot forces attacked the Turkish Cypriot village of Melousha. The **United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus** managed to place a group of peacekeepers between the two belligerents and informed the Greek Cypriots that the peacekeepers would oppose any armed attack through their lines into Melousha. The Greek Cypriots ended the attack and returned

their troops to their barracks. This action is in contrast to an incident at **Kokkina**, during which the **United Nations** withdrew its forces when fighting erupted between the two belligerents.

**MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP (MOG).** In 1990, a Tutsi military force crossed from Uganda into **Rwanda**. The majority Hutu dominated the political system of Rwanda and the minority Tutsi. Conflict erupted, and many individuals became refugees as the fighting spread. Belgium and **France** airlifted paratroopers to Rwanda to evacuate foreign nationals. The **Organization of African Unity (OAU)** worked with the belligerents to secure a cease-fire and initiate a peace process in Rwanda. In April 1991, the OAU dispatched a small force of military observers, known as the Military Observer Group (MOG), to Rwanda in support of the peace process. Some sources refer to the operation as the Military Observer Team (MOT). The MOG personnel monitored the situation in Rwanda. **Burundi**, Uganda, and Zaire contributed military personnel to the small operation. The Rwandan groups did not view these states as neutral parties to the conflict, and the mission collapsed by late 1991 as a result of this perception. After another cease-fire, the OAU fielded a second **peacekeeping** mission known as the **Neutral Military Observer Group I (NMOG I)**. Many sources, including governmental and international agency reports, have confused MOG, NMOG I, and the **Neutral Military Observer Group II (NMOG II)** and interchanged the facts of their composition and deployment dates.

**MILITARY OBSERVER TEAM (MOT).** *See* MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP (MOG).

**MISSION FOR THE CONSOLIDATION OF PEACE IN CENTRAL AFRICA (MICOPAX).** Under the **African Stand-by Force (ASF)** system, the **Economic Community of Central African States (CEEAC)** represents the **African Union (AU)** in regional security missions within Central Africa. After implementation of the ASF planning process, the **Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States (CEMAC)** agreed to transition its **Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States Multinational Forces in the Central African Republic**

(FOMUC) to a CEEAC-mandated operation known as the Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in Central Africa. CEEAC mandated the mission for the **Central African Republic** on 12 July 2008, under the AU's plan for five regional organizations to take the lead in African-mandated **peacekeeping** operations on the continent. Under the ASF system, the operation is more likely to receive the financial and logistical support pledged to the AU by outside countries and organizations. Second, CEEAC is a larger organization than CEMAC, meaning there are more states from which to solicit troops for the operation. While the initial troop deployment for the Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in Central Africa remained the same as under FOMUC, Cameroon later deployed peacekeepers as a member of CEEAC. *See also* EUROPEAN UNION FORCE CHAD/CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (EUFOR TCHAD/RCA); UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC AND CHAD (MINURCAT); UNITED NATIONS PEACEBUILDING SUPPORT OFFICE IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (BONUCA).

**MISSION OF MILITARY OBSERVERS ECUADOR-PERU (MOMEPE).** Ecuador and Peru maintained a territorial dispute that dated back to the 19th century. In January 1995, the dispute erupted into open conflict as air and ground units from Peru intruded several times into Ecuadorian territory. Ecuador resisted and called for a cease-fire and international support. Negotiations opened in Brazil the next month. On 17 February 1995, the two belligerents, along with the guarantor states of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the **United States**, signed the Itamaraty Treaty. This agreement called for a cease-fire, the separation of the military forces of Peru and Ecuador along their border, the demilitarization of the conflict zone, and the dispatch of neutral military observers from the guarantor states to monitor the cease-fire and withdrawal of armed forces. The parties signed a second agreement, the Montevideo Treaty, on 28 March 1995, which verified the provisions of Itamaraty.

The guarantor states deployed the Mission of Military Observers Ecuador-Peru (MOMEPE) in accordance with the peace process. The small mission conducted its operations based on four phases. The first phase involved implementing the cease-fire. Second, MOMEPE

assumed control of the air space in the conflict zone and received the order of battle from Ecuador and Peru. Third, Ecuador and Peru removed their forces from the conflict zone. Fourth, MOMEP initiated its mission to monitor the cease-fire and conflict zone. MOMEP maintained base camps on both sides of the border and conducted its patrols by helicopter due to the remoteness of the area. Originally, MOMEP consisted of military personnel from the guarantor states. As conditions warranted, Ecuador and Peru were invited to contribute monitors to the operation. Ecuador and Peru signed a final border treaty on 26 October 1998, and MOMEP ended its mission on 17 June 1999. MOMEP was funded by Ecuador and Peru.

### **MISSION OF THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC (DOMREP).**

The Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP), a three-man operation to the Dominican Republic, is classified by the **United Nations (UN)** as a **peacekeeping** operation; however, the size of the mission and the nature of its mandate leaves one to question whether DOMREP should be listed as such by the global body. Civil war conditions in the Dominican Republic prompted an intervention by U.S. military forces on 28 April 1965. The **Organization of American States (OAS)** opted to assume official responsibility for the operation the following month and issued a call to its members for contingents for a multinational peacekeeping mission. This operation, later named the **Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF)**, consisted of approximately 14,000 U.S. and 1,700 Latin American soldiers. The latter group represented six member states of the OAS. The UN mandated a small observer mission in Security Council Resolution 203 on 14 May 1965 to monitor the OAS operation and the cease-fire process.

Secretary-General U Thant selected Jose Antonio Mayobre as his **special representative** in the Dominican Republic and appointed Major-General **Indar J. Rikhye** as the military adviser for the group. Rikhye's staff consisted of two military advisers. Brazil, Canada, and Ecuador provided one military adviser each to DOMREP; however, only two of these advisors were authorized to be assigned to DOMREP at any time. The OAS's Special Committee of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation complained that the presence of the UN per-

sonnel interfered with its mission of bringing peace to the Dominican Republic. Following a period of turmoil and elections in June 1966, the IAPF initiated a phased withdrawal from the state, which was completed on 21 September 1966. In response, the UN officially terminated DOMREP on 22 October 1966. DOMREP, headquartered in Santo Domingo, was funded by the regular budget of the UN and cost the organization \$275,831 between May 1965 and October 1966.

**MISSION TO SUPPORT THE PEACE PROCESS IN COLUMBIA (MAPP/OEA).** The government of Columbia has struggled with an insurgency movement for many years. One of these groups, the National Liberation Army (ELN), entered into negotiations with the government to end their conflict. The **Organization of American States (OAS)** mandated the Mission to Support the Peace Process in Columbia on 6 February 2004 with Resolution 859 to assist with the peace process in the country. The operation consists of approximately 35 OAS civilian staff and 68 local civilians at an annual cost of \$9.4 million. The non-OAS countries of Italy, Lithuania, Spain, and Sweden contribute personnel to this mission, which has an annual budget of \$9.4 million.

**MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSIONS.** The Mixed Armistice Commissions are part of the Armistice Commission that oversees the cease-fire between **Israel** and its Arab neighbors. Observers of the **United Nations Truce Supervision Organization** are assigned to the Mixed Armistice Commissions. The four commissions investigate and examine complaints of the various parties related to firing across or crossing the armistice demarcation line. The **Egypt–Israel** Mixed Armistice Commission (EIMAC) operated between both belligerents until 1956, when Israel unilaterally denounced the armistice agreement and refused to cooperate with the commission. After 1956, the commission remained in place but operated only on the Egyptian side of the frontier. The other commissions included the **Israel–Syria** Mixed Armistice Commission, **Israel–Jordan** Mixed Armistice Commission, and **Israel–Lebanon** Mixed Armistice Commission. Despite armistice violations from all parties, these organizations remained in place until the Six-Day War in 1967, when Israel denounced the last three commissions. The **United Nations** refused to accept any of the

unilateral withdrawals from the armistice agreements; however, the EIMAC was officially terminated in 1979, following the conclusion of a peace agreement between the two states.

**MIYAZAWA, KIICHI.** Miyazawa, a former Japanese prime minister, was instrumental in persuading the diet (parliament) of his country, on 15 June 1992, to vote for participation in **United Nations peace-keeping** operations. **Japan** dispatched military personnel to the **United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia** shortly after the approval given by the diet. *See also* AKASHI, YASUSHI.

**MIYET, BERNARD.** Miyet, a French citizen, replaced **Kofi Annan** as undersecretary-general for peacekeeping operations in January 1997, when the latter became **secretary-general** of the **United Nations**. Some claim the selection of Miyet was a French requirement for support to Annan's candidacy for secretary-general. Miyet served in the position until 2000, when **Jean-Marie Guehénno** assumed the title.

**MOLDOVA.** *See* JOINT CONTROL COMMISSION PEACEKEEPING FORCE; ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE MISSION TO MOLDOVA.

**MOLDOVA JOINT FORCE.** *See* JOINT CONTROL COMMISSION PEACEKEEPING FORCE.

**MONTENEGRO.** *See* ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE MISSION TO MONTENEGRO; YUGOSLAVIA.

**MORILLON, GENERAL PHILIPPE.** Morillon, an army officer from **France**, served as the commander of the **United Nations Protection Force** element in **Bosnia and Herzegovina** after Brigadier-General **Lewis MacKenzie**. In July 1993, he was replaced by Lieutenant-General **Francis Briquemont**. Morillon openly criticized **Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali** in January 1994 for the operation's problems. Morillon not only declared that the peacekeepers lacked the means, including the use of air support from

the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization**, to counter snipers and artillery fire, but that they operated under an unclear mandate.

**MOROCCO.** *See* UNITED NATIONS MISSION FOR THE REFERENDUM IN WESTERN SAHARA (MINURSO).

**MOZAMBIQUE.** *See* UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN MOZAMBIQUE (ONUMOZ).

**MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS (MFO).** The **United States** proposed the deployment of a **peacekeeping** operation to oversee the peace process of the Camp David Accords signed in March 1979 by **Egypt, Israel**, and the United States. The mission, to be known as the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), would operate as a multinational peacekeeping unit but would not be mandated by an international organization. Instead, the operational mandate stemmed directly from the Camp David Accords, and the United States offered to organize the mission. The **United Nations (UN)** had deployed the **United Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF II)** following the Yom Kippur War of October 1973. This peacekeeping operation helped pave the way for the MFO, since the latter organization benefited from the experience of the former in the Sinai between Egypt and Israel. Following the signing of the Camp David Accords, the UN withdrew the UNEF II, whose mandate was completed by the conclusion of a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. In turn, the MFO replaced the UNEF II in the Sinai. The United States Sinai Field Mission (SFM), located in the Sinai with the UNEF II, was responsible for operating radar installations to prevent a surprise air attack by either Egypt or Israel. This organization remained in the Sinai with the MFO.

The composition of the MFO includes approximately 1,660 soldiers from 12 countries. Colombia, Fiji, and the United States provide the three combat battalions assigned to MFO. The Colombians are based in the northern, the Fijians in the central, and the Americans in the southern areas of the neutral zone between Egypt and Israel. Italy provides the naval element, and **Australia, France**, and New Zealand contribute the air element of the MFO. General Bull



Hansen of Norway was selected as the first **force commander** of the MFO due to his experience as a **North Atlantic Treaty Organization** commander, his time spent as a UNEF commander, and because of his linguistic ability. The headquarters of the MFO is located in Rome, Italy. Operations in Rome are coordinated by a director-general. His relationship to the force commander is similar to that of the United Nations **secretary-general** to his force commanders. The command structure of the MFO is also similar to that of the UN. The MFO headquarters in the Sinai consists of a civilian observer unit that conducts reconnaissance and arms verification of the areas outside of the neutral zone where MFO battalions are based. The MFO maintains liaison with the **United Nations Disengagement Observer Force**, **United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon**, and **United Nations Truce Supervision Organization**.

The Camp David Accords divided the Sinai and western Israel into four zones. Egypt is allowed to post an unlimited number of troops and weapons west of the Suez Canal. Zone A, located in western Sinai, is the first arms limitation area. Egypt may station a total of 230 tanks and 22,000 soldiers in this zone. Zone B is located in the central Sinai. Within Zone B, Egypt may post four infantry battalions. Zone C, a MFO neutral barrier, extends along the eastern area of the Sinai. Only military forces of the MFO may enter Zone C. Zone D is a very narrow area immediately across the border inside Israel. The Israeli military may place four infantry battalions within Zone D. Outside of Zone D, Israel may have an unlimited number of troops and weapons. The MFO has been an unqualified success due to the cooperation of Israel and Egypt following the Camp David Accords. It is interesting to note that the MFO uses the color orange to designate its forces, in contrast to the UN, which equips its personnel in the color light blue. Egypt and Israel equally share the costs of the MFO; however, the United States increased its economic aid to Egypt and Israel to allow them to cover their share of the funding for the MFO.

**MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN HAITI.** Haiti's democratically elected president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, lost power to a military coup on 30 September 1991. Violence erupted across the country as supporters of the coup murdered backers of President Aristide and committed numerous human rights violations. The **United Nations** began debating how

to handle the issue and eventually imposed an arms and oil embargo in June 1993. This act was suspended after successful negotiations to end the crisis. On 23 September 1993, the Security Council passed Resolution 867, which mandated the **United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH)** in cooperation with the **Organization of American States**. The government refused to cooperate and allow the peacekeepers to move into Haiti. In response, the Security Council mandated a Multinational Force (MNF) on 31 July 1994. The MNF, consisting of units from 28 states, arrived unopposed in Haiti on 19 September 1994. The mission included seizing weapons and overseeing security on the island. The coup leaders departed on 15 October 1994. On 31 March 1995, the MNF transferred responsibility to UNMIH, which completed its mandate and departed Haiti at the end of June 1996.

**MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN IRAQ (MNF-I).** The Multinational Force in Iraq (MNF-I) was the **United States**-led military operation in **Iraq** between 2004 and 2009. MNF-I replaced the Combined Joint Task Force 7 on 15 May 2004 and then officially terminated on 31 December 2009. The follow-on operation is known as the United States Forces–Iraq. The **United Nations (UN)** Security Council mandated MNF-I with Resolution 1546 on 8 June 2004 at the request of the Iraqi government. The Security Council endorsed the pending transition to a sovereign interim government of Iraq in the same resolution. The mandated mission of MNF-I included providing security for Iraq as a new government formed and training the military and police forces of the state. Troop numbers fluctuated from approximately 120,000 to nearly 300,000 based on the military necessity on the ground. The United States led the coalition that originally removed Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq in 2003 and then deployed the vast majority of the troops under MNF-I. Approximately 41 countries deployed personnel to MNF-I at some point during the mission's duration. The force suffered more than 4,300 fatalities during the mission. Despite its controversy among many individuals across the globe, MNF-I was officially a **Chapter Seven peace enforcement** operation mandated by the UN Security Council. *See also* NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION TRAINING MISSION IN IRAQ (NTM-I); UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR IRAQ (UNAMI).

**MULTINATIONAL FORCES I (MNF I).** Israel invaded Lebanon in June 1982, following a series of attacks by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The Israeli military pushed the PLO northward until they were cornered in Beirut. At that point, the **United States** and other countries stepped in to prevent a large-scale clash between Israel and the PLO. The United States proposed a multinational military unit that would act as an independent **peacekeeping** operation. The **League of Arab States**, which had fielded the **Arab Deterrent Force (ADF)** in eastern Lebanon, agreed to the suggestion. It should be noted that in June 1982, there were three peacekeeping operations in Lebanon—the ADF; the **United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon**, located just north of the border with Israel; and personnel assigned with the **United Nations Truce Supervision Organization**. The proposed peacekeeping operation, to be known as the Multinational Forces I (MNF I), was not mandated by an international organization. It was based on a series of bilateral agreements between the contingent providers and the Lebanese government.

The mission of MNF I included providing assistance in evacuating the PLO from Beirut, guaranteeing the safety of PLO families remaining in Beirut, and denying access into civilian refugee camps by the Israeli military and Christian Phalange forces. The United States deployed 800 marines to the operation, while **France** offered an equal number of its personnel, and Italy fielded 400 of its soldiers. The contingents arrived in August 1982 and departed the following month. Following the evacuation of the PLO, the contingents assigned to MNF I withdrew from Lebanon. The United States planned to request funding for MNF I by an unspecified international organization; however, the State Department covered the initial costs of American participation, and the United States never secured international backing for the operation. MNF I was a successful operation; however, massacres of civilians living in the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps led to a return of the contingents in a new operation titled the **Multinational Forces II**.

**MULTINATIONAL FORCES II (MNF II).** The Multinational Forces II (MNF II) **peacekeeping** operation followed on the heels of the successful **Multinational Forces I (MNF I)** fielded in Beirut in August 1982. After MNF I withdrew from Beirut, massacres of

civilians at the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps erupted following the assassination of a Lebanese Christian leader. The **United States** proposed a return to **Lebanon** in an operation to mirror the successful MNF I. The new international mission, MNF II, was similar to MNF I in that both missions lacked a mandate from an international organization and were funded by the contingent providers. The United States offered 1,400 marines, while **France** agreed to field 1,500 personnel. Italy sent 1,400 soldiers, and **Great Britain** later joined the mission and dispatched 80 troops with armored cars. Again, each contingent provider signed a bilateral agreement with the government of Lebanon.

MNF II held a two-fold mandate. First, MNF II's mission included the short-term goal of providing a buffer between the Israeli forces, their opponents, and the refugee centers. The long-term objective of the operation included assisting the Lebanese government in expanding its control in the country. MNF II, like its predecessor, was unique in peacekeeping. A central headquarters for command, control, and coordination of the contingents did not exist. Each contingent did provide a liaison officer to the other contingents, but none of the four worked for a neutral command. In other words, each contingent responded directly to its home government. This issue damaged the credibility of MNF II, since the operation was not perceived as being truly neutral in character. In addition, each contingent exercised its own agenda and **rules of engagement**. The Lebanese tended to perceive the Italians as being neutral in the conflict due to the latter's humanitarian projects. On the other hand, the Americans and French were viewed as "lackeys" of the Lebanese government and became the targets of various factions in the civil war. The U.S. contingent increasingly received hostile fire. As casualties mounted, the Americans altered their rules of engagement from being highly restrictive to just the opposite, as naval gunfire and air support joined the marines in returning fire. Car bombings of the U.S. and French detachments on 23 October 1983 persuaded the contributing states to withdraw their units during February and March 1984. The British and Italians departed after the withdrawal of the U.S. and French detachments.

**MULTINATIONAL INTERIM FORCE HAITI.** The 2000 presidential election in **Haiti** was severely tainted with fraud and manipulation

according to international observers and locals. Protests grew in intensity as opposition groups formed alliances and demanded the resignation of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. An international alliance of organizations and states proposed a plan that would leave Aristide in power while implementing political reform. Aristide accepted the plan, while the opposition groups did not, since it allowed the former to remain in his post. Fighting between the opposition and government erupted in February 2004, and Aristide resigned and departed the country on 29 February 2004. The interim president requested security assistance from the **United Nations (UN)**. Security Council Resolution 1529 of 29 February 2004 mandated a Multinational Interim Force (MIF) to deploy to Haiti until the arrival of a UN **peace-keeping** mission. MIF's mandated mission included contributing to security in Haiti, facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance, helping the Haitian police and Coast Guard to maintain law and order and promote human rights, and aiding the establishment of conditions necessary for the deployment of a UN operation. While the UN referred to the mission as MIF, the **United States** and other participants referred to it as Combined Joint Task Force–Haiti. MIF consisted of 3,300 troops from the United States, **France**, Chile, and Canada. The United States deployed more than half of the total troops assigned to MIF. American troops began arriving the evening of 29 February 2004, and MIF officially terminated on 1 June 2004, as the **United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti** assumed its mission.

**MULTINATIONAL PROTECTION FORCE (FMP).** The Albanian government was dominated by Enver Hoxha, a self-proclaimed communist, between 1945 and 1985. During this 20-year period, the country had few contacts outside of its borders, and Hoxha ruled with an iron fist. Six years after his death, communism collapsed in Albania. The newly freed Albanian people adopted democratic institutions and a free market economy. Pyramid investment schemes attracted a large segment of the population with the hopes of high returns on their money. The pyramids began collapsing in 1996. The collapse of the pyramids and other economic heartbreaks, such as criminal gangs, helped lead to political unrest by early 1997. Riots erupted in the capital of Tirana and other areas of the country. By March 1997, the army folded, and people began to loot military

armories. Refugees began flooding Italy, prompting the state to assume the **lead state** role in the future formation of an international **peacekeeping** force in Albania.

The **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)** appealed for a military force to stabilize Albania and provide protection for humanitarian relief efforts. Italy and Greece agreed to provide the leadership and bulk of the forces for a peacekeeping mission in support of OSCE and **European Union (EU)** humanitarian relief. The **United States** did not want to participate but was not against an all-European peacekeeping mission. Italy attempted to utilize the **West European Union (WEU)** as the mandating organization by citing the operation as a **Petersberg Mission**; however, the WEU, led by the **Great Britain** and **Germany**, was not willing to provide strong support for a military operation in Albania. Italy turned to the **United Nations (UN)** and the Security Council agreed to endorse a “coalition of the willing” for Albania on 28 March 1997, with Resolution 1101. Thus, the Multinational Protection Force (FMP) deployed to Albania without the mandate of an international organization but held the endorsements of the UN, EU, and OSCE.

The FMP contributing states formed an Ad Hoc Political Steering Committee to oversee the operation. Austria, Denmark, **France**, Greece, Italy, Romania, Spain, and Turkey offered up to 7,000 soldiers. Italy alone contributed 3,778 peacekeepers to the operation. France, with the second largest contingent in the FMP, sent 1,000 soldiers. Greece dispatched 803 soldiers and 224 vehicles. Rumania provided 400 men, Denmark offered 100 peacekeepers, and the other states sent the remaining troops. FMP, also known as Operation Alba, was the first all-European peacekeeping mission fielded in Europe. The peacekeepers arrived on 15 and 16 April 1997. FMP’s mission included providing a visible stabilization force for Albania, the protection of humanitarian relief work, and the protection of civilian election monitors. The peacekeepers withdrew on 12 August 1997, after completing their mandate. Part of the Italian contingent and one Greek company of 205 personnel remained in Albania under bilateral agreements between the states to help the Albanians reorganize their armed forces. Contributing states funded their own contingents during the peacekeeping operation.

**MULTINATIONAL STAND-BY HIGH READINESS BRIGADE.** *See* STAND-BY FORCES HIGH READINESS BRIGADE (SHIRBRIG).

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**NAMIBIA.** *See* UNITED NATIONS TRANSITION ASSISTANCE GROUP (UNTAG).

**NAVAL PEACEKEEPING.** The term “naval **peacekeeping**” is often applied to the utilization of naval assets to support peacekeeping missions. Peacekeeping primarily involves the use of personnel situated on the ground between or among belligerents; however, international organizations came to realize that many of the functions carried out on land must also be conducted on the open ocean or inland waterways. Naval assets in support of peacekeeping missions usually conduct surveillance-type missions. *See also* COMBINED MARITIME FORCE (CMF); COMBINED TASK FORCE 151; COMBINED TASK FORCE 158; EUROPEAN UNION NAVAL FORCE SOMALIA (EUNAVFOR SOMALIA).

**NEUTRAL MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP I (NMOG I).** After the collapse of the **Military Observer Group (MOG)**, the **Organization of African Unity (OAU)** fielded a second **peacekeeping** mission known as the Neutral Military Observer Group I (NMOG I) in **Rwanda** after the signing of another cease-fire in July 1992. Mali, **Nigeria**, Senegal, and Zimbabwe dispatched approximately 50 military observers to NMOG I. Reports exist that place the number of peacekeepers as high as 130 observers. Some sources report the number of peacekeepers as high as 130. Many sources, including governmental and international agency reports, have confused MOG, NMOG I, and the **Neutral Military Observer Group II** and interchanged the facts of their composition and deployment dates. The NMOG I peacekeepers oversaw a four-kilometer neutral zone within Rwanda and established three observation posts to monitor the cease-fire and report violations. A renewal of the conflict in February 1993 resulted in the arrival of reinforcements for a small French

garrison based in the capital of Kigali since October 1990. NMOG I peacekeepers withdrew to the relative safety of Kigali. The OAU denied a request for 400 additional military observers. NMOG I's mission was essentially over, as the OAU and **United Nations** continued to work to return the belligerents to the peace process. Further negotiations would lead to the mandating of NMOG II. *See also* UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA (UN-AMIR); UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION UGANDA–RWANDA (UNOMUR).

**NEUTRAL MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP II (NMOG II).** **Neutral Military Observer Group I (NMOG I)** peacekeepers withdrew to the relative safety of Kigali, **Rwanda**, following the renewal of hostilities in February 1993. After the introduction of a new cease-fire, the **Organization of Africa Unity (OAU)** agreed to mandate a third **peacekeeping** mission in August 1993. The operation, known as the Neutral Military Observer Group II (NMOG II), consisted of approximately 50 military observers with a mission to monitor the new cease-fire. Some reports place the number of peacekeepers as high as 130. Many governmental and international agency reports have confused the **Military Observer Group (MOG)**, NMOG I, and NMOG II and interchanged the facts of their composition and deployment dates. The OAU transferred NMOG II's personnel to the **United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda** when the latter mission arrived in Rwanda in December 1993. *See also* UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION UGANDA–RWANDA (UN-OMUR).

**NEUTRAL NATIONS SUPERVISORY COMMISSION (NNSC).**

The Armistice Agreement of 27 July 1953 technically ended the **Korean War** and mandated a small neutral observer mission to oversee the armistice. The agreement provides the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC), with a mission to supervise, inspect, observe, and investigate issues associated with and/or violations of the armistice. Originally, military observers from Sweden, **Switzerland**, Poland, and Czechoslovakia deployed to the Korean **demilitarized zone** to conduct the observation mission. The NNSC currently consists of approximately 10 military observers from Sweden and



Switzerland in the demilitarized zone, and the mission is related more to promoting communications and demonstrating that an official armistice still exists. Poland still sends a delegate to some meetings, although it does not provide military observers to the operation. NNSC personnel are located in the Joint Security Area at Panmunjom in the demilitarized zone between North Korea and South Korea. The annual cost of the NNSC is \$2.4 million.

**NICARAGUA.** *See* INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SUPPORT AND VERIFICATION; UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER GROUP IN CENTRAL AMERICA (ONUCA).

**NICE TREATY.** The **European Union** developed the Nice Treaty to alter the structure of the organization to accommodate new members from Eastern Europe; however, Irish citizens opposed to the ratification of the treaty claimed it would negate the country's neutral foreign policy and destroy its traditional standing as a major participant in **peacekeeping** operations. The opposition rallied sufficient support in 2001 to defeat a government referendum to ratify the treaty. In 2002, the government launched an aggressive campaign to inform Irish voters that the treaty did not alter Ireland's neutrality or traditional stance on peacekeeping participation. Irish citizens finally approved their country's ratification of the treaty in October 2002.

**NIEMBA.** Niemba, a town in the Katanga province of the Congo (currently the Democratic Republic of the Congo), was the site of a massacre of Irish peacekeepers assigned to the **United Nations Operation in the Congo**. On 8 November 1960, the 11-man Irish patrol was ambushed, resulting in the deaths of nine peacekeepers. *See also* KINDU; PORT-FRANCQUI.

**NIGERIA.** The Nigerians, major participants in multinational **peacekeeping** operations deployed by the **United Nations (UN)**, **Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)**, **Organization of African Unity (OAU)**, and **African Union (AU)** have fielded two unilateral "peacekeeping" operations. Lagos is a major participant in UN operations. In 2001, Nigeria ranked first and in

2010 ranks fourth among all UN members for manpower contributions to missions fielded by the global organization.

Nigeria's first unilateral peacekeeping operation was in Tanganyika. British soldiers provided security for the government of Tanganyika after a mutiny by the military in 1964. At the request of Tanganyika's government, Nigeria dispatched a military force to replace the British and provide security and stability within the country. The Nigerians arrived on 31 March 1964 and departed without any incidents on 26 September 1964.

The second Nigerian unilateral peacekeeping operation deployed to neighboring **Chad**. The French military occupied the Chadian capital of N'Djamena, and Nigeria sought to have them removed. Nigeria opted to host what became known as the Kano Accords between March and April 1979. During these meetings, the leaders of major Chadian factions met with Nigerian officials to develop a provisional government that would represent each group until popular elections. The Kano Accords included a provision for the introduction of peacekeepers from Nigeria to oversee the cease-fire. Nigerian soldiers, eventually numbering 800, began arriving in Chad on 7 March 1979 (actually three days prior to the first meeting under the Kano Accords).

The peacekeeping mandate, as recorded in the Kano Accords, included instructions to guarantee the demilitarization of N'Djamena and a 100-kilometer zone around the capital, protect the Chadian faction leaders, and ensure the free movement of civilians in Chad. The Nigerian peacekeepers were also to replace the departing French forces. Because the Chadian factions viewed the Nigerian peacekeepers as an army of occupation, they refused to cooperate fully with the Nigerian military, despite signing the Kano Accords. The Nigerians also suffered from internal problems, as evidenced by the lack of sufficient funding and logistical support, including adequate amounts of food. The frustrated peacekeepers, commanded by Colonel M. Magoro, departed on 4 June 1979 at the request of the Chadian interim government.

Nigeria served as a major organizer for many regional and sub-regional operations on the African continent, including the **Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group in**

**Liberia, Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group in Sierra Leone, and Organization of African Unity Peacekeeping Force in Chad II.**

**NIMMO, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL ROBERT H.** Nimmo, an officer from **Australia**, served as the **chief military observer** of the **United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)** from October 1950 to January 1966. In 1959, he was given the title assistant **secretary-general** to help in his negotiating duties. This was the first time that a **peacekeeping** commander, other than the chief of staff for the **United Nations Truce Supervision Organization**, had been awarded this title. In 1965, Nimmo was named as the interim commander of the newly established **United Nations India–Pakistan Observation Mission** until the arrival of Major-General B. F. Macdonald of Canada. Nimmo’s 16 years with UNMOGIP is the **United Nations** record for a tour as a peacekeeping operation commander.

**NIYOYUNGURUZA, MAJOR-GENERAL JUVENAL.** Niyoyunguruza, a citizen of **Burundi**, served as the deputy force commander of the **African Union Mission in Somalia**. He was killed, along with nine other peacekeepers, in a suicide bombing in September 2009. Niyoyunguruza is the highest-ranking officer to die in the line of duty during an African-mandated **peacekeeping** operation.

**NOBEL PEACE PRIZE.** The Nobel Peace Prize has been awarded twice for **United Nations (UN)** multinational **peacekeeping**-related activities. The prize, given annually to the individual(s) selected as having accomplished the most toward promoting global peace, was awarded in 1988 to all UN peacekeepers. **Secretary-General** Javier Pérez de Cuéllar accepted the award in Oslo, Norway, on 10 December 1988, on behalf of all UN peacekeepers. Seventeen peacekeepers, representing the 17 operations fielded by the UN between 1948 and 1988, accompanied the secretary-general to Oslo. The secretary-general used the occasion to remind the world that 733 soldiers had died in the service of the UN. Egil Aarvik, chairman of the Norwegian Nobel Committee, also asked listeners to remember those who died in the service of the UN and commented, “They came from dif-

ferent countries and had widely different backgrounds, but they were united in one thing: They were willing to devote their youth and their energy to the service, knowing that it could involve risk. It became their lot to pay the highest price a human can pay.” In 1956, **Lester B. Pearson** received the Nobel Peace Prize for his development of the concepts that led to the establishment of the **United Nations Emergency Force I**.

**NO-FLY ZONES.** The **United Nations (UN)** established no-fly zones in the former **Yugoslavia** and **Iraq**. The term refers to areas where the UN only permits aircraft over certain areas by its own aircraft or those of another international organization to safeguard a protected population.

**NONAGGRESSION AND ASSISTANCE ACCORD PEACE FORCE (FPA).** In May 1997, the members of the Nonaggression and Assistance Accord (ANAD), an African subregional organization, endorsed a report establishing an ANAD Peace Force. The Nonaggression and Assistance Accord Peace Force (FPA) would be a banner under which ANAD members could dispatch military units in times of a crisis. A communiqué at the end of the meeting stated that the FPA will support the prevention, management, and settlement of conflicts. In particular, members viewed the FPA as a mechanism to conduct humanitarian operations. Members called for future **peacekeeping** operations under the FPA banner. Little has been reported on this initiative since 1997.

**NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO).** The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) emerged on 4 April 1949, as a Western alliance to counter any possible Soviet military threat to Western Europe. The North Atlantic Council is NATO’s senior political authority and consists of permanent representatives from all full member states. Decisions in the body are based on consent. The Military Committee is the highest military body in the organization but is under the council and the civilian authorities. Each member holds a seat on the Military Committee. At the conclusion of the **Cold War**, NATO evolved to develop new missions, including **peacekeeping** operations. Since the North Atlantic Council is

based on consent, all members must agree to deploy NATO forces in a peacekeeping operation; however, members are not required to participate.

NATO's first peacekeeping missions were sent to the new states of the former **Yugoslavia**, including **Bosnia and Herzegovina**, **Croatia**, **Kosovo**, and **Macedonia**. Prior to deploying its own missions, NATO made air power available to the **United Nations** to support the **United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina**. The organization approved the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization Rapid Reaction Force** in November 2002 to facilitate the speedy coordination and deployment of NATO assets during crisis situations. NATO's best known operations have been the **Implementation Force** and the **Stabilisation Force** in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the **Kosovo Force** in Kosovo.

NATO made the step to go beyond European borders when it mandated the **International Security Assistance Force for Afghanistan** in December 2001. NATO followed this in 2004 with another non-European based mission, the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission in Iraq**. NATO has 28 full members and 22 partner members. The **Partnership for Peace (PfP)** is a program that coordinates and promotes cooperation between NATO and other states outside of the alliance. PfP members have fielded contingents alongside NATO forces in peacekeeping operations. *See also* OPERATION ALLIED HARMONY; OPERATION AMBER FOX; OPERATION ESSENTIAL HARVEST.

**NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION RAPID REACTION FORCE.** The **North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)** established a **Rapid Reaction Force** in November 2002. One purpose of the force is to have military units designated, trained, and ready for short notice deployment for **peacekeeping** operations under a NATO mandate. *See also* AFRICAN STAND-BY FORCE; EUROPEAN UNION RAPID REACTION FORCE; UNITED NATIONS STAND-BY ARRANGEMENT SYSTEM (UNAS).

**NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION TRAINING MISSION IN IRAQ (NTM-I).** In 2004, the **North Atlantic Treaty**

**Organization (NATO)** established the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I) to help equip and train the military and police forces of **Iraq**. While not technically a **peace-keeping** operation, NTM-I is an international organization-mandated multinational operation to assist a country with its internal security situation. NTM-I cooperated closely with the **Multinational Force in Iraq** and now works with the **United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq**. NTM-I consists of approximately 170 personnel on the ground in Iraq, as of 2010, with more personnel involved in training Iraqi military and police forces in their home countries. Several NATO members ended their participation with NTM-I after 2006. Non-NATO states that have participated in some way with NTM-I include **Japan, Egypt, and Jordan**.

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**OAKLEY, ROBERT B. U.S.** president George H. W. Bush originally selected Oakley as the White House special envoy in **Somalia** in 1992. Oakley established the United States Liaison Office in Somalia in December 1992. In his capacity, Oakley served as the senior American civilian posted to Somalia and represented President Bush and President Bill Clinton in the country. Robert Gosende replaced Oakley in March 1993; however, Clinton requested that Oakley return to Somalia before the end of 1993. Oakley was responsible for the negotiations with supporters of General **Mohammed Farah Aidid** following a series of bloody clashes between the latter's supporters and U.S. rangers assigned to assist the **United Nations (UN)** military contingent in Somalia. Oakley's efforts resulted in a cease-fire between Aidid's forces and UN peacekeepers.

**OBSERVER DETACHMENT DAMASCUS (ODD).** The approximately 35 observers assigned to the Observer Detachment Damascus (ODD) performed support functions for the **Observer Group Golan** of the **United Nations Truce Supervision Organization**. ODD was later renamed **Observer Group Golan–Damascus (OGG-D)**, with approximately 33 observers.

**OBSERVER GROUP BEIRUT (OGB).** The **United Nations (UN)** established the Observer Group Beirut (OGB) in August 1982, following **Israel's** invasion of **Lebanon** and attack upon Beirut. The personnel assigned to OGB were from the **United Nations Truce Supervision Organization**. The purpose of the group included monitoring the movements of the Israelis and Palestinians in and around Beirut. After the Israeli withdrawal in 1983, the strength of OGB was gradually reduced until phased out.

**OBSERVER GROUP EGYPT (OGE).** The **United Nations Truce Supervision Organization** established the Observer Group Egypt (OGE) following the lapse of the **United Nations Emergency Force II** mandate and the termination of the **Israel–Egypt** Mixed Armistice Commission in 1979. The conclusion of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel made both operations obsolete. The **United Nations** formed OGE by merging the UN Liaison Office Cairo and the **Observer Group Sinai**. OGE's mission includes maintaining a neutral presence along the Israeli–Egyptian frontier. The group operates six static outposts as well as mobile patrols in the Sinai and an outpost at Ismailia. Areas under observation by the **Multinational Force and Observers** are not supervised by the OGE. The group consists of approximately 55 personnel.

**OBSERVER GROUP GOLAN (OGG).** The **United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)** established the Observer Group Golan (OGG) in support of the **United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)** deployed between **Israel** and **Syria** in May 1974. The 90 **United Nations** peacekeepers assigned to UNTSO in the area were detailed to the UNDOF and later organized under the title of the OGG in 1979. The peacekeepers assigned to the group perform inspections to ensure that both sides are in compliance with the disengagement agreement. The OGG consists of a headquarters collocated with UNDOF, **Observer Group Golan–Damascus**, and **Observer Group Golan–Tiberias**.

**OBSERVER GROUP GOLAN–DAMASCUS (OGG–D).** The **Observer Detachment Damascus** of the **United Nations Truce Supervision Organization** changed names to the Observer Group

Golan–Damascus (OGG–D). OGG–D consists of approximately 33 observers and serves as the Damascus liaison for the **Observer Group Golan**.

**OBSERVER GROUP GOLAN–TIBERIAS (OGG–T).** The Observer Group Golan–Tiberias consists of approximately 37 observers and serves as the liaison with **Israel** for the **Observer Group Golan**.

**OBSERVER GROUP LEBANON (OGL).** The **United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)** discontinued its monitoring of the Israeli–Lebanese cease-fire line following the establishment of the **United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)** in March 1978; however the organization continued to monitor the armistice (dating to 1948) between the two states. The peacekeepers assigned to UNTSO along the Israeli–Lebanese border were organized as the Observer Group Lebanon (OGL) and are under the operational control of UNIFIL. Approximately 51 OGL peacekeepers operate four static observation posts and conduct mobile patrols along the border. Lieutenant-Colonel William Higgins, a U.S. chief of OGL, was kidnapped in 1988 and later murdered while assigned to the organization.

**OBSERVER GROUP SINAI (OGS).** The **United Nations Truce Supervision Organization** established the Observer Group Sinai (OGS) to support the peace observations between **Israel** and **Egypt**. OGS merged with the United Nations Liaison Office Cairo to form **Observer Group Egypt**.

**OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR WEST AFRICA (UNOWA).** The Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa (UNOWA) is directed by the Department of Political Affairs of the **United Nations (UN)**. The UN mandated the office on 29 November 2001, to coordinate the organization’s efforts to promote conflict prevention and peacebuilding within the West African subregion. Headquartered in Senegal, UNOWA is manned by 14 international and 10 local civilians, as well as four military advisers.



**OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COORDINATOR FOR LEBANON (UNSCOL).** The Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL) is directed by the Department of Political Affairs of the **United Nations (UN)**. The UN mandated the office on 16 February 2007, to coordinate the organization's efforts to promote peacebuilding in Lebanon. UNSCOL is manned by 20 international and 51 local civilians.

**OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COORDINATOR FOR THE MIDDLE EAST (UNSCO).** The Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East (UNSCO) is directed by the Department of Political Affairs of the **United Nations (UN)**. The UN mandated the office on 1 October 1999, to coordinate the organization's efforts to promote the peace process related to **Palestine** and support humanitarian assistance. UNSCO is manned by 27 international and 26 local civilians.

**OPANDE, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL DANIEL.** Opande, a citizen of Kenya, has served in a number of significant positions within **United Nations (UN) peacekeeping** operations on the African continent. He served as deputy force commander with the **United Nations Transitional Assistance Group** in Namibia from 1989 to 1990, chief military observer of the **United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia** from 1993 to 1995; **force commander** of the **United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone** from 2000 to 2003, and force commander of the **United Nations Mission in Liberia** from 2003 to 2005.

**OPERATION ABLE SENTRY.** The **United States** military applied this name to its support of the **United Nations Protection Force in Macedonia**. Fielded in July 1993, Operation Able Sentry originally consisted of 315 U.S. soldiers who were part of a total **United Nations** strength of 1,000 peacekeepers in **Macedonia**. The majority of the soldiers in this operation were infantry transferred from the Berlin Brigade, which was scheduled for deactivation after the reunification of **Germany**.

**OPERATION ALBA.** *See* MULTINATIONAL PROTECTION FORCE (FMP).

**OPERATION ALLIED HARMONY.** The **North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)** planned to turn over **peacekeeping** responsibilities in **Macedonia** to the **European Union (EU)** at the end of 2002; however, the EU was not able to deploy a force as originally scheduled due to political issues, including disagreement between Greece and Turkey. The former is a NATO and EU member, while the latter is only a NATO member. NATO continued with plans to end its **Operation Amber Fox** mission in Macedonia but also agreed to field a new mission as a transition while awaiting the arrival of the EU force. This new mission, **Operation Allied Harmony**, assumed its duties on 16 December 2002. Its responsibilities included supporting international monitors and providing security advice to the Macedonian government. **Operation Allied Harmony** consisted of approximately 400 personnel. The EU officially replaced **Operation Amber Fox** on 1 April 2003, with the introduction of its **European Union Force Concordia**.

**OPERATION AMBER FOX.** After **Operation Essential Harvest** departed from the Former Yugoslav Republic of **Macedonia (FYROM)**, the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)** mandated **Operation Amber Fox** on 26 September 2001. The mandate for this mission included the protection of international monitors overseeing the peace plan within the FYROM. **Germany** led the mission, consisting of approximately 1,000 NATO soldiers. NATO troops assigned to the operation were known as **Task Force Fox**. The **United Nations Security Council** endorsed NATO's efforts by passing **Security Council Resolution 1371** on 26 September 2001. Although NATO peacekeepers served as a security and extraction force for the international monitors, they could only act if requested by the FYROM government, which maintained the primary security role for the teams. **Operation Amber Fox's** mandate ended on 25 December 2002. NATO intended to turn over the **peacekeeping** duties of Macedonia to the **European Union (EU)** prior to the end of 2002; however, the EU was not prepared to assume the mission and postponed the plan. NATO mandated **Operation Allied Harmony** to replace **Operation Amber Fox** until the EU was ready to assume the peacekeeping mission with the **European Union Force Concordia**. **Operation Allied Harmony** initiated its operations on 16 December

2002. *See also* UNITED NATIONS PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENT FORCE (UNPREDEP).

**OPERATION ARTEMIS.** Operation Artemis is the **European Union (EU)** name for European military units deployed to the Democratic Republic of the Congo under the **United Nations (UN)**–authorized Interim Multinational Emergency Force (IMEF). Operation Artemis is the common name for this deployment of EU peacekeepers, but IMEF is the official name of the operation, as listed in the UN mandate (Security Council Resolution 1484 of 30 May 2003).

**OPERATION ASTUTE.** Operation Astute is the name for the 2006 deployment of troops and police from **Australia**, Malaysia, New Zealand, and Portugal as the **International Security Forces in Timor-Leste**.

**OPERATION ATLANTA.** Operation Atlanta is the **European Union** operational name for the **European Union Naval Force Somalia (EUNAVFOR SOMALIA)**.

**OPERATION CONCORDIA.** *See* EUROPEAN UNION FORCE CONCORDIA.

**OPERATION CURRICULUM.** Operation Curriculum is the name for the 2006 to 2009 deployment of South African troops as the **African Union Special Task Force**.

**OPERATION DEMOCRACY IN THE COMOROS.** *See* AFRICAN UNION ELECTORAL AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE MISSION IN COMOROS (MAES).

**OPERATION DESERT SHIELD.** Operation Desert Shield is the American nickname for the movement of **United States** military forces, as well as units from other **United Nations** members, to the Persian Gulf area following the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990. Desert Shield's purpose included the protection of Saudi Arabia from possible military advances by Iraq. *See also* OPERATION DESERT STORM; PERSIAN GULF WAR.

**OPERATION DESERT STORM.** Operation Desert Storm is a code name applied by the **United States** to the **United Nations (UN)** air and ground strikes into **Iraq** and Kuwait during the 1991 **Persian Gulf War**. Desert Storm's purpose included the crippling of the Iraqi military and removal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Operation Desert Storm was fielded under a **UN Chapter Seven peace enforcement** mandate. *See also* OPERATION DESERT SHIELD; PERSIAN GULF WAR.

**OPERATION ESSENTIAL HARVEST.** Civil strife between the Macedonian majority population and minority ethnic Albanians in the Former Yugoslav Republic of **Macedonia (FYROM)** resulted in serious clashes by mid-2001. On 20 June 2001, President Boris Trajkovski called upon the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)** for assistance. NATO approved and produced a draft plan for a small **peacekeeping** operation, known as Operation Essential Harvest, on 29 June 2001, with a requirement that the two sides agree to a political dialogue and respect a cease-fire. NATO troops assigned to the operation were known as Task Force Harvest, and the organization officially mandated the mission on 15 August 2001. An advance party of 400 NATO peacekeepers arrived on 17 August 2001, and approximately 3,100 additional NATO troops deployed to FYROM by 22 August 2001, with a mandate to disarm the ethnic Albanians and destroy their weapons; however, NATO troops were to only destroy weapons and ammunition voluntarily given to them. They did not hold any authority to conduct searches and seize any weapons or ammunition. NATO declared the end of the operation on 26 September 2001, and most of the peacekeepers began departing the country. They were replaced with other NATO peacekeepers under **Operation Amber Fox**. *See also* UNITED NATIONS PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENT FORCE (UNPREDEP).

**OPERATION LICORNE.** Côte d'Ivoire collapsed into political chaos in September 2002, as elements of the army mutinied, splitting the country into two sections. French soldiers based in the country deployed to protect foreign citizens. Each party in the conflict claimed **France** supported the other side. The **Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)** convened an emergency

summit on 29 September 2002. A follow-on meeting of the ECOWAS Defense and Security Commission recommended the deployment of a **peacekeeping** operation to support the peace process. ECOWAS mediators persuaded the belligerents to agree to a cease-fire on 17 October 2002. President Laurent Gbagbo requested that France continue providing military security until the arrival of an ECOWAS force. Later, France agreed to maintain its military presence even after the deployment of the ECOWAS peacekeepers. The French peacekeeping effort is known as Operation Licorne and is frequently dated to the original French deployment from its Côte d'Ivoire bases in September 2002. The French force originally consisted of approximately 4,000 troops to stabilize the country in support of the peace process. France dispatched soldiers stationed in Gabon to assist those already in Côte d'Ivoire. By mid-2007, the number of French soldiers had been reduced to approximately 2,700. The most serious incidents involving French peacekeeping forces occurred in November 2004, when aircraft serving with the air force of Côte d'Ivoire attacked the French, resulting in many casualties. Within minutes, the French launched a reprisal, destroying two aircraft on the main government airfield. France destroyed additional large military equipment of the government to prevent further attacks on its personnel or rebel forces in the north.

**United Nations (UN)** Security Council Resolution 1464 of 4 February 2003 endorsed the dual efforts of ECOWAS under the **Economic Community of West African States Mission in Côte d'Ivoire** and France under Operation Licorne. The resolution provided the global organization's mandate, which included monitoring the cessation of hostilities; facilitating the restoration of public services and the free movement of goods and services; providing a general contribution to the peace process; and guaranteeing the safety of observers, humanitarian aid personnel, and insurgents. The UN renewed Operation Licorne's mandate with Security Council Resolution 1528 of 27 February 2004, by authorizing it to assist the **United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire**. The annual cost of Operation Licorne is approximately \$250 million, and there have been at least 26 French fatalities during the deployment. *See also* UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN COTE D'IVOIRE (MINUCI).

**OPERATION POISED HAMMER.** When the **United Nations** assumed responsibility for humanitarian aid to the Kurds in northern **Iraq** after the **Persian Gulf War** in 1991, the allies established Operation Poised Hammer to provide air support in the event of Iraqi intervention into the **safe havens**. Forces assigned to the operation were primarily based in western Turkey. *See also* OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT; UNITED NATIONS GUARDS CONTINGENT IN IRAQ (UNGCI).

**OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT.** Operation Provide Comfort is the American nickname for Allied (**United States, France, Italy, Canada, Belgium, Luxembourg, Australia, Spain, Netherlands, and Germany**) humanitarian support for Kurds in northern **Iraq** following the **Persian Gulf War** in 1991. The military elements of Operation Provide Comfort were replaced by the **United Nations Guards Contingent in Iraq** by July 1991. *See also* OPERATION POISED HAMMER; SAFE HAVENS.

**OPERATION SMASH.** This title, also known as Operation MOTHOR in the Hindi language, was a series of highly controversial **United Nations (UN)** offensives in the Congo (currently the Democratic Republic of the Congo) from September and December 1961 to December 1962. The three offensives were conducted by contingents assigned to the **United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC)**. The first offensive, also known as Round One, lasted from 13 September 1961 to 21 December 1961. This operation is perhaps the most controversial act of ONUC during the Congolese civil war. ONUC has been accused of initiating the offensive without proper authority, exceeding its mandate, and employing excessive force. The offensive lacked the element of surprise and was poorly executed and led. **Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld** died on 18 September 1961 in an aircraft crash on his way to Northern Rhodesia to arrange a cease-fire in Round One. The UN did secure a cease-fire by 20 September; however, the embarrassment to the global organization included the capture of a 200-man Irish company by forces loyal to secessionist Katanga. The second offensive, known as Round Two, lasted from 21 December 1961 to 28 December 1961.

This offensive resulted from a series of incidents in **Elisabethville**. Although Round Two had better planning and military support, many UN member states opposed the offensive, including **France**, **Great Britain**, Congo, Portugal, Rhodesia, and the **Central African Republic**. ONUC suffered 21 casualties during Round Two's move to end Katanga's attempt at secession from the Congo. Round Three lasted from 28 December 1962 to 21 January 1963. This offensive, spearheaded by Indian and Ethiopian troops, quickly occupied much of Katanga and forced the region to end its attempts at secession.

**ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE (OSCE)**. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is a pan-European international organization that also links several non-European states to Europe. The organization has 56 members and 12 partners for cooperation. The latter states include **Japan**, South Korea, and Thailand, as well as six North African/Middle Eastern countries. The **United States** and **Russia** are full members. The OSCE emerged from the **Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)**. The CSCE was a **Cold War** organization, lacking a permanent secretariat, established in 1975 by the Helsinki Final Act as a means to discuss state behavior toward citizens and other countries. Members opted to form a more permanent structure for the organization at the end of the Cold War. In 1994, the CSCE changed its name to the OSCE, and the organization established a permanent headquarters in Vienna, Austria.

The OSCE has fielded several international monitoring missions in Europe and the former Soviet Union. While many of these are political in nature, others can be placed into the category of **peacekeeping**. The classification of the latter OSCE missions as peacekeeping is based on their mandated international mission to monitor areas affected by conflict and their deployment as multinational units. A select few missions are included in this dictionary. A difference between OSCE operations and the missions fielded by other organizations is the fact that monitors in the former are usually unarmed and tend to be civilians. Some OSCE missions include very limited numbers of military personnel in the roles of advisers. While most OSCE missions tend to be quite small, some have been fielded with a large number of observers/monitors. OSCE mandates frequently assign

the missions with tasks that are more political in nature rather than in direct support of the peace process and handling such functions as disarmament and cease-fire observation. For example, the **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Mission to Serbia** is mandated to support the implementation of laws, monitor the proper functioning and development of democratic institutions, and assist law enforcement and judiciary bodies in training and restructuring; however, other OSCE operations carry out functions normally conducted by the peacekeeping operations fielded by other international organizations. For example, the **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje** helped monitor the border between **Macedonia** and Serbia. Another characteristic of OSCE missions is their deployment in cooperation with the peacekeeping operations mandated by other international organizations. *See also* ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE KOSOVO TASK FORCE; ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE KOSOVO VERIFICATION MISSION (KVM); ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE MISSION IN KOSOVO (OMIK); ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE MISSION TO BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA; ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE MISSION TO CROATIA; ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE MISSION TO GEORGIA; ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE MISSION TO MOLDOVA; ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE MISSION TO MONTENEGRO; ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE MISSION TO SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO; ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE MISSION TO TAJIKISTAN; ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE OFFICE IN ZAGREB; ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE PRESENCE IN ALBANIA.

**ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE KOSOVO TASK FORCE.** The **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe** established the Kosovo Task Force



on 8 June 1999, as a three-week transition between the **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Kosovo Verification Mission** and the **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Mission in Kosovo**.

**ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE KOSOVO VERIFICATION MISSION (KVM).** By 1998, tensions were increasing between the ethnic Albanian majority and Serbian minority within **Kosovo**, and fighting between the Yugoslav army and Kosovo Liberation Army became daily occurrences. A humanitarian crisis erupted as Serbians forced people to flee Kosovo. The government of **Yugoslavia** refused to abide by international demands to end the crisis, and the situation threatened to spread to other states in the region. On 13 October 1998, the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)** authorized air strikes to support diplomatic moves to force the Serbians to end the violence. The Serbs backed down, and the **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe** established its Kosovo Verification Mission. By March 1999, the situation again began to collapse, and the monitors of the verification mission departed Kosovo. A final appeal to Milosevic was rebuffed, and NATO commenced air strikes after 23 March 1999. The campaign lasted until 10 June 1999, when the Serbs agreed to international demands. The **United Nations Security Council**, with Resolution 1244 on 10 June 1999, endorsed the sending of a NATO ground force into Kosovo. This operation became known as the **Kosovo Force**. The OSCE would later field the **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Mission in Kosovo**.

**ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE MISSION IN KOSOVO (OMIK).** The **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)** mandated the **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM)** prior to the commencement of air strikes in March 1999 by the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)** against Serbia for human rights violations in **Kosovo**. After the conclusion of hostilities, the OSCE established a new operation, the **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Mission in Kosovo (OMIK)**, on 1 July 1999, with OSCE Permanent Council

Decision 305. The mission actually replaced the **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Kosovo Task Force** set up as a transition between KVM and OMIK. The mandate includes monitoring the compliance of the Federal Republic of **Yugoslavia** with the **United Nations' (UN)** resolutions concerning Kosovo. The group also monitors the cease-fire, observes the movement of military forces, and promotes human rights and democracy. The joint OSCE–UN training of a new police force is also included in the mandate. The OSCE opened and operates the Kosovo Police Service School as part of this process. The operation consists of approximately 262 international civilian staff and 664 local civilians at an annual cost of 30.1 million euros. The OSCE closely coordinates the operation of the monitors with the UN. The OSCE head of mission also serves as the **United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo** deputy **special representative** for institution building. This is the first time the OSCE linked one of its missions with a UN operation. NATO's **Kosovo Force** provides security for the OSCE monitors to conduct their work.

**ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE MISSION TO BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA.** The **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)** established its Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina on 8 December 1995, in accordance with Annex Six of the Dayton Accord. The mandated mission includes assisting the various parties with regional stabilization measures and democracy building. The operation consists of 75 OSCE civilian staff and 507 local civilians at an annual cost of 22.7 million euros. *See also* UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (UNMIBH).

**ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE MISSION TO CROATIA.** In the 1980s, **Yugoslavia** began showing serious strains between the various ethnic groups comprising the state. In June 1991, **Croatia** and Slovenia declared their independence from Serb-dominated Yugoslavia, leading to conflict in the new states between Croats and Serbs. The **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)** established

its operation for Croatia on 18 April 1996. The mandated mission included assisting with monitoring the implementation of Croatian legislative agreements upon the return of refugees and the protection of national minorities. The operation consisted of 10 OSCE civilian staff and 94 local civilians at an annual cost of 9.8 million euros. The OSCE terminated the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Mission to Croatia on 31 December 2007 and replaced it the next day with the **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Office in Zagreb**.

**ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE MISSION TO GEORGIA.** Georgia faced an attempt by Abkhazia, located in the northwestern part Georgia, to separate itself from the country soon after independence following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The unrest devolved into open fighting by the summer of 1992, after Georgia deployed 2,000 soldiers to the region. **Russia** negotiated a cease-fire agreement between the two parties on 2 September 1992. The agreement collapsed on 1 October 1992. The **Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)** mandated an observer mission, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Mission to Georgia, in December 1992, to monitor the situation in Georgia and along the latter's borders. The objective of the mission is to encourage negotiations to settle the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In 1994, the name of the operation changed to reflect the transition of the CSCE to the **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)**. The mission worked to help develop methods of defining the political positions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which lie within Georgia. It also monitored the Russian-led peacekeepers in South Ossetia (**South Ossetia Joint Peacekeeping Force**). On 15 December 1999, the OSCE expanded the mission to include observing the border between Georgia and the Chechen Republic with **Russia**. The observers also coordinated with the **United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia**. The operation consisted of 46 international staff and 137 local civilians at an annual cost of 9.75 million euros when it closed operations on 31 December 2008, following the failure of the various parties to agree to the terms of a mandate extension.

**ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE MISSION TO MOLDOVA.** The **Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)** mandated the Mission to Moldova on 4 February 1993. The purpose of the operation is to monitor the political situation within the Transdnister region of Moldova. The CSCE was concerned about the proper definition of the region within a newly sovereign Moldova following the breakup of the Soviet Union. Many in Transdnister are of Romanian descent and seek measures of autonomy, if not separation, from Moldova. The name of the mission changed to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Mission to Moldova when the CSCE evolved into the **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe** in 1994. The mandate of the operation includes assisting the parties in their negotiations, as well as observing the **Joint Control Commission Peacekeeping Force** fielded by **Russia**. The operation consists of 13 international staff and 35 local civilians at an annual cost of 1.95 million euros.

**ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE MISSION TO MONTENEGRO.** In 1996, following the collapse of **Yugoslavia** and the Croatian and Bosnian Wars, the government of Montenegro attempted to cut its political ties to Serbia, which was attempting to hold together the remnants of the original state. In 2002, the two agreed to a political arrangement as the Federal State of Yugoslavia, only to be replaced the next year. The 2003 political arrangement, known as Serbia and Montenegro, granted the latter more freedom than the 2002 federation. The **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)** established its **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Mission to Serbia and Montenegro** on 11 January 2001. After Montenegro's declaration of independence on 3 June 2006, the OSCE split the operation into the **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Mission to Serbia** and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Mission to Montenegro. The official start date of the Mission to Montenegro is 29 June 2006. The mandated mission includes advising on the implementation of laws, monitoring the proper functioning and development of democratic institutions,

and assisting law enforcement and judiciary bodies in training and restructuring. The operation consists of 14 OSCE civilian staff and 32 local civilians at an annual cost of 3 million euros.

**ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE MISSION TO SERBIA.** Yugoslavia began collapsing into separate states in 1990, initiating conflict throughout much of the country over the next several years. The **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)** established its **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Mission to Serbia and Montenegro** on 11 January 2001. In 2003, the Federal State of Yugoslavia reorganized into a new political entity based on the states of Serbia and Montenegro. On 3 June 2006, Montenegro declared independence. In response, the OSCE split the operation into the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Mission to Serbia and the **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Mission to Montenegro**. The mandated mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Mission to Serbia includes advising on the implementation of laws, monitoring the proper functioning and development of democratic institutions, and assisting law enforcement and judiciary bodies in training and restructuring. The operation consists of 39 OSCE civilian staff and 138 local civilians at an annual cost of 10.1 million euros.

**ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE MISSION TO SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO.** Montenegro attempted to cut its political ties to Serbia, which was attempting to hold together the remnants of the original Yugoslavia as a new state. The **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)** mandated the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Mission to Serbia and Montenegro on 11 January 2001, to ensure harmony within the state. The mission's mandate included advising on the implementation of laws, monitoring the proper functioning and development of democratic institutions, and assisting law enforcement and judiciary bodies in training and restructuring. In 2002, the two entities agreed to a political arrangement as the Federal State of Yugoslavia, only to be replaced the next year. The 2003 political arrangement, known as Serbia and Mon-

tenegro, granted the latter more freedom than the 2002 federation. After Montenegro's declaration of independence on 3 June 2006, the OSCE split the operation into the **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Mission to Serbia** and the **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Mission to Montenegro**.

**ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE MISSION TO TAJIKISTAN.** On 24 September 1993, the **Commonwealth of Independent States** mandated the **Commonwealth of Independent States Collective Peacekeeping Force (Tajikistan)**. The **Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)** opted to work with the **United Nations (UN)** in its own conflict management process. As a result, the **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)** mandated its Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Mission to Tajikistan to assist the **United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan**. The CSCE established the mission on 1 December 1993, and the group began operations on 19 February 1994. In 1994, the CSCE changed its name to the OSCE. A new opposition offensive nullified the cease-fire agreement by July 1996. A second cease-fire was signed in December 1996, and a general peace agreement was endorsed on 27 June 1997. The latter agreement initiated a transitional period that included the return of refugees and demobilization of opposition fighters. Tajikistan held legislative elections for its lower house on 27 February 2000, which were monitored by the UN and OSCE Joint Electoral Observation Mission. The Joint Electoral Observation Mission noted that the election did not meet minimum electoral standards. The upper house elections occurred on 23 March 2000.

The OSCE's mission included promoting confidence building measures among the disputing parties in Tajikistan, promoting respect for human rights, securing adherence to OSCE norms and principles, and assisting in the establishment of democratic institutions. In 1995, the OSCE provided the monitors with a mission to also observe the conditions of returning refugees. The mission consisted of approximately 15 personnel with an annual budget of approximately 3 million euros. On 31 October 2002, the mission transformed into the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Center in Dushanbe. The OSCE closed the latter center on 30 June 2008 and replaced it with

the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Office in Tajikistan. The OSCE mandated the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Center in Dushanbe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation Europe Office in Tajikistan as small political missions less concerned with security than the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Mission to Tajikistan.

**ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE OFFICE IN ZAGREB.** In June 1991, **Croatia** and **Slovenia** declared their independence from Serb-dominated **Yugoslavia**, followed by conflict in the former between Croats and Serbs. The **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)** established the **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Mission to Croatia** on 18 April 1996. The OSCE terminated its Mission to Croatia on 31 December 2007 and replaced it the next day with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Office in Zagreb. The mission mandate includes monitoring the proceedings of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and reporting on the aspects behind the implementation of housing care programs. The operation consists of nine OSCE civilian staff and 25 local civilians at an annual cost of 2.74 million euros.

**ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE PRESENCE IN ALBANIA.** The **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)** mandated its Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Presence in Albania mission on 27 March 1995. The mandated original mission includes providing advice on democratization, human rights, and election monitoring. The operation is included in this book due to a modification of the mandate on 11 March 1998, to monitor the border between Albania and **Kosovo**. This new border mission essentially terminated in 1999, although the organization maintains field offices in the border area. The operation consists of 27 OSCE civilian staff and 75 local civilians at an annual cost of 3.5 million euros.

**ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE SPILLOVER MONITOR MISSION TO SKOPJE.** The Former Yugoslav Republic of **Macedonia** (FYROM) faced the

potential of ethnic conflict spillover in 1992, as **Yugoslavia** split into several regions. Ethnic Serbs contested Croats and Bosnian Muslims in Croatia and **Bosnia and Herzegovina**. The **Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)** mandated a multinational operation to monitor the border between Macedonia and Serbia in the attempt to prevent conflict spillover. At approximately the same time, the European Community planned to expand its European Community Monitoring Mission as an effort to prevent the spread of ethnic conflict in the region. The two organizations agreed to allow the CSCE to mandate and field the mission in Macedonia, an observer member of the latter organization. In 1994, the name of the operation changed to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje to reflect the transition of the CSCE to the **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)**. Macedonia became a full member of the OSCE in October 1995. The mandate of the operation calls for the monitoring of the border, as well as promoting efforts for ethnic cooperation within the country and training/advising the Macedonian police. The mission consists of approximately 74 international civilians and 164 locals with an annual budget of approximately 9.1 million euros.

**ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU).** The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was established on 25 May 1963. The 52 members represented all countries on the continent and several offshore island states, except Morocco. The purpose of the organization was to promote African unity, defend the sovereignty of member states, and improve living standards on the continent. The body mandated several **peacekeeping** operations and transitioned into a new organization in 2002 known as the **African Union**. *See also* MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP (MOG); NEUTRAL MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP I (NMOG I); NEUTRAL MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP II (NMOG II); ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY MISSION IN BURUNDI (OMIB); ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY OBSERVER MISSION IN THE COMOROS I (OMIC I); ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY OBSERVER MISSION IN THE COMOROS II (OMIC II); ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY OBSERVER MISSION IN THE COMOROS III (OMIC III); ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY



PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN CHAD I; ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN CHAD II; UNITED AFRICAN ACTION.

**ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY LIAISON MISSION IN ETHIOPIA–ERITREA (OLMEE).** A border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea erupted in May 1998. American and **Organization of African Unity (OAU)** mediators failed to secure an early settlement, and the conflict escalated in size. In June 2000, the belligerents accepted the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, which included a provision for a **United Nations (UN) peacekeeping** operation in cooperation with the OAU. In response, the UN mandated the **United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)**. The OAU mandated the Organization of African Unity Liaison Mission in Ethiopia–Eritrea (OLMEE) to represent it on the ground and provide direct coordination with UNMEE and the governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea. OLMEE’s mandate included assisting UNMEE to maintain security in the security zone between Ethiopian and Eritrean troops and monitor the implementation of the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities. The OAU planned OLMEE to be a small operation, originally consisting of 43 military and civilian staff members. This figure was later reduced to approximately 27 members. OLMEE consisted of personnel from Algeria, Ghana, Kenya, **Nigeria, South Africa**, and Tunisia. OLMEE established liaison offices in Addis Ababa and Asmara. The annual budget was approximately \$3 million. When the OAU officially evolved into the **African Union** in 2002, OLMEE became the **African Union Liaison Mission in Ethiopia–Eritrea**.

**ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY MISSION IN BURUNDI (OMIB).** In 1993, the belligerents in **Rwanda** agreed to a new cease-fire and peace process. The **Organization of African Unity (OAU)** had supported the peace process in Rwanda since 1990, with the **Military Observer Group, Neutral Military Observer Group I**, and **Neutral Military Observer Group II (NMOG II)**. The **United Nations (UN)** mandated the **United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR)** and began fielding the operation in December 1993. The OAU transferred its personnel from NMOG II to UNAMIR during the same month. The OAU expressed concern that

the civil war in Rwanda could spillover into neighboring **Burundi**. In February 1994, the OAU dispatched approximately 47 military observers to Burundi in an attempt to monitor the situation and prevent conflict spillover. The operation, known as the Organization of African Unity Mission in Burundi, was originally envisioned as a larger force with 400 military observers. Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and Tunisia provided the personnel for the operation. Other sources report that the contingents arrived from Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Guinea, Mali, Niger, and Tunisia. This could be due to rotating contingents or simply confusion among the sources. Even government and international agency reports have frequently confused and interchanged the facts of the various small OAU peacekeeping missions in Rwanda and Burundi. The operation departed in July 1996, following a coup.

**ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY OBSERVER MISSION IN THE COMOROS I (OMIC I).** Separatists on two islands, Anjouan and Moheli, attempted to secede from the **Comoros** in 1997. The **Organization of African Unity (OAU)** quickly stepped in and offered to mediate the crisis. On 6 November 1997, the OAU mandated the Organization of African Unity Observer Mission in the Comoros I (OMIC I) to monitor the situation and establish a climate of trust. The OAU deployed 20 military observers from **Egypt**, Niger, Senegal, and Tunisia in 1998. OMIC I withdrew the military observers from the Comoros in May 1999, following a military coup on 30 April 1999. Three civilians remained to continue the OAU mission. OMIC I cost approximately \$1,414,253. The OAU returned peacekeepers to the country in 2002 with the **Organization of African Unity Observer Mission in the Comoros II**. *See also* AFRICAN UNION ELECTORAL AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE MISSION IN COMOROS (MAES); AFRICAN UNION MISSION FOR SUPPORT TO THE ELECTIONS IN COMOROS (AMISEC); ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY OBSERVER MISSION IN THE COMOROS III (OMIC III).

**ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY OBSERVER MISSION IN THE COMOROS II (OMIC II).** The **Organization of African Unity (OAU)** fielded the **Organization of African Unity Observer**

**Mission in the Comoros I (OMIC I)** in 1998 and 1999, following a secessionist crisis in the country. After the departure of the small OAU force, the organization continued to threaten Anjouan with a more robust military force to compel it to cease moves toward complete secession. The **Comoros** held a referendum on the issue and presented a new Union Constitution to provide Anjouan with greater self-rule while remaining a part of the country. The OAU readmitted the Comoros to the organization following its removal in 1999, after a military seizure of the government. The OAU mandated a small observer team, the Organization of African Unity Observer Mission in the Comoros II (OMIC II), in December 2001 and deployed it beginning in January 2002. The OAU observer team deployed under the provisions of the Framework Agreement for the Reconciliation in the Comoros to verify the collection of weapons from armed Anjouannais elements. The operation included 14 military observers from **South Africa**, Mauritius, Mozambique, Togo, Ethiopia, and Senegal commanded by a colonel from Madagascar. OMIC II cost an estimated \$105,000. OMIC II's official mission ended in February 2002, and the operation evolved into the **Organization of African Unity Observer Mission in the Comoros III (OMIC III)** in March 2002.

It should be noted that many sources list this operation and OMIC III under the same name. This is understandable, since the OAU did not have a break in time between January and May 2002 when peacekeepers were not on the ground in Comoros; however, the **African Union**, as the successor to the OAU, officially states that there were two separate missions during this five-month window (OMIC II from January to February 2002 and OMIC III from March to May 2002) and presents their names as listed in this dictionary. Each mission operated under a separate mandate with a different number of military observers. *See also* AFRICAN UNION ELECTORAL AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE MISSION IN COMOROS (MAES); AFRICAN UNION MISSION FOR SUPPORT TO THE ELECTIONS IN COMOROS (AMISEC).

**ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY OBSERVER MISSION IN THE COMOROS III (OMIC III).** The **Organization of African Unity (OAU)** mandated the Organization of African Unity Observer Mission in the Comoros III for the period March to May

2002, following the completion of the weapons collection verification mission of the **Organization of African Unity Observer Mission in the Comoros II (OMIC II)** from January to February 2002. OMIC III provided election supervision and security duties under the provisions of the Framework Agreement for the Reconciliation in the Comoros and consisted of approximately 30 military observers at an estimated cost of \$305,000. The peacekeepers withdrew from the **Comoros** in May 2002, following the elections. It should be noted that many sources list this operation and OMIC II as the same mission (OMIC II from January to February 2002 and OMIC III from March to May 2002); however, the **African Union (AU)**, as the successor to the OAU, officially states there were two separate missions during this five-month window and presents their names as listed in this book. Each mission operated under a separate mandate with a different number of military observers. It should also be noted that OMIC III was the last **peacekeeping** mission mandated by the OAU before its official transformation into the AU in July 2002. The AU returned peacekeepers to the island state in 2006, with the **African Union Mission for Support to the Elections in Comoros**. *See also* AFRICAN UNION ELECTORAL AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE MISSION IN COMOROS (MAES); ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY OBSERVER MISSION IN THE COMOROS I (OMIC I).

**ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN CHAD I.** Following the failure of a Nigerian unilateral **peacekeeping** operation and the peace process in **Chad**, Lagos persuaded the **Organization of African Unity (OAU)** to assume a role in settling the conflict. The OAU opted to use the newly signed Lagos Accords as the legal basis for a peacekeeping mission. The Lagos Accords, written by **Nigeria** and signed by the major Chadian factions, called for a multinational peacekeeping force to replace the military units of **France** in Chad. The international force, as envisioned in the Lagos Accords, would supervise the Chadian ceasefire, protect the free movement of civilians, restore law and order, and help establish an integrated national army representing all of the major factions. The mandate of the neutral force terminated upon the completion of the training and fielding of the new integrated Chadian

national army, which would then protect the new interim government of Chad.

On paper, the Organization of African Unity Peacekeeping Force in Chad I actually consisted of two separate organizations. The first included the OAU peacekeeping force, and the second involved a Monitoring Commission consisting of two representatives from each of Chad's neighbors (Cameroon, the **Central African Republic**, Libya, Niger, Nigeria, and **Sudan**); two from the four OAU observer states of Benin, the Congo, **Liberia**, and Senegal; and two from each of Chad's major factions. To placate the Chadian factions that still resented the Nigerian attempt at unilateral peacekeeping, the Lagos Accords declared that participants on the military side of the operation could not be states that shared a border with Chad. The Congo, Guinea, and Benin each pledged 500 soldiers for the peacekeeping force, while Algeria and Nigeria agreed to provide transportation and logistical support for the mission. The OAU requested that each member state contribute \$50,000 toward the operational costs.

The contingent from the Congo (Congo-Brazzaville) was the only body of neutral soldiers to arrive in Chad. The approximately 550 Congolese troops began flying into Chad on 18 January 1980, six days after renewed hostilities in the civil war. Logistical problems arose quickly in this operation. Benin and Guinea announced that the lack of transport prevented the deployment of their units. The Congolese, who also experienced logistical difficulties, reportedly arrived in Chad on Algerian aircraft piloted by Angolans. Nigeria did offer to transport the contingent from Guinea but made it conditional on the departure of the French army from Chad. The French did not withdraw, and the Nigerians did not assist Guinea. The Congolese contingent occupied a substandard barracks complex near the airport and reportedly only entered the capital to obtain supplies. The unit never received a mission, came under attack by at least one faction suffering at least one fatality, and departed out of concern for its safety four months later. OAU member states did not meet their contributions to the peacekeeping operation. OAU appeals to members of the **United Nations** also fell on deaf ears. Algeria, when not reimbursed for transporting the Congolese detachment, forwarded a bill to the Congo. Despite the miserable failure of this mission, the OAU did attempt to deploy a peacekeeping operation to Chad two

years later. That force is listed in this dictionary as the **Organization of African Unity Peacekeeping Force in Chad II**. The OAU did not officially apply these names to its two operations in Chad. These terms are utilized in this book to distinguish between the two separate OAU peacekeeping operations fielded in Chad.

**ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN CHAD II.** The Organization of African Unity Peacekeeping Force in Chad II grew out of the failure of the 1980 **Organization of African Unity Peacekeeping Force in Chad I** that was fielded in Chad. By 1981, French forces in Chad had been replaced by Libyan troops. Many **Organization of African Unity (OAU)** members considered this situation even more intolerable than the one that existed in 1980, when they had to contend with French forces in Chad. The OAU mandated a new attempt at **peacekeeping** with Resolution AHG/102 (XVIII) in June 1981. The peacekeeping operation included the mission of ensuring the defense and security of Chad while awaiting the integration of a new government army. **Nigeria**, Senegal, and Zaire offered combat battalions for the OAU peacekeeping operation. **France** assisted in equipping and fielding the Senegalese, the **United States** helped the battalion from Zaire, and both the United States and Great Britain worked with Nigeria. Algeria, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, and Zambia provided detachments of military observers. Nigeria provided the **force commander**, Major-General Geoffrey Obiaje Ejiga.

One hundred parachutists from Zaire were the first soldiers fielded under the OAU mandate in Chad. The contingent from Zaire began arriving on 15 November 1981, in an attempt to fill the vacuum created by the departing Libyan army, and eventually approximately 800 troops from Zaire flew to Chad in support of the OAU. The Senegalese soldiers began arriving on 27 November 1981 and by mid-December numbered approximately 700 troops. Nigerian soldiers initiated their crossing into Chad on 7 December 1981. Deployment of the contingents to their operational zones commenced after the arrival of the Nigerian units. Originally, the OAU envisioned fielding six contingents to six zones, each stretching from the capital, N'Djamena. With the reduced manpower and a rebel army on the offensive in the east, the OAU was forced to quickly develop a

new deployment plan. Troops from Nigeria and Zaire were rushed to the town of Ati in central Chad to block the rebels' westward advance from the town of Abeche. The Senegalese battalion deployed to Mongo, a town south of Ati, to block the south-central road to N'Djamena. A final Nigerian battalion, fielded in Chad on 2 March 1982, deployed to a series of small towns north of N'Djamena to prevent the rebels from outflanking the peacekeepers in central Chad.

The hasty deployment of the OAU contingents to block rebel forces and the Chadian government's frequent forays against its rival through the peacekeeper's lines demonstrated the failure of a cease-fire to take hold in Chad. The OAU twice attempted to force a cease-fire on the rival parties after fielding the peacekeeping unit. The government and rebels refused to abide by the previously adopted OAU resolutions and communiqués, so the OAU tried twice more, in February and May 1982, to get the two rivals to agree to a conflict management process that the already fielded peacekeeping force could facilitate. The lack of finances and the rebels' ouster of President Ouédemimi Goukouni from N'djamena in June 1982 prompted the OAU to officially terminate the operation, but not before a frustrated Nigeria began a unilateral withdrawal of its forces from the country.

The OAU sought funding for the peacekeeping operation from its member states. When these countries refused to contribute to the operation, **Secretary-General** Edem Kodjo and Chairman Daniel Arap Moi dispatched representatives to the **United Nations** to seek funding. A few members of the global body pledged small amounts of cash, but the OAU officially terminated the operation before any funds were received. The failure of the OAU's peacekeeping force can be seen as resulting from a lack of funding and the refusal of the belligerents to adhere to a cease-fire in the conflict. Logistically, the contingents established bilateral agreements with Western states. The OAU departed Chad with a negative feeling toward the concept of peacekeeping and did not attempt another such operation until 1993, with the fielding of the **Neutral Military Observer Group I in Rwanda**. The OAU did not officially apply the names Organization of African Unity Peacekeeping Force in Chad I and Organization of African Unity Peacekeeping Force in Chad II to its two operations.

These terms are utilized in this book to distinguish between the two separate OAU peacekeeping operations fielded in Chad.

**ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS).** The Organization of American States (OAS) was established in March 1948 and is headquartered in Washington, DC. The organization has 35 members representing North America, Central America, and South America. It is a broad-based organization that handles issues involving regional security, economics, and social issues. The OAS has fielded its own operations that can be classified as peacekeeping in nature as well as assisted the **United Nations** with missions mandated by the latter. *See also* INTER-AMERICAN PEACE FORCE (IAPF); MISSION TO SUPPORT THE PEACE PROCESS IN COLUMBIA (MAPP/OEA); ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES SPECIAL MISSION FOR STRENGTHENING DEMOCRACY IN HAITI; MISSION OF THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC (DOMREP); UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN HAITI (UNMIH).

**ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES SPECIAL MISSION FOR STRENGTHENING DEMOCRACY IN HAITI.** The 2000 presidential election in **Haiti** was severely tainted with international observers and locals noting fraud and manipulation in the process. An international alliance of organizations and states proposed a plan that would leave President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in power while implementing political reform. Aristide accepted the plan, while the opposition groups refused and continued to call for his removal from office. In the midst of this situation, the **Organization of American States (OAS)** mandated the Organization of American States Special Mission for Strengthening Democracy in Haiti on 16 January 2002, with Resolution 806. The operation is mandated to assist the government in Haiti to strengthen democratic institutions and the democratic process, help with elections, promote human rights, and assist with the development of the police. The mission consists of approximately 22 civilian staff and six civilian police. The non-OAS states of Benin and **France** contribute to the civilian police to the mission. There has been at least one fatality among personnel assigned to the




operation. In 2004, the **Multinational Interim Force Haiti** deployed to the country as the political situation collapsed. *See also* UNITED NATIONS STABILIZATION MISSION IN HAITI (MINUSTAH).

### **ORGANIZATION OF EAST CARIBBEAN STATES (OECS).**

The Organization of East Caribbean States (OECS) was founded in 1981 and consists of states located in the eastern Caribbean Sea. The OECS has participated in one multinational military operation that can be classified as a form of collective security. The location of this operation was the island state of Grenada. Maurice Bishop had come to power in Grenada by a coup in 1979. On 13 October 1983, a faction of Bishop's ruling group staged another coup that ousted him from power. Six days later, Bishop's attempt to regain control of the government failed, and he, along with several ministers, was executed. The OECS met on 21 October 1983 to discuss the situation on Grenada and its impact to the region, as well as the potential for greater violence within Grenada. The OECS opted to launch an armed intervention of Grenada and sought assistance from states outside of the organization. The **United States** accepted the invitation from the OECS; however, it is not clear if the United States had any role in prompting the OECS to elect to field an armed intervention into Grenada prior to the extension of the invitation to Washington, DC. The British governor-general of Grenada was secretly contacted and informed that he should seek a multinational intervention. He made the request, and U.S. soldiers landed on the island on 24 October 1983.

Although the United States justified its participation with the OECS as a means to protect approximately 1,000 U.S. citizens, mainly medical students, in Grenada, Washington exhibited a desire to remove the island from the political orbit of Cuba. Approximately 2,000 U.S. paratroopers and marines were joined by 300 soldiers and policemen from Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, the Grenadines, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent. Offers by Montserrat and St. Kitts-Nevis were withdrawn due to "technical reasons." Other members of the OECS, including Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago, objected to the military action in the name of the international organization. Shridath Ramphal, the **secretary-general** of the **Commonwealth**, called for the replacement of the OECS force with a Commonwealth peacekeeping unit. The United States officially handed over security



*European Union Force (EUFOR) Tchad/RCA patrol, 2008. Credit: EUFOR Tchad/RCA.*



*A vessel assigned to the European Union Naval Force Somalia (EUNAVFOR Somalia) intercepts Somali men in a small craft, 2008. Credit: EUNAVFOR Somalia.*



*Polish peacekeepers with the European Union Force (EUFOR) Tchad/RCA, 2008. (Credit: EUFOR Tchad/RCA).*



*French peacekeepers assigned to the European Union Force (EUFOR) Tchad/RCA record a weapon as part of their disarmament mission, 2008. Credit: EUFOR Tchad/RCA.*



*Peacekeepers assigned to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) Kosovo Force (KFOR) train with United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) police, June 8, 2008. Credit: KFOR photos.*



*Swedish peacekeepers with North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) Kosovo Force (KFOR) maintain order following a riot in Gračanica, Kosovo, June 6, 2003. Credit: KFOR photos.*

*A peacekeeper from Mali provides security at a polling location in the Central African Republic while assigned to the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA), November 22, 1998. UN Photo 21107/ Evan Schneider.*



*Peacekeepers from Mali assigned to the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA), November 22, 1998. UN Photo 21113/Evan Schneider.*



*A peacekeeper from Kenya with the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) holds a Croatian child in a predominantly Serbian village of Bosnia and Herzegovina, August 28, 1992. UN Photo 31362/John Isaac.*



*A Kenyan peacekeeper assigned to the United Nations Mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE) prior to departure on a patrol in the Eastern Sector of the Temporary Security Zone, May 1, 2001. UN Photo 36586/Jorge Aramburu.*



*An armored personnel carrier of the United Nations Mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE) on patrol, February 1, 2001. UN Photo 45330/Jorge Aramburu.*



*South African peacekeepers with the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) patrol Lake Tanganyika, December 27, 2004. UN Photo 62134/Martine Perret.*



*Finnish peacekeepers assigned to the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) arrive in Namibia aboard an American C-5A Galaxy, April 1, 1989. UN Photo 64265/Milton Grant.*



*United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) transports excombatants from Kibuye to Muyinga to begin training as policemen, May 11, 2005. UN Photo 74845/Martine Perret.*





*Jordanian peacekeepers with the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) deliver food to a school in their area of responsibility, February 22, 2006. UN Photo 112714/Sophia Paris.*



*United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I) peacekeepers from Norway, April 1, 1959. UN Photo 120929/KDS.*



*A United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) peacekeeper from Fiji, May 1, 1980. UN Photo 123012/John Isaac.*



*Dutch peacekeepers with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) set out on patrol from their Battalion headquarters in Haris, May 1, 1980. UN Photo 123017/John Isaac.*



*A Norwegian peacekeeper on duty at the Ebel es Saqi observation post of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), April 5, 1978. UN Photo 123369/John Isaac.*



*A United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) checkpoint manned by peacekeepers from Ghana, November 25, 1990. UN Photo 123379/John Isaac.*



*United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) peacekeepers provide security during the trial of those accused in the 2003 killing of United Nations military observers from Jordan and Malawi in Mongwalu, February 19, 2007. UN Photo 139411/Martine Perret.*



*Colombian peacekeepers with the United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I) at lunch, December 1, 1956. UN Photo 142969/JG.*

*Peacekeepers from Brazil man an outpost of the United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I), April 1, 1959. UN Photo 143224/JG.*



*Major Emilio Alteiri, a peacekeeper from Uruguay assigned to the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), in a village near the Kashmir cease-fire line, January 1, 1955. UN Photo 180615.*



*A British peacekeeper with the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) with a Muslim boy in the Muslim enclave of Stari Vitez, May 1, 1994. UN Photo 181119/John Isaac.*



*A Congolese child in the arms of an Ethiopian peacekeeper with the United Nations Operation in the Congo, March 1, 1963. UN Photo 184419.*



*A United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) observation post, January 30, 2006. UN Photo 184769/Gernot Maier.*



*Nigerian peacekeepers of the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), March 10, 2008. UN Photo 190260/Stuart Price.*



*An Indian peacekeeper with the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), September 12, 2008. UN Photo 323633/Marie Frechon.*



*Bangladeshi peacekeepers assigned to the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) extinguish a fire at a market in Juba, Sudan, December 22, 2006. UN Photo 136657/Tim McKulka.*





*A gunshot victim is received by Indian medical personnel of the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), December 3, 2006. UN Photo 133840/Tim McKulka.*



*An Indian peacekeeper with the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) talks to children in the Virunga Market, February 23, 2008. UN Photo 18533/Marie Frechon.*

control of the island to the OECS contingents on 22 November 1983, which numbered approximately 392 at that point. All U.S. combat forces were withdrawn by 15 December 1983.

**OSORIO-TAFALL, BIBIANO F.** Osorio-Tafall, a Mexican diplomat, held the position of officer in charge of the **United Nations Operation in the Congo** between April and June 1964. In February 1967, he was named the **special representative** for the **United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus** and held that post until June 1974.

**OSSETIA.** *See* GEORGIA; SOUTH OSSETIA JOINT PEACEKEEPING FORCE.

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**“PAINTING A COUNTRY BLUE.”** British foreign secretary Douglas Hurd coined this phrase to illustrate **peacekeeping** missions aimed at providing humanitarian aid, security, disarmament, and a jump-start for a political reconciliation in states whose governments have broken down, such as **Somalia**. The **United Nations Transition Assistance Group** and **United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia** are classic examples of this term in application. *See also* BLUE HELMETS.

**PAKISTAN.** **Great Britain** granted independence to **India** and **Pakistan** in 1947. Cultural and religious differences helped divide the two countries and fuel a competition over the acquisition of the state of Jammu and Kashmir (often simply referred to as Kashmir), which held the right to join either of the two new states. The dispute over this issue devolved into open conflict before the end of 1947. The **United Nations (UN)** formed the **United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan** to examine the issues in the crisis. The commission recommended the formation of the **United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan**. The UN deployed the **United Nations India–Pakistan Observation Mission** from 1965 to 1966, after a brief conflict between the two states. In 1988, the UN mandated the **United Nations Good Offices in Afghanistan and Pakistan** to oversee the

withdrawal of the Soviet Union from **Afghanistan**. The organizations established several posts on the Pakistani side of the border with Afghanistan. Pakistan has served as a major provider of contingents for UN **peacekeeping** operations for many years, ranking third in 1993, ninth in 2001, and second in 2010, when compared to all contributors of manpower to UN missions.

**PALESTINE.** Palestine, as defined politically for this book, consists of the Palestinian territories of Gaza and the West Bank. Palestinians in both areas have alternated between negotiating and fighting **Israel** for complete independence and sovereignty. There have been five **peacekeeping**-related operations deployed to either Gaza or the West Bank to assist with the peace process and/or help train Palestinian police officers. *See also* EUROPEAN UNION BORDER ASSISTANCE MISSION AT RAFAH (EUBAM RAFAH); EUROPEAN UNION POLICE MISSION FOR THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES (EUPOL COPPS); OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COORDINATOR FOR THE MIDDLE EAST (UNSCO); TEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE IN HEBRON I (TIPH I); TEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE IN HEBRON II (TIPH II).

**PAN-AFRICAN FORCE.** *See* ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN CHAD I; ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN CHAD II.

**PAN-ARAB FORCE.** *See* ARAB DETERRENT FORCE (ADF); ARAB LEAGUE FORCE IN KUWAIT; SYMBOLIC ARAB SECURITY FORCE (ASF).

**PANEL ON UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS.** In March 2000, **United Nations (UN) secretary-general Kofi Annan** established a panel to make a formal inquiry into and offer recommendations to improve the global organization's **peacekeeping** capabilities following the release of the Carlsson Report by the **Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda**, as well as a second study on the massacre of civilians in **Srebrenica**. Annan tasked former Algerian foreign min-

ister Ladhkar Brahimi to chair the 10-member panel that consisted of members from all six inhabited continents. The secretary-general requested the members of the inquiry panel to make a critical examination of past attempts to reorganize the structure and management of UN peacekeeping.

The resulting document, known as the Brahimi Report, made the following recommendations:

1. Utilize more conflict preventive measures such as fact-finding missions.
2. Enhance peace-building strategies.
3. Provide peacekeepers with “robust” **rules of engagement**.
4. Develop clear, credible, and achievable mandates.
5. Establish a secretariat for information and strategic analysis.
6. Develop an interim criminal code for use by peacekeeping operations pending the reestablishment of local rule of law and local law enforcement capability.
7. Define “rapid and effective deployment capacities” as the ability to fully deploy **traditional peacekeeping** operations within 30 days after the passage of a mandating Security Council resolution and within 90 days for more complex missions.
8. Strengthen the processes for the selection and assembling of leadership assigned to a peacekeeping operation.
9. Strengthen the **United Nations Stand-by Arrangements System**.
10. Enhance the selection and training of civilian police personnel assigned to peacekeeping operations.
11. Reform the recruitment and training of civilian specialists assigned to peacekeeping operations.
12. Increase mission budgets for public information.
13. Review and overhaul the logistics support and financial management systems for peacekeeping operations.
14. Increase the funding for peacekeeping support at the UN headquarters.
15. Integrate peacekeeping mission planning and support.
16. Restructure the **Department of Peacekeeping Operations**.
17. Establish an organization for the operational planning and support of public information at the UN headquarters.

18. Establish a peace-building organization within the UN Department of Political Affairs.
19. Enhance the field mission planning and preparation capacity of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.
20. Increase the acquisition and use of new information technology.

**PAPUA NEW GUINEA.** *See* SOLOMON ISLANDS.

**PARTICIPATING STATES AGREEMENT.** This document is an agreement between the **United Nations** and a member state to provide personnel and/or equipment for a **peacekeeping** operation.

**PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE (PfP).** The **North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)** established the Partnership for Peace program to allow non-NATO members to cooperate militarily with members of the organization. There are 22 countries in the PfP program, which is the basis for non-NATO members to participate in such NATO-mandated **peacekeeping** operations as **Kosovo Force**, **Stabilisation Force**, and the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission in Iraq**.

**PATRIOTIC FRONT COMMISSIONER TEAMS.** These special teams, led by Patriotic Front officers in the grade of lieutenant-colonel, monitored the activities of the former Patriotic Front soldiers who were reporting to **rendezvous points** and **assembly points** in Zimbabwe. Each team included a liaison officer from the **Commonwealth Monitoring Force in Zimbabwe**.

**PEACEKEEPING.** Peacekeeping is a broad term with a definition that has evolved over the years. It should be noted that peacekeeping is not mentioned in the charter of the **United Nations (UN)** but was interpreted as a function of the organization under **Chapter Six Peacekeeping**. The term itself evolved in the 1950s to describe any type of military force mandated, normally by the UN, and deployed to perform duties related to the peace process between countries or within a single country. **United States** Department of Defense Joint Publication 3-07.3 *Peace Operations* (October 2007) defines peace-

keeping as “military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease-fire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.” The introduction to this book includes a more detailed discussion of peacekeeping’s evolving definition and related terms, along with a structure that presents this discussion on types of operations in better detail.

**PEACE ENFORCEMENT.** The **United States** Department of Defense views peace enforcement as a category of “**peace operations.**” Department of Defense Joint Publication 3-07.3 *Peace Operations* (October 2007) defines peace enforcement as “application of military force, or threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order.” The armed personnel of this type of operation would be allowed to go beyond the normal neutral stance of other peacekeepers and have permission to use force to restore a cease-fire or end a breach of the peace. **Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali** of the **United Nations** called for the establishment of this category of operations in his *An Agenda for Peace*. The definition of peace enforcement has evolved over the years. For example, the Department of Defense’s October 1993 *Report of the Bottom-Up Review* defined peace enforcement as a “military intervention to compel compliance with international sanctions or resolutions designed to maintain or restore international peace and security.” The introduction to this book includes a more detailed discussion of the evolving definition and related terms of peace enforcement, peace operations, and **peacekeeping**, along with a structure that presents this discussion on types of operations in better detail.

**PEACE OPERATIONS.** **United States** Department of Defense Joint Publication 3-07.3 *Peace Operations* (October 2007) defines peace operations as a “broad term that encompasses multiagency and multinational crisis response and limited contingency operations involving all instruments of national power with military missions to contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and facilitate the transition to legitimate

governance. Peace operations include **peacekeeping**, **peace enforcement**, peacemaking, peacebuilding, and conflict prevention efforts.” The introduction to this book includes a more detailed discussion of the evolving definition and related terms of peace operations and peacekeeping, along with a structure that presents this issue in better detail.

**PEARSON, LESTER B.** Pearson, former foreign minister of Canada, received the **Nobel Peace Prize** for his part in developing the **United Nations (UN)** concept of **peacekeeping** during the Suez Crisis in 1956. Although the **League of Nations** mandated two peacekeeping missions between 1920 and 1935 (and fielded the one in 1935) and the UN fielded the **United Nations Truce Supervision Organization** in 1948 and the **United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan** in 1948, Pearson is often described as the “father of peacekeeping” for the development of the **United Nations Emergency Force I** in 1956 between **Egypt** and **Israel**. Pearson actually developed the concept of placing a barrier force between conflicting parties.

Pearson, representing Canada at the UN, opposed a resolution that called for a cease-fire in the Suez Crisis but did not include provisions to assist the peace process. Pearson suggested the establishment of an international force to replace the British, French, and Israeli troops that had invaded the area. **Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld** originally doubted that such a multinational force could be deployed to the Middle East; however, Ambassador Cabot Lodge of the **United States** informed Pearson that his idea had U.S. support. Pearson worked on the details of the plan while Lodge submitted a resolution calling for the deployment of an international military force to oversee a cease-fire in the Suez Crisis. The discussions had to be moved to the General Assembly to avoid vetoes by **France** and **Great Britain**. The General Assembly approved the resolution and requested that the secretary-general establish the peacekeeping operation in accordance with Pearson’s plans. Many future UN peacekeeping operations were based on Pearson’s concept. *See also* UNITING FOR PEACE RESOLUTION.

**PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC).** *See* CHINA.

**PERSIAN GULF WAR.** Although not a **peacekeeping** operation in the classic sense, the Persian Gulf War represents an example of the **United Nations (UN)** using collective security to mobilize its members in a military action under Chapter Seven of the UN Charter against a state labeled as an aggressor. The military action is best described as a **Chapter Seven peace enforcement** operation. The **Korean War** is another example of this type of action. **Iraq** invaded the small state of Kuwait on 2 August 1990, following a period of diplomatic hostility between the two countries. When attempts at negotiation failed, the Security Council voted under the provisions of Chapter Seven of the UN Charter on 6 August 1990 to initiate sanctions against Iraq. On 7 August 1990, U.S. forces began arriving in Saudi Arabia under a bilateral agreement between the two states. **Egypt**, **Morocco**, and **Pakistan** also agreed to deploy military units to Saudi Arabia. A multitude of countries from around the world soon followed these states and deployed either combat or combat service support (logistics and medical) to the area. The Security Council passed Resolution 678 on 29 November 1990, authorizing member states to use all necessary means (including force) if Iraq did not withdraw from Kuwait by 15 January 1991. UN forces were placed under the command of General Norman Schwarzkopf of the **United States**. The UN coalition forces launched air strikes against Iraq on 16 January 1991 and followed this action with a ground assault on 25 February 1991. A provisional cease-fire on 2 March 1991 was followed by the Iraqi acceptance of a formal truce on 6 April 1991. The Persian Gulf War resulted in the fielding of two peacekeeping operations after the conclusion of hostilities, the **United Nations Iraq–Kuwait Observation Mission** and **United Nations Guards Contingent in Iraq**.

**PERU.** *See* MISSION OF MILITARY OBSERVERS ECUADOR–PERU (MOMEPE).

**PETERSBERG MISSIONS.** The **West European Union (WEU)** developed the Petersberg Declaration at its ministerial summit in Bonn, Germany, on 19 June 1992. The foreign ministers of the WEU member states wanted to strengthen the organization. Europe was reliant upon U.S. participation for military operations, and the **United**



**States** demonstrated a reluctance to become involved in many European crises. Washington, DC, opted to not contribute soldiers for the **United Nations (UN)** missions in **Croatia** and **Bosnia and Herzegovina**. The Europeans realized that they needed to develop their own ability to militarily intervene in crises outside of the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization** framework.

As a result, WEU members pledged to make conventional military forces available for crisis situations under the authority and mandate of the WEU. The organization would field military units in support of humanitarian and rescue tasks, **peacekeeping**, and peacemaking. These categories became known as the “Petersberg Missions” and are sometimes known as the “Petersberg Tasks.” The Petersberg Declaration provided the WEU with the mandate to conduct military operations without the participation of the United States. The WEU would carry out these operations in cooperation with the UN and **Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)**. This cooperation was later extended to the **European Union (EU)** and the **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe**, when the latter replaced the CSCE. The WEU offered support for African peacekeeping efforts in cooperation with the EU.

In 1996, the WEU and EU conducted a summit, which produced a document known as the “WEU Contribution to the European Union Intergovernmental Conference of 1996.” The Petersberg Missions were adopted into the EU’s **Amsterdam Treaty** of 1 May 1999. The EU utilized its new military options from the Petersberg Missions to develop plans for the **European Union Rapid Reaction Force** and to mandate many peacekeeping operations after 2002. *See also* MULTINATIONAL PROTECTION FORCE (FMP).

**PHILIPP, MAJOR-GENERAL HANNES.** Philipp, a native of Austria, served as the officer in charge and later **force commander** of the **United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)** from December 1974 to April 1979. He held the title officer in charge from the beginning of his tour until July 1975, when he received his promotion from colonel directly to major-general. The same scenario occurred with **Gunther G. Greindl** of Austria. Passing over the rank of brigadier-general for both men apparently resulted from the requirement that the force commander of UNDOF be a major-general.

The two brigadier-generals assigned to command the operation were referred to as “interim” or “acting.” Philipp later served as the force commander designate of the **United Nations Transition Assistance Group** in Namibia between September 1978 and January 1980. He never assumed the full title of force commander since the operation did not deploy until 1989.

**PINK ZONES.** Pink Zones were areas in **Croatia** held by Serbian forces but outside of the **United Nations Protected Areas (UNPA)** established by the global organization. The **United Nations** identified the latter as geographical areas with a Serbian majority population within Croatia. Before the arrival of the **United Nations Protection Force** in Croatia, the Serbs expanded their control from the UNPAs into adjacent territory, which then became known as the Pink Zones. These zones were a thorny issue in negotiations between the Croatian government and Serbs.

**POLAND.** *See* VILNA INTERNATIONAL FORCE.

**POLICY PLANNING UNIT.** *See* BEST PRACTICES UNIT.

**PORT-FRANCQUI.** A detachment of peacekeepers from Ghana, their British officers, and a Swedish movement control team assigned to the **United Nations Operation in the Congo** were based in the town of Port-Francqui in the Congo (currently the Democratic Republic of the Congo). During 26 to 28 April 1961, soldiers of the Congolese National Army (ANC) attacked the detachment and killed at least 48 of the peacekeepers, including 44 Ghanaians. Actual casualties are still disputed because the bodies were thrown into a river by the ANC soldiers. **Lieutenant-General Carl C. von Horn** originally reported that approximately 120 peacekeepers were massacred in the attack. The incident prompted the **United Nations** to cease basing small detachments of peacekeepers at isolated posts in the Congo. *See also* KINDU; NIEMBA.

**PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE TWENTY-FIVE.** The Bill Clinton administration released Presidential Directive Twenty-Five on 5 May 1994. The document outlined U.S. policy toward

participating in multinational **peacekeeping** operations. The directive addressed the following six issues:

1. Establishing standards for the **United States** to decide which **United Nations (UN)** peacekeeping operations to support and to which to contribute U.S. troops
2. Reducing of the U.S. contribution to UN peacekeeping operations
3. Defining U.S. policy regarding the command and control of U.S. personnel in UN operations
4. Reforming the UN's capability to manage peace operations
5. Improving the way the U.S. government manages and funds peace operations
6. Establishing better forms of communication within the government and between the government and the public on peace operations

*See also* PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE THIRTEEN.

**PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE THIRTEEN.** President Bill Clinton requested the preparation of Presidential Review Directive Thirteen in February 1993, and the group, headed by Deputy National Security Adviser Samuel R. Berger, completed the draft in July of the same year. The purpose of the document was to review **U.S.** participation in international **peacekeeping** operations. The document proposed supporting a greatly expanded U.S. role in the **United Nations** and advocated placing U.S. troops under international commanders. Congressional and public concern about the latter proposal, combined with U.S. combat-related deaths in support of the **United Nations Operation in Somalia II**, persuaded the Clinton administration to redraft the directive in October 1993. The resulting new document is known as **Presidential Decision Directive Twenty-Five**.

**PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENT.** Preventive deployment is a concept in which a threatened party may request the dispatch of a **United Nations (UN) rapid deployment force** before a conflict erupts. **Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali** called for the establishment of this type of operation in his *An Agenda for Peace*. In theory, the fielding of this rapid deployment force would serve as a barrier

and deter aggression. For this concept to be implemented, the global body would need to establish a **standing army**. The UN and **North Atlantic Treaty Organization** have deployed types of preventive deployment operations in **Macedonia** to ensure that conflict did not spill over into the country. *See also* UNITED NATIONS PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENT FORCE (UNPREDEP).

**PRIVATIZATION OF PEACEKEEPING.** There has been a trend among countries to privatize many functions previously carried out by military personnel. These functions range from basic facility maintenance to security duties. The same trend is occurring with **peacekeeping** operations. Rather than provide the airlift assets for some peacekeeping missions, the **United States** sometimes contracts this role out to civilian companies. For example, Washington, DC, funded the air assets of the **Economic Community of West African States Mission in Côte d'Ivoire** by contracting a civilian company that flies Russian-built transport aircraft and helicopters. In addition, many of the U.S. personnel serving with the **Stabilisation Force** were civilians working for private companies rather than the U.S. military or government. Their duties included serving as security guards at U.S. posts. The United States also contracted civilian companies to provide various types of support for the **African Union Mission in Somalia** and other operations. Other countries have also moved to contract civilians to perform duties associated with peacekeeping operations that were once exclusively conducted by military personnel.

– Q –

**QUICK REACTION FORCE (QRF).** The quick reaction force (QRF) consisted of 1,700 U.S. soldiers assigned to the **United Nations Operation in Somalia I**. The purpose of the unit included the quick movement to areas where other peacekeepers were under threat or actual attack to either reinforce or remove them. The **United Nations** tended to rely heavily on the QRF for nonemergency missions, including the escort of convoys and weapons sweeps, due to the efficiency of the U.S. units compared to soldiers of other **peacekeeping**

contributing states. This heavy reliance led to criticism of the international organization in the U.S. Congress since the U.S. forces lacked adequate armored support and began taking casualties in the conflict. *See also* FORCE MOBILE RESERVE (FMR); RAPID REACTION FORCE.

– R –

**RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE.** A rapid deployment force is made up of military units designated to an international organization as being available for a quick deployment in **peacekeeping operations**. **Rapid reaction force** is the more common name for this type of program that is maintained by several international organizations.

**RAPID REACTION FORCE.** A rapid reaction force, sometimes referred to as a **rapid deployment force**, is established by an international organization as a means to have military units at its disposal for such short-notice operations as **peacekeeping** missions. A rapid reaction force is not a military unit already deployed with a peacekeeping mission and earmarked for quick action to rescue or protect other units. Rather the units remain with their home countries and receive special training and designation to respond on short notice to a crisis situation. Rapid reaction forces are fielded only if the contingent-providing states agree to the request of the international organization. *See also* AFRICAN STAND-BY FORCE; EUROPEAN UNION RAPID REACTION FORCE; NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION RAPID REACTION FORCE; UNITED NATIONS STAND-BY ARRANGEMENTS SYSTEM (UNSA).

**RECAMP.** *See* RENFORCEMENT DES CAPACITÉS AFRICAINES DE MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX (RECAMP).

**RED LINE.** The “red line” represented the southernmost boundary of **Lebanon** within which **Israel** would tolerate the deployment of forces of the **Arab Deterrent Force (ADF)**. ADF units could not move south of the **Litani River**, which later became the northern

boundary of the area patrolled by the **United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon**. Christian militia, armed by Israel, patrolled south of the Litani River. Names such as “red line” derive from the fact that an actual red line was drawn on a map of Lebanon, and the boundary became known for the color pen used in the marking. *See also GREEN LINE.*

**REGIONAL ASSISTANCE MISSION IN THE SOLOMON ISLANDS (RAMSI).** Continued discussions in the peace process on Guadalcanal in the **Solomon Islands** resulted in the local government requesting **Australia** and the Pacific Islands Forum to become more active on the island. As a result, the Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) deployed beginning on 24 July 2003, to replace the **International Peace Monitoring Team**, a small observer force deployed to Guadalcanal in 2000 to assist the peace process. RAMSI’s mandate includes the restoration of stability on Guadalcanal and providing general security for the government to regain control of the situation. Initially, RAMSI consisted of 760 troops, 108 military observers, and 297 civilian police provided by Australia, the Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Tonga, and Vanuatu. The numbers have fluctuated since 2003. After a decrease in manpower in 2004, riots following the 2006 elections resulted in Australia and New Zealand dispatching reinforcements. After restoring calm, RAMSI’s numbers decreased to approximately 210 troops, 300 military observers, and 170 civilian police. As of 2010, RAMSI consists of 160 personnel and is structured with a headquarters element, one platoon from Australia, a second platoon that rotates between Australia and New Zealand, and a third platoon with personnel from the other Pacific states. Australia provides half of the total manpower. The annual cost of RAMSI is approximately \$107 million. At least one Australian soldier has died while serving in the operation.

**REHAT.** To “rehat” is a term applied to peacekeepers from a regionally mandated operation who are reassigned to a **United Nations (UN)** mission established to replace the former. For example, in Liberia, the **United Nations Mission in Liberia** replaced the **Economic Community of West African States Mission in Liberia**

(**ECOMIL**) in October 2003. The ECOMIL peacekeepers remained on the ground and became part of the UN mission.

**RENDEZVOUS POINT (RV).** Rendezvous point (RV) is the name given to the initial coordination areas for soldiers of the Patriotic Front who came in from the bush during the peace process in Zimbabwe. The **Commonwealth Monitoring Force in Zimbabwe** managed 22 RVs from 29 December 1979 to 6 January 1980. The purpose of the temporary camps was to allow the Patriotic Front units to make their initial contact with representatives of their organization and the **Commonwealth** peacekeepers. After reporting to the RVs, the Commonwealth soldiers bused the Patriotic Front soldiers to more permanent camps known as **assembly points (APs)**. Due to the nature of the long conflict in Zimbabwe, initial contacts between the Patriotic Front forces and the peacekeepers were tense. Many Patriotic Front soldiers also viewed the British contingent as being the equivalent of the Rhodesian Security Forces, a group they had been fighting for years. Despite the early tensions, the Commonwealth peacekeepers completed their mission at the RVs by 6 January 1980 and moved on to the two-month AP phase of the operation. *See also* COMMONWEALTH OBSERVER GROUP.

**RENFORCEMENT DES CAPACITÉS AFRICAINES DE MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX (RECAMP).** In November 1995, **United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali** called for the international community to place a greater emphasis on solving crisis situations before they had to be debated by the global organization. At the same time, the Western powers were searching for alternatives to sending their peacekeepers into such explosive situations as **Somalia** and **Rwanda**. The **United States** developed the **African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI)** as a means of training African military units for the rigors of peace operations on the African continent. **France** proposed the **Renforcement des Capacités de Maintien de la Paix (RECAMP)** program at the same time. RECAMP was similar to the **African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA)** that followed ACRI. The French provided individual training to African officers and noncommissioned officers who returned to work with their units. The French then coordinated

subregional **peacekeeping** exercises to allow the units to practice their skills and operate in a multinational environment. France established peacekeeping training centers in **Côte d'Ivoire** and Benin. RECAMP also included the stockpiling of large quantities of equipment at French overseas bases for the use by African peacekeeping units. In 2007, RECAMP merged into the newly established **European Reinforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix**. *See also* ENHANCED INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING CAPABILITIES (EIPC); GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS INITIATIVE (GPOI).

**REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO.** *See* CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE.

**RESERVE FUND.** The **United Nations** maintains a **peacekeeping** reserve fund to help it finance the initial deployment of peacekeeping operations. The fund must be repaid when money arrives from member states under the **Special Assessment** program.

**RHODESIA.** *See* COMMONWEALTH MONITORING FORCE IN ZIMBABWE (CMF); COMMONWEALTH OBSERVER GROUP.

**RIAD, MAHMOUD.** Riad, an Egyptian, held the post of **secretary-general** of the **League of Arab States**. He conducted the negotiations with Lebanese president Suleiman Frangieh that led to the latter's acceptance of the **Symbolic Arab Security Force** in 1976 and was instrumental in the discussions that transformed the operation into the **Arab Deterrent Force**. As secretary-general, Riad supervised the two **peacekeeping** missions. He resigned from his post in 1979, following the conclusion of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. The League of Arab States expelled **Egypt** as a member and moved its headquarters from Cairo to Tunis, Tunisia.

**RIKHYE, MAJOR-GENERAL INDAR JIT.** Rikhye, an Indian officer, had a distinguished career with the **United Nations**. He began as the military adviser to the **secretary-general**. In 1963, Secretary-General U Thant dispatched Rikhye to Yemen following the resignation of **Lieutenant-General Carl C. von Horn**, the **force**



**commander** of the **United Nations Yemen Observation Mission**. He reported that despite physical hardships, the morale of the peacekeepers was high. Rikhye also reported that supplies, although often limited, were adequate for mission accomplishment. Rikhye, still in his capacity as military adviser, greatly assisted in the original establishment of the **United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus** by purchasing equipment and developing airlift timetables. He later became the military adviser to **Special Representative** Jose Antonio Mayobre during the **Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic** for the duration of the operation from May 1965 to October 1966. He served as the last force commander of the **United Nations Emergency Force I** between January 1966 and June 1967. Rikhye faced the tremendous logistical difficulty of removing the peacekeepers from the Sinai following the Egyptian order for the neutral soldiers to depart the area. The Israeli–Arab Six-Day War erupted immediately after the departure of the peacekeepers.

**RIYADH RESOLUTION.** The Riyadh Resolution, adopted at the **Riyadh Summit Conference** on 18 October 1976, outlined the functions of the **Arab Deterrent Force** that evolved from the **Symbolic Arab Security Force**. The operation, according to the resolution, would ensure observance of the cease-fire, disengage belligerent soldiers, deter any violation of the agreement, implement the Cairo Agreement, maintain internal security, supervise the withdrawal of armed troops to positions held on 13 April 1975, oversee the collection of heavy weapons, and assist the Lebanese authorities when necessary. The document also included an elaborate schedule detailing how the mission should accomplish its mandate. *See also* BEITED-DINE CONFERENCE; CHATAURA AGREEMENT.

**RIYADH SUMMIT CONFERENCE.** Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, **Syria**, **Lebanon**, **Egypt**, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) met in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, during 16 to 18 October 1976. The Riyadh Summit Conference, also known as the Six-Party Summit Conference, discussed the situation in Lebanon and agreed to send additional forces to strengthen the **Symbolic Arab Security Force** deployed under a mandate of the **League of Arab States**. The meet-

ing also proposed changing the force to an **Arab Deterrent Force** by giving it more teeth in dealing with transgressions of the peace in Lebanon. At the same time, the force was placed under the personal command of the president of Lebanon. The resolutions of the conference were endorsed by the League of Arab States at the **Cairo Summit Conference** during the same month. *See also* RIYADH RESOLUTION.

**ROSE, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR MICHAEL.** Rose, an army officer from **Great Britain**, was tapped to serve as the commander of the **United Nations Protection Force** element in **Bosnia and Herzegovina**. He officially replaced **Lieutenant-General Francis Briquemont** in January 1994. Within two weeks of assuming command, Rose faced a Serbian challenge to his command. Serbian militiamen placed a roadblock between Sarajevo and the main peacekeeper's base at Kiseljak. Rose ordered a British platoon to "press for the right of freedom of movement by negotiation initially, and by force if necessary." The Serb militia units backed down to Rose's counter-challenge. Rose was commander during the air strikes launched by the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization** against Serb forces. Like his predecessors, Rose tended to criticize the international bureaucracy that hampered his operation. Although rumors stated that he might be removed due to his candid criticism, Rose completed his one year term and was replaced by Major-General Rupert Smith in January 1995.

**RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE).** Rules of engagement (ROE) establish the conditions when peacekeepers are allowed to use force during their mission. Most ROEs call for peacekeepers to use force only in defense of lives and property. Other ROEs allow the peacekeepers to use force against a belligerent who violates the cease-fire agreement. This type of mission is often called "**peace enforcement**." An example is the **United Nations Protection Force** mission in the former **Yugoslavia**. In addition, ROEs may call for a multinational unit to actively enter a conflict on behalf of one belligerent against another. Examples include the **Korean War** and the **Persian Gulf War**.

**RUSSIA.** During the **Cold War**, Russia (the former Soviet Union) maintained minimal participation in **peacekeeping** operations. After the Cold War, the emphasis of Russian peacekeeping is with the **Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)**, although Russian troops have participated with **United Nations**– and **North Atlantic Treaty Organization**–mandated operations. The Russians have fielded peacekeepers within the borders of the former Soviet Union four times. Twice, the CIS mandated peacekeeping operations under Russian domination, including the **Commonwealth of Independent States Collective Peacekeeping Force (Tajikistan)** and the **Commonwealth of Independent States Peacekeeping Forces in Georgia (Abkhazia)**. The Russians have also fielded two additional missions that they label as peacekeeping under bilateral agreements with multinational contingents. Much of the Russian-led collective security discussions shifted from the CIS to the **Collective Security Treaty Organization** since 2002.

The Russians have two terms for what is often called “peacekeeping.” The first is *voiska po podderzhaniyu mira*, which translates as “forces for the maintenance of peace,” while the second, *mirotvorcheskie voiska*, means “peacemaking forces.” The first term is more in line with **traditional peacekeeping** concepts, while the second refers to the use of military forces to actively impose a peaceful settlement on belligerents, which is also known in English as “**peace enforcement**.” Because the Russians use the terms interchangeably, an academic review of peacekeeping operations in which they are contributing soldiers is difficult. The composition of the peacekeeping operations is controversial. In the two Russian bilateral operations, the units contain contingents from the belligerent states. In the case of Ossetia, both North Ossetians and South Ossetians have joined the Russians, while the Moldovans are included in the operation in their state. One of the challenges of reviewing CIS or Russian peacekeeping operations is the establishment of names for the missions. Non-Russian sources tend to have different names for the same mission partly due to translation variations. This is clarified where possible under the entries in this dictionary for each operation as well as the CIS. *See also* JOINT CONTROL COMMISSION PEACEKEEPING FORCE; SOUTH OSSETIA JOINT PEACEKEEPING FORCE.

**RWANDA.** Rwanda achieved independence from Belgium in 1962. Conflict between the majority Hutu and minority Tutsi populations existed before independence and intensified in 1963 with a Tutsi guerrilla invasion of the Hutu-dominated state from **Burundi**. Fighting continued throughout the next three decades. In 1990, the Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) invaded Rwanda from Uganda and intensified the conflict within the state. Belgium and **France** initiated an airlift of foreign nationals from Rwanda. The **Organization of African Unity (OAU)** dispatched a small force of military observers, known as the **Military Observer Group (MOG)**, in support of the peace process. The mission collapsed by late 1991 as a result of a perception that the contributing states to MOG were not neutral in the conflict. After another cease-fire, the OAU fielded a second **peacekeeping** mission, the **Neutral Military Observer Group I**, which withdrew to the relative safety of Kigali, Rwanda, following the renewal of hostilities in February 1993. After the introduction of a new cease-fire, the OAU agreed to mandate a third peacekeeping mission, the **Neutral Military Observer Group II (NMOG II)**, in August 1993. NMOG II supported the operations of the **United Nations Observer Mission Uganda–Rwanda**, mandated by the **United Nations (UN)** Security Council on 22 June 1993, to prevent weapons from entering Rwanda.

The warring factions agreed to a cease-fire in August 1993, and in response the UN mandated the **United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR)**. The OAU transferred NMOG II's personnel to UNAMIR when the latter mission arrived in Rwanda in December 1993. During the first week of April 1994, President Juvénal Habyarimana of Rwanda and President Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi died in a mysterious aircraft crash. Hutu extremists blamed the Tutsi, and organized violence soon erupted across the country, as Hutus began murdering Tutsis and fellow Hutus who supported the peace process. Over the next three months, approximately 800,000 people died, as Hutus sought the genocidal extermination of Tutsi men, women, and children, as well as moderate Hutu. The Hutu utilized modern weapons as well as machetes and farm tools to kill the Tutsi. At the same time, the Tutsi-dominated RPF launched a fresh offensive against the interim government of Rwanda. UNAMIR peacekeepers watched helplessly as the genocide erupted around them. On 21 April 1994, the UN Security

Council voted to reduce the size of UNAMIR from 2,548 to 270 and essentially left the Rwandans to themselves. Many debated who and what was to blame for the failure to prevent the genocide.

Two significant reviews investigated the events surrounding the massacre and UNAMIR's mandate. In 1999, the UN released the final report of the **Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda**, and in 2000, the OAU released the results of the **International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events**. As the world waited for UN member states to slowly contribute troops to a strengthened UNAMIR, **France** led a multinational mission to secure refugee camps in southwestern Rwanda. *See also* DALLAIRE, BRIGADIER-GENERAL ROMEO A.

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**SAAR.** *See* SAAR INTERNATIONAL FORCE; SAAR PLEBISCITE.

**SAAR INTERNATIONAL FORCE.** The **League of Nations** proposed the Saar International Force in 1934 as a means to ensure law and order during the **Saar plebiscite** scheduled for January 1935. The proposed force, primarily organized by **Great Britain**, overcame stiff opposition in the British government thanks to the firm backing of Prime Minister Anthony Eden. British support and agreement to participate allowed the league to propose the international force as an alternative to a reintroduction of French troops, which would have antagonized **Germany**. As a means of winning acceptance from Germany and **France**, the league requested contingents from states that lacked an interest in the Saar plebiscite. The multinational unit consisted of 3,300 soldiers from Great Britain (1,500), Italy (1,300), the Netherlands (250), and Sweden (250). The units were deployed to the Saar by 22 December 1934. Each contingent provided for its own logistics needs and forwarded the tab to the league, which in turn required France, Germany, and the Saar to share the costs of the operation. Major-General J. E. S. Briand of Great Britain served as the military commander, and the entire operation fell under the authority of the Saar Governing Commission.

The force adopted the **British Method** of military assistance to civilian governments as its **rules of engagement**. The Saar International Force performed well in its mission, despite the cold weather and less-than-adequate housing, and was withdrawn by 28 January 1935, following the conclusion of the plebiscite. The international force is noted for the concern for neutrality displayed by the League of Nations. Until this operation, other multinational units fielded by the league were essentially coalitions of the Allied powers from World War I. **Switzerland** declined to participate so as to not to jeopardize its position as a neutral state, while the Netherlands, neutral during World War I, refused to contribute a contingent unless Sweden also provided a unit to the international force.

**SAAR PLEBISCITE.** The Saar is a region located along the French and German border southeast of Luxembourg. German by language and culture, the area was coveted by **France** following World War I due to an abundance of rich coal mines. The other Allied states did not want to provide **Germany** with a grievance against them and thus refused to openly support the French claims on the Saar. The **League of Nations** prepared the 1920 Compromise that established a five-man Saar Governing Commission to administer the region for 15 years. Following this period, the league would supervise a plebiscite to determine if the inhabitants desired to remain a ward of the international organization or unite with either France or Germany. French troops, numbering 2,000, would police the region during the period of league administration. In 1927, the French troops were replaced by an allied force of 800 soldiers from **Great Britain**, Belgium, and France, who were in turn removed in 1930.

The league faced potential difficulties with the impeding plebiscite due to France's desire to hold the area and right-wing German elements that were organizing support for returning the Saar to Germany. The league needed to restrain France from returning its soldiers to the area under the pretense of maintaining law and order; however, the league did insist that it could handle any violence that might break out during the plebiscite. The solution materialized when Prime Minister Anthony Eden of Great Britain persuaded his government to provide British soldiers as an element of a **Saar International Force** that would maintain order during the voting process.

The plebiscite, held on 13 January 1935, overwhelmingly confirmed the opinion of the population to reunite with Germany.

**SAFE AREAS.** The **United Nations (UN)** established six safe areas in **Bosnia and Herzegovina** in 1992 in an attempt to protect Muslims from Bosnian Serbs. The safe areas were protected by units assigned to the **United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina**. The peacekeepers moved to six Muslim-dominated towns, including Sarajevo, Gorazde, Zepa, **Srebrenica**, Tuzla, and **Bihac**. The first five towns are located in eastern Bosnia near the border with Serbia, while Bihac is on the border with **Croatia**. The use of safe areas did not eliminate the shelling of Muslims in these towns. Srebrenica was overrun by Serbs, resulting in a massacre of Muslim men and boys. The **North Atlantic Treaty Organization** offered the use of its aircraft in support of UN peacekeepers, who were often targets of the same shelling aimed at the Muslims.

**SAFE HAVENS.** Safe havens were areas established in northern **Iraq** by the **United Nations (UN)** for the protection of Kurds following the **Persian Gulf War** in 1991. The operation, under the UN suboffices and Humanitarian Centers Program and protected by the **United Nations Guards Contingent in Iraq**, offered humanitarian assistance and protection of the Kurds from the Iraqi forces of Saddam Hussein. The safe havens extended from Iraq's northern border to the 36th parallel. Iraq was prohibited from using either fixed-wing aircraft or helicopters north of the 36th parallel into the safe havens. The term "safe havens" replaced "enclaves" to preserve Iraqi territorial integrity.

**SAHNOUN, MOHAMMED.** Sahnoun, an Algerian, was the **special representative** of the **United Nations (UN)** in **Somalia** during the initial fielding of the **United Nations Operation in Somalia I** in 1992. He is credited with the difficult negotiations, especially with Mohammed Farah Aidid, to gain acceptance of the various warlords for the fielding of the peacekeepers. Sahnoun is also noted for his diplomacy in persuading Ethiopia, Eritrea, **Sudan**, and Djibouti that an international force in Somalia would not threaten their security. Sahnoun openly stated that the UN did not understand either the

conflict in Somalia or Somali culture. He gained the respect of the local warlords and relief workers for his understanding of the political situation and his criticism of the way the UN handled the crisis. **Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali** dismissed Sahnoun in October 1992, after only five months on the job, for criticizing the operation. He was replaced by Ismat Kattani. Sahnoun's previous assignments included serving as his country's ambassador to the UN, **France, Germany, and the United States.**

**SANCTIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION (SAM).** *See* CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE (CSCE).

**SARAJEVO.** *See* BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA; SAFE AREAS; UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA.

**SARKIS, PRESIDENT ELIAS.** The Six-Party Arab Summit Conference concluded that the envisioned **Arab Deterrent Force** should be under the personal command of the president of **Lebanon**. President Elias Sarkis, to counter the heavy influence of **Syria** in the force as well as within Lebanon, selected Lebanese officers who were neutral in the civil war to command the operation. The restricted selection criteria meant that the two Lebanese commanders of the force, Colonel Ahmed al-Hajj (1976–1977) and **Lieutenant-Colonel Sami al-Khatib** (1977–1983) were junior in rank to the Syrian and Saudi generals appointed to assist them. *See also* SYMBOLIC ARAB SECURITY FORCE (ASF).

**SECOND GENERATION PEACEKEEPING.** “Second Generation peacekeeping” is a term applied to **United Nations (UN) peacekeeping** operations fielded primarily after 1989. In contrast to earlier missions, sometimes referred to as **First Generation peacekeeping** or **traditional peacekeeping**, which simply separated two belligerents, Second Generation peacekeeping missions include the duties of state building, election monitoring, and humanitarian assistance. They are sometimes given the authority to use force to ensure compliance with an existing cease-fire.



**SECRETARY-GENERAL.** The secretary-general is the full-time civil servant in charge of an international organization's permanent headquarters. The secretary-general provides recommendations on **peacekeeping** operations and how to organize them. At the **United Nations**, the Security Council or General Assembly normally requests that the secretary-general recommend the composition and organization of peacekeeping operations. The **force commander** or **special representative** of an operation responds to the directions of the secretary-general who, in turn, answers to the Security Council or General Assembly.

**SERBIA.** *See* ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE MISSION TO SERBIA; ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE MISSION TO SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO; YUGOSLAVIA.

**SHABA.** *See* FRANCE.

**SHAHEEN, BRIGADIER-GENERAL IMTIAZ.** Shaheen commanded the initial Pakistani battalion fielded as the **United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I)**. In addition, he served as the UNOSOM I **force commander**. As UNOSOM I commander, Shaheen had to cope with the early **United Nations** logistical problems in the operation and the humiliation of having well-armed locals rob and disarm small parties of his soldiers. It has been reported that logistics were so poor when the Pakistanis first arrived that Shaheen had to use his personal credit card to order rice for his soldiers to eat.

**SHARM EL-SHEIKH.** Sharm el-Sheikh is a town located on the southern tip of the Sinai Peninsula. It is of strategic importance because it overlooks the entrance to the Strait of Tiran, which leads to the Israeli port of Elath. Prior to the Suez Conflict in 1956, **Egypt** utilized the location to prevent Israeli shipping from entering or leaving the Strait of Tiran. After the war, the **United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I)** stationed a small group of peacekeepers at Sharm el-Sheikh to ensure the free passage of Israeli shipping to and from the port of Elath. The **peacekeeping** detachment consisted of 43 Swedish and nine Canadian soldiers. Conflicting sources state

that Finns and not Swedes manned the observation posts at Sharm el-Sheikh. **Israel** requested that the **United Nations (UN)** station a naval contingent at Sharm el-Sheikh to ensure free passage of the Strait of Tiran; however, **Secretary-General U Thant** declined to act on the suggestion, saying that the proposal was outside of UNEF I's mandate. This request was the first time that the UN considered a naval arm to a peacekeeping operation. Many future missions would have a naval arm to assist in carrying out their mandates. The detachment withdrew when UNEF I was ordered out of the Sinai by Egypt in 1967.

**SIERRA LEONE.** Internal conflict in Sierra Leone has resulted in the deployment of several **peacekeeping** operations in support of an ongoing peace process in the state. Civil war erupted in Sierra Leone in March 1991, as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), with assistance from rebels in Liberia, attempted to overthrow the government. Charles Taylor, the main rebel leader in Liberia, dimly viewed Sierra Leone's backing of the **Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group in Liberia**, which was under Nigerian leadership. The presence of diamond fields in Sierra Leone was also another attraction for the rebel groups. The Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) dispatched a small force of peacekeepers from **Liberia** to Sierra Leone to assist the government. The force managed to contain the RUF with the assistance of the military of Sierra Leone. On 29 April 1992, the military overthrew the government of Sierra Leone and stepped down four years later, as Sierra Leone held its first democratic elections since 1967. On 20 November 1996, President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah signed a peace agreement with the RUF. On 25 May 1997, the military launched another coup and toppled President Kabbah. The military formed an Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) under Major Johnny Koroma and invited the RUF to join it. Although Koroma remained the nominal head of government, the RUF essentially wrestled control of the government from the AFRC. Nigerian forces already in Sierra Leone were reinforced. The two phases of West African intervention in the civil war are often referred to as the **Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group in Sierra Leone**.

In February 1998, a Nigerian-led ECOMOG offensive forced the AFRC and RUF to abandon Freetown, and President Kabbah returned to power in Sierra Leone. Fighting in the rural areas continued. The **United Nations (UN)** Security Council mandated the **United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL)** in July to assist with the disarming of combatants and restructuring the military of Sierra Leone. In December 1998, RUF forces infiltrated into Freetown, initiating the heaviest fighting in the country's civil war. ECOMOG regained the upper hand by late January 1999. UNOMSIL personnel evacuated Sierra Leone and traveled to Guinea during this period. In July 1999, the belligerents signed the Lomé Accord. This agreement called for a cease-fire and disarmament/demobilization to be overseen by a new UN **peacekeeping** operation, the **United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)**, and ordered that the new organization absorb the mission and personnel of UNOMSIL. In 2000, the **International Military Assistance Training Team** formed to assist the government of Sierra Leone, as well as UNAMISIL. The UN terminated UNAMSIL and replaced it with the **United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone**.

**SIILASVUO, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL ENSIO P. H.** Siilasvuo, a native of Finland, served as the chief of staff of the **United Nations Truce Supervision Organization** between August 1970 and October 1973, when he was named as the first **force commander** of the **United Nations Emergency Force II**. He held the title of interim commander from October to November 1973 and then commander from November 1973 until August 1975. On behalf of the **United Nations**, he helped negotiate and then signed the Egyptian–Israeli cease-fire at Kilometer 101. In January 1974, Siilasvuo officially witnessed the signing of the disengagement agreement between **Egypt** and **Israel**. Due to his extensive experience, **Secretary-General** Kurt Waldheim named Siilasvuo the chief coordinator of the United Nations Peacekeeping Missions in the Middle East. In this capacity, he negotiated with the Israeli and Lebanese governments for the deployment of a **peacekeeping** operation that would become known as the **United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon**. He also negotiated the Israeli withdrawal from **Lebanon** in 1978 on behalf of the UN.

**SINAI.** *See* EGYPT.

**SOLOMON ISLANDS.** The islands of the Solomon chain are divided between two countries. Bougainville, located in the northern region of the chain, is part of Papua New Guinea (PNG), while the other islands stretching to the southeast are grouped as a single state known as the Solomon Islands. Bougainville experienced political turmoil and an armed insurrection beginning in the late 1980s. Many islanders resented being part of PNG and preferred their own independent state. Another problem involved the attitudes of the islanders toward a large copper mine. Many believed that they should share more of the mine's profits and were concerned about the environmental damage caused by the mine's operation. The Bougainville Revolutionary Army emerged in 1988 and forced the mine to close. PNG removed its military forces from Bougainville in 1990 but returned them in 1991 and 1992. The **South Pacific Peacekeeping Force** deployed for three weeks in 1994 to oversee a peace conference. The **Bougainville Truce Monitoring Group** arrived in December 1997 to assist with the peace process and was replaced by the **Bougainville Peace Monitoring Group (PMG)** in 1998, following progress from a truce to a cease-fire in the conflict. The PMG transitioned to the **Bougainville Transition Team** in June 2003 and then departed in December 2003.

Two **peacekeeping** operations have deployed to Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands. Ethnic conflict erupted on Guadalcanal in 1998. Local Guadalcanese expressed concern about the migration of people from the island of Malaita to Guadalcanal and believed that the newcomers were taking land without compensation, disrespecting the local culture, and taking job opportunities away from the local inhabitants. More than 100 people died and approximately 30,000 others became internal refugees following the toppling of the local government. The country nearly collapsed as services dried up and the government faced bankruptcy. **Australia** and New Zealand, along with **Commonwealth** support, stepped in and offered to help mediate a settlement to the crisis. The resulting Townsville Peace Agreement, signed on 15 October 2000, ended the hostilities and established an international presence, known as the **International Peace Monitoring Team (IPMT)**, to monitor the cease-fire.

Progress in the peace process permitted the transition of the IPMT to the **Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands** in 2003.

**SOLOMON ISLANDS PEACE MONITORING TEAM.** *See* INTERNATIONAL PEACE MONITORING TEAM (IPMT).

**SOMALIA.** Somali clans ousted President Sid Barre of Somalia in 1991, initiating an era of clan conflict and a de facto split of the country into northern and southern states, despite the lack of recognition by most of the world to this reality. While the north proved to be more stable, conditions in the south worsened as rival clans carved fiefdoms and fought over territory and humanitarian aid. The **United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I)** deployed in 1992 to support the humanitarian aid process. Opposition by Somali clans prompted the **United States** to field the **Unified Task Force (UNITFAF)** under a **United Nations (UN)** mandate to provide security for UNOSOM I. Casualties among UNITAF personnel led to the UN remandating UNOSOM I as the **United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II)** in 1993 as a **Chapter Seven peace enforcement** mission. UNOSOM II withdrew from Somalia in 1995, due to continued opposition of the Somali clans to its mission as well as a peace process. Attempts to find a peace process formula for the country led to an attempt by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the **African Union (AU)** to field a new **peacekeeping** mission in Somalia between 2002 and 2007. The operation, referred to as the **Intergovernmental Authority on Development Peace Support Mission in Somalia**, never deployed due to many problems and concerns in the peace process. The AU did deploy the **African Union Mission in Somalia** in March 2007.

**SOUTH AFRICA.** South Africa, with one of the best-equipped armies in Sub-Saharan Africa, emerged as a major participant in **African Union (AU)-** and **United Nations (UN)-**mandated **peacekeeping** operations. In May 1998, South Africa served as the **lead state** in the **Southern African Development Community Operation in Lesotho**. The country fielded one peacekeeping operation in the lead state role under the endorsement of the **Organization of African Unity**. The mission, the **South African Protection Support Detach-**

**ment**, deployed to **Burundi** on 27 October 2001, despite the lack of a cease-fire in the state. Many groups in Burundi resented the South African presence and threatened the peacekeepers. **Nigeria** and Senegal originally offered to field contingents but not until after an effective cease-fire was in place. Peacekeepers from these states never arrived. Individual European countries provided South Africa with the funding required to maintain its 700 peacekeepers in Burundi. Following a December 2002 cease-fire, the South African troops remained in Burundi as the largest contingent of the **African Mission in Burundi** under an AU mandate. The latter mission transformed into the **United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB)** on 31 May 2004. As the peace process progressed, the UN withdrew ONUB on 31 December 2006; however, South African troops remained in Burundi under an AU mandate as the **African Union Special Task Force (AUSTF)**. The final South African soldiers departed Burundi, signaling the termination of AUSTF, on 31 December 2009. *See also* UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN SOUTH AFRICA (UNOMSA); UNITED NATIONS TRANSITION ASSISTANCE GROUP (UNTAG).

**SOUTH AFRICAN PROTECTION SUPPORT DETACHMENT (SAPSD)**. Tanzania and then **South Africa** led the negotiations that resulted in the signing of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement on 28 August 2000, between the government and various Hutu and Tutsi groups in **Burundi**. The Arusha document included a request for a **United Nations (UN) peacekeeping** operation but lacked a cease-fire agreement, which was required by the global organization. The **Organization of African Unity** discussed deploying a multinational African peacekeeping operation to support the peace process until a cease-fire could be successfully negotiated. Several states offered troops, but only South Africa actually deployed personnel. Officially, the operation was mandated by the 15th Summit of the Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi, held on 23 July 2001. South Africa informed the UN Security Council that it intended to deploy peacekeepers to Burundi in support of the regional peace process. In turn, the Security Council endorsed the mission on 29 October 2001, with Resolution 1375. While the official start date of the mission is 1 November 2001, South African troops, eventually

numbering 700, began deploying to Burundi on 27 October 2001. The mandated mission of what became known as the South African Protection Support Detachment (SAPSD) included the protection of faction and government leaders, the safeguarding of state institutions, and providing a confidence-building measure by its presence.

Following the conclusion of a cease-fire in 2003, the newly established **African Union (AU)** mandated a peacekeeping operation to support the peace process in Burundi. The force, the **African Mission in Burundi (AMIB)**, officially mandated on 2 April 2003, commenced operations that same month, since South African troops were transferred from SAPSD to AMIB. The AU terminated AMIB on 31 May 2004, and the African peacekeepers merged into the **United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB)**. Following the departure of ONUB in December 2006, South African troops continued their presence in Burundi as the **African Union Special Task Force**. There were at least eight fatalities among SAPSD personnel between November 2001 and April 2003.

**SOUTH OSSETIA JOINT FORCE.** *See* SOUTH OSSETIA JOINT PEACEKEEPING FORCE.

**SOUTH OSSETIA JOINT PEACEKEEPING FORCE.** While North Ossetia is situated in **Russia**, the ethnically related South Ossetians are located within the borders of **Georgia**. Joseph Stalin originally divided the area between the two former Soviet republics, but the dissolution of the Soviet Union left the two areas split into separate countries. Many South Ossetians have expressed a desire to join their Northern cousins and become a part of Russia but have been overruled by Georgia. The Southerners launched a guerrilla war against the government of Georgia, while the latter imposed an economic blockade on the area. Russia signed a bilateral agreement with Georgia and the other belligerents on 24 June 1992, establishing the South Ossetia Joint Peacekeeping Force. The force consisted of 1,385 soldiers from Russia, Georgia, North Ossetia, and South Ossetia and originally deployed in July 1992. Russian forces in South Ossetia were involved in the August 2008 conflict between Georgia and Russia. Following this engagement, Russia officially recognized South Ossetia as a sovereign state and negotiated its military presence in the country as

a bilateral defense arrangement, essentially removing any status as a multinational **peacekeeping** force. One of the challenges of reviewing Commonwealth of Independent States or Russian peacekeeping operations is the establishment of names for the missions. Non-Russian sources tend to have different names for the same mission partly due to translation variations. This operation is also known as the South Ossetia Joint Force. *See also* ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE MISSION TO GEORGIA; UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN GEORGIA (UNOMIG).

**SOUTH PACIFIC PEACEKEEPING FORCE (SPPKF).** Bougainville, part of Papua New Guinea (PNG), experienced political turmoil and an armed insurrection beginning in the late 1980s. Many islanders resented being part of PNG and preferred their own independent state. Another problem involved the attitudes of the islanders toward a large copper mine. Many believed that they should share more of the mine's profits and were concerned about the environmental and land damage caused by the mine's operation. The Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) emerged in 1988 and forced the mine to close. PNG removed its military forces from Bougainville in 1990 but returned them in 1991 and 1992. The BRA and PNG agreed to a cease-fire agreement on 8 September 1994 and to attend a Bougainville Peace Conference.

**Australia**, New Zealand, Tonga, Fiji, and Vanuatu offered to dispatch a **peacekeeping** force to provide security and ensure a neutral environment for the peace conference. The operation was mandated by an international treaty between the belligerents and contingent providers that also served as the mission's **status of force agreement**. The peacekeepers arrived in Bougainville on 3 October 1994. Talks between the belligerents failed to materialize after a BRA member was killed, and the PNG reportedly did not withdraw all of its forces from areas designated as neutral zones. A small splinter group of the BRA did meet with the government. The talks resulted in the establishment of the Bougainville Transitional Government. The peacekeepers departed by 22 October 1994. Additional discussions in 1997 would lead to the deployment of the **Bougainville Truce Monitoring Group**. The maximum authorized strength of SPPKF was approximately 400 military personnel. Fiji provided the



bulk of the force and dispatched 232 soldiers. The remaining peacekeepers came from Tonga (130) and Vanuatu (50). Australia and New Zealand provided logistical assistance and training. SPPKF was financed by the PNG government. *See also* SOLOMON ISLANDS.

**SOUTH WEST AFRICA.** *See* UNITED NATIONS TRANSITION ASSISTANCE GROUP (UNTAG).

**SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (SADC).** The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is a 15-member subregional international organization comprising states in southern Africa and the Indian Ocean and is sometimes dominated by **South Africa**. The primary purpose of the organization involves economic development, but SADC does have a defense protocol allowing the body to mandate **peacekeeping** operations. In 1998, members mandated the **Southern African Development Community Operation in Lesotho**.

**SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY ADVISORY TEAM.** *See* SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY OPERATION IN LESOTHO.

**SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY OPERATION IN LESOTHO.** A May 1998 disputed election led to protests in Lesotho. Related to ongoing demonstrations, junior military officers forced 15 senior officers to resign and flee to **South Africa** in September 1998. The **Southern African Development Community (SADC)**, with prodding from South Africa, mandated a military operation. Officially, the king of Lesotho requested the SADC intervention. South Africa dispatched 600 soldiers, later followed by 200 more (some sources say 300) from Botswana, to Lesotho. SADC forces officially entered Lesotho on 22 September 1998. South African reinforcements arrived later to join the mission. After securing the country, the SADC forces departed on 14 May 1999.

**SOVIET UNION.** *See* RUSSIA.

**SPECIAL ACCOUNT.** A special account is established as a way to financially support a **peacekeeping** operation. The term is primarily used by the **United Nations (UN)** in support of a **special assessment** on member states. *See also* SUSPENSE ACCOUNT.

**SPECIAL ASSESSMENT.** Special assessment is a method used to finance **peacekeeping** operations. With a special assessment, each member state of an international organization contributes a fixed amount to help cover the expenses of the operation. *See also* RESERVE FUND; SPECIAL ACCOUNT; SUSPENSE ACCOUNT.

**SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE TENTH MEETING OF CONSULTATION.** The Special Committee of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation was an **Organization of American States (OAS)** committee that consisted of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, and Panama. Its mission involved finding a solution to the political crisis that had erupted in the Dominican Republic in 1965. The OAS officially replaced a unilateral **U.S.** intervention in the state with a multinational mission known as the **Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF)**. The **United Nations (UN)** deployed a three-man mission, known as the **Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP)**, to monitor the IAPF and the cease-fire process. The Special Committee complained that the UN presence in the Dominican Republic interfered with efforts to bring peace to the island. The committee also requested that the Security Council withdraw DOMREP. The UN refused to abide by the committee's request and kept DOMREP in the Dominican Republic until the IAPF departure.

**SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.** The **United Nations (UN)** General Assembly established the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations on 18 February 1965, with Resolution 2006 (XIX). The mandate of the committee includes conducting a comprehensive review of all aspects of **peacekeeping**. The committee reports directly to the General Assembly through the **Fourth Committee** (Special Political and Decolonization

Committee) and consists of 100 member states, although the other UN members do participate in the work of the organization and sit in working groups as observers.

**SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE.** “Special representative” is a term applied to the individual selected to represent the secretary-general in negotiations for the fielding and continued operations of **peacekeeping** missions.

**SPINELLI, P. P.** Spinelli, an Italian, was the **special representative** assigned to the **United Nations Yemen Observation Mission**. Prior to this selection, he held the position as undersecretary and director of the European Office of the **United Nations (UN)**. Although the operation deployed in July 1963, Spinelli’s tour as special representative lasted from November 1963 to September 1964. In addition, he held the position of acting special representative for the **United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus** from January to February 1967.

**SREBRENICA.** Srebrenica was one of the **safe areas** established by the **United Nations (UN)** in **Bosnia and Herzegovina** on 16 April 1993. The UN assigned a 150-man Dutch contingent of the **United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina** to protect Bosnian Muslims in and around Srebrenica from Bosnian Serbs. The small Dutch detachment was overwhelmed by a 2,000-man Serb unit that overran the town in July 1995. Following the fall of Srebrenica, thousands of Muslim men and boys were massacred by the Serbs. The massacre at Srebrenica stands as one of the worst moments in UN **peacekeeping** history.

A comprehensive investigation in 1999 faulted many in the massacre. First, those responsible among the Serbs were identified for arrest and prosecution. The Dutch were faulted for not defending the safe area. Dutch requests for air support were denied on several occasions by United Nations Protection Force headquarters. The Dutch commander reported more than once to his superiors that his small force, with small arms, would not be able to halt a determined Serb advance with heavy weapons and armored vehicles. The UN failed to fully comprehend the Serb war aims. In other words, the Serbs did not have the intention of withdrawing from around the safe areas

simply because the UN declared them to be “safe.” A Dutch investigation of the incident was not completed until the spring of 2002. In response, the Dutch government resigned, but this was only a symbolic gesture since elections were already scheduled for the country.

**SRI LANKA.** *See* INDIA; SRI LANKA MONITORING MISSION (SLMM).

**SRI LANKA MONITORING MISSION (SLMM).** In 2002, the government of Sri Lanka signed a cease-fire with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE), a group who had been operating in the northern part of the country for many years. The agreement included provisions for the establishment of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), a small **peacekeeping** mission consisting of approximately 60 military observers from Norway, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and Iceland. The SLMM’s mandate included observation of the cease-fire and the freedom of movement of the population. The official establishment date of the mission is 22 February 2002.

Continued hostilities resulted in the LTTE being labeled a terrorist organization by the **European Union (EU)**. In turn, the LTTE ordered all military observers from EU countries to depart Sri Lanka. This move resulted in the departure of more than half of the SLMM observers, leaving only 20 personnel from Iceland and Norway to continue the mission. Despite the presence of the SLMM observers, the LTTE renewed the conflict, and the cease-fire completely collapsed. The remaining SLMM military observers departed Sri Lanka, and the mission terminated on 16 January 2008. SLMM’s annual cost was approximately \$7 million, and it should be noted that this operation was mandated by the 2002 cease-fire agreement and not a separate international organization. *See also* INDIA.

**STABILISATION FORCE (SFOR).** When the **Implementation Force (IFOR)** of the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)** completed its mission in **Bosnia and Herzegovina**, the members of the organization agreed to maintain a continued presence to oversee the peace process. The Stabilisation Force (SFOR) resulted from those meetings. NATO activated SFOR on 20 December 1996, the same date that IFOR’s mandate expired. While IFOR *implemented*

the peace, SFOR would *stabilize* the peace. The **United Nations (UN)** Security Council, with Resolution 1088 (1996), endorsed the establishment of SFOR under NATO leadership. SFOR's mission includes deterring or preventing a renewal of hostilities, promoting a climate for peace, and offering support to civilian humanitarian organizations. Non-NATO members, including **Russia**, were invited to join SFOR. As of March 2002, 17 non-NATO states had dispatched peacekeepers under the SFOR banner. Operational decisions were made by NATO's North Atlantic Council, with the participation of non-member countries that contributed troops to SFOR. The operation was fairly successful in meeting its mandated mission. SFOR provided a secure environment for local elections in 1997 and 2000 and national elections in October 1998. The NATO peacekeepers developed and maintained a close working relationship with the **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe** and the latter's operations in the area, as well as the **United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina**. SFOR also detained numerous individuals who have since been indicted for war crimes.

The initial maximum authorized strength of SFOR was 32,000 troops, but this was reduced as the situation warranted. As of March 2002, NATO and non-NATO members contributed approximately 18,000 troops for SFOR, with 17,500 troops located in Bosnia and Herzegovina and approximately 500 in **Croatia**. Another 2,000 soldiers could be found in National Support Elements. In January 2004, SFOR underwent a major reorganization that reduced the number of personnel to 7,000. SFOR was funded by NATO and the states contributing contingents to the operation. NATO officially passed responsibility for the **peacekeeping** mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina to the **European Union** on 2 December 2004, when the latter organization deployed the **European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina**.

**STABILITY OPERATIONS.** *See* PEACEKEEPING.

**STAND-BY FORCE.** This concept is an alternative to the efforts to build a **standing army** for the **United Nations (UN)**. A stand-by force would consist of military personnel and equipment earmarked for service with the UN or another international organization. The

personnel would remain based in their home states and would deploy for international service upon receiving authorization from their governments following a request from the UN. In 1993, **Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali** requested that the member states of the UN pledge military personnel and equipment for a stand-by force. He appointed **Colonel Gerard Gambiez of France** as his negotiator in this process. By April 1994, Gambiez reported that 15 states had pledged a total of 54,000 personnel for the stand-by force. The establishment of this type of force would reduce the time required by the UN to deploy a **peacekeeping** operation, since military units would be earmarked for international service with the global body. Boutros-Ghali has stated that the personnel of a stand-by force would only serve in “**traditional peacekeeping**” operations. The terms “stand-by force” and “standing army” are often mistakenly confused.

**STAND-BY FORCES HIGH-READINESS BRIGADE (SHIRBRIG).** Austria, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden (with the Czech Republic, Finland, and Ireland as observers) formed the Stand-By Forces High-Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) in 1997. The purpose of SHIRBRIG, also known as the Multinational Stand-By High-Readiness Brigade, is to pool military resources that are maintained at a high state of readiness to meet crisis situations. Planners could form a brigade-sized **rapid reaction force** from the contingents earmarked by the members for deployment by the **United Nations**. Each country retains command of its contingents and the option of whether to deploy them as part of SHIRBRIG when requested. Currently, SHIRBRIG consists of 16 member states and seven observer countries.

**STANDING ARMY.** This term is applied to the concept of assigning national military units directly to **United Nations (UN)** command. Although the units would remain based in their home countries, they would respond directly to the UN and could be deployed, in theory, without consultation of their respective national governments. Many countries, including the **United States**, have expressed grave reservations about this concept and have ensured that it has never been implemented. As an alternative, the UN has developed the plan to designate a **stand-by force** of military personnel and equipment that

would be earmarked for international service. The terms “standing army” and “stand-by force” are often confused.

**STATUS OF FORCE AGREEMENT.** This document is developed based upon close coordination between the mandating international organization and the **host state** of a **peacekeeping** operation. The agreement details specific privileges and responsibilities of the peacekeepers while in the territory of the **host state**. For example, the Status of Force Agreement examines such issues as legal jurisdiction over peacekeepers; freedom of movement; distinctive markings for peacekeepers and their vehicles; settlement of disputes or claims; evacuation of deceased peacekeepers; and the importation of supplies, weapons, and personal items for the peacekeepers. The **United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I)** was the first **United Nations** peacekeeping operation to use a Status of Force Agreement, and this document became the model for future missions mandated by the global body. Although many of the future peacekeeping operations in the Middle East did not have agreements due to political reasons, the UNEF I document became the unofficial standard for dealing with issues in these missions.

**SUDAN.** Conflict between the northern (predominantly Muslim) and the southern (predominantly Christian and animist) areas of Sudan has raged since 1955, as Sudan prepared for independence. Differences between the two areas range across the spectrum of culture and economics, with the latter becoming more important as oil fields opened in the south. The two sides agreed to a cease-fire in 1972 that lasted until 1983, when the introduction of Islamic law across the entire country helped reignite the conflict. Negotiations in 2002 led to a cease-fire and the introduction of the **International Monitoring Unit (Sudan)**, a civilian observation force mandated by the peace process. The **United Nations (UN)** mandated the **United Nations Advance Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS)** in June 2004 to assist the parties with the peace process following the signing of a power-sharing agreement in May 2004. The Sudanese government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLM/SPLA), representing the south, signed a comprehensive peace agreement in January 2005,

prompting the UN to mandate the **United Nations Mission in Sudan** on 24 March 2005.

Since the 1970s, Western Sudan, often known as the Darfur region, has experienced problems similar to those in southern Sudan. The conflict in Darfur intensified in 2003, following the advances in the peace process within southern Sudan. In many ways, the Darfur chaos involved black sedentary farmers at conflict with nomadic northerners of Arab descent backed by the government. The Janjaweed, an armed northern group of Darfur, joined the fighting against the southern ethnic groups of Darfur. The Janjaweed initiated vicious attacks against villages, forcing those not murdered to flee the area. The **United States** declared the attacks as acts of genocide but met resistance rather than political support from other countries. The **African Union (AU)** fielded the **African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS)**, and the **European Union (EU)** dispatched advisers and monitors, known as the **European Union Support to the African Union Mission in Darfur**, to assist AMIS. AU and EU monitors began arriving in May 2004 to support an April 2004 cease-fire; however, they accomplished little other than filing reports of Janjaweed attacks. Violence did lessen in early 2005, but the conflict continued despite the promise of progress. AU and UN discussions resulted in the mandating of a new operation, the **United Nations–African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur**, a hybrid mission of the two organizations. Refugees fled from Sudan into **Chad** and the **Central African Republic**, resulting in the EU deploying the **European Union Force Chad/Central African Republic** in January 2008, followed by the **United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad**.

**SUDAN VERIFICATION MISSION.** *See* INTERNATIONAL MONITORING UNIT (SUDAN).

**SUSPENSE ACCOUNT.** A suspense account is an account established to receive voluntary financial contributions from states to support a **peacekeeping** operation. Normally, a suspense account is set up in the attempt to cover a deficit resulting from the refusal of some states to contribute to a **special account** due to political or financial reasons.



**SWITZERLAND.** Switzerland maintained its fairly strict neutrality after World War II and refused to formally join the **United Nations (UN)** until 2002. As a UN observer state, Switzerland refused to offer troop contingents but did provide funding and nonlethal aid (medical and evacuation aircraft) to many UN **peacekeeping** operations. Even before admission to the UN as a full member, Switzerland began slowly increasing its participation in peacekeeping operations and has even assisted the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization** in the latter's **Kosovo Force**. As of 2010, Switzerland ranks 90th among members of the global body for manpower contributions to UN peacekeeping missions. *See also* GORGE, REMY; SAAR INTERNATIONAL FORCE; TEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE IN HEBRON II (TIPH II); UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA (UNMEE); UNITED NATIONS MISSION OF OBSERVERS IN PREVLAKA (UNMOP); UNITED NATIONS TRANSITION ASSISTANCE GROUP (UNTAG).

**SYMBOLIC ARAB SECURITY FORCE (ASF).** The **League of Arab States** mandated the Symbolic Arab Security Force (ASF), also known as the Token Arab Security Force, on 8 June 1976, at an extraordinary session in Cairo. The league's members were concerned about the Lebanese civil war, as well as the Syrian intervention in **Lebanon** on 1 June 1976. **Syria** cited the pretext of responding to an appeal for assistance from the Maronite Christian population of Qoubaiyat and Aandqet. The mandating resolution gave the ASF the authority to maintain security and stability in Lebanon. League members also envisioned it as a replacement for the Syrian forces in the country; however, the ASF would have Syrian participation. The league modified the mandate the next day and granted the **secretary-general** the responsibility for determining the size of the contingents.

The league organized the ASF along the lines of **United Nations (UN) peacekeeping** operations. Algeria, Libya, Saudi Arabia, **Sudan**, Syria, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization offered to provide contingents. After initial objection, league secretary-general Mahmoud Riad persuaded Lebanese president Salomon Frangieh to accept the international mission. Libya and Syria each deployed 500-man units to Beirut under the agreement on 21 June 1976. Over the

next few weeks, additional peacekeepers from Syria and Libya, as well as smaller units from Saudi Arabia and Sudan, arrived in Lebanon, raising the total strength of the force to 2,500 men by mid-July 1976. The presence of Libyan soldiers created controversy within the Lebanese government, but they remained until November, when Tripoli decided to remove them. The Syrian contingent included 600 men from the Palestine Liberation Army. Egyptian major-general Muhammad Ghoneim was selected to command the force.

The ASF established itself around the international airport, while Syrian forces not assigned to the league's operation were withdrawn from the city. The force was limited by its size and the refusal of Lebanese Christians to allow it to deploy to Christian areas of east Beirut. In addition, the Syrians refused to allow the ASF to replace all of its units in Lebanon and actually increased the number of its nonleague soldiers in Lebanon after the deployment of the peacekeepers. The Lebanese civil war intensified over the summer and into the early fall, as Syrian forces went on the offensive around Beirut in September and October. The ASF was not able to contain the hostilities due to its mandate and size. In response, Saudi Arabia called for a conference to discuss the crisis situation. The meeting, known as the **Riyadh Summit Conference**, proposed a strengthened **peacekeeping** operation and transformed the original ASF into the larger **Arab Deterrent Force**.

**SYRIA.** Syria has hosted five **peacekeeping** operations or organizations as a result of its conflicts with **Israel**. In 1948, Syria and several other Arab states attacked Israel after the latter's declaration of independence. Following the war and the establishment of the **Mixed Armistice Commissions**, the **United Nations (UN)** deployed observers of the **United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)** along Israel's borders. The 1973 Yom Kippur War resulted in the introduction of a UN peacekeeping operation known as the **United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)**. UNTSO established the **Observer Group Golan** and **Observer Detachment Damascus** to support UNDOF. Syria served as the major troop contributor to the **Symbolic Arab Security Force** and the **Arab Deterrent Force** fielded in **Lebanon** by the **League of Arab States**. *See also* AGREEMENT ON DISENGAGEMENT BETWEEN ISRAELI

AND SYRIAN FORCES; AREA OF LIMITATION (AOL); AREA OF SEPARATION (AOS).

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**TAJIKISTAN.** Tajikistan declared its independence from the Soviet Union on 9 September 1991. Economic and social instability, along with disagreements among clans and other regional groups, prevailed after independence. At the same time, tensions between Tajik secularists and Islamic fundamentalists increased. In May 1992, an antigovernment coalition managed to gain control of the government following two months of unrest within the state. A civil war ensued that resulted in a defeat of the coalition by the end of 1992 and forced them to take refuge in **Afghanistan**. In 1993, Tajikistan and **Russia** signed an agreement permitting Russian soldiers to deploy along the border with Afghanistan as the **Commonwealth of Independent States Collective Peacekeeping Force (Tajikistan)**. The **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe** mandated the **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Mission to Tajikistan** to assist the **United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan** in overseeing the peace process.

**TANGANYIKA.** *See* NIGERIA.

**TASHKENT AGREEMENT.** The Tashkent Agreement, signed by the prime minister of **India** and the president of **Pakistan** on 10 January 1966, in Tashkent in the former Soviet Union, called for the withdrawal of each belligerent to the positions held prior to the initiation of hostilities in 1965. The agreement, negotiated with the assistance of the **United Nations (UN)**, set the rules for the withdrawal and requested verification by representatives from the **United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)** and **United Nations India–Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM)**. The completion of the withdrawals in February 1966 allowed the UN to officially terminate the mission of UNIPOM the following month. At the same time, the strength of UNMOGIP was reduced from 103 to 45 peacekeepers.

**TASK FORCE 160.** Task Force 160 is the operational name for **United States** special operations forces sent to Somalia in an attempt to capture **Mohammed Farah Aidid**. The Task Force was carrying out **United Nations (UN)** orders to capture the Somali warlord following an ambush that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers assigned to the **United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNISOM II)**. Approximately 100 Rangers of Task Force 160 were pinned down for nine hours following a raid to capture several of Aidid's lieutenants at the Olympic Hotel in Mogadishu. The U.S. Rangers were embroiled in a firefight that left 15 Americans and approximately 400 Somalis dead. Some sources indicated Somali fatalities were as high as 1,000. Aidid's forces captured an U.S. helicopter pilot and already held a Nigerian peacekeeper. The event led to considerable debate in Washington, DC; persuaded President Bill Clinton to redefine U.S. goals in Somalia; and helped prompt many in the U.S. Congress to demand a reduced U.S. role in **Somalia**, if not a total withdrawal. *See also* UNIFIED TASK FORCE (UNITAF).

**TASK FORCE 212.** Task Force 212 is the operational name for the initial **United States** contribution to the **United Nations Protection Force**. The U.S. support included the 212th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital from which the task force name evolved. As U.S. participation grew to include the **United Nations Protection Force in Macedonia**, the name was changed to **Joint Task Force Provide Promise**.

**TASK FORCE FOX.** *See* OPERATION AMBER FOX.

**TASK FORCE HARVEST.** *See* OPERATION ESSENTIAL HARVEST.

**TEL EL-QADI INCIDENT.** The Tel el-Qadi Incident involved the **Armistice Demarcation Line (ADL)** between **Israel** and **Syria** in 1964. The Israelis decided to construct a track and parallel drainage ditch along the ADL and initiated a survey project prior to construction. The **United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)** had completed a partial survey of the ADL in 1963. When the Israelis moved beyond the line surveyed by UNTSO, the Syrians claimed they had encroached on Syrian territory and commenced

firing on the party. The resulting fire and counterfire resulted in considerable death and destruction on both sides before the issue was submitted to the **United Nations** Security Council, which stalemated over the issue. The incident served to show that UNTSO's mission accomplishment relied on the consent and cooperation of the two belligerents.

### **TEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE IN HEBRON I**

**(TIPH I).** Following the murder of 29 Palestinians by a citizen of **Israel** on 25 February 1994, the **United Nations (UN)** Security Council passed Resolution 904 condemning the attack and authorizing a neutral international presence in the Hebron area of the West Bank. Palestinian chairman Yasser Arafat demanded Israeli acceptance of the international observers as a condition for returning to the negotiating table. The Israelis and Palestinians signed an agreement on 31 March 1994, requesting Denmark, Italy, and Norway to provide observers for the mission to be known as the Temporary International Presence in Hebron I (TIPH I). The observers arrived in April 1994 but withdrew on 8 August 1994, following the inability of the belligerents to agree on a mandate extension. The interim Oslo peace agreement of 28 September 1995 called for a new international observer team often referred to as the **Temporary International Presence in Hebron II (TIPH II)**, which was established on 12 May 1996. Officially, the mission headquarters does not refer to itself as TIPH I and TIPH II but as a single operation with breaks in deployment. The division of TIPH into two separate entries in this book corresponds with the way many specialists view the organization and permits readers to better understand the absence of observers between 1994 and 1996. *See also* PALESTINE.

### **TEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE IN HEBRON**

**II (TIPH II).** The interim Oslo peace agreement of 28 September 1995 called for a new international observer team to replace the **Temporary International Presence in Hebron I (TIPH I)** after its August 1994 departure. A team returned to Hebron in 1996 and is often referred to as the Temporary International Presence in Hebron II (TIPH II) with an official establishment date of 12 May 1996. After the January 1997 withdrawal of Israeli forces from Hebron, the

parties signed the Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron on 21 January 1997. Some sources credit January 1997 rather than May 1996 as the beginning of TIPH II. Officially, the mission headquarters does not refer to itself as TIPH I and TIPH II but as a single operation with a break in deployment. The division of TIPH into two separate entries in this book corresponds with the way many specialists view the organization and permits readers to better understand the absence of observers for more than one year between 1994 and 1996.

Approximately 55 observers and staff are assigned to TIPH II. The operation costs an estimated \$2.3 million annually paid by the observer-contributing states of Norway, Denmark, **Switzerland**, Italy, Turkey, and Sweden. Although a provision exists for the observers to carry pistols, they are unarmed at the request of the Israelis and Palestinians. The team members are strictly observers and do not have any enforcement or police powers. TIPH II is led by Norway and organized into three divisions. The Operations Division coordinates the observer teams; the Staff Division provides legal advice, liaison functions, research, and public relations; and the Support Division oversees transportation, communications, and administrative and financial needs.

There have been several incidents involving TIPH II personnel. Two of the unarmed observers were murdered in 2002 by a Palestinian, and in February 2006, Palestinians attacked the TIPH II headquarters. Following this attack, the states providing the TIPH II observers withdrew their personnel. Observers returned in April 2006. An Israeli injured an observer with a stone in 2007. **Israel** and the Palestinians must approve the extension of the TIPH II mandate every six months. *See also* PALESTINE.

**TIMOR-LESTE.** In 1974, Portugal, the colonizer of East Timor, began preparations for the territory to determine its future status—an independent state or integration into **Indonesia**. Civil strife erupted between the opposing groups supporting the two options. The East Timorese are heavily Roman Catholic, and the Indonesians are predominantly Muslim. This cultural and religious difference helped fuel the conflict. In 1976, Indonesia unilaterally intervened with its military and annexed East Timor. The **United Nations (UN)** did

not recognize this action. Continued discussions between Indonesia and Portugal led to an agreement on 5 May 1999, to allow the UN to conduct a referendum to determine the will of the East Timorese people. The Security Council mandated the **United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET)** in June 1999 to assist the peace process; however, increased violence resulted in UNAMET not being able to fulfill its mission, followed by UN negotiations with Indonesia to deploy an international military operation, known as the **International Force in East Timor (INTERFET)**, to stabilize the situation. Further discussions among the UN, Indonesia, and Portugal resulted in the transfer of the territory to UN administration. The UN deployed the **United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor** to support its efforts. East Timor became an independent state on 20 May 2002, and the UN mandated the **United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET)** with a directive to provide assistance to the government during a transitional period. The UN replaced UNMISET with a political mission, the **United Nations Office in Timor-Leste**, in 2005. In 2006, soldiers in the newly independent country of Timor-Leste (formally East Timor) mutinied, resulting in the deployment of the **International Security Forces in Timor-Leste**. Later in 2006, the UN mandated and fielded the **United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste**.

**TOKEN ARAB SECURITY FORCE.** *See* SYMBOLIC ARAB SECURITY FORCE (ASF).

**TRADITIONAL PEACEKEEPING.** The U.S. Department of Defense adopted this term in the early 1990s for **peacekeeping** operations accepted by all parties in a conflict. The official Department of Defense definition of traditional peacekeeping is “Deployment of a UN, regional organization, or coalition presence in the field with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving UN, regional organization, or coalition military forces, and/or police and civilians. Noncombat military operations (exclusive of self-defense) that are undertaken by outside forces with the consent of all major belligerent parties, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce agreement in support of diplomatic efforts to reach a political settlement to the dispute.”

Traditional peacekeeping operations are **Chapter Six peacekeeping** and **Chapter Six-and-a-Half peacekeeping** missions where belligerents have granted their consent to the deployment. Department of the Army Field Manual 3-07 *Stability Operations and Support Operations* (October 2008) presents the U.S. Army's current guidance on stability operations, including peacekeeping. The term "traditional peacekeeping" has been phased out but is still useful, along with the term **aggravated peacekeeping**, for understanding the differences between missions undertaken with the consent of the belligerents and those with nominal consent of the belligerents. *See also* FIRST GENERATION PEACEKEEPING; SECOND GENERATION PEACEKEEPING.

**TREATY OF GUARANTEE.** Cyprus, **Great Britain**, Greece, and Turkey signed the Treaty of Guarantee on 16 August 1960. The treaty provided a measure of security for the Turkish and Greek Cypriots on the island. Great Britain played a role in the treaty, since it was the former colonial holder of Cyprus. The treaty pledged Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey to consult each other on joint action during periods of crisis on Cyprus; however, if joint action could not be agreed upon, the treaty allowed each to unilaterally act to restore the status quo. In addition, the treaty forbade a union of Cyprus with any other state, as well as partitioning the country along ethnic lines. The Turkish government used the Treaty of Guarantee as the legal basis for its invasion of Cyprus in 1974. The **United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus** currently observes the cease-fire line established following the Turkish invasion of Cyprus.

**TREATY OF JOINT DEFENSE AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION.** Members of the **League of Arab States** signed the Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation as a supplementary document to the Pact of the League. The treaty provides for the military cooperation of members if the territorial integrity, independence, or security of one state is threatened. The league has mandated its two **peacekeeping** missions based upon the provisions of this document. The treaty established a Permanent Military Commission and a Joint Defense Council to coordinate the military policies of member states. *See also* ARAB DETERRENT FORCE (ADF); ARAB LEAGUE



FORCE IN KUWAIT; SYMBOLIC ARAB SECURITY FORCE (ASF).

**TRIPARTITE MILITARY INTEGRATION COMMITTEE.** The Tripartite Military Integration Committee, chaired by a representative of the **United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG)**, had responsibility for developing an integrated Namibian national army following independence. The other members included **South Africa** and the South West Africa Peoples' Organization. Kenya, which supplied one of the three combat battalions to UNTAG, kept its soldiers in Namibia for three months after independence under a bilateral agreement with the new Namibian government to assist in the training and integration of the new Namibian national army.

**TRUCE COMMISSION.** The **United Nations** established the Truce Commission in April 1948, to oversee the cease-fire between **Israel** and its Arab neighbors. On 21 May 1948, the Truce Commission formally requested that the Security Council provide military observers to assist in the truce supervision. This request for observers developed into the formation of the **United Nations Truce Supervision Organization**.

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**UGANDA.** *See* UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION UGANDA–RWANDA (UNOMUR).

**UNIFIED AFRICAN ACTION.** On 7 December 1993, 11 members of the **Organization of African Unity (OAU)** held a mini summit in Cairo, **Egypt**. The group signed what is known as the Mechanism for the Prevention, Management, and Settlement of African Disputes. The meeting and resulting declaration is often referred to as **Unified African Action**. The document reexamines the issue of **peacekeeping** under the auspices of the OAU. The OAU had exhibited a reluctance to mandate peacekeeping operations following the failure of the **Organization of African Unity Peacekeeping Force in Chad II** in 1982. In the report, the organization accepted the responsibility for

funding peacemaking measures, including peacekeeping. *See also* AFRICAN UNION (AU).

**UNIFIED TASK FORCE (UNITAF).** The Unified Task Force (UNITAF), led by the **United States**, deployed to **Somalia** to assist the **United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I)** mission. The operation, mandated by **United Nations (UN)** Security Council Resolution 794 on 3 December 1992, was independent of the UNOSOM I units and consisted of approximately 37,000 personnel. More than 21,000 of these soldiers came from the United States. Contributing states, based upon the size of their contingents in descending order, included the United States, **France**, Italy, Morocco, Canada, Saudi Arabia, Belgium, Turkey, Botswana, **Egypt**, **Great Britain**, **Germany**, Kuwait, and New Zealand. Units assigned to UNITAF began arriving on 9 December 1992.

UNITAF's mission included the stabilization of the conflict in Somalia to allow humanitarian agencies to carry out their duties in the country, and the force's methods included seizing arms, securing strategic points, and escorting convoys. Following the ambush deaths of 24 Pakistani peacekeepers at the hands of followers of **Mohammed Farah Aidid**, U.S. forces assigned to UNITAF initiated a UN-backed hunt for the Somali leader. A firefight with Aidid's followers on 3 October 1993 resulted in the deaths of 18 U.S. soldiers. Somali deaths are estimated to have been in the hundreds. The series of firefights prompted the United States and other Western states to withdraw their forces in early 1994, as UNOSOM I was transformed into the **United Nations Operation in Somalia II**.

**UNITED KINGDOM.** *See* GREAT BRITAIN.

**UNITED NATIONS (UN).** The **United Nations (UN)** has mandated and fielded more multinational **peacekeeping** operations than any other international organization. During the **Cold War**, most international disputes were debated at the UN, despite the fact that the body prefers for them to be settled by regional or subregional organizations. Thus, nearly every peacekeeping operation mandated between 1948 and 1990 emerged from the UN. Regional and subregional organizations began to increase in political and economic

importance after the end of the Cold War. As a result, there has been a dramatic increase in peacekeeping missions mandated and fielded by these organizations. By 2003, more than half of newly mandated peacekeeping operations were emerging from regional and subregional international organizations rather than the UN, and this trend has continued through 2010.

The Security Council, consisting of **France, Great Britain, China, Russia,** and the **United States**, as well as 10 rotating members, is the body within the UN that officially mandates, extends the mandates, and terminates peacekeeping operations. There is a provision known as the **Uniting for Peace Resolution** that permits the mandating of a peacekeeping operation to be shifted to the General Assembly if the Security Council is deadlocked by a veto from one of the five permanent members. The General Assembly, consisting of each UN member, officially funds peacekeeping operations via a formula that allocates a percentage of the total cost to each member state based upon its economic status in the world.

In recent years, the UN has been under considerable criticism from such members as the United States for its management of peacekeeping operations. The body has conducted several studies, including the **Panel on United Nations Peace Operations** and the **Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda** to review its handling of peacekeeping missions and develop better methods for internal management and service in the field.

Despite an increase in regionally mandated peacekeeping operations since 2002, the UN is still the most active international organization in the deployment of these missions. There have been a number of interesting developments in UN peacekeeping since the second edition of this book. The **United Nations–African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)**, deployed in 2007, is the first official UN mission that is comandated with a regional international organization. In the past, the UN would mandate or at least present its support for regional operations to field peacekeeping operations; however, UNAMID is considered a joint mission of the UN and **African Union**. Following the U.S.-led military campaigns in **Afghanistan** and **Iraq**, the global body mandated multinational missions to assist with training the military and police units of both

states. The two operations are the **United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan**, fielded in 2002, and the **United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq**, originally deployed in 2004. The UN has also increased its deployment of political missions to support its efforts in areas facing potential strife or recovering from recent civil conflict. These tend to be small operations administered by the Department of Political Affairs rather than the **Department of Peacekeeping Operations**. The **United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau**, **United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone**, and **United Nations Mission in Nepal** are three examples. While some may argue that these are not peacekeeping missions, they do perform tasks assigned to previously fielded UN peacekeeping operations, including disarmament oversight and cease-fire compliance; they are mandated by the global body; and they are multinational in composition; however, the operations tend to consist of all civilian personnel or have very few military personnel who only serve as advisers or observers. *See also* DEPARTMENT OF FIELD SUPPORT (DFS); DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS (DPKO); OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR WEST AFRICA (UNOWA); OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COORDINATOR FOR LEBANON (UNSCOL); OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COORDINATOR FOR THE MIDDLE EAST (UNSCO); UNITED NATIONS ADVANCE MISSION IN CAMBODIA (UNAMIC); UNITED NATIONS ADVANCE MISSION IN SUDAN (UNAMIS); UNITED NATIONS–AFRICAN UNION HYBRID OPERATION IN DARFUR (UNAMID); UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION I (UNAVEM I); UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION II (UNAVEM II); UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION III (UNAVEM III); UNITED NATIONS AOUZOU STRIP OBSERVER GROUP (UNASOG); UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR IRAQ (UNAMI); UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN (UNAMA); UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA (UNAMIR); UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN SIERRA LEONE (UNAMSIL); UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR INDIA AND PAKISTAN

(UNCIP); UNITED NATIONS CONFIDENCE RESTORATION MISSION IN CROATIA (UNCRO); UNITED NATIONS DIS-ENGAGEMENT OBSERVER FORCE (UNDOF); UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE I (UNEF I); UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE II (UNEF II); UNITED NATIONS GOOD OFFICES IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN (UNGOMAP); UNITED NATIONS GUARDS CONTINGENT IN IRAQ; UNITED NATIONS INDIA–PAKISTAN OBSERVATION MISSION (UNI-POM); UNITED NATIONS INTEGRATED MISSION IN TIMOR-LESTE (UNMIT); UNITED NATIONS INTEGRATED OFFICE IN BURUNDI (BINUB); UNITED NATIONS INTEGRATED OFFICE IN SIERRA LEONE (UNIOSIL); UNITED NATIONS INTEGRATED PEACEBUILDING OFFICE IN GUINEA-BISSAU (UNIOGBIS); UNITED NATIONS INTEGRATED PEACEBUILDING OFFICE IN SIERRA LEONE (UNIPSIL); UNITED NATIONS INTERIM ADMINISTRATION MISSION IN KOSOVO (UNMIK); UNITED NATIONS INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON (UNIFIL); UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL POLICE TASK FORCE (IPTF); UNITED NATIONS IRAN–IRAQ MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP (UNIIMOG); UNITED NATIONS IRAQ–KUWAIT OBSERVATION MISSION (UNIKOM); UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN (UNMOGIP); UNITED NATIONS MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE; UNITED NATIONS MISSION FOR THE REFERENDUM IN WESTERN SAHARA (MINURSO); UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (UNMIBH); UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (MINURCA); UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC AND CHAD (MINURCAT); UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN CÔTE D'IVOIRE (MINUCI); UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN EAST TIMOR (UNAMET); UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA (UNMEE); UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN HAITI (UNMIH); UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN LIBERIA (UNMIL); UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN NEPAL (UNMIN); UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN SUDAN (UNMIS); UNITED NATIONS MISSION OF OBSERVERS IN PREVLAKA (UNMOP); UNITED NATIONS MISSION OF OBSERVERS IN TAJIKISTAN (UNMOT);

UNITED NATIONS MISSION OF SUPPORT IN EAST TIMOR (UNMISSET); UNITED NATIONS OBSERVATION GROUP IN LEBANON (UNOGIL); UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER GROUP FOR THE VERIFICATION OF THE ELECTIONS IN HAITI (ONUVEH); UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER GROUP IN CENTRAL AMERICA (ONUCA); UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN ANGOLA (MONUCA); UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN EL SALVADOR (ONUSAL); UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN GEORGIA (UNOMIG); UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN LIBERIA (UNOMIL); UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN SIERRA LEONE (UNOMSIL); UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION TO SOUTH AFRICA (UNOMSA); UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION UGANDA–RWANDA (UNOMUR); UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN BURUNDI (ONUB); UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN THE CONGO (ONUC); UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN CÔTE D’IVOIRE (UNOCI); UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN SOMALIA I (UNOSOM I); UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN SOMALIA II (UNOSOM II); UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION MISSION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (MONUC); UNITED NATIONS PEACEBUILDING SUPPORT OFFICE IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (BONUCA); UNITED NATIONS PEACE FORCES (UNPF); UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS (UNFICYP); UNITED NATIONS POLICE SUPPORT GROUP (UNPSG); UNITED NATIONS POLITICAL OFFICE FOR SOMALIA (UNPOS); UNITED NATIONS PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENT FORCE (UNPREDEP); UNITED NATIONS PROTECTED AREAS (UNPA); UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE (UNPROFOR); UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA; UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE IN MACEDONIA; UNITED NATIONS REGIONAL CENTRE FOR PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY FOR CENTRAL ASIA (UNRCCA); UNITED NATIONS SECURITY FORCE (UNSF); UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE BALKANS (UNSCOB); UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS; UNITED NATIONS STABILIZATION MISSION IN HAITI (MINUSTAH);

UNITED NATIONS SUPPORT MISSION IN HAITI (UNSMIH); UNITED NATIONS TEMPORARY EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY (UNTEA); UNITED NATIONS TRANSITION ASSISTANCE GROUP (UNTAG); UNITED NATIONS TRANSITION MISSION IN HAITI (UNTMIH); UNITED NATIONS TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION IN EASTERN SLAVONIA, BARANJA, AND WESTERN SIRMIMUM (UNTAES); UNITED NATIONS TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION IN EAST TIMOR (UNTAET); UNITED NATIONS TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY IN CAMBODIA (UNTAC); UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION (UNTSO); UNITED NATIONS VERIFICATION MISSION IN GUATAMALA (MINUGUA); UNITED NATIONS YEMEN OBSERVATION MISSION (UNYOM); UNITED NATIONS ZIMBABWE FORCE.

**UNITED NATIONS ADVANCE MISSION IN CAMBODIA (UNAMIC).** The **secretary-general** of the **United Nations (UN)** recommended, on 30 September 1991, the formation of the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) to assist the belligerents in the Cambodian conflict. The UN envisioned UNAMIC as a means to help maintain a cease-fire until the fielding of the **peace-keeping** mission that would be known as the **United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)**. The Security Council agreed and passed Resolution 717 on 17 October 1991. Later, the UN expanded UNAMIC's mission to include training the Cambodians in the clearance of mines. UNTAC absorbed UNAMIC on 15 March 1992 and covered the latter's costs within its own budget.

**UNITED NATIONS ADVANCE MISSION IN SUDAN (UNAMIS).** Representatives from northern and southern **Sudan** signed the Machakos Protocol in 2002, pledging them to negotiate a cease-fire and procedures for power sharing. The **International Monitoring Unit (Sudan)** deployed in April 2002 to assist in the peace process. The **United Nations** mandated the United Nations Advance Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS) in June 2004 to assist the parties with the peace process following the signing of a power-sharing agreement in May 2004. The **United Nations Mission in Sudan** replaced UNAMIS in 2005. *See also* AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN SUDAN (AMIS);

EUROPEAN UNION SUPPORT TO THE AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN DARFUR; UNITED NATIONS–AFRICAN UNION HYBRID OPERATION IN DARFUR (UNAMID).

**UNITED NATIONS–AFRICAN UNION HYBRID OPERATION IN DARFUR (UNAMID).** African Union (AU) and United Nations (UN) discussions resulted in the mandating of the United Nations–African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) under Security Council Resolution 1769 of 31 July 2007 for the Darfur region of **Sudan**. UNAMID is often described as a hybrid mission of the two organizations. The **African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS)** officially terminated on 31 December 2007, as UNAMID assumed its mission and absorbed its peacekeepers. UNAMID’s mandate includes protecting UN personnel and other humanitarian aid workers, supporting the Darfur peace agreement, protecting civilians, ensuring the flow of humanitarian assistance, promoting human rights and the rule of law, and monitoring the security situation along Sudan’s borders. In March 2010, UNAMID consisted of approximately 14,083 troops, 207 military observers, 4,280 police, and 3,700 international and local civilians.

The major contributors of personnel to UNAMID include Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, **China**, **Egypt**, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, **Indonesia**, Jordan, Nepal, **Nigeria**, **Pakistan**, Philippines, **Rwanda**, Senegal, **South Africa**, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. Nigeria and Rwanda provide nearly half of the troops deployed with UNAMID. The operation can clearly be seen as primarily manned by African states, at the insistence of Sudan, while under a UN mandate, funding, and logistical assistance. UNAMID has encountered numerous obstacles from the Sudanese government while attempting to fulfill its mandate. The annual budget of the operation is \$1.6 billion, and there have been 57 UNAMID fatalities as of March 2010.

**UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION I (UNAVEM I).** A costly military stalemate in **Angola** brought **South Africa** and Cuba to the negotiating table, overseen by the **United States** and the Soviet Union, by the end of the 1980s. South Africa withdrew its forces from Angola, and Cuba moved its forces away from the Namibian border. The diplomatic negotiations led to a



two-part peace process whereby Namibia would become independent of South African control and the Cuban army would withdraw from Angola, which would then conduct national elections. Despite some Angolan opposition, which slowed the process, an agreement was signed between Angola, Cuba, and South Africa in 1988, with the assistance of the **United Nations (UN)**, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Security Council Resolution 626 of 20 December 1988 established a **peacekeeping** operation known as the United Nations Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I).

The Security Council mandate called for the peacekeeping operation to verify the redeployment and eventual withdrawal of the Cuban military from Angola. The schedule required Cuba to withdraw 3,000 soldiers by 1 April 1989; 25,000 by 1 November 1989; 33,000 by 1 April 1990; 38,000 by 1 October 1990; and all 50,000 by 1 July 1990. UNAVEM I initially consisted of 70 unarmed peacekeepers from 10 states (Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Congo, Czechoslovakia, **India**, Jordan, Norway, Spain, and **Yugoslavia**). UNAVEM I also included 37 international and local civilian staff. There were no fatalities among UNAVEM I personnel between December 1988 and May 1991.

An advance party of 18 peacekeepers arrived in Angola on 3 January 1989, to verify the withdrawal of the first 450 Cuban soldiers. Following the arrival of the remaining 52 peacekeepers, the mission established its headquarters in Luanda and deployed to the ports of Cabinda, Lobito, Luanda, and Namibe, as well as the airport at Luanda. The peacekeepers also established two mobile teams that could be used to verify the redeployment of Cuban soldiers northward away from the Namibian border. Following each official completion of a redeployment phase, the UNAVEM I mobile teams verified the process. The Cubans completed their northward redeployments on schedule by 31 October 1989, and in response UNAVEM I closed its observation mission in Namibe and reduced its overall strength to 60 (withdrawing one soldier from each contingent-providing state). The Cubans withdrew ahead of schedule, permitting the UN to terminate UNAVEM I on 30 May 1991.

The total cost of the operation between December 1988 and May 1991 was \$16.4 million. The UN estimated the annual cost of UNAVEM I as approximately \$9 million for the first 12 months and \$9.8

million for the remaining 19 months (\$18.8 million for 31 months). Approximately \$1 million in savings materialized during the first year when the UN required the Angolan government to provide office and residence space for the operation headquarters in Luanda. Additional savings were realized due to the successful completion of the mission one month ahead of schedule. The cooperation extended by the Cuban and Angolan governments and military officials helped make UNAVEM I a successful mission, operating with relative ease despite strife and turmoil in the area since 1975. Following negotiations between the Angolan government and União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] for national elections, the UN developed a new mandate and transformed UNAVEM I into the **United Nations Angola Verification Mission II**.

**UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION II (UNAVEM II)**. The United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II) emerged after the successful completion of the **United Nations Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I)**. Following the completion of the Cuban military withdrawal from Angola in 1991, the belligerents in the civil war agreed to a cease-fire and national elections. **United Nations (UN)** Security Council Resolution 696 of 30 May 1991 extended the mission of UNAVEM I, which became known as UNAVEM II. The peace plan called for UNAVEM II to be in place by 30 June 1991 and complete its mission following national elections in November 1992. The first elements of UNAVEM II arrived on 2 June 1991. The UNAVEM II mandate stated that the operation should verify the arrangements made by the Angolan belligerents—the Angolan government and the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] (UNITA), led by Jonas Savimbi. UNAVEM II was also set to monitor the Angolan police during the cease-fire. The peacekeepers kept track of the number of personnel reporting to designated **assembly points (APs)**, oversaw the storage of surrendered weapons, and investigated cease-fire violations. UNAVEM II also assumed a mission to provide oversight during the Angolan election process. Observers in the operation deployed to Luanda, Huambo, Lubango, Saurimo, Luena, and Mavinga. Full-time

monitors were also deployed to 82 locations (23 assembly sites for UNITA, 27 assembly sites for government soldiers, and 32 critical points such as airports and ports) across Angola.

Logistical difficulties resulted in many government and UNITA soldiers deserting from APs. The cease-fire held despite many individual breaches. Savimbi refused to accept defeat in the 1992 elections and renewed the civil war. Newly elected president Jose Eduardo dos Santos of Angola requested that the UN increase the size of its **peacekeeping** mission and support his government, since it was UNITA that broke the cease-fire and refused to abide by the election results. **Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali** did not agree to the Angolan proposal and recommended that the Security Council reduce the size of the operation to a skeleton presence and move all personnel to the relative safety of Luanda since two-thirds of the APs were already abandoned due to fighting. UNAVEM II remained on the ground in its reduced strength as negotiations continued between the belligerents. The various parties signed the Lusaka Protocol on 31 October 1994. The protocol was a comprehensive peace agreement that included a provision for a continued presence of UN military observers in the state. The UN Security Council mandated the **United Nations Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III)** to replace UNAVEM II and oversee the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol. UNAVEM II officially ended its mission on 8 February 1995.

The maximum authorized strength of UNAVEM II consisted of 350 military observers, 126 police observers, and 96 international and local civilian staff. The operation's electoral monitoring division included a total of 400 observers. The strength of the operation decreased to 171 military observers, 122 civilian police, and an unlisted number of international and local civilians by the time the mission ended. There were five fatalities among UNAVEM II personnel between 1991 and 1995. Twenty-four countries provided the military and police observers assigned to UNAVEM II. All 10 of the contingent providers of UNAVEM I contributed observers to UNAVEM II. The mission cost approximately \$175.8 million between 1991 and 1995.

**UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION III (UNAVEM III).** The **United Nations (UN)** Security Council

mandated the United Nations Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III) with Resolution 976 of 8 February 1995 to replace the **United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II)** and oversee the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol. The mistrust between the Angolan government and the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] (UNITA) continued and prevented the fulfillment of the Lusaka Protocol's provisions. In October 1996, the UN warned both sides, but UNITA in particular, to end the delays. UNAVEM III prepared for a reduction in its strength and a withdrawal from Angola in light of the planned completion of its mandate. UNAVEM III officially withdrew on 30 June 1997. The Security Council voted to replace the operation with the **United Nations Observer Mission in Angola**. The maximum strength of UNAVEM III at the end of June 1997 was 3,649 soldiers, 283 military observers, and 288 civilian police. There were 32 fatalities among UNAVEM III personnel between February 1995 and June 1997. Thirty-one countries provided military personnel for UNAVEM III, and the operation cost the UN \$135 million annually.

**UNITED NATIONS AOZOUZ STRIP OBSERVER GROUP (UNASOG)**. After years of disputing the Aouzou Strip region, Libya and **Chad** submitted their claims to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The court ruled that the territory in dispute belonged to Chad. Libya needed to remove its military and administrative forces from the area. The **United Nations (UN)** Security Council mandated the United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group (UNASOG) on 4 May 1994 with Resolution 915. The mandate of the mission included witnessing the certification that Libyan personnel had withdrawn from the Aouzou Strip. UNASOG consisted of nine military observers and six international civilians detailed from the **United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara** and completed its task on 6 June 1994. The mission cost the UN \$64,471 from the regular budget rather than a **special assessment** on the members.

**UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR IRAQ (UNAMI)**. The **United Nations (UN)** Security Council mandated the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) on 8 June 2004

with Resolution 1546. UNAMI's mandate includes coordinating UN efforts to assist the government of **Iraq**, advising the National Electoral Commission of Iraq, counseling the national government in issues related to civil and social services, facilitating humanitarian aid, and promoting human rights and national reconciliation. There are approximately 237 personnel assigned to UNAMI, with Fiji providing 221 troops to support the mission. The other members of UNAMI are civilian specialists from seven countries. The operation serves as a UN political mission and is not directed by the UN's **Department of Peacekeeping Operations**. There have been 11 fatalities among UNAMI personnel as of March 2010. *See also* MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN IRAQ (MNF-I); NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION TRAINING MISSION IN IRAQ (NTM-I).

**UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN (UNAMA).** The **United Nations (UN)** mandated the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) on 28 March 2002, with Security Council Resolution 1401. UNAMA's mandated mission includes spearheading the UN's efforts to promote peace and security in **Afghanistan**, supporting efforts to guarantee the rule of law and good governance, strengthening cooperation with the **International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)**, facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid, assisting the electoral process, and encouraging regional cooperation for the development of a stable Afghanistan. UNAMA is a political mission manned by civilians but is under the direction of the UN's **Department of Peacekeeping Operations**. There are approximately 1,500 international civilian police and other specialists as well as locals assigned to the operation. Locals represent at least 80 percent of this total. There have been 16 fatalities among UNAMA personnel as of March 2010.

**UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA (UNAMIR).** The **United Nations (UN)** Security Council mandated the **United Nations Observer Mission Uganda–Rwanda (UNOMUR)** on 22 June 1993 to help stem the violence between the Hutu and Tutsi in **Rwanda**. UNOMUR observed the border between Uganda and Rwanda to prevent weapons from entering Rwanda. The Security Council voted on 5 October 1993 to deploy a second **peacekeeping**

operation, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UN-AMIR), consisting of 2,500 soldiers and 331 military observers to the country of Rwanda. The warring factions agreed to a cease-fire in August 1993, and the Security Council mandated UNAMIR with Resolution 872 on 5 October 1993. The peacekeeping operation was given the mission to retrain the Rwandan army, disarm irregular military units, assist in the return of refugees, add an element of protection in the capital, and help the state in election preparations. The UN added clearly defined timetables for the operation in an attempt to guarantee its prompt departure following the accomplishment of its duties.

The UN operation included observers from Belgium (the former colonial power), Bangladesh, Botswana, Brazil, Fiji, Ghana, Hungary, the Netherlands, Senegal, Slovakia, and Zimbabwe. UNAMIR replaced the **Neutral Military Observer Group II** deployed by the **Organization of African Unity** to oversee an earlier cease-fire. The peacekeepers began arriving on 10 December 1993 and established a demilitarized buffer zone approximately 100 miles long and 15 miles wide in northern Rwanda to separate the main rebel stronghold of Mulindi from the government-controlled south. The group also deployed observers to the airport at Kigali.

During the first week of April 1994, President Juvénal Habyarimana of Rwanda and President Cyprien Ntaryamira of **Burundi** died in a mysterious aircraft crash. Hutu extremists blamed the Tutsi, and organized violence soon erupted across the country as Hutus began murdering Tutsis and fellow Hutus who supported the peace process. Over the next three months, approximately 800,000 people died as Hutus sought the genocidal extermination of Tutsi men, women, and children. The Hutu utilized modern weapons as well as machetes and farm tools to kill Tutsi. At the same time, the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) launched a fresh offensive against the interim government of Rwanda. UNAMIR peacekeepers watched helplessly as the genocide erupted around them. The renewed ethnic fighting placed the operation in jeopardy when several Belgian peacekeepers were killed trying to prevent the murder of Rwandan prime minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana. Belgium unilaterally withdrew its contingent. The Belgians were followed by other contingent providers. Many peacekeepers attempted to fulfill their mandate,

but the belligerents were not willing to compromise or adhere to a cease-fire.

On 21 April 1994, the Security Council voted to reduce the size of UNAMIR from 2,548 to 270 and essentially left the Rwandans to themselves. UNAMIR became one of the most controversial UN peacekeeping missions in history. Many debated who and what was to blame for the failure to prevent the genocide. Two significant reviews investigated the events surrounding the massacre and UNAMIR's mandate. In 1999, the UN released the final report of the **Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda**, and in 2000, the OAU released the results of the **International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events**.

On 17 May 1994, the Security Council enlarged UNAMIR to 5,500 troops with Resolution 918; however, it took six months for member states to contribute contingents. Countries, remembering the experience of Belgium, did not want to send soldiers into an unstable area where they could become casualties. In the interim, the Security Council backed a French-led multinational mission to secure refugee camps in southwestern Rwanda. In July 1994, the RPF seized control of the capital and the government of Rwanda. UNAMIR departed on 8 March 1996.

The maximum authorized strength of UNAMIR before the massacre was 2,548 soldiers, 331 military observers, and 60 civilian police. The maximum authorized strength after May 1994 was 5,500 soldiers and 90 civilian police. The strength at withdrawal was 1,200 troops, 200 military observers, and international and local civilian staff. There were 27 fatalities among UNAMIR personnel between October 1993 and March 1996. UNAMIR cost the UN \$453.9 million. *See also* FRANCE.

**UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN SIERRA LEONE (UNAMSIL).** The United Nations (UN) Security Council mandated the **United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL)** to assist the **Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group in Sierra Leone** with the disarming of combatants and restructuring the military of **Sierra Leone**. Follow-

ing the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement, there was a need for a greater UN presence in Sierra Leone. Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) forces were preparing to depart the country, and a continued international military force was required to assist in the country's transition. The Security Council mandated the United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) on 22 October 1999, with Resolution 1270. UNAMSIL absorbed the mission and personnel of UNOMSIL. UNAMSIL's mandate included assisting in the disarmament and demobilization process, ensuring freedom of movement of UN personnel, monitoring the cease-fire, facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and providing support for elections. The mandate was modified on 7 February 2000, with Resolution 1289. New tasks included providing security at key locations and government buildings, facilitating the free flow of people, providing security at disarmament and demobilization sites, assisting the civilian police force, and guarding weapons and ammunition collected at disarmament sites.

After the arrival of UNAMSIL, some of the peacekeepers were taken hostage by Revolutionary United Front (RUF) fighters. In some areas, UNAMSIL personnel were left alone, but their equipment was seized by RUF. UNAMSIL declared that their **rules of engagement** did not permit the **peacekeeping** force to launch an offensive or series of raids to rescue the peacekeepers being held by RUF. **Great Britain**, the former colonizer of Sierra Leone, dispatched a small military force to the country in response to the RUF actions. London declared that its soldiers were not part of UNAMSIL and operated outside of the peacekeeping mandate. They quickly brought the situation under control and forced the release of the peacekeepers being held hostage.

The original mandate of October 1999 authorized UNAMSIL to have 6,000 military personnel. The maximum authorized strength stood at more than 17,000 peacekeepers, 87 civilian police, and 874 international and local civilian staff. Thirty-one countries, including the rare appearance of **China** in peacekeeping at this time, contributed military personnel to UNAMSIL. UNAMSIL completed its mission on 31 December 2005, suffering 192 fatalities in Sierra Leone between October 1999 and December 2005, making this one of the most costly UN peacekeeping operations in terms of human



life. UNAMSIL operated with an annual budget of approximately \$543.49 million at its peak and cost the UN a total of \$2.8 billion between 1999 and 2005.

**UNITED NATIONS CIVILIAN POLICE (UNCIVPOL).** *See* UNITED NATIONS TRANSITION ASSISTANCE GROUP (UNTAG).

**UNITED NATIONS CIVILIAN POLICE MISSION IN HAITI (MIPONUH).** The **United Nations (UN)** Security Council mandated the United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH) with Resolution 1141 on 28 November 1997 as a follow-on to the **United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH)**. MIPONUH's mission included the training and supervision of specialized Haitian police units. MIPONUH completed its mandate and departed Haiti in March 2000 and was replaced by the **International Civilian Support Mission in Haiti**, a joint operation of the UN and the **Organization of American States**.

The maximum authorized strength of MIPONUH was 300 policemen and approximately 225 other international and local civilian personnel. Eleven states contributed personnel to this mission, and there were no fatalities between 1997 and 2000. MIPONUH was financed by **special Assessment** and bilateral donor contributions. The total operation cost approximately \$20.4 million. *See also* MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN HAITI; UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN HAITI (UNMIH); UNITED NATIONS SUPPORT MISSION IN HAITI (UNSMIH).

**UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR INDIA AND PAKISTAN (UNCIP).** The **United Nations (UN)** established the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) on 20 January 1948, through Security Council Resolution 39 (1948). UNCIP, composed of representatives of Czechoslovakia, Argentina, and the **United States**, represented the global body in the attempt to resolve the crisis between **India** and **Pakistan**. The commission recommended that the **secretary-general** select and dispatch a military adviser, General Maurice Delvoie of Belgium, to the area. This military position evolved over time to become the commander of the future

**United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP).** The UN extended the membership of the commission to include Columbia and Belgium.

UNCIP negotiated a cease-fire between India and Pakistan in their conflict over Jammu and Kashmir and offered neutral military observers to oversee the process. These neutral observers eventually formed the core of UNMOGIP. The tasks of the observers included accompanying Indian and Pakistani military officials during the investigation of cease-fire violations and gathering their own information on such incidents. They were ordered to remain as neutral as possible in all discussions and investigations. UNCIP officials were instrumental in the negotiation of the Karachi Agreement, which officially established the cease-fire line between the two belligerents. The commission's mission was completed following the successful implementation of the Karachi Agreement, and the group returned to New York to write its final report. UNMOGIP remained on the subcontinent to provide a continuing observation of the cease-fire.

**UNITED NATIONS CONFIDENCE RESTORATION MISSION IN CROATIA (UNCRO).** The **United Nations (UN)** Security Council mandated the United Nations Confidence Restoration Mission in Croatia (UNCRO) on 31 March 1995, with Resolution 981. UNCRO's mission involved replacing the **United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)** personnel fielded in **Croatia**. UNCRO peacekeepers were deployed in the Serb-dominated regions of Western Slavonia, Krajina, and Eastern Slavonia, and the operation was intended as a temporary measure to establish the conditions required for the reintegration of these areas with Croatia. Croatia reintegrated Western Slavonia and Krajina by force during the summer of 1995. UNCRO continued its mission in Eastern Slavonia while negotiations continued in that region. On 12 November 1995, an agreement provided for the peaceful integration of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium into the country of Croatia. The UN Security Council established the **United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium** on 15 January 1996, to replace UNCRO. UNCRO consisted of 6,775 military personnel and 296 civilian police, along with international and local staff. There were 16 fatalities among UNCRO personnel

between March 1995 and January 1996. The mission's expenditures were included in UNPROFOR's totals.

**UNITED NATIONS DISENGAGEMENT OBSERVER FORCE (UNDOF).** In October 1973, Syrian forces attacked Israeli military units located on the Golan Heights. **Israel** had originally seized the Golan Heights from **Syria** during the 1967 Six-Day War. The attack, in cooperation with Egyptian forces crossing the Suez Canal, penetrated the Israeli lines but quickly turned into a reversal of fortune, as Israel counterattacked. Tensions remained high following a cease-fire partially arranged with the assistance of the **United Nations (UN)**. Peacekeepers assigned to the **United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)** moved to the cease-fire area and established observation posts. In May 1974, U.S. secretary of state **Henry A. Kissinger** persuaded the two belligerents to sign an Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces. The protocol to this agreement called for the deployment of a neutral **peacekeeping** operation to oversee the cease-fire. This document, later endorsed by the UN in Security Council Resolution 350 of 31 May 1974, established what has become known as the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF). The resolution called on UNDOF to supervise the cease-fire and redeployment of military forces as well as establish a neutral buffer zone between the belligerents.

Peacekeepers assigned to the **United Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF II)** in the Sinai formed the core of UNDOF. The UN transferred two battalions, one from Peru and one from Austria, from UNEF II to UNDOF. These peacekeepers joined the personnel from UNTSO who had already been on the ground for six months. The Canadian and Polish units assigned to UNEF II detached elements to provide logistical support to UNDOF. The Canadian detachment operated on the Israeli side of the cease-fire line, while the Polish detachment was located on the Syrian side. The peacekeeping mission patrols from within the buffer zone, which is known as the **Area of Separation**. Both sides extending from the neutral zone are known as the **Area of Limitation**, since Israel and Syria are required to limit the size of forces and types of weapons located in the region. The UNDOF peacekeepers established a military unit known as the Rapid Reaction Group to counter any potential violations of the cease-fire

neutral zone. The UNDOF peacekeepers maintain observation posts and mobile patrols in the Area of Separation, while the personnel officially assigned to UNTSO verify the number of forces and weapons systems located in the two Areas of Limitation.

The original maximum total strength of UNDOF was set at 1,250. Many states have contributed contingents to UNDOF for various lengths of service. Peru removed its battalion in 1975 and was replaced by Iran. Following the Iranian revolution in 1979, that state withdrew its personnel from UNDOF. Finland offered a battalion to replace the departing Iranian peacekeepers. As of March 2010, there are 1,050 troops, 39 international civilians, 105 local civilians, and 79 **Observer Group Golan** military observers of UNTSO assigned to UNDOF. Seven countries contribute military personnel to UNDOF, including Austria, Canada, **Croatia, India, Japan**, the Philippines, and Poland. Austria and Poland provide battalion-sized infantry units, while Croatia maintains a company for UNDOF duty. The other countries provide logistical support personnel. There have been 43 fatalities between May 1974 and March 2010. Financing UNDOF is through a unique arrangement. UNDOF's funds were provided from the appropriations collected for UNEF II. This arrangement resulted from a decision documented in General Assembly Resolution 301 (XXVII) of 1973. When UNEF II completed its mission in 1979, the account, rather than being closed, remained in place to continue channeling funds to UNDOF. UNDOF costs approximately \$45 million annually.

**UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE I (UNEF I).** Relations between **Israel** and **Egypt**, rocky since 1949, quickly collapsed when Gamal Abdel Nasser assumed power in the latter state during 1954. Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, prompting resentment of **Great Britain** and **France**, and supported the raids of guerrillas into Israel. Great Britain, France, and Israel coordinated a joint attack on Egypt in 1956, with the former two states declaring their intentions of “protecting” the Suez Canal during an Israeli–Egyptian conflict. The **United Nations (UN)** Security Council met to review the crisis in October 1956; however, the vetoes held by Great Britain and France prevented the Security Council from acting on the issue. The body moved discussion to the General Assembly under the **Uniting for**

**Peace Resolution.** The General Assembly, meeting in its first emergency session, called for a cease-fire, the withdrawal of all forces to the 1949 armistice lines, and the reopening of the Suez Canal. Canada abstained during the vote and objected to the resolution due to the lack of enforcement procedures. **Lester B. Pearson** of Canada proposed the establishment of a neutral military force that could oversee the cease-fire and withdrawal of military units. The new resolution [Resolution 998(ES-I)] asked **Secretary-General** Trygve Lie to develop Pearson's plan into a workable scenario, prompting all four of the belligerents to abstain during the vote. The secretary-general's reply resulted in the now famous Resolution 1000(ES-I), which officially mandated what became known as the United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I) and provided the operation with its mission.

Resolution 1001(ES-I) outlined the functions of the operation. The global body utilized the peacekeepers assigned to the **United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)** as the initial core of the new operation. Former UNTSO personnel were also utilized by UNEF I as liaison detachments headquartered in Cairo, Egypt, Tel Aviv, Israel, Beirut, **Lebanon**, and Pisa, Italy. The latter unit assisted in the logistical coordination of the mission. The chief of staff of UNTSO, **E. L. M. Burns**, was named as the first **force commander** of UNEF I. The secretary-general established an **Advisory Committee** to assist in the development of this new concept of **peacekeeping**. Earlier peacekeeping operations were observer missions; however, UNEF I can be seen as the first true **interposition force** fielded by either the League of Nations or UN.

Egypt agreed to accept the peacekeeping operation on its territory but wanted clarification of the rights and privileges of the personnel assigned to the mission. The resulting meetings produced what is known as a **status of force agreement** between the Egyptian government and the UN. The secretary-general sought contingents of battalion size to fill the ranks of UNEF I. His criteria included that each contingent must be acceptable to all parties involved in the conflict, neutral in the conflict, and represent a geographical balance of forces. Great Britain and France were denied their requests to participate in the contingent selection process. **Afghanistan**, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Finland,

**India, Indonesia, Iran, Laos, Myanmar, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, Romania, Sri Lanka, Sweden, and Yugoslavia** volunteered contingents on their own initiative. The secretary-general opted to select contingents from Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, India, Indonesia, Norway, Sweden, and Yugoslavia.

The secretary-general decided to exclude any Middle Eastern states that chose to volunteer peacekeepers. Egypt rejected the participation of Pakistan due to the latter's recent critical remarks about the Egyptian government. Egypt also initially rejected the inclusion of Canada, Norway, and Denmark, since they are viewed as pro-Western members of the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization**; however, the Egyptian government relented and the Canadians deployed from the staging area in Naples, Italy. Opposition to the other two states was later dropped when Finland and Sweden refused to participate unless Norway and Denmark also contributed forces to UNEF I. Israel originally objected to countries that did not recognize it as a state. Indonesia withdrew its forces in September 1957, Finland in December 1957, and Colombia in October 1958. The other contingents remained until the operation was ordered out of Egypt in 1967. The maximum authorized strength of UNEF I was 6,073 military personnel, accompanied by an international and civilian staff.

British and French forces departed the area by the end of 1956. Withdrawal of Israeli forces took longer and was conducted in stages across the Sinai. Israel evacuated the Sinai and Gaza Strip by March 1957. UNEF I moved into the Gaza Strip along the 1949 armistice line and took up positions as an interposition force on the Egyptian side of the frontier since Israel refused to allow the peacekeepers on its side of the border. A UNEF I detachment remained in the town of **Sharm el-Sheikh** to ensure Israeli passage through the Strait of Tiran. UNEF I operated static observation posts along the armistice line during the day and shifted to roving patrols at night. Peacekeepers from the force assisted in the establishment of the **United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC)**, **United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM)**, and **United Nations Temporary Executive Authority**. In fact, UNYOM was almost entirely constructed from the personnel and equipment assigned to UNEF I.

The peacekeeping operation remained at its positions until June 1967, when President Gamel Abdul Nasser ordered UNEF I to depart following increased tensions between Egypt and Israel. The Six-Day War erupted upon the departure of the peacekeepers who had not completed their total withdrawal from the area. Fifteen UNEF I peacekeepers died in the Gaza Strip fighting as they awaited removal from the area. A total of 107 UNEF I personnel died between November 1956 and June 1967.

Financing of the operation was handled through **special assessment**. This was the first time that the UN established a special assessment, outside of the regular budget, to fund a peacekeeping operation. Each contingent provider would cover the costs of equipment and normal salaries of its personnel. The UN would cover such special costs as transportation and logistics within the host state. General Assembly Resolution 1089(XI) modified this proposal to state that a country's payment of peacekeeper salaries was voluntary. If requested, the UN would provide the salaries of peacekeepers assigned to UNEF I. The Soviet Union refused to contribute to the special assessment. This action, along with opposition to finance the UNTSO and the ONUC, led to the **Article 19 Crisis**. UNEF I's annual budget equaled one-third of the total UN annual regular budget. The total cost of UNEF I was \$214.25 million. Many of the contingent providing states absorbed some of their personal costs in the operation and, thus, reduced the overall cost of force to the UN. *See also* BLUE HELMETS; GOOD FAITH AGREEMENT.

**UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE II (UNEF II)**. Following a period of increased tensions, **Egypt** and **Syria** launched a coordinated surprise attack on **Israel** in October 1973. Egyptian forces crossed the Suez Canal and, in doing so, overran observation posts manned by the **United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)**. An Israeli counterattack in the Sinai trapped two Egyptian armies on the east bank of the Suez Canal and led to the establishment of an Israeli bridgehead on the west side of the waterway. The threat of Soviet military intervention led to the issue being considered by the **United Nations (UN)** Security Council on 24 October 1973. The next day, the Security Council passed Resolution 340 of 25 October 1973, which called for an immediate cease-fire to the conflict;

asked **Secretary-General** Kurt Waldheim to increase the number of UNTSO peacekeepers in the area of hostilities; and established a United Nations Emergency Force patterned on the operation fielded in 1956, the **United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I)**. The United Nations Emergency Force II's (UNEF II) mandate included supervising the cease-fire between the Egyptians and Israelis. After 1975, the mandate was modified to allow UNEF II to oversee the re-deployment of Egyptian and Israeli military forces and man the neutral buffer zone between the two states as Israel returned territory in the Sinai to Egypt. UNEF II personnel also coordinated and provided drivers, in cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross, for the movement of humanitarian supplies to the Egyptian forces trapped on the east side of the Suez Canal.

The secretary-general arranged for the movement of military forces from Austria, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden from the **United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus** to Egypt. The early deployers dispatched their personnel directly to the front lines between the Egyptians and Israelis. These peacekeepers, along with personnel assigned to UNTSO, became the initial core of what became known as the UNEF II. The chief of staff of the UNTSO, Major-General **Ensio P. H. Siilasvuo**, was selected as the interim **force commander** of the new operation.

The UN estimated it needed approximately 7,000 soldiers for UNEF II and selected Ghana, **Indonesia**, Nepal, Panama, Peru, Canada, and Senegal to join the previously mentioned states. The Soviet Union objected to the inclusion of Canada, since the latter was a member of the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization** and demanded inclusion of a Warsaw Pact country. In the compromise, Poland joined the mission and provided logistical support, along with Canada. Several states withdrew their contingents between 1974 and 1979 as others arrived to join the operation. The Irish contingent is a good example. Ireland withdrew its battalion from UNEF II to provide home security following a series of terrorist bombings around Dublin. The Austrian and Peruvian elements transferred from UNEF II and became the core of the **United Nations Disengagement Observer Force** in June 1974. The UN did not develop a **status of force agreement** for UNEF II but instead utilized the document developed for UNEF I.



Following a disengagement agreement in January 1974, UNEF II supervised the staged withdrawal of Israeli forces. UNEF II personnel manned the moving buffer zone between the belligerents, while UNTSO peacekeepers were responsible for surveying and demarcating the buffer zones. Continued negotiations between Egypt and Israel led to more withdrawals eastward across the Sinai. An Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty, negotiated by the **United States**, was signed in March 1979. This agreement called for the continued observation of the border area by a **peacekeeping** operation. Although the signatories desired that UNEF II continue this function, opposition arose from the Palestinian Liberation Organization, the Soviet Union, and many Arab states. The UN chose to allow the mandate of UNEF II to lapse on 24 July 1979, forcing the United States to enact an annex to the treaty, which called upon Washington, DC, to organize a new peacekeeping operation if UNEF II departed the area. The resulting mission is known as the **Multinational Force and Observers**. UNEF II personnel quickly left the Sinai following the lapse of their mandate, while those peacekeepers assigned to UNTSO remained to continue their mission. The maximum strength of UNEF II was 6,973 military personnel, supported by international and local civilian staff. There were 55 fatalities among the UNEF II personnel between October 1973 and July 1979, and the force cost the UN a total of \$446.5 million.

**UNITED NATIONS FORCE IN THE CONGO.** *See* UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN THE CONGO (ONUC).

**UNITED NATIONS GOOD OFFICES IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN (UNGOMAP).** The Soviet Union intervened in **Afghanistan** on 27 December 1979. The **United Nations (UN)** Security Council, deadlocked due to the veto of the Soviet Union, could not pass a resolution on the Soviet intervention. The General Assembly, using the **Uniting for Peace Resolution** of 1950, called for the withdrawal of all “foreign” forces from Afghanistan. Eight years of negotiations culminated in the signing of the Agreements on the Settlement of the Situation Relating to Afghanistan on 14 April 1988. The agreements included four provisions, including the repatriation of refugees and a timetable for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from

Afghanistan. The UN offered to field a **peacekeeping** mission to oversee the agreements.

The mission, known as the United Nations Good Offices in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP), was mandated by Security Council Resolution 622 on 31 October 1988. The mandate authorized UNGOMAP to ensure that Afghanistan and **Pakistan** did not interfere across their common border, oversee the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, and monitor the voluntary repatriation of refugees. UNGOMAP operated from headquarters facilities in Islamabad and Kabul. Fifty peacekeepers were detached from existing UN operations, including the **United Nations Truce Supervision Organization**, **United Nations Disengagement Observer Force**, and **United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon** and reassigned to UNGOMAP. The transferred personnel represented Austria, Canada, Denmark, Fiji, Finland, Ghana, Ireland, Nepal, Poland, and Sweden. The initial element of UNGOMAP arrived on 25 April 1988. UNGOMAP set up three observation posts on the Afghan side of the border with the Soviet Union to observe compliance with the withdrawal timetables. These posts were located at Hayratan, Torghundi, and the air base at Shindand.

Withdrawal of the Soviet military proceeded smoothly and was completed in February 1989. UNGOMAP logged numerous complaints from Afghanistan and Pakistan against each other. To assist in the investigation of border incidents (including the smuggling of weapons), UNGOMAP established posts on the Pakistani side of the border at Peshawar, Quetta, Torkham, Teri Mangal, and Chaman. Following the refusal of signatories of the agreements to extend the mandate of UNGOMAP, the UN officially ended the operation on 15 March 1990; however, 10 peacekeepers, one from each contributing country, remained in the area to serve as military advisers to the **special representative** of the **secretary-general**. UNGOMAP's maximum authorized strength was 50 military observers, supported by international and local civilians. There were no UNGOMAP fatalities between May 1988 and March 1990. The total cost of UNGOMAP was \$14 million. The UN financed UNGOMAP via its regular budget. **Japan** provided additional voluntary contributions for the operation.

**UNITED NATIONS GUARDS CONTINGENT IN IRAQ (UNGCI).** The **United Nations (UN)** established the United Nations Guards Contingent in Iraq (UNGCI) to replace allied soldiers who were protecting the Kurds in northern **Iraq** following the **Persian Gulf War** in 1991. This unit was assigned to provide limited security for the operations of the UN suboffices and Humanitarian Centers program to coordinate the administration of aid to the Kurds. The mandate dictated that the total strength of the UNGCI could not exceed 500 soldiers, with no more than 150 assigned to any one particular region under UN protection. The guards in the UNGCI were authorized to carry small arms that were to be provided by the Iraqi government. The first 10 guards arrived on 19 May 1991, and the rest were on the ground by July 1991. The main headquarters was established in Baghdad. The mission of the unit included the protection of the individuals providing humanitarian relief to the Kurds, as well as UN property and buildings. Funding of the operation rested on appeals made by the United Nations Disaster Relief Organization and the International Committee of the Red Cross. The UNGCI eventually consisted of soldiers from 35 different countries. The UN terminated UNGCI on 21 November 2003, when it withdrew all personnel and suspended programs due to security concerns.

**UNITED NATIONS INDIA–PAKISTAN OBSERVATION MISSION (UNIPOM).** An outbreak of hostilities between **India** and **Pakistan** in 1965 prompted the **United Nations (UN)** to mandate the United Nations India–Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM). The Security Council developed this operation to supplement the **United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)**, which held the responsibility of overseeing a cease-fire in Kashmir since 1949. Rather than providing UNMOGIP with a new mandate to cover the Indian–Pakistani border south of Kashmir, the UN opted to establish a separate temporary **peacekeeping** mission. The Security Council mandated the mission with Security Council Resolution 211 of 20 September 1965. The peacekeepers, the core of who were detailed from UNMOGIP and the **United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)**, began arriving on 23 September 1965.

The mission of UNIPOM included the supervision of the cease-fire outside of the Kashmir region, as well as the oversight of the withdrawal of the belligerents to the prewar frontier. UNIPOM's maximum authorized strength was 96 military observers. The states that provided detached observers from UNTSO and UNMOGIP included **Australia**, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden. The observers specifically assigned to UNIPOM began arriving at the end of September 1965 and eventually included representatives from Brazil, Canada, Ethiopia, Ireland, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, **Nigeria**, and Venezuela. In October 1965, the force reached its maximum strength. Following the successful implementation of the **Tashkent Agreement**, the UN terminated the mandate of UNIPOM on 22 March 1966. The peacekeeping mission was funded by the UN regular budget and cost the organization \$1.7 million.

**UNITED NATIONS INTEGRATED MISSION IN TIMOR-LESTE (UNMIT).** The **International Security Forces in Timor-Leste** deployed to the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste in May 2006, following an uprising of national soldiers from a western enclave of **Timor-Leste** complaining of discrimination compared to troops from the main region of the country. The **United Nations (UN)** Security Council mandated the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timore-Leste (UNMIT) on 25 August 2006, with Resolution 1704 to support the peace process in the country. UNMIT's mandated mission includes assisting the national police, promoting human rights, cooperating with other UN agencies, promoting good governance, and supporting the democratic process in the country. UNMIT works closely with International Security Forces, which provides security for the UN operation. In March 2010, UNMIT consisted of approximately 1,517 police officers, 36 military liaison officers; and 1,400 international and local civilians. Major contributors of personnel to UNMIT include Bangladesh, Malaysia, Nepal, **Pakistan**, the Philippines, and Portugal. There have been seven fatalities among UNMIT personnel as of March 2010, and the annual budget is \$205.94 million. *See also* INDONESIA.

**UNITED NATIONS INTEGRATED OFFICE IN BURUNDI (BINUB).** By late 2006, the peace process in **Burundi** had progressed to the point that the **United Nations (UN)** planned to withdraw the **United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB)** and replace it with a political presence to continue assisting Burundi. The United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) is a political mission rather than a **peacekeeping** force but is administered by the UN's **Department of Peacekeeping Operations**. The UN mandated BINUB on 25 October 2006, with Security Council Resolution 1719, and it officially replaced ONUB on 31 December 2006. The mandate calls for BINUB to provide political oversight of the disarmament and demobilization process, promote human rights and the rule of law, support peace consolidation, and coordinate with other UN agencies. In early 2010, BINUB consisted of 10 police officers and seven international civilians. There have not been any fatalities among BINUB personnel as of March 2010.

**UNITED NATIONS INTEGRATED OFFICE IN SIERRA LEONE (UNIOSIL).** The **United Nations (UN)** Security Council mandated the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) on 31 August 2005, with Resolution 1620, to support the peace process in **Sierra Leone**. UNIOSIL officially commenced operations on 31 December 2005, with the termination of the **United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone**. UNIOSIL's mandate included coordinating UN activities in Sierra Leone, working with the local government to assist in good governance and the rule of law, helping develop an action plan for human rights, cooperating with the **International Military Assistance Training Team**, developing measures for the protection of women and children, and serving as a liaison to the local security sector. The operation served as a UN political mission but was directed by the UN's **Department of Peacekeeping Operations**. The UN terminated UNIOSIL on 30 September 2008 and replaced it with the **United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone**. There were four fatalities among UNIOSIL personnel during the operation.

**UNITED NATIONS INTEGRATED PEACEBUILDING OFFICE IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (BINUCA).** The United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central

African Republic (BINUCA) is directed by the Department of Political Affairs of the **United Nations (UN)** and is not technically a **peacekeeping** operation. The UN mandated the office on 1 January 2010, to coordinate the organization's efforts to promote political stability in the **Central African Republic**. The office replaced the **United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic**. BINUCA is manned by 25 international and 54 local civilians, five military advisers, six police officers, and two UN volunteers.

**UNITED NATIONS INTEGRATED PEACEBUILDING OFFICE IN GUINEA-BISSAU (UNIOGBIS)**. The United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) is directed by the Department of Political Affairs of the **United Nations (UN)** and is not technically a **peacekeeping** operation. The UN mandated the office on 1 January 2010, to coordinate the organization's efforts to promote political stability in Guinea-Bissau. UNIOGBIS is manned by 11 international and 13 local civilians as well as one military adviser.

**UNITED NATIONS INTEGRATED PEACEBUILDING OFFICE IN SIERRA LEONE (UNIPSIL)**. The **United Nations (UN)** Security Council mandated the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) on 4 August 2008, with Resolution 1829, to continue the organization's support of the peace process in **Sierra Leone**. UNIPSIL officially commenced operations on 30 September 2008, with the termination of the **United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone**. UNIPSIL's mandate includes coordinating UN activities in Sierra Leone, providing political support to all levels of government, promoting human rights, consolidating good governance reforms, supporting decentralization of government, and encouraging government efforts to counter international crime and the transshipment of illegal drugs. The operation serves as a UN political mission and is not technically a **peacekeeping** operation. UNIPSIL is manned by 29 international and 30 local civilians. There has been one fatality among UNIPSIL personnel as of March 2010. *See also* UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN SIERRA LEONE (UNAMSIL).

**UNITED NATIONS INTERIM ADMINISTRATION MISSION IN KOSOVO (UNMIK).** The **United Nations (UN)** Security Council, with Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999, endorsed the **Kosovo Force (KFOR)** and mandated the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). One of KFOR's missions is to provide security for UNMIK. UNMIK's mandate includes performing basic civil administration functions, promoting the establishment of autonomy and self-government in **Kosovo**, coordinating humanitarian and disaster relief, maintaining civil law and order, promoting human rights, and assuring the safe return of refugees. In March 2004, UNMIK police arrested 270 locals following a period of rioting and ethnic violence directed at Serbs, during which at least 22 people died and hundreds were injured. Following Kosovo's declaration of independence in February 2008, the UN began discussing the eventual closing of UNMIK. In early 2010, UNMIK consisted of approximately 510 civilian personnel, as well as eight police officers and nine military liaison officers. There have been 54 UNMIK fatalities between June 1999 and March 2010. The annual budget is approximately \$210.7 million.

**UNITED NATIONS INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON (UNIFIL).** **Lebanon**, a state with a diverse population divided along cultural and religious grounds, erupted into civil war in 1975. Despite an official end of the hostilities the following year and the dispatch of the **Arab Deterrent Force**, the turmoil endured, especially in southern Lebanon, where Christian and Muslim militia continued to battle each other. The Israelis invaded Lebanon in March 1978 in retaliation for a Palestinian Liberation Organization attack on civilians near Tel Aviv, **Israel**. Israeli forces quickly occupied all of Lebanon south of the **Litani River**, except for the city of Tyre. The Lebanese government protested the Israeli invasion at the **United Nations (UN)**, prompting an U.S.-led Security Council Resolution 425 of 19 March 1978, calling for the withdrawal of the Israeli forces and the establishment of a United Nations Interim Force to replace them. The Security Council proposed that the new **peacekeeping** operation would verify the withdrawal of the Israeli military, restore international peace and security in the region, and assist the Lebanese government in its attempts to assert governmental authority over the area.

The Security Council officially named the operation the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). The name offered an explicit declaration that the Security Council considered this operation to be a temporary mission to assist the Lebanese government. Peacekeepers assigned to the **United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)** were asked to assist UNIFIL while carrying out the mission of monitoring the **Armistice Declaration Line** between Israel and Lebanon. UNTSO also provided the initial core of peacekeepers until the arrival of soldiers who would be permanently assigned to the new mission. A company of Iranian peacekeepers assigned to the **United Nations Disengagement Observation Force (UNDOF)** and a company of Swedish soldiers from the **United Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF II)** were dispatched, with the approval of their home governments. Guidelines developed for the operation mirrored those written for UNEF II and UNDOF. **Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim** asked Major-General **Emmanuel A. Erskine**, the chief of staff of UNTSO, to serve as the first **force commander**. Erskine became the first African force commander of a UN peacekeeping operation outside of the African continent.

The UNIFIL composition of forces has changed frequently since 1978. For example, **France**, Iran, Nepal, Norway, and Sweden deployed units to Lebanon in support of UNIFIL. These units were joined by contingents from Fiji, Ireland, Nepal, **Nigeria**, and Senegal by the end of May 1978. Additional contingents included Finland (November 1982), Ghana (September 1979), Italy (July 1979), and the Netherlands (February 1979). Sweden removed its temporarily deployed infantry company during May 1978, and Iran did the same in March 1979. A Canadian logistics unit, detached from UNEF II, returned to its original assignment by October 1978. States that removed their contingents from UNIFIL include the Netherlands (October 1985), Nigeria (February 1983), Senegal (November 1984), and Ireland (November 2001). It is interesting to note that Nepal withdrew its peacekeepers in May 1980 and then returned them to Lebanon from June 1981 to November 1982 in response to the removal of the contingent from Senegal. The Nepalese combat units returned again in early 1985. The dispatch of troops from Finland covered the gap left by the departure of Nepalese troops in 1982. France, while always maintaining some type of presence in UNIFIL,



removed its infantry battalion in March 1979 and then redeployed it from May 1982 to December 1986. At the same time, Ghana and Ireland increased the size of their infantry battalions. The Irish withdrew their battalion from UNIFIL at the end of 2001, as the UN prepared to make substantial cuts in UNIFIL's strength due to the withdrawal of Israeli soldiers in May and June 2000.

UNIFIL remained quiet and at a strength of 2,000 personnel until July 2006, when Hezbollah forces and Israel clashed in southern Lebanon. Fighting in July and August 2006 resulted in the deaths of five UNIFIL peacekeepers. The UN Security Council passed Resolution 1701 of 11 August 2006, authorizing UNIFIL to add an additional 13,000 peacekeepers. Member states reinforced UNIFIL with unusual speed compared to responses to other crises. Resolution 1701 mandated UNIFIL to monitor the cease-fire, accompany Lebanon's national army as it deployed into the south of the country, assist with ensuring access to humanitarian aid, and aid Lebanon in securing its borders. As of March 2010, UNIFIL consisted of approximately 12,133 troops, 335 international civilians, 664 local staff, and 50 military observers from **Observer Group Lebanon**. UNIFIL has a Maritime Task Force that patrols the Lebanese coast. Personnel assigned to UNIFIL have suffered more fatalities than any other UN operation. Between March 1978 and March 2010, 283 personnel have died while serving with UNIFIL. The annual budget of UNIFIL is \$589.8 million. In earlier years, many members refused to fund the special account established for UNIFIL. In response, the secretary-general established a special **suspense account** to allow states, other international organizations, and private sources to make voluntary contributions to UNIFIL. *See also* KASMIYAH BRIDGE.

**UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL POLICE TASK FORCE (IPTF).** The **United Nations (UN)** mandated the United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF) in 1996 and attached it to the **United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH)**. IPTF's mission included the implementation of reforms in the state police force and oversight of the police officers throughout the country. The organization consisted of approximately 1,500 officers, and its funding came from the UNMIBH budget. On 1 January 2003,

the **European Union Police Mission** replaced IPTF. There were six fatalities among IPTF personnel between 1996 and 2002.

**UNITED NATIONS IRAN–IRAQ MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP (UNIIMOG).** A conflict between Iran and **Iraq** erupted in 1980. Attempts by the **United Nations (UN)** to broker a peace plan failed for several years. In 1984, the belligerents agreed to allow a limited UN presence in their states. In June 1984, two teams of military observers arrived in the capitals of the states to oversee compliance with a call to cease launching attacks on population centers. The teams, each consisting of three officers, were detached from the **United Nations Truce Supervision Organization**. These teams would later become the core of a more traditional **peacekeeping** operation. Iran and Iraq agreed to accept a cease-fire during July 1988. In turn, the UN Security Council approved the fielding of the United Nations Iran–Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) as a means of monitoring the cease-fire in the Iran–Iraq war. The mandate, Resolution 619, was approved on 9 August 1988. The peacekeepers were also given the mission of investigating alleged violations of the cease-fire, restoring the situation when a violation occurred, preventing changes in the status quo prior to the withdrawal of all forces to internationally recognized boundaries, supervising and verifying the withdrawal to these boundaries, and overseeing exchanges of prisoners.

The UN maintained a headquarters in the capital of each country and deployed peacekeepers to each side of the cease-fire line. Except for limited liaison meetings, UNIIMOG peacekeepers were not allowed to cross the cease-fire line. The advance parties of UNIIMOG personnel arrived on 19 August 1988, joining the teams of military observers that were in the capitals since 1984. The **chief military observer** and his staff spent alternate weeks in Baghdad and Tehran, where the UN maintained headquarters led by assistant chief military observers. Sector headquarters in Iran were located in Saqqez, Bakhtaran, Dexful, and Ahwaz. In Iraq, the UN sector headquarters were in Sulaymaniyah, Baqubah, and Basra. During the **Persian Gulf War**, all but three of the UNIIMOG personnel headquartered in Baghdad were moved to Iran. Mobile patrols were conducted by vehicle, by aircraft, by boat, by foot with pack mules, and even by skis.

The peacekeeping mission encountered many difficulties on the Iranian side of the border due to Tehran's distrust of foreign military personnel. For example, the Canadian communications unit was flown from Turkey to Iran on Soviet aircraft because of Iran's refusal to allow U.S. military aircraft to enter the country. The Iranians also placed many restrictions on the movement of peacekeeping personnel. On the other hand, the personnel assigned to the Iraqi side of the cease-fire line exercised greater freedom of movement. By the end of 1990, the cease-fire line developed into a one-kilometer neutral zone. Following successful negotiations between Iran and Iraq, UNIIMOG was withdrawn in February 1991. UNIIMOG's maximum strength was 400 military observers, as well as international and local civilian staff. The number of peacekeepers decreased during the mission due to operational constraints and Iraq's willingness to solve its problems with Iran in the wake of the Persian Gulf War. UNIIMOG suffered one fatality between 1988 and 1991. The operation cost the global body approximately \$177.9 million.

**UNITED NATIONS IRAQ–KUWAIT OBSERVATION MISSION (UNIKOM).** The **United Nations (UN)** deployed the United Nations Iraq–Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) to the Iraqi–Kuwaiti border following the conclusion of the **Persian Gulf War** in 1991. Security Council Resolution 689 of 9 April 1991 mandated UNIKOM to monitor the Khor Abdullah Waterway and a **demilitarized zone** extending along the border between **Iraq** and Kuwait, use its presence to deter violations of the demilitarized zone, and observe any hostile or potentially hostile acts mounted from the territory of either state. The demilitarized zone extended from the border to a depth of 10 kilometers into Iraq and five kilometers into Kuwait. The two states, not the UN, were responsible for humanitarian relief and law and order within their respective sides of the zone. The demilitarized zone was divided into three sectors within which could be found a headquarters location and six observation posts. Mobile foot and helicopter patrols (provided by Chile) were also carried out within the demilitarized zone.

The Security Council envisioned the operation consisting of approximately 1,440 personnel. The maximum authorized strength as of July 2002 was 1,103 military personnel (905 soldiers and 198

military observers) and 222 international and local civilians. The UN initially deployed five infantry companies to establish the demilitarized zone in April 1991. Fiji, Ghana, and Nepal each provided a company from their contingents assigned to the **United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)**, while an Austrian company and a Danish company arrived from the **United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus**. A Swedish logistics company joined the operation from UNIFIL. All six companies returned to their original assignments when the UNIKOM peacekeepers arrived. The five permanent members of the Security Council (**China, France, Russia, Great Britain, and the United States**) each provided 20 military observers to the operation. After the initial deployment, the UN opted to replace the unarmed observers with 750 armed peacekeepers in response to Iraqi incursions along the border with Kuwait. A total of 32 states contributed personnel to UNIKOM. On 17 March 2003, the UN withdrew UNIKOM from the border region due to the impending American Coalition attack on Iraq. The UN officially terminated UNIKOM on 30 September 2003. Eighteen UNIKOM personnel were killed while serving with the operation. UNIKOM was funded by a **special assessment**, but Kuwait paid two-thirds of the costs beginning in 1993. The operation cost the UN approximately \$600 million between 1991 and 2003.

**UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN (UNMOGIP)**. The **United Nations (UN)** established the **United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP)** as a means to assist in the peaceful negotiation of the conflict between **India** and **Pakistan** over Kashmir. Neutral military observers assigned to UNCIP eventually formed the nucleus of the newly deployed United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). The Security Council mandated UNMOGIP in Resolution 47 of 21 April 1948. Following the successful implementation of the **Karachi Agreement** on a cease-fire in the Kashmir region, UNCIP departed the area; however, the Security Council, in Resolution 91 of 30 March 1951, chose to retain UNMOGIP on the subcontinent as a tool in the continued oversight of the cease-fire between India and Pakistan. UNMOGIP headquarters alternates between Srinagar in Indian-controlled Kashmir (from May

through November) and Rawalpindi, Pakistan, (from November through May) to ensure the neutrality of the mission.

An outbreak of hostilities in 1965 between India and Pakistan taxed the resources of UNMOGIP, leading to the reinforcement of the unit by additional peacekeepers. As the war spread to areas outside of Kashmir, the UN opted to establish a new **peacekeeping** operation rather than assign UNMOGIP observers outside of Kashmir, which would have demanded a new mandate for the operation. The name given to this new mission was the **United Nations India–Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM)**. UNMOGIP's commander, **Lieutenant-General Robert H. Nimmo**, held the position of UNIPOM interim commander until the arrival of Major-General B. F. MacDonald of Canada in October 1965. In 1966, the **Tashkent Agreement** between India and Pakistan implemented a successful withdrawal of the belligerents to the prewar frontiers. UNMOGIP observed the withdrawal in the Kashmir region, while UNIPOM accomplished the same task along the border south of Kashmir. Following the completion of the withdrawal, the UN terminated UNIPOM and left UNMOGIP in place to continue its mission of overseeing the cease-fire in Kashmir.

In 1971, hostilities were renewed as the Indian military attacked Pakistani positions in the area that would later become independent Bangladesh. The conflict spread to Kashmir until the implementation of a cease-fire. Following the war, India and Pakistan agreed to minor changes in the cease-fire line and established what has become known as the **Line of Control** between the two belligerents. While Pakistan continues to use UNMOGIP observers, India has not reported cease-fire violations to the peacekeepers since 1972, citing its view that the Karachi Agreement has lapsed. The Indians still allow peacekeepers to operate along the eastern side of the Line of Control but restrict their movement. The UN is of the opinion that only the world body can terminate UNMOGIP; therefore, the peacekeeping operation is still in place in Kashmir.

The number of peacekeepers assigned to the operation fluctuates depending upon the needs of the **chief military observer**. The maximum strength stood at 102 observers following an outbreak of hostilities in 1965. UNMOGIP's strength stands at approximately 44 military observers, 26 international civilians, and 48 local staff.

The original contingents in UNMOGIP came from Belgium, Canada, Mexico, Norway, and the **United States**. Mexico withdrew its peacekeepers during the same year of their arrival, the Canadians departed in 1979, the Norwegians left in 1952 (but returned in 1957), and the United States removed its observers in 1954. India demanded the departure of the U.S. military observers following the extension of military aid from Washington, DC, to Pakistan. Thus, in the eyes of India, the United States had lost its neutrality in the conflict and should not participate in the UN operation to oversee the cease-fire in Kashmir. UNMOGIP has suffered 11 fatalities between 1947 and March 2010. UNMOGIP, originally funded by the regular budget of the UN, like the **United Nations Truce Supervision Organization**, costs approximately \$16.96 million annually.

**UNITED NATIONS MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE.** The United Nations Military Staff Committee, established in 1946 in accordance with Article 47 of the **United Nations (UN)** Charter, assists and advises the Security Council in military planning. The work of the committee includes advisement on **peacekeeping** operations. The group officially consists of the chiefs of staff of the five permanent members of the Security Council (**France, Great Britain, China, Russia,** and the **United States**), although subordinate officers actually attend the sessions. The committee was relatively ineffective due to tensions during the **Cold War**. Its future role has yet to be fully determined.

**UNITED NATIONS MISSION FOR THE REFERENDUM IN WESTERN SAHARA (MINURSO).** The Western Sahara, previously known as the Spanish Sahara, is located between Morocco and Mauritania in Northwestern Africa. Spain held the region as a colony between 1884 and 1976. Spain, Morocco, and Mauritania secretly agreed to partition the area between the latter two states, which had militarily occupied the Western Sahara after the official withdrawal of Spain. The Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Rio de Oro (POLISARIO), a political and military group organized in 1973 to resist Spain, attempted to prevent the occupation of the area by Morocco and Mauritania but were defeated by superior arms and air power. The POLISARIO and other Saharan refugees

withdrew to Algeria, where they proclaimed the formation of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic and initiated a guerrilla war against Morocco and Mauritania. Forces of the POLISARIO concentrated their efforts on Mauritania and compelled that state to relinquish its claims to the Western Sahara in 1979 following a three-year war of attrition. Morocco annexed the region of the Western Sahara previously held by Mauritania, increased the size of its armed forces in the region, and began construction of a sand wall teeming with electronic detection devices.

Morocco scored military successes while the POLISARIO dominated the political victories in the conflict over the Western Sahara. By 1988, the two parties began direct negotiations on the issue of the Western Sahara, which prompted Pérez de Cuéllar, the **secretary-general** of the **United Nations (UN)**, to offer his assistance with a referendum that would be supervised by a **peacekeeping** mission consisting of military observers and civilian election monitors.

The Security Council officially authorized the mission on 29 April 1991, with Resolution 690. The UN developed the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) to oversee a referendum slated to determine the fate of the Western Sahara. The organization originally envisioned the need to spend \$260 million for an estimated 36-week operation; however, the UN was already \$200 million behind in the collection of funding from member states for peacekeeping during a period when even more missions were being fielded in Kuwait, northern **Iraq**, and the former **Yugoslavia**. The budget for the operation in the Western Sahara was slashed to a total of \$177 million as a result of these difficulties.

Moroccan referendum-delaying tactics prevented the full deployment of the operation to the Western Sahara. King Hassan of Morocco allowed a maximum of 200 personnel from the peacekeeping operation to deploy to the region in late 1991. By early 1992, he agreed to permit the entry of the communications, air, and medical units. As of 1993, there were only 228 military observers with MINURSO due to the delay in the referendum. The UN personnel established 10 field sites, five on each side of the Moroccan sand wall. Moroccan soldiers have hampered UN patrols from these sites due to the failure to negotiate a **status of forces agreement** between the host state (officially Morocco) and the international organiza-

tion. The POLISARIO have been cooperative with the UN personnel since they see the referendum as being their best chance for securing their aims. The identification of individuals in the area to determine eligibility for voting has proven to be difficult but was declared complete by 2000. Discussions continue on the appeals process for voter identification, the repatriation of refugees, and other issues in the peace plan.

MINURSO consists of 20 troops, six police officers, 216 military observers, 99 international civilians, 156 local staff, and 19 UN volunteers. Twenty-nine states provide troops for MINURSO, while three countries contribute civilian police to the mission. There have been 15 fatalities between 1991 and March 2010. MINURSO costs approximately \$53.5 million annually.

**UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (UNMIBH).** The **United Nations (UN)** Security Council, with Resolution 1035, mandated the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) on 21 December 1995, to support the **Implementation Force (IFOR)** of the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization**. UNMIBH deployed to **Bosnia and Herzegovina** with IFOR. UNMIBH's mandate included monitoring law enforcement activities, advising and training law enforcement personnel, coordinating humanitarian relief, organizing demining operations, monitoring human rights, overseeing and advising on the election process, and assisting with the rehabilitation of the infrastructure. The **United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF)** was part of UNMIBH. UNMIBH worked closely with IFOR and its successor, the **Stabilisation Force**. The mission, a relatively unseen **peacekeeping** operation in terms of public knowledge, made international headlines on 1 July 2002, when the **United States** vetoed the extension of its mandate in response to the rejection of the **International Criminal Court (ICC)** to exempt U.S. soldiers on peacekeeping duty from potential prosecution. The United States believed that U.S. soldiers could be wrongfully prosecuted on political grounds. A compromise emerged on 12 July 2002, allowing for the extension of UNMIBH's mandate.

The maximum authorized strength of UNMIBH was 2,057 civilian police officers and five military liaison officers. The actual



strength as of July 2002 was approximately 1,550 police officers, three military liaison officers, and 1,800 international and local civilians. Forty-three countries contributed civilian police officers for UNMIBH, and the military liaison observers came from Denmark, Poland, and **Russia**. Eleven members of UNMIBH died between December 1995 and December 2002, and the mission cost approximately \$145 million annually. It should be noted that the **United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka** drew its funding from the UNMIBH budget and was, thus, also affected by the ICC controversy. The **European Union Police Mission** replaced the UNMIBH and IPTF on 1 January 2003.

**UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (MINURCA).** The **United Nations (UN)** recognized the inability of the African states in the **Inter-African Force in the Central African Republic** to continue the operation in the **Central African Republic** following the pending withdrawal of troops and logistical support from **France**. In response, the Security Council passed Resolution 1159 on 27 March 1998, mandating the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA). The global organization fielded MINURCA in April 1998. MINURCA's mandate called for the mission to assist in maintaining security and stability in and around the capital of Bangui, support the national army in preserving law and order, supervise the disarmament process, assist in the short-term police trainer's program, and provide advice and support in the planned legislative elections. In July, the Security Council passed a resolution adding a mission to conduct limited-duration reconnaissance patrols outside of the capital.

MINURCA successfully helped oversee the election process in the country and was phased out by the end of June 2000. The **peacekeeping** operation was replaced by the **United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic**. The maximum authorized strength of MINURCA reached 1,350 troops and military support personnel, 24 civilian police officers, and up to approximately 250 civilian staff. Fourteen states (11 from Africa) contributed military personnel to MINURCA, and there were two fatalities between 1998 and 2000. MINURCA cost the UN approximately \$101.3 million.

**UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC AND CHAD (MINURCAT).** The continuing instability in the Darfur region of **Sudan** generated nearly 300,000 refugees who fled to **Chad** and the **Central African Republic (CAR)**. Another 180,000 Chadians were internally displaced due to the civil war in their own country. Civilians suffered from crossborder attacks, prompting the **United Nations (UN)** to seek the means to secure the refugee and internally displaced person camps within Chad and the CAR. The UN officially mandated a temporary operation to provide security along the borders of Sudan with Chad and the CAR in Security Council Resolution 1778 of 25 September 2007. The **European Union (EU)** assumed responsibility for this mission and began deploying the **European Union Force Chad/Central African Republic (EUFOR TCHAD/RCA)** in January 2008.

The UN and EU envisioned EUFOR TCHAD/RCA as a type of bridging operation until the global organization could field its own force. The UN officially mandated its operation, the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), in the resolution of 25 September 2007 but approved its deployment on 14 January 2009 with Security Council Resolution 1861. MINURCAT officially assumed the EUFOR TCHAD/RCA's mandate on 9 March 2009, terminating the latter operation. MINURCAT's mandate includes a liaison mission with the governments of Chad, the CAR, and Sudan, as well as with the **United Nations–African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur**, **United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic**, **Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in Central Africa**, and **Community of Sahel-Saharan States**. The operation also trains and advises local security forces; monitors and promotes human rights; facilitates the delivery of humanitarian aid; protects civilians, UN personnel, and equipment; and supports the peace process.

In early 2010, MINURCAT consisted of approximately 2,961 troops, 23 military observers, 256 police officers, and 900 international and local civilians at an annual cost of \$690.75 million. The major contributors of personnel include Austria, **France**, Ghana, Ireland, Mongolia, Nepal, Norway, Poland, **Russia**, and Togo. There have been four fatalities of MINURCAT personnel as of March 2010.

**UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN COTE D'IVOIRE (MINUCI).**

The **United Nations (UN)** mandated the deployment of a political mission under Security Council Resolution 1479 of 13 May 2003, to support the efforts of the **Economic Community of West African States Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (ECOMICI)**. The mandate of the small operation in **Côte d'Ivoire** included monitoring the military situation; maintaining an official liaison with **Operation Licorne**, **ECOMICI**, the national army, and the rebel forces; and providing UN input into the disarmament process. The United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (MINUCI) consisted of approximately 75 military observers, 55 international civilians, and 55 local staff members. The UN set the annual budget at \$29.9 million. The Security Council officially mandated a larger **peacekeeping** mission, known as the **United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI)**, on 27 February 2004, with Security Council Resolution 1528. UNOCI replaced MINUCI in Côte d'Ivoire on 4 April 2004. MINUCI did not suffer any fatalities during its one-year deployment.

**UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN EAST TIMOR (UNAMET).**

Negotiations between **Indonesia** and Portugal reference the status of East Timor resulted in an agreement on 5 May 1999, to allow the **United Nations (UN)** to conduct a referendum to determine the will of the East Timorese people. The Security Council mandated the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) on 11 June 1999, by Resolution 1246, to assist in this process. UNAMET's mandate provided the operation with the mission to oversee the transition period as East Timor conducted a referendum to determine whether the people wanted special autonomy within the Republic of Indonesia. UNAMET personnel assisted with the registration of East Timorese voters. A large majority of the population rejected proposed autonomy within Indonesia and preferred independence. Pro-Indonesian militias, with some support from the Indonesian military, initiated a campaign of violence. Approximately half of the East Timorese population became internal refugees, and many were killed. The majority of those serving in UNAMET were evacuated to Australia for safety. A small group of UNAMET personnel remained in their headquarters in the capital of Dili. UN negotiations with Indonesia resulted in an agreement on 12 September 1999, permitting the de-

ployment of an international military force to assist in stabilizing the situation. The peacekeepers, known as the **International Force in East Timor**, arrived on 20 September 1999. Additional discussions between the UN, Indonesia, and Portugal resulted in the transfer of the territory to UN administration.

The Security Council opted to replace UNAMET with a new operation, the **United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor**, mandated to help the international organization administer the territory. The maximum authorized strength of UNAMET included 50 military liaison officers, 271 police officers, 425 UN volunteers, 242 international civilians, and 668 local civilians. Fourteen countries provided military observers, and 31 states dispatched civilian police officers to UNAMET. The operation cost approximately \$100 million and was primarily funded by contributions from **Australia**, Finland, **Japan**, New Zealand, Norway, and Portugal.

#### **UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN EL SALVADOR (MINUSAL).**

*See* UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN EL SALVADOR (ONUSAL).

#### **UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA**

**(UNMEE)**. A border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea erupted into open warfare in May 1998. The **United Nations (UN)** and **Organization of African Unity (OAU)** immediately called for restraint and dispatched representatives to calm the crisis. Both states agreed at the annual OAU summit in July 1999 to abide by the Modalities for the Implementation of the OAU Framework Agreement. Both sides agreed to redeploy their military forces. Further discussion led to the signing of the Technical Arrangements for the Implementation of the OAU Framework Agreement and its Modalities. This document included a provision for the deployment of military observers to monitor the border area between the two states. Tensions remained high, and the two parties began fighting again in May 2000, resulting in increased efforts of the UN and OAU to settle the crisis. The two belligerents signed a new document, the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea, on 18 June 2000.

The UN Security Council originally mandated the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) on 31 June 2000, by

Resolution 1312. Like the **United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo**, the UN planned to field UNMEE in stages based on acceptance of the belligerents of the cease-fire agreement. The first stage called for the deployment of observers to the capitals of the two states to serve as a military liaison. The UN provided UNMEE's first stage with a mandate to establish and maintain a liaison presence with both states; put into operation the mechanism for verifying the cessation of hostilities; prepare for the establishment of a Military Coordination Commission; and assist in planning for the later stages of the UNMEE. The second stage involved dispatching approximately 100 military observers and additional civilian personnel. The third stage included the deployment of the main body of peacekeepers into a neutral **demilitarized zone** along the border and totaled approximately 4,300 soldiers.

The Security Council mandated the third stage of UNMEE on 15 September 2000, by Resolution 1320. UNMEE's new mission included monitoring the cessation of hostilities, observing the redeployment of Ethiopian and Eritrean forces, ensuring that the military forces of both states remained 25 kilometers apart, monitoring a temporary security zone between the two belligerents, providing technical assistance for humanitarian mine clearing, and assisting with human rights monitoring. Ethiopia and Eritrea signed a peace agreement on 12 December 2000, in Algiers. The document provided for a Boundary Commission to examine the demarcation of the common border between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The commission concluded its review in April 2002, but the border situation was not fully settled at the same time. In May 2002, Ethiopia began restricting the movement of UNMEE personnel along the border. Political relations between UNMEE and Ethiopia remained tense. In 2008, Eritrea restricted UNMEE's access to the border. As conditions became more difficult due to the failure of both Ethiopia and Eritrea to fully cooperate, the UN opted to withdraw UNMEE on 31 July 2008.

UNMEE's maximum assigned strength reached 3,940 military personnel, 214 police officers, 229 international civilians, and 244 local staff. At least 45 countries, including **Switzerland**, dispatched military personnel to UNMEE. The Swiss contribution is unique due to the neutrality of the state and the fact it did not become a full member of the UN until late 2002. Twenty UNMEE personnel died

while serving in the operation, and the mission cost the UN a total of \$1.32 billion.

**UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN HAITI (UNMIH).** Haiti's democratically elected president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, lost power to a military coup on 30 September 1991. Violence erupted across the country as supporters of the coup murdered backers of President Aristide and committed numerous human rights violations. The **United Nations (UN)** began debating how to handle the issue and eventually imposed an arms and oil embargo in June 1993. This act was suspended after successful negotiations to end the crisis. On 23 September 1993, the Security Council passed Resolution 867, which mandated the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). The mission was envisioned as a cooperative effort with the **Organization of American States** and would help modernize the Haitian military and establish a new police force. The **peacekeeping** mission did not have the authority to intervene in the civil crisis facing the island or the unqualified acceptance of the military government in power.

The Haitian government refused to implement the peace agreement. In October 1993, the USS *Harlan County* attempted to land U.S. and Canadian personnel to join peacekeepers who had previously arrived in the capital. Mobs organized by the government prevented the ship from docking. Following growing tensions, the remaining peacekeepers withdrew from Haiti in January 1994. By July 1994, the few UN observers in Haiti were ordered to depart the country. The Security Council, in Resolution 940 of 31 July 1994, mandated the formation of a **Multinational Force in Haiti**. The same resolution altered UNMIH's mandate and authorized the force to help provide a secure and stable environment and assist in the professionalization of the Haitian military and the establishment of a separate civilian police force.

The Multinational Force in Haiti deployed to Haiti on 19 September 1994 and secured the return of President Aristide on 15 October 1994. The force handed over security responsibility to the UNMIH on 31 March 1995. UNMIH remained in the country until 30 June 1996, when it transferred its responsibility to the **United Nations Support Mission in Haiti**. The maximum authorized strength of UNMIH was 1,200 military personnel, 300 civilian police officers,

and 240 international and local civilians. Twenty-four countries contributed military personnel to UNMIH, while 19 states provided civilian police. There were nine fatalities between 1993 and 1996. UNMIH cost the UN \$315.8 million. *See also* UNITED NATIONS CIVILIAN POLICE MISSION IN HAITI (MIPONUH); UNITED NATIONS OBSERVATION GROUP FOR THE VERIFICATION OF THE ELECTIONS IN HAITI (ONUVEH); UNITED NATIONS TRANSITION MISSION IN HAITI (UNTMIH).

**UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN LIBERIA (UNMIL).** Conflict between the government of Charles Taylor, the main rebel leader in **Liberia**, and the opposition factions in Liberia resulted in the call for peacekeepers to support the peace process. As the fighting increased in 2003, European countries noted that Liberia should be a **United States** issue due to the historical ties between the two states. A reluctant United States persuaded **Nigeria** and the **Economic Community of West African States** to deploy soldiers as the **Economic Community of West African States Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL)**, which began arriving on 4 August 2003. The **United Nations (UN)** mandated the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) on 15 September 2003, with Security Council Resolution 1509, to assume the peacekeeper mission in Liberia. The Security Council authorized UNMIL up to 15,000 personnel and provided a mandate that included observing and monitoring the cease-fire, establishing liaison with all of the factions, observing and assisting in the establishment and operation of cantonment sites, conducting voluntary disarmament of factions, providing security at key government sites, protecting UN personnel and facilities, supporting humanitarian aid and human rights missions, assisting with the reform of government police services, and supporting the peace process. UNMIL absorbed the African peacekeepers of ECOMIL on 1 October 2003.

In early 2010, following a successful national presidential election and continued reconstruction, UNMIL consisted of approximately 11,300 uniformed personnel, including approximately 10,000 troops and military observers, 1,300 police officers, and 1,600 international and local civilian staff. The major contributors of personnel to UNMIL include Bangladesh, **China**, Ethiopia, Ghana, **India**, Jordan, Mongolia, Nepal, **Nigeria**, **Pakistan**, the Philippines, and Ukraine.

The annual budget of UNMIL is \$561.1 million, and there have been 143 fatalities as of March 2010. *See also* FORMED POLICE UNIT (FPU).

**UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN NEPAL (UNMIN).** In 1996, the communist party of Nepal initiated a civil war in the country of Nepal. In 2005, the king of Nepal assumed nearly total control of the government to combat the insurgency. By the end of the year, a stalemate existed between the belligerents. In 2006, the king agreed to transfer political power to the people. In May, the legislature voted to change Nepal from a kingdom into a democracy. The **United Nations (UN)** Security Council mandated the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) on 23 January 2007, with Resolution 1740, to assist Nepal with its transition. UNMIN is a political mission and is not under the UN's **Department of Peacekeeping Operations**. UNMIN's mandated mission includes managing arms for all parties, assisting the parties with their compliance to the cease-fire agreement, and providing technical assistance to the Election Commission. The operation consists of approximately 72 civilian specialists, and there have been six fatalities among UNMIN personnel as of March 2010.

**UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN SUDAN (UNMIS).** The **International Monitoring Unit (SUDAN)** deployed in April 2002 to assist in the peace process in the southern area of **Sudan** as outlined in the Machakos Protocol. The **United Nations (UN)** mandated the **United Nations Advance Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS)** in June 2004, to assist the parties with the peace process following the signing of a power-sharing agreement in May 2004. The Sudanese government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/ Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLM/SPLA), representing the south, signed a comprehensive peace agreement in January 2005, prompting the UN to mandate the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) on 24 March 2005, with Security Council Resolution 1590, to replace UNAMIS. The mandate of UNMIS includes monitoring the cease-fire agreement, assisting with the disarmament and demobilization program, helping with restructuring the Sudanese police, promoting the rule of law and human rights, assisting with the voluntary return of refugees, cooperating with other organizations in demining efforts,



and protecting UN personnel as well as humanitarian aid workers and civilians. As of early 2010, UNMIS consists of approximately 8,821 troops, 476 military observers, 715 police officers, and 3,600 international and local civilians. The major contributors of personnel include Bangladesh, **China**, **Egypt**, **India**, Kenya, **Pakistan**, **Russia**, **Rwanda**, and Zambia. Bangladesh, Egypt, India, and Pakistan deployed approximately 6,800 of the 8,821 troops assigned to UNMIS. The annual budget of the mission is \$958 million, and there have been 50 fatalities as of March 2010. *See also* AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN SUDAN (AMIS); EUROPEAN UNION SUPPORT TO THE AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN DARFUR; UNITED NATIONS–AFRICAN UNION HYBRID OPERATION IN DARFUR (UNAMID).

**UNITED NATIONS MISSION OF OBSERVERS IN PREVLAKA (UNMOP).** The **United Nations (UN)** Security Council mandated the **United Nations Confidence Restoration Mission in Croatia (UNCRO)** on 31 March 1995, to replace the **United Nations Protection Force** personnel fielded in **Croatia**. UNCRO's mandate ended on 15 January 1996; however, the UN opted to maintain a presence to ensure the continued demilitarization of Croatia's Prevlaka peninsula. The United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP) began operations on 1 February 1996, under a mandate in Security Council Resolution 1038 to fulfill this role. UNMOP's mandate included monitoring the demilitarization of the Prevlaka peninsula and neighboring areas in Croatia and the Federal Republic of **Yugoslavia**. UNMOP conducted regular coordination meetings with the **Stabilisation Force** fielded in **Bosnia and Herzegovina**. The maximum authorized strength of UNMOP was 27 military observers and 12 international and local civilians. Twenty-two states, including the traditionally neutral **Switzerland**, provided observers to UNMOP. The mission's funding was included in the budget of the **United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH)**.

UNMOP and UNMIBH, relatively unseen **peacekeeping** operations in terms of public knowledge, made international headlines on 1 July 2002, when the **United States** vetoed the extension of UNMIBH's mandate in response to the rejection of the **International Criminal Court (ICC)** to exempt U.S. soldiers on peacekeeping

duty from potential prosecution. The United States believed that U.S. soldiers could be wrongfully prosecuted based on political grounds. A compromise emerged on 12 July 2002, allowing for the extension of the mandate. UNMIBH is financed by **special assessment** and costs approximately \$145 million annually. It should be noted that since UNMOP draws its funding from the UNMIBH budget, the threat to UNMIBH's mandate during the ICC controversy had a direct impact on the resources required to continue UNMOP as a peacekeeping mission. UNMOP was terminated on 15 December 2002, two weeks prior to the **European Union Police Mission** replacing UNMIBH.

**UNITED NATIONS MISSION OF OBSERVERS IN TAJIKISTAN (UNMOT).** On 24 September 1993, the **Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)** mandated the **Commonwealth of Independent States Collective Peacekeeping Force (Tajikistan)** destined for **Tajikistan**. **United Nations (UN)** envoys and teams assisted in the negotiation process among the belligerents in Tajikistan that resulted in a cease-fire agreement in September 1994. Talks between the belligerents continued through the end of 1994. On 14 December 1994, the UN Security Council mandated the United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) with Resolution 968. The mandate of UNMOT included monitoring the implementation of the cease-fire along the Tajik–Afghan border, investigating reports of cease-fire violations, maintaining liaison with the CIS operation and the **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Mission to Tajikistan**, and providing support for the **secretary-general's** envoy. A new opposition offensive nullified the cease-fire agreement by July 1996.

A second cease-fire was signed in December 1996, and a general peace agreement was authorized on 27 June 1997. The latter agreement initiated a transitional period that included the return of refugees and demobilization of opposition fighters. The belligerents requested that the UN provide some form of oversight during the period. The Security Council expanded the mandate on 14 November 1997, with Resolution 1138, and provided UNMOT with the mission to monitor the assembly and disarmament of opposition fighters, coordinate UN assistance to Tajikistan, and provide good offices and advice. At the same time, the UN increased the authorized size of UNMOT from

45 to 120 military observers. Tajikistan held legislative elections for its lower house on 27 February 2000, which were monitored by the UN and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Joint Electoral Observation Mission. The mission noted that the elections did not meet minimum electoral standards. The upper house elections occurred on 23 March 2000.

UN secretary-general **Kofi Annan** announced that UNMOT had accomplished its mandate, and the operation officially ended on 15 May 2000. The maximum authorized strength of UNMOT was 120 military observers, plus international and local civilian staff. The maximum deployed military strength reached only 81 personnel. Fifteen countries contributed military personnel to UNMOT, and there were seven fatalities between 1994 and 2000. UNMOT cost the UN approximately \$64 million.

#### **UNITED NATIONS MISSION OF SUPPORT IN EAST TIMOR**

**(UNMISET)**. East Timor became an independent state on 20 May 2002, following many years of being part of **Indonesia**. The **United Nations (UN)** played a significant role in negotiating between the two parties during the process. The UN fielded the **United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor** between 1999 and 17 May 2002. Just prior to East Timorese independence, the UN mandated and deployed a new **peacekeeping** operation, the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET), on 17 May 2002. UNMISET's mandate included providing assistance to the government to ensure political stability, maintaining interim law enforcement and public security, assisting in developing an East Timor Police Service, and contributing to the maintenance of the country's internal and external security. The initial maximum authorized strength of UNMISET was 5,000 peacekeepers and police, along with more than 1,000 international and local civilians. The UN ended UNMISET's mission on 20 May 2005, the third anniversary of independence. At least 46 states contributed military personnel or civilian police to UNMISET, and 21 personnel died between May 2002 and May 2005. UNMISET cost the UN \$565.5 million. *See also* INTERNATIONAL FORCE IN EAST TIMOR (INTERFET); UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN EAST TIMOR (UNAMET).

**UNITED NATIONS OBSERVATION GROUP IN LEBANON**

**(UNOGIL).** Lebanon emerged from French colonial domination in 1943 with a constitution that divided the government among the dominant religious groups of the state. The Maronite Christians controlled the office of the presidency; however, each president could serve only one term. In May 1958, President Camille Cahmoun sought an amendment to the constitution that would allow him to seek a second term of office. This move prompted an armed uprising among Muslim elements of the country. The Lebanese executive branch of government charged that the United Arab Republic (**Egypt**) was supplying weapons to the rebels. In addition, the government accused armed personnel of entering Lebanon from **Syria**. Following a failure of the **League of Arab States** to solve the crisis, the **United Nations (UN)** Security Council adopted Resolution 128, on 11 June 1958, calling for the dispatch of a neutral observation mission, which would be named the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL).

UNOGIL's mission in Lebanon involved the observation of the border with Syria to determine if armed personnel or weapons were crossing the frontier. The group did not have a mandate to halt any illegal movement of goods or personnel from Syria. Operations were carried out via daylight jeep patrols, the establishment of fixed observation posts, and flights of helicopters and light aircraft along the border. The peacekeepers began arriving on 12 June 1958. The initial personnel were detached from duty with the **United Nations Truce Supervision Organization**. UNOGIL reached a maximum strength of 591 military observers in November and consisted of personnel from 20 states.

Initially, the strength of UNOGIL stood at approximately 100 personnel; however, following a political crisis raised by the 1958 U.S. intervention in Lebanon and the dispatch of British paratroopers to Jordan, a Security Council compromise called for the increase in UNOGIL's size. U.S. and British troops departed the area, and the UN sent additional peacekeepers to Lebanon. Jordan refused to allow the establishment of a **peacekeeping** operation similar to UNOGIL on its territory. A few UNOGIL personnel were permitted to oversee the withdrawal of British forces from Jordan but returned to Lebanon

after the evacuation. The election of a new president brought a truce to the fighting in Lebanon and better relations with the United Arab Republic. The Security Council accepted a UNOGIL recommendation that the operation be terminated due to the completion of the mandate. The last element of UNOGIL departed Lebanon on 9 December 1958. The UN funded UNOGIL through its regular budget, and the total cost for the six-month operation came to \$3.7 million.

**UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER GROUP FOR THE VERIFICATION OF THE ELECTIONS IN HAITI (ONUVEH).** The **United Nations (UN)** established the United Nations Observer Group for the Verification of the Elections in Haiti (ONUVEH) on 10 October 1990, under General Assembly Resolution 45/2 at an estimated cost of \$6.5 million. The mission of ONUVEH included the monitoring of elections scheduled for **Haiti**. The operation was envisioned as including 193 observers from 43 countries, the core of which would be 39 peacekeepers selected from the **United Nations Transition Assistance Group** and United Nations Observer Mission to Verify the Electoral Process in Nicaragua (ONUVEN). The chief election observer, Horacio Boneo, was the deputy chief election observer from ONUVEN. Initially, 64 security observers from Algeria, Canada, Colombia, **France**, Spain, and Venezuela were deployed to Haiti. The observers withdrew following the completion of the election process in Haiti; however, the military ousted president-elect Jean-Bertrand Aristide of Haiti and returned the state to autocratic rule in September 1991. On 23 September 1993, the Security Council approved a new **peacekeeping** force for Haiti known as the **United Nations Mission in Haiti**.

**UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER GROUP IN CENTRAL AMERICA (ONUCA).** The United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) resulted from a locally originated peace process. Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela formed an informal organization known as the **Contadora Group** in 1983 in the attempt to settle the civil wars raging across Central America. The region had suffered from a very lengthy period of internal conflicts. The presidents of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua joined the Contadora Group, which developed the Procedure for

the Establishment of a Firm and Lasting Peace in Central America in August 1987, in Esquipulas, Guatemala. The **Organization of American States (OAS)** and **United Nations (UN)** were requested to monitor the peace process and participate in the **International Verification and Follow-Up Commission**.

General Assembly Resolution 42/1 of 7 October 1987 confirmed the intention of the global body to assist the Central American states. A joint UN and OAS team visited the area in October 1987, to evaluate the security needs of the peace process. On 8 February 1989, UN **secretary-general** Javier Pérez de Cuéller met with representatives of the five Central American states. The group issued what is known as the **Costa del Sol Declaration** to settle the crisis within Nicaragua. The secretary-general fielded the United Nations Observer Mission to Verify the Electoral Process in Nicaragua (ONUVEN) on 25 August 1989. This civilian-manned mission oversaw the successful election process in Nicaragua. The UN and OAS also formed the International Support and Verification Commission (CIAV) to assist in the monitoring of the demobilization of Nicaraguan guerrillas, also known as Contras. Brigadier-General Pericles Ferreira Gomes of Brazil, the **chief military observer** for the **United Nations Angola Verification Mission I**, conducted a reconnaissance of the region between 3 and 23 September 1989. After reviewing the report submitted by Gomes, the secretary-general recommended the deployment of ONUCA.

The mandate of ONUCA included the verification of the cessation of aid to irregular and insurrectionist forces and the nonuse of the territory of one state to launch attacks on other states. ONUCA originally consisted of military observers and support personnel from Canada, Colombia, Ireland, Spain, and Venezuela, who were later joined by observers from Brazil, Ecuador, **India**, and Sweden. Argentina offered four patrol boats and crews for use in the Gulf of Fonseca. Canada contributed a helicopter unit, and West Germany provided a civilian medical unit and civilian aircraft and crews. Venezuela dispatched a combat battalion between April and June 1990 for the purpose of demobilizing the Nicaraguan resistance.

An advance party of ONUCA peacekeepers arrived with **chief military observer** Major-General Agustin Quesada Gomez of Spain on 3 December 1989. Gomez established his headquarters at

Tegucigalpa, Honduras, and set up liaison units in the capital of the five Central American states. ONUCA dispatched patrols of 10 military observers to oversee the peace process. The group's mandate was expanded on 27 March 1990, via Security Council Resolution 650, to include the cease-fire and demobilization of irregular forces throughout the region, as requested in the Declaration of San Isidro de Coronado. A battalion from Venezuela arrived to assist in the demobilization of the Nicaraguan resistance within the country of Honduras. The mandate was further expanded on 20 April 1990, via Security Council Resolution 653, to allow ONUCA to oversee the cease-fire and separation of forces inside Nicaragua itself. The personnel from ONUCA monitored five security zones in Nicaragua. Each security zone was surrounded by a 20-kilometer **demilitarized zone** for the safety of the demobilizing personnel. After a rocky beginning, ONUCA completed the demobilization process and departed the area in January 1992. The group reached a maximum strength of 1,038 at the end of May 1989. This had been reduced to approximately 500 personnel by the end of 1991. ONUCA did not suffer any casualties during its deployment and cost the UN \$88.5 million.

**UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN ANGOLA (MONUA).** After a series of cease-fires in **Angola** verified by **United Nations (UN) peacekeeping** operations, the belligerents signed the Lusaka Protocol in November 1994. The protocol called for an integrated national army and police force, as well as a reconciliation government. The **United Nations Angola Verification Mission III** departed the country in June 1997, after completing its mission associated with the protocol.

The UN Security Council mandated the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) by Resolution 1118, on 30 June 1997, to assist Angola in the national reconciliation process. MONUA's multitask mission included verifying the neutrality of the National Police, incorporating National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) personnel into the National Police, quartering and deploying a rapid reaction police force, guaranteeing the free passage of civilians, protecting civil and political rights and freedoms, conducting joint patrols with the National Police, inspecting prisons,

supervising the disarmament process, providing security for UNITA leaders, overseeing human rights issues, verifying the cease-fire, investigating troop movements, and monitoring the integration of government and UNITA personnel into a national army.

The belligerents proved to be slow in enacting the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol. Disarmament of UNITA was difficult, as both sides mistrusted each other. The UN imposed a series of sanctions against UNITA for its failure to comply with the protocol. The global body also recognized the need for the continuance of MONUA and extended its mandate, yet reduced the size of its force. During the summer of 1998, UNITA stepped up its military operations, frustrating the UN even further. **Special Representative** Maître Alioune Blondin Beye of Mali died in an aircraft accident while consulting with regional leaders about the crisis. The military situation continued to deteriorate as UNITA forces increased their ambushes and incursions against government forces and civilian targets. Concern grew for MONUA personnel assigned to UNITA-held areas. On 7 December 1998, the UNITA leadership allowed UN aircraft to land and remove the MONUA peacekeepers. Two UN and four commercial aircraft were downed over UNITA territory by January 1999. The Security Council opted to not extend the mission's mandate after its 26 February 1999 expiration date. The maximum authorized strength of MONUA reached 3,279 troops and military support personnel, 289 civilian police observers, and numerous civilian staff. Personnel assigned to MONUA steadily declined after July 1997, until the strength by the expiration of the mandate was 447 troops and 54 civilian police observers. Thirty-six states contributed military personnel to MONUA, and there were 17 total fatalities between 1997 and 2000. The mission cost the UN approximately \$300 million. *See also* UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION I (UNAVEM I); UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION II (UNAVEM II).

**UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN EL SALVADOR (ONUSAL).** The ongoing civil war between the government and rebels in El Salvador moved toward settlement during the opening of the 1990s. On 26 July 1990, the various parties signed the Agreement on Human Rights in San Jose. The agreement included a provision



for the fielding of an international observer force to verify the protection of human rights. The **United Nations (UN)** agreed to mandate a **peacekeeping** operation to perform this task. Eventually known as the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), the mission was the first military/civilian peacekeeping unit mandated solely to verify compliance with the protection of human rights. ONUSAL did not originally have a mandate to verify the cease-fire in the conflict. The mandate was later expanded to include cease-fire observation based on an agreement dated 31 December 1991. ONUSAL's additional mission included monitoring public order pending the organization of a new civilian police force. The Security Council originally mandated ONUSAL with Resolution 693 on 20 May 1991.

ONUSAL completed its mission on 30 April 1995. When the mission departed, a small group of civilians, known as the United Nations Mission in El Salvador (MINUSAL), remained to provide oversight for the remaining points of the agreements. ONUSAL's maximum authorized strength consisted of 380 military observers, 631 civilian police officers, and 320 international and local civilian staff. There were five fatalities among ONUSAL personnel between July 1991 and April 1995. The mission cost the UN \$107 million. *See also* UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER GROUP IN CENTRAL AMERICA (ONUCA).

**UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN GEORGIA (UN-OMIG).** The **United Nations (UN)** Security Council mandated the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) with Resolution 850 on 24 August 1993. The purpose of the operation was to verify the cease-fire of 27 July 1993 between the government of **Georgia** and the province of Abkhazia. The cease-fire collapsed on 16 September 1993. The UN modified UNOMIG's mandate and directed the mission to maintain contact with the belligerents and a Russian military force in the state. The UN modified the mandate again on 27 July 1994 and asked UNOMIG to also monitor a new cease-fire agreement, observe the **Commonwealth of Independent States Peacekeeping Forces in Georgia**, watch heavy weapons storage sites, monitor the withdrawal of Georgian troops beyond the boundaries of Abkhazia, and investigate violations of the cease-fire.

The situation in Georgia remained unstable. UNOMIG patrols were fired upon and several UN peacekeepers abducted and held for various lengths of time. On 8 October 2001, a UNOMIG helicopter was shot down with the loss of all on board, including four military observers. The operation consisted of 118 military observers, 11 civilian police officers, and 102 international civilian staff. At least twenty-three states contributed military personnel to UNOMIG. In 2008, **Russia**, a UN Security Council member, engaged in a brief conflict with Georgia over issues associated with Abkhazia and Ossetia. UNOMIG's mandate ended on 30 June 2009, due to a lack of consensus among Security Council members. There were 12 fatalities among UNOMIG personnel between August 1993 and June 2009. The mission cost the UN approximately \$36.1 million annually.

**UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN LIBERIA (UNOMIL).** The **United Nations (UN)** Security Council mandated the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) on 22 September 1993, in Resolution 866, to support the **Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group in Liberia**. UNOMIL's mandate included investigating cease-fire violations, monitoring compliance with the peace agreement, verifying the election process, helping to coordinate humanitarian assistance, training Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) engineers in demining operations, and coordinating with ECOMOG. Renewed fighting delayed implementation of the agreement and planned elections. Delays continued, and new provisions were added to the peace agreement.

On 10 November 1995, the Security Council added several new missions to UNOMIL's mandate, including providing good offices to support ECOMOG and the Liberian transitional government, assisting in the maintenance of demobilization sites, and monitoring compliance of the belligerents with the peace agreement. **Liberia** held elections in July 1997, and the Security Council terminated UNOMIL's mandate on 30 September 1997. The maximum authorized strength of UNOMIL was 303 military observers, 65 other soldiers, and approximately 200 international and local civilian personnel. Twenty-two states (including the rare participation of **China** at the time) contributed personnel to UNOMIL without any fatalities. It is

interesting to note that Zimbabwe refused an invitation to participate because it claimed it would not receive an adequate amount of cash from the UN as compensation for dispatching its soldiers to Liberia. UNOMIL cost the UN approximately \$104 million

### **UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN SIERRA LEONE**

(UNOMSIL). The **United Nations (UN)** Security Council mandated the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) on 13 July 1998, with Resolution 1181, to assist the **Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group in Sierra Leone** with the disarming of combatants and restructuring the military of **Sierra Leone**. UNOMSIL's mandate included supervising the security situation in the country, overseeing the disarmament of former belligerents, and monitoring the role of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) within Sierra Leone. UNOMSIL included an authorized 70 military observers and approximately 120 other personnel; however, only approximately half of this strength was actually fielded until August 1999. Opposition forces launched a new offensive and captured more than half of the country, including most of the capital, by January 1999, before succumbing to an ECOMOG counteroffensive in February 1999. UNOMSIL personnel evacuated Sierra Leone and traveled to Guinea during this period. New negotiations between the belligerents began in May 1999, resulting in the Lomé Peace Agreement in July 1999. The Security Council authorized the expansion of UNOMSIL to 210 military observers in August 1999. On 22 October 1999, the Security Council mandated a new **peacekeeping** operation, the **United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone**, and ordered that the new organization absorb the mission and personnel of UNOMSIL. The maximum fielded strength of UNOMSIL reached 210 military observers and 142 other personnel. Twenty-five states contributed personnel to the mission without any fatalities. UNOMSIL cost the UN approximately \$52.6 million.

### **UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN SOUTH AFRICA**

(UNOMSA). Although not a **peacekeeping** mission in the traditional sense of the term, the United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA) was an observer operation fielded by the **United**

**Nations (UN)** to monitor the political process in **South Africa**'s transition to a democracy where all citizens, regardless of race, would have the opportunity to participate in the political process. Former **U.S.** secretary of state Cyrus Vance and **Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali** recommended the deployment of the UNOMSA on behalf of the UN following an escalation of political violence in June 1992. The Security Council authorized 60 international observers for the operation in August 1992. The observers monitored political rallies and meetings throughout South Africa.

**UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION TO VERIFY THE ELECTORAL PROCESS IN NICARAGUA (ONUEN).** *See* UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER GROUP IN CENTRAL AMERICA (ONUCA).

**UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION UGANDA–RWANDA (UNOMUR).** In 1990, a Tutsi exile group in Uganda, the Rwandan Patriotic Fund (RPF), invaded **Rwanda** in hope of toppling the Hutu-dominated government. African calls for a cease-fire were met with limited success. The Rwandan government accused Uganda of supporting the RPF. In reply, the **United Nations (UN)** Security Council mandated the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda–Rwanda (UNOMUR) on 22 June 1993, with Resolution 846. UNOMUR's mandate included monitoring the border between Uganda and Rwanda to prevent weapons from entering Rwanda. The Security Council voted on 5 October 1993 to deploy a second **peacekeeping** operation, the **United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR)**, to oversee the cease-fire within Rwanda itself. UNAMIR absorbed UNOMUR for administrative purposes and funding on 21 December 1993, although UNOMUR did continue as a separate peacekeeping mission. Following the Rwandan genocide, the Security Council terminated UNOMUR on 21 September 1994. UNAMIR remained in place until 8 March 1996. The maximum authorized strength of UNOMUR was 81 military observers, supported by international and local civilians. There were not any fatalities during the mission. UNOMUR cost the UN \$2.3 million from June 1993 to December 1993. From December 1993 to September 1994, UNOMUR was funded through the UNAMIR budget.

**UNITED NATIONS OFFICE IN TIMOR-LESTE.** The **United Nations (UN)** mandated the UN Office in **Timor-Leste** in 2005 with Security Council resolution 1599. The small organization commenced operations on 20 May 2005 to continue assisting the development of the local police force and to promote democratic governance. The office ended its mission in June 2006.

**UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN BURUNDI (ONUB).** In 2003, the **African Union (AU)** deployed the **African Mission in Burundi (AMIB)** to support the peace process in **Burundi**. With a cease-fire in place, the **United Nations (UN)** Security Council mandated the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) on 21 May 2004, with Resolution 1545. The AU terminated AMIB on 31 May 2004, and the African peacekeepers merged into ONUB as of 1 June 2004. ONUB's mandate included monitoring the cease-fire, observing and providing security at disarmament and demobilization sites, supervising the flow of illegal weapons into Burundi, contributing to the election process, and protecting civilians and UN personnel. At peak strength in 2005, ONUB consisted of 5,400 troops, 168 military observers, 97 police officers, and 855 international and local civilians. The major personnel-contributing states included Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Nepal, **Pakistan**, **South Africa**, and Thailand. Following successful progress with the peace process, the UN terminated ONUB as of 31 December 2006 and replaced it with the **United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi**, a political field office. There were 24 ONUB fatalities during the mission, and the annual cost was \$678.3 million.

**UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN THE CONGO (ONUC).** The Republic of the Congo (currently the Democratic Republic of the Congo) emerged from colonization under Belgium in 1960. The new state gained independence with only a six-month period of preparation. A last-minute political compromise established a government with Joseph Kasa Vubu as the president and Patrice Lumumba as the prime minister of the state. Belgium negotiated an agreement guaranteeing the former metropole an economic and military presence in the new country. On 5 July 1960, the Congolese soldiers of the new state's military mutinied against their Belgian commanders.

Following attacks on European civilians, the Belgians asked Lumumba to request their military assistance. Lumumba refused and attempted a series of reforms in an attempt to Africanize the military. **Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld** of the **United Nations (UN)** persuaded the Congo to request assistance from the global body; however, before the assistance could materialize, the Belgians unilaterally intervened in the crisis. In turn, Lumumba and Kasa Vubu asked the UN to provide their state with military assistance.

Hammarskjöld invoked Article 99 of the UN Charter to convene the Security Council. He was the first secretary-general to use this article, which allows the holder of his position to present an issue of international significance to the Security Council for deliberation. At the same time, Hammarskjöld recommended the deployment of a **peacekeeping** operation to assist the Congolese government. Originally referred to as the United Nations Force in the Congo, the mission later became known as the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC). Hammarskjöld envisioned the force comprising a core of African contingents. Other non-African contingents would ensure an international mixture in ONUC. Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, the Federation of Mali (present-day Mali and Senegal), Morocco, and Tunisia offered to provide soldiers for ONUC. The secretary-general accepted the offers from all of the states, except the Federation of Mali, whose troops he activated later. The original five African states provided the core of 4,000 peacekeepers. In addition, the global body sought contingents from three European, one Asian, and one Latin American state. **Ralph J. Bunche** accepted the post of **special representative** in the Congo, and **Lieutenant-General Carl C. von Horn** assumed the position as ONUC's first **force commander**.

Two existing peacekeeping operations provided assistance in the deployment of ONUC. General von Horn and his initial staff transferred to the Congo from the **United Nations Truce Supervision Organization**, and a Swedish battalion arrived from the **United Nations Emergency Force I**. The UN originally viewed ONUC's mission as a temporary security force that would remain neutral in the internal conflicts within the Congo. The **rules of engagement** called upon the peacekeepers to use force only in self-defense. This rule would be altered as the duration of ONUC lengthened. Tunisian soldiers were the first peacekeepers to arrive in the Congo. The

Tunisians landed on 15 July 1960 and were followed within days by the other previously mentioned African contingents, as well as combat units from **India**, Ireland, **Liberia**, and Sweden.

Although the mandate of ONUC can be traced through a series of resolutions, Security Council Resolution 143 of 14 July 1960 is the first to authorize the secretary-general to field a peacekeeping mission in the Congo. The original objectives included oversight of the Belgian withdrawal and assistance to the Congolese government to maintain law and order in the state. By August 1960, UN soldiers replaced the Belgian military throughout the Congo, except in two base areas and Katanga province, which had declared its secession from the state. Lumumba requested ONUC personnel to assist his government in subjugating Katanga. Further negotiations led to a peaceful entry of ONUC peacekeepers into Katanga and the bases to replace the Belgians. Political divisions within the Congo culminated with Kasa Vubu and Lumumba dismissing each other and the lack of an effective Congolese government for nearly one year. This incident led to coordination problems for ONUC, which was mandated to assist the Congolese government, an institution that was now difficult to identify.

Lumumba was murdered by political rivals in January 1961. In protest, several states withdrew their contingents from ONUC. In addition, the Soviet Union demanded Hammarskjöld's resignation and refused to recognize his authority as secretary-general. The Security Council dramatically altered the mandate of ONUC on 15 February 1961, when Resolution 161 authorized the operation to help prevent a civil war in the Congo. ONUC could use force in this mission but only as a last resort. The peacekeepers, who had been suffering casualties in the civil war, initiated their first limited offensive in Katanga in April 1961. Further attacks on ONUC personnel occurred at **Port-Francqui** and **Kindu** and later at **Niamba** and **Elisabethville**. Katanga ended its secession from the Congo by January 1963. The UN reduced the strength of ONUC throughout 1963, so that by December the total manpower equaled 6,535 peacekeepers. The General Assembly, in Resolution 1885 (XVIII) of 18 October 1963, opted to fund ONUC until 30 June 1964. At the termination date, ONUC consisted of 3,297 peacekeepers. ONUC suffered 249 fatalities during its operations.

The funding of ONUC resulted in a political controversy at the UN and the introduction of a novel way to finance the operation. Several member states refused to pay their portions of the assessment set by the General Assembly. The Soviet Union's refusal to pay its peacekeeping tab for ONUC, as well as UNEF I in the Sinai, led to what is often called the **Article 19 Crisis**. The cash shortfall of ONUC, which cost the global body \$400 million between 1960 and 1964, led the UN to attempt a unique approach for financing a peacekeeping operation. The world body offered bonds for sale to countries across the globe. These notes were similar to bonds offered by the governments in member states when they needed to raise cash.

#### **UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN COTE D'IVOIRE (UNOCI).**

The **United Nations (UN)** mandated the deployment of a political mission, the **United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (MINUCI)**, under Security Council Resolution 1479 of 13 May 2003, to support the peace process in **Côte d'Ivoire**. The mandate of the small UN operation included monitoring the military situation; maintaining an official liaison with **Operation Licorne**, the **Economic Community of West African States Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (ECOMICI)**, the national army, and the rebel forces; and providing UN input into the disarmament process. The Security Council mandated the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) on 27 February 2004, with Security Council Resolution 1528 to replace MINUCI and assume a greater role in providing the **peacekeeping** assets to support the peace process. UNOCI officially replaced MINUCI as the UN presence in the country on 4 April 2004. **Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)** troops deployed with ECOMICI were absorbed into UNOCI, officially ending the African-mandated peacekeeping mission in favor of the UN effort.

UNOCI's mandate (as originally listed in 2004 and updated since its deployment) includes observing compliance with the cease-fire agreement; maintaining an official liaison with Operation Licorne, the national army, and the rebel forces; assisting the government in monitoring the country's borders; helping with disarmament and demobilization activities; coordinating with the **United Nations Mission in Liberia** repatriation of Liberian refugees in Côte d'Ivoire; aiding with identification of individuals within the country and



registering those eligible to vote; protecting UN and other personnel performing humanitarian duties; monitoring the arms embargo; providing humanitarian assistance; assisting with law and order concerns; and providing public information. French forces in Operation Licorne are officially mandated to assist the UN in its duties. In early 2010, UNOCI included approximately 8,378 military and police personnel in the attempt to comply with its extensive mandate. This figure includes 7,028 soldiers, 192 military observers, and 1,158 police officers. Another 1,400 civilians (international and locals) support UNOCI. The largest troop contributors to the operation include Bangladesh, Benin, Ghana, Jordan, Morocco, Niger, **Pakistan**, Senegal, and Togo. The annual cost of UNOCI is \$491.8 million. UNOCI has suffered 65 fatalities as of March 2010.

**UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN MOZAMBIQUE (ONUMOZ).** Mozambique erupted into civil war following its independence from Portugal in 1975. The conflict, fanned by external sponsors, engulfed the entire society for two decades. A cease-fire agreement in the civil war allowed the **United Nations (UN)** to step in and propose a **peacekeeping** operation to oversee the cessation of hostilities, the disarming of rebel forces, the integration of a new army, and the general election process. The Security Council mandated the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) on 16 December 1992, with Resolution 797. After several difficulties in negotiating the deployment of the peacekeepers, UN troops finally began arriving in Mozambique at the end of October 1993.

The peacekeepers were organized into five independent battalions of approximately 850 men each, three logistics companies, a headquarters company, and air and communications units. In addition, there were approximately 350 military observers. The peacekeepers carried out the additional mission of replacing the soldiers of Zimbabwe who guarded the Beria, Limpopo, and Nacal corridors, as well as the national road in Tete Province. The mandate of ONUMOZ formally ended on 9 December 1994, following successful elections in the country. The maximum authorized strength was 6,625 soldiers, 354 military observers, 1,144 civilian police officers, and more than 2,000 international and local civilians. By November 1994, ONUMOZ consisted of 3,941 soldiers, 204 military observers, and

918 civilian police officers. Twenty-five states contributed military personnel, and 28 countries provided civilian police to ONUMOZ between 1992 and 1994. There were 24 fatalities among ONUMOZ personnel. The mission cost the UN \$486.7 million.

## UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN SOMALIA I (UNOSOM

**I).** **Somalia**, a country of one ethnic group, but many clans, erupted into civil war as rivals of President Siad Barre moved to replace him. Following Barre's removal in January 1991, the country devolved into a state of anarchy and chaos, with rival clans preying on each other. The inability of humanitarian organizations to curb the death rates from starvation and malnourishment led **United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali** to criticize the West for ignoring African problems, while displaying concern for such European crises as the conflict in **Yugoslavia**. In response, the Security Council passed Resolution 751 on 21 April 1992, which mandated the United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I). UNOSOM I's stated purpose noted that the mission should facilitate an immediate and effective cessation of hostilities and the maintenance of a cease-fire throughout the country to promote the process of reconciliation and political settlement and provide urgent humanitarian assistance. UNOSOM I would accomplish its mission by visible patrols within Mogadishu, the capital. In addition, the peacekeepers would accompany humanitarian aid convoys from the airport and port facilities of Mogadishu to the distribution points. It has been estimated that up to 40 percent of all food aid was being hijacked by the Somali factions.

The first peacekeepers, an unarmed advance group of 50 military personnel, arrived in August 1992. The first armed peacekeepers, a 40-man contingent from Pakistan, arrived on 14 September 1992, after the Somali factions granted grudging permission for the fielding of the operation. The remaining members of a 500-man Pakistani battalion arrived by the end of the month. Canada pledged a 750-man unit destined for the northeastern city of Bossaso. Other states offering 750-man **peacekeeping** contingents for UNOSOM I included Belgium, **Egypt**, and **Nigeria**. It is interesting to note that the new state of Eritrea, which had just won its independence from Ethiopia, offered to provide troops for UNOSOM I, but the UN declined the offer for political reasons.

The UN planned to establish four zones in the country and post a 750-man battalion into each, including a civilian director of operations. Although the Security Council authorized up to 3,000 peacekeepers for UNOSOM I, the number of personnel never reached that amount due to harassment and opposition offered by the Somali factions. In particular, **Mohammed Farah Aidid**, the leader of the largest faction in Mogadishu, accepted the idea of the 500-man battalion but objected to the number of peacekeepers being increased to approximately 3,000 personnel.

The number of personnel assigned to UNOSOM I was frozen at 715 upon the arrival of the **Unified Task Force (UNITAF)** in December. The Pakistanis suffered greatly at the hands of the local factions. Reports indicate that Pakistani patrols were even robbed of money and clothing while performing their duties. Another report indicates that the Pakistani commander had to feed his troops by ordering food from home with a personal credit card while waiting for the UN to implement a logistical system in Somalia. Continued problems and the inability to deploy additional peacekeepers persuaded the **United States** to lead UNITAF into Somalia in December 1992. The **United Nations Operation in Somalia II** officially replaced UNOSOM I on 4 May 1993, following a stabilization of the situation in Somalia by UNITAF. Six UNOSOM I personnel died during the operation. The operation cost the UN \$42.9 million.

**UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN SOMALIA II (UNOSOM II).** The United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) is actually a rebirth or remandating of the failed **United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I)**. Following the inability of UNOSOM I to accomplish its mission due to the opposition of the Somali factions, the **United States** led the **Unified Task Force (UNITAF)** into **Somalia**. After the stabilization of the political situation in and around Mogadishu, the **United Nations (UN)** moved to mandate a new **peacekeeping** operation to replace UNOSOM I. The United States and UN agreed to the replacement on 1 February 1993. The Security Council established UNOSOM II with a **Chapter Seven peace enforcement** mandate on 26 March 1993, with Resolution 814. UNOSOM II would monitor the cease-fire in Somalia and gradually replace UNITAF, as well as escort humanitarian aid

deliveries. The global body authorized UNOSOM II to maintain and restore peace where required.

**Lieutenant-General Cevik Bir** of Turkey was selected as the first **force commander**. It has been reported that Bir was selected because the United States refused to serve under a commander who lacked significant **North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)** experience. In other words, the force commander must come from a NATO member and not an African, Asian, or Latin American Third World state.

The UN authorized UNOSOM II's strength at up to 28,000 peacekeepers. Thirty-three states served as the initial contributors to UNOSOM II. It is interesting to note that UNOSOM II marks the peacekeeping debut (armed personnel) for the states of **Germany**, Namibia, South Korea, and the United Arab Emirates. UNOSOM II also included a **quick reaction force** consisting of 1,167 U.S. soldiers; however, this unit was never officially a part of UNOSOM II. There were 160 fatalities among UNOSOM II personnel between March 1993 and March 1995.

After the 1994 withdrawal by most Western states, UNOSOM II's composition included approximately 20,000 personnel. **Egypt**, **India**, and **Pakistan** provided the bulk of the assigned combat troops (approximately 15,000). Other combat contingents remaining with UNOSOM II included Bangladesh, Botswana, Malaysia, Nepal, **Nigeria**, and Zimbabwe.

UNOSOM II and UNITAF are well known for their armed clashes with the forces of **Mohammed Farah Aidid** within Mogadishu. On 5 June 1993, 24 Pakistani peacekeepers died in an ambush initiated by Aidid's followers, which resulted in an UN-mandated manhunt for the Somali faction leader. On 3 October 1993, U.S. forces clashed with Aidid's faction, leading to at least 18 battle deaths for the former and a reported figure for the latter in the hundreds. Peacekeeper deaths with UNOSOM II numbered 69 between May and October 1993, with an additional 200 personnel wounded. The ensuing controversy over casualties led to most Western states opting to withdraw from UNOSOM II from late 1993 to early 1994. On 4 November 1994, the Security Council voted to withdraw UNOSOM II by 31 March 1995, following the repeated refusal of the Somali factions to implement a cease-fire. In addition, the factions continued to ambush

peacekeeper convoys, and the mounting fatalities, which numbered 154 at the termination of the mission in March 2005, helped prompt the global body to remove the international force. UNOSOM II cost the UN \$1.6 billion.

**UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION MISSION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (MONUC).** A war involving military forces from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and numerous neighboring states and internal groups lasted throughout the mid- and late 1990s. By the end of that decade, the conflict involved military forces from approximately 10 African states, with major units from **Angola**, Namibia, and Zimbabwe aiding the DRC against internal groups allied with Uganda and **Rwanda**. On 10 July 1999, the major states involved in the conflict and one major guerrilla group signed what is known as the Lusaka Agreement. The document offered numerous provisions to stabilize the situation in eastern DRC and included the introduction of an unspecified “force” to be mandated and deployed by the **United Nations (UN)** to assist in the peace process.

The UN Security Council mandated the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) on 6 August 1999, with Resolution 1258. The UN opted to implement a new strategy in **peacekeeping** deployment. Rather than immediately dispatching the entire operation, the organization decided to send peacekeepers in stages. As the belligerents proved they were honestly willing to abide by the Lusaka Agreement, the UN gradually altered MONUC’s mandate to increase its size and scope of mission. The first stage included the deployment of 90 military liaison personnel with civilian staff to the capitals of the states signing the Lusaka Agreement. The second stage, authorized by Security Council Resolution 1279, on 30 November 1999, involved the dispatch of up to 500 military observers to the DRC. The third stage, authorized by Security Council Resolution 1291 on 24 February 2000, permitted the expansion of MONUC. A three-stage strategy was repeated with the **United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea**. MONUC’s mandate, as listed in Resolution 1291, includes monitoring the cease-fire, maintaining liaison with all parties, working with all parties for the release of prisoners of war and captives, supervising the redeploy-

ment of forces, facilitating humanitarian assistance, and coordinating demining activities.

In May 2003, MONUC faced a crisis, as renewed fighting and murders erupted in the northeast area of the country. Following the deaths of hundreds of civilians and two UN peacekeepers, the world body called upon **France** and other states to organize an international force to restore order and prevent a “second Rwanda.” The operation, the **Interim Multinational Emergency Force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo**, officially a **European Union (EU)** mission, helped restore calm and then withdrew from the country. After 2003, MONUC continued to face problems with the noncompliance of various parties toward the peace process. In 2005, MONUC troops from **South Africa**, **Nepal**, **Pakistan**, and **India** launched a **Chapter Seven** offensive in Ituri, killing at least 50 gunmen. In 2006, the EU briefly deployed the **European Union Force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo** to assist MONUC during the election process in the country. Rebel groups continued to attack civilians, prompting the latter to protest against MONUC in 2008. Civilians threw rocks and fire bombs at the MONUC compound in Goma.

The mission continued operations against rebels in the country, with some contingents more being aggressive than others. Some MONUC units fled from their bases rather than engage the rebels. The year 2009 witnessed continued clashes, with MONUC peacekeepers being moved around the country in attempts to stem the crises. In 2010, the DRC government demanded that the UN begin phasing out MONUC to reduce accusations that the presence of the global peacekeepers were the key for it maintaining power in the state. In response, the UN transformed MONUC into the **United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo** on 1 July 2010.

In early 2010, MONUC consisted of approximately 18,600 troops, 70 military observers, 940 police, 1,001 international civilians, 2,610 local staff, and 630 UN volunteers. Major contributors of personnel included Bangladesh, Benin, **Egypt**, Ghana, India, Jordan, Morocco, Nepal, **Pakistan**, Senegal, South Africa, Tunisia, and Uruguay. There were 160 fatalities among MONUC members between November 1999 and June 2010. The mission’s annual budget was \$1.35 billion. *See also* EUROPEAN UNION POLICE MISSION IN THE

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (EUPOL RD CONGO); EUROPEAN UNION POLICE MISSION IN KINSHASA (EUPOL KINSHASA); UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN THE CONGO (ONUC).

**UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION STABILIZATION MISSION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (MONUSCO).**

On 28 May 2010, the **United Nations (UN)** mandated the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) with Security Council Resolution 1925 to replace the **United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)**. MONUSCO is essentially MONUC remanded with a slightly smaller size following demands by the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Many groups in the DRC accused the government of utilizing MONUC as a means of remaining in power and noted that no progress had been made in the country. The government's response included demands for the renaming of MONUC to emphasize progress in the peace process. MONUSCO's mission includes protecting civilians and UN personnel, supporting national and international efforts to bring those accused of crimes to justice, encouraging efforts to ensure that rebel groups comply with human rights and international law, aiding with the peace process, assisting the government reintegrate territories freed from rebel control and rebuild their political and legal institutions, providing support for the rebuilding of the criminal justice system, and helping with the implementation of local elections. The Security Council authorized MONUSCO a maximum of 19,815 military personnel, 760 military observers, 391 police officers, and 1,050 personnel assigned to **formed police units**. Approximately 2,000 peacekeepers withdrew from the DRC by the end of June 2010, to reduce the total number of MONUC personnel to the figures desired for a slightly smaller MONUSCO.

**UNITED NATIONS PEACEBUILDING SUPPORT OFFICE IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (BONUCA).**

The United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA) was technically not a **peacekeeping** organiza-

tion but a field office of the Department of Political Affairs of the **United Nations (UN)**. BONUCA provided a UN presence for the coordination of the global organization's multiple efforts in the **Central African Republic** and served as a liaison with other international organizations working in the country. These included the **United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad** and **Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in Central Africa**. The Security Council approved the office on 10 February 2000, and BONUCA suffered one fatality during its mission. The **United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic** replaced BONUCA on 1 January 2010.

**UNITED NATIONS PEACE FORCES (UNPF)**. On 31 March 1995, the **United Nations (UN)** Security Council, with Resolution 982, voted to restructure the **United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)** peacekeeping operation in the former **Yugoslavia**. UNPROFOR, which had elements in **Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina**, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of **Macedonia**, ceased to exist, and the latter three missions became independent peacekeeping operations as the **United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia, United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina**, and **United Nations Preventive Deployment Force**. Each of the three missions was commanded by its own **force commander** and civilian chief of mission. At the same time, the Security Council established the United Nations Peace Forces (UNPF) in Zagreb, Croatia, as a theater headquarters to oversee all UN peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia. The **special representative** and a theater force commander resided with the UNPF headquarters. Essentially, UNPF was only a headquarters element and not a separate peacekeeping mission. UNPF ended its mission on 31 January 1996, following the withdrawal of most UN peacekeepers and the introduction of **North Atlantic Treaty Organization** troops to Bosnia and Herzegovina. UNPF's personnel authorization was combined with those of the other three missions for a total of 57,370 soldiers supported by international and local civilian staff. Nine UNPF headquarters staff died between 31 March 1995 and 31 January 1996. Funding for UNPF and the other three UN missions was included in



a single-budget estimate of \$4.6 billion from 12 January 1992 to 31 March 1996.

**UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS (UNFICYP).** The **United Nations (UN)** deployed the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) as a tool to help settle a civil war in Cyprus. UNFICYP is one of the three longest ongoing **peacekeeping** operations in the history of the UN. The two operations that have been on the ground longer than UNFICYP are the **United Nations Truce Supervision Organization** and **United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan**.

**Great Britain** granted Cyprus independence on 16 August 1960. The population at independence was approximately 80 percent Greek descent and 18 percent Turkish descent. The two groups exhibit vastly different and conflicting cultures. In addition, both Greece and Turkey maintained close relations with the population of Cyprus. Independence included a pledge that the island state would never unite with either Greece or Turkey to eliminate the fears of one group about being incorporated into a state hostile to its culture. The new constitution guaranteed that the president would always be a Greek Cypriot, while the vice president would be a Turkish Cypriot. Each leader would be elected by his segment of the total Cypriot population. The Council of Ministers would consist of seven Greek Cypriots and three Turkish Cypriots.

In late 1963, President Archbishop Makarios of Cyprus proposed several amendments to the constitution that would decrease the influence of the Turkish Cypriots in the government. In response to the resulting civil disturbances, Turkish forces, stationed in Cyprus under the Treaty of Guarantee, left their barracks in support of the Turkish Cypriot community on 24 December 1963. Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey arranged a cease-fire in Cyprus and persuaded the Cypriot government to accept a “peacemaking” operation consisting of soldiers from the three former states to patrol a neutral zone between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots in the capital of Nicosia. This zone, known as the **Green Line**, was actually manned almost exclusively by British soldiers. Cyprus brought the issue to the UN during December 1963. **Secretary-General** U Thant appointed Lieutenant-General P. S. Gyani of **India** as his **special representative** on the

Cyprus crisis. Gyani's mission included observing the peace process set up by Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey in Cyprus.

The situation in Cyprus continued to deteriorate despite the attempts to settle the conflict. On 4 March 1964, the Security Council adopted Resolution 186, which called for the establishment of the UNFICYP. The body presented UNFICYP with a mission of preventing a recurrence of fighting, as well as maintaining law and order where necessary. The actual mandate for UNFICYP was vague to win the acceptance of the permanent members of the Security Council and avoid a battle over a potential veto. The original mandate envisioned a mission length of three months. The first contingent, a Canadian unit, arrived in Cyprus on 13 March 1964. The original contingents of UNFICYP included **Australia** (police officers), Austria (police officers), Canada (infantry), Denmark (infantry and police officers), Finland (infantry), Great Britain (infantry from the units permanently stationed on Cyprus), Ireland (infantry), New Zealand (police officers), and Sweden (infantry and police officers). The Swedish military unit arrived after being detached from the **United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC)**. UNFICYP represents the first UN peacekeeping mission where one of the permanent Security Council members—Great Britain—contributed a large military force. Permanent members were usually excluded from peacekeeping operations until after 1989, due to the political complications of the **Cold War**.

The belligerents did not trust the British contingent of UNFICYP. An incident involving a British airman, not assigned to UNFICYP, running weapons to the Turkish Cypriots intensified Greek Cypriot mistrust of the British. (Members of the Swedish contingent were also caught attempting to smuggle weapons to the Turkish Cypriots at **Lefka** in Eastern Cyprus.) Anti-British feelings extended to the other contingents of the operation. The Canadians, concerned over being mistaken for British soldiers, repainted their vehicles and displayed their maple leaf national emblem on their equipment. The Irish and Finns also exhibited apprehension over serving with the British on Cyprus. As a result, Great Britain reduced its contingent size. UNFICYP personnel were deployed to match the administrative divisions of the island state. The British and Finns, under Canadian command, moved into Nicosia. Contingents in the districts of

Kyrenia and Lefka deployed along the dividing lines between Turkish and Greek Cypriots, while peacekeepers in the remaining districts established posts in areas where ethnic conflict seemed likely.

One of the missions of UNFICYP included the demarcation of the cease-fire line on the ground. To accomplish the mission, the peacekeepers resorted to such tactics as painting white lines within urban areas and even painting boulders in rural areas. The peacekeepers of UNFICYP also assisted in restoring the Cyprus mail service. The UN police units, known as UNFICYP Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL), conducted joint patrols with the Cyprus police, while also manning their own posts.

According to the UN, each belligerent in the civil crisis viewed the role of UNFICYP differently. The government, dominated by Greek Cypriots, saw UNFICYP as a tool to assist it in returning all territory to its sovereignty. The Turkish Cypriots viewed UNFICYP as a tool to assist them in returning the government of the island to the provisions of the 1960 Constitution. The secretary-general rejected both views and declared the neutrality of the operation. Ethnic conflict, which led to the loss of life of many peacekeepers, finally cooled by the end of December 1964. Fighting renewed itself with great intensity in November 1967. A UN-brokered agreement led to the removal of Greek national troops from Cyprus and a softening of the political crisis.

On 15 July 1974, the Cyprus National Guard launched a coup against the Makarios government. The Turkish government initiated a large-scale military operation in northern Cyprus under what it declared as the terms of the Treaty of Guarantee and landed troops on the island on 20 July 1974. In turn, the UN reinforced UNFICYP, which emerged as a major participant in the conduct of humanitarian operations throughout Cyprus. Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey, in consultation with the UN, agreed to establish a neutral security zone around the enclave carved out by Turkish forces. UNFICYP peacekeepers would be the only personnel authorized to enter the security zone. In addition, UNFICYP would replace Greek or Greek Cyprus forces within smaller Turkish enclaves. UNFICYP would also provide security to villages consisting of both Greek and Turkish civilians.

Since 1974, UNFICYP observes a cease-fire and neutral buffer zone that covers the island from north to south. The buffer zone is seven kilometers at its widest point and only 20 meters at its narrowest point (within Nicosia). Patrolling the buffer zone still has its hazards, as peacekeepers are tested and taunted by the belligerents. This operation was the first UN peacekeeping mission to establish a rapid mobile force to quickly react to crisis situations. The Canadians, Danes, and Finns originally contributed personnel to the mobile force, which used scout cars, armored cars, and jeeps mounting recoilless rifles to display UN determination within Nicosia.

UNFICYP achieved a maximum strength of 6,411 peacekeepers in June 1964. The strength of the operation in March 2010 is approximately 856 troops, 68 police officers, 40 international civilians, and 111 local staff. Twenty-two countries currently contribute military personnel to the operation. Major contributors of personnel include Argentina, Hungary, Slovakia, and **Great Britain**. There have been 180 fatalities among UNFICYP personnel between March 1964 and March 2010. It is interesting to note that in 1964 the contingents of UNFICYP originated predominantly from Western and neutral European states. Cyprus was seen as a dispute between two members of the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization** and Cyprus. Thus, East European states were excluded from the operation.

Due to the controversy over funding the **United Nations Emergency Force I** and ONUC, the UN originally opted to fund UNFICYP by billing the government of Cyprus and asking the contingent providers to cover their own costs. Funding by the Cypriots did not materialize in the early years. The contingent providers, with the exception of the Scandinavian states, covered the costs of their units, while the UN sought voluntary contributions from member states. The former Soviet Union (**Russia**), **China**, **France**, and **India** represent the many states that refused to contribute to UNFICYP's bills. Other states offered extremely small sums, including South Vietnam, which pledged only \$1,000. Cyprus and Greece have enlarged their contributions to the operation. The Security Council later approved a resolution to finance UNFICYP through a **special assessment** on all members of the organization. The annual cost of UNFICYP is \$54.41 million, with Cyprus contributing approximately \$18.1 million and

Greece offering \$6.5 million. UNFICYP is still in place, with little hope of a chance of a settlement to the situation on Cyprus in the near future.

**UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS CIVILIAN POLICE.** *See* UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS (UNFICYP).

**UNITED NATIONS PERMANENT STANDING FORCE.** *See* STANDING ARMY.

**UNITED NATIONS POLICE SUPPORT GROUP (UNPSG).** The **United Nations (UN)** Security Council mandated the United Nations Police Support Group (UNPSG) on 19 December 1997, with Resolution 1145. In January 1998, UNPSG assumed the policing duties of the **United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium**. The UN authorized up to 180 police officers for UNPSG and presented it with the mission to monitor Croatian police activities in the Danube region. In particular, the UN wanted UNPSG to oversee the conduct of the Croatian police with returning displaced persons. UNPSG maintained three mobile patrols in the region and observed the Croatian police at 14 stations. One particular challenge involved working with Croatian authorities to increase the number of ethnic Serb police officers in the area.

The UN opted to phase out UNPSG following the determination that the Croatian police were handling issues within international standards. The UN coordinated its withdrawal with the **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)**. UNPSG's mandate expired on 15 October 1998, and the **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Mission to Croatia** assumed the police monitoring duties the next day. The maximum fielded strength of UNPSG was 114 police officers, along with international and local support personnel. Nineteen states contributed personnel to UNPSG without any fatalities, and the group cost the UN approximately \$23 million.

**UNITED NATIONS POLITICAL OFFICE FOR SOMALIA (UNPOS).** The United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) is directed by the Department of Political Affairs of the **United Nations**

(UN). The UN mandated the political office on 15 April 1995, to assist in the peace process within **Somalia**. UNPOS is manned by 34 international and six local civilians.

**UNITED NATIONS PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENT FORCE (UNPREDEP).** The **United Nations (UN)** fielded the **United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)** in 1992, to provide security and monitor the conflict in areas of the former **Yugoslavia**. The UN Security Council mandated the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) on 31 March 1995, with Resolution 983, to replace the **United Nations Protection Force in Macedonia**. UNPREDEP represents a unique type of **peacekeeping**, where the UN deployed an operation in an area without a conflict to prevent an outbreak of possible violence. The mandate, adopted from the former UNPROFOR mission in the state, included monitoring the 420-kilometer border between the Former Yugoslav Republic of **Macedonia (FYROM)** and its neighbors, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Albania; offering advice to the local communities; and providing humanitarian assistance as required. UNPREDEP manned 24 permanent and 33 temporary observation posts along the borders between the three countries. The peacekeepers remained on the Macedonian side of the borders.

In 1998, the UN increased the size of UNPREDEP to 1,050 observers due to increased tensions in the area. On 28 February 1999, the Security Council failed to extend the mandate of UNPREDEP, and the mission officially ended. Due to international concerns about the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization** campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia), **Russia** abstained in the vote, and **China** opted to veto the resolution. A veto by a single permanent member of the Security Council defeats a resolution. The Chinese complained that UN peacekeeping operations should not be open-ended missions, and it was, thus, time to end the mandate of UNPREDEP; however, the Chinese were upset that the FRYOM had opened diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

The **United Nations Peace Forces (UNPF)**, headquartered in Zagreb, **Croatia**, served as the administrative and logistical center for UNPREDEP, as well as the **United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia** and **United Nations Protection Force**

**in Bosnia and Herzegovina.** During its four-year term, UNPREDEP coordinated its work with the **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)** and the **European Union**. The maximum authorized strength of UNPREDEP was approximately 1,050 soldiers and military observers, as well as 26 civilian police officers. Twenty-seven states contributed personnel to the force, which had four fatalities during its four years. UNPREDEP cost the UN approximately \$166.5 million. Unpaid assessed contributions totaled approximately \$20 million at the time of the operation's termination.

**UNITED NATIONS PROTECTED AREAS (UNPA).** The **United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)** was originally mandated to safeguard three United Nations Protected Areas (UNPA) in **Croatia**. These geographical areas were populated by ethnic Serbs but located within the newly independent Croatia. The UNPA included western Slavonia, Krajina, and Baranja and western Srem in eastern Slavonia. Prior to the arrival of UNPROFOR, Serbian forces moved into Croat areas adjacent to the UNPA, which later became known as **Pink Zones**.

**UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE (UNPROFOR).** The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) can be one of the more challenging **peacekeeping** operations to follow throughout its life. It was originally deployed to the newly established state of **Croatia**, which seceded from the former **Yugoslavia** in 1991. As civil war spread throughout the area, the mission expanded, as peacekeepers were dispatched to **Bosnia and Herzegovina** and then **Macedonia**. The peacekeepers in the former became the **United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina**, while the troops assigned to the latter were labeled as the **United Nations Protection Force in Macedonia**. All three of the UNPROFOR missions later evolved into separate UN peacekeeping operations with different names.

The term "UNPROFOR" has *three* possible meanings. First, it represented the entire **United Nations (UN)** peacekeeping mission in the former Yugoslavia between February 1992 and March 1995. The peacekeepers in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia officially fell under the command of UNPROFOR. Second, the title UNPROFOR represented the peacekeeping mission established within the borders

of Croatia (the original mandate of the operation). Third, the term “UNPROFOR” is applied to the nine-month mission that replaced the United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The fragile federation of states comprising Yugoslavia began breaking up following the death of Marshal Tito in 1980. In June 1991, Slovenia and Croatia seceded from Yugoslavia, later followed by Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia. Vojvodina, Montenegro, and Kosovo chose to remain in a Yugoslavian federation with Serbia. The latter state objected to the secession movements and elected to aid the Serbian population living in the self-declared independent areas. Serbian efforts were directed against Croatia and, later, Bosnia-Herzegovina. On 23 November 1991, at a meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, the belligerents agreed to a cease-fire, but it quickly collapsed (as would the many cease-fires to come). The Geneva meeting also gave birth to the idea of a UN-mandated peacekeeping operation to oversee a cease-fire in the former Yugoslavia. The European Community elected to recognize the independence of Croatia and Slovenia in January 1992. Following the dispatch of a UN advance team, the Security Council passed Resolution 743 on 21 February 1992, officially mandating UNPROFOR, which would enter Croatia and establish what became known as **United Nations Protected Areas (UNPA)**. The latter were developed around pockets of the Serbian minority population in Croatia.

The UN envisioned an operation consisting of 14,000 armed and civilian personnel, including up to 12 combat battalions, 530 police officers, and more than 100 civilian administrators with an initial 12-month mandate. Combat battalions assigned to UNPROFOR and posted in Croatia included those from Argentina, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic (originally fielded under the banner of Czechoslovakia), Denmark, **France**, Jordan, Kenya, Nepal, Poland, and **Russia**. Additional support personnel deployed from 18 other countries.

UNPROFOR’s mission was based around the protection of three UNPA, including western Slavonia, Krajina, and Baranja and western Srem in eastern Slavonia. UNPROFOR’s problems developed early, as the Serbs increased their holdings in Croatia prior to the arrival of peacekeepers to oversee the original UNPA, while some areas of the zones were actually under the control of Croatian forces.



Atrocities, “concentration” camps, and cease-fire failures continued to plague the peacekeepers after the official inauguration of the mission on 15 March 1992. During the next month, civil strife between Muslims, Croats, and Serbs erupted in Bosnia and Herzegovina. On 27 April 1992, Bosnian leaders requested the emergency deployment of UN peacekeepers to prevent a full-scale civil war from breaking out in the new state.

As cease-fires began to take hold in Croatia, global attention shifted to Bosnia and Herzegovina and the UN decision to deploy peacekeepers from Croatia to form the United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The UN would later again expand the peacekeeping mission by posting combat personnel in Macedonia as a preventive move prior to any civil unrest. The Security Council altered the structure of UNPROFOR with Resolution 871 on 4 October 1993. The UN reorganized UNPROFOR into a headquarters with three subordinate operations under it, including the **United Nations Protection Force in Croatia**, United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and United Nations Protection Force in Macedonia. The commanders of the three latter missions reported to the UNPROFOR **force commander** situated in Croatia. The United Nations Protection Force in Croatia carried out the mission originally given to UNPROFOR forces in the state prior to 4 October 1993. The United Nations Protection Force in Croatia officially transitioned into the **United Nations Confidence Restoration Mission in Croatia (UNCRO)** on 31 March 1995. The UN mandated the **United Nations Peace Forces (UNPF)** to serve as a headquarters element for the newly established UNCRO, the United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the **United Nations Preventive Deployment Force**.

Manpower for all three operations is officially rolled up into a UNPROFOR total of 38,599 military personnel, 803 civilian police officers, and 4,632 international and local civilian staff. The maximum authorized strength of UNPROFOR peacekeepers in Croatia prior to 4 October 1993, was 14,000 military and civilian personnel. There were 167 fatalities among UNPROFOR personnel in all three areas, and the force was funded through **special assessment**; however, it is difficult to determine the exact costs for each location due to UN insistence to include all three UNPROFOR missions, as well as

their follow-on operations after 1995, in a single budgetary total. The UN reports the total cost between January 1992 and March 1996 as \$4.6 billion. *See also* BRIQUEMONT, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL FRANCIS; MACKENZIE, BRIGADIER-GENERAL LEWIS; MORILLON, GENERAL PHILIPPE; ROSE, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR MICHAEL.

**UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA.** The **United Nations (UN)** Security Council altered the structure of the **United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)** with Resolution 871 on 4 October 1993. The UN reorganized UNPROFOR into a headquarters with three subordinate operations under it, including the United Nations Protection Force in Croatia, United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and **United Nations Protection Force in Macedonia**. The commanders of the three latter missions reported to the UNPROFOR **force commander** situated in Croatia. In February 1994, UN **secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali** requested and received the authorization to call for air strikes by the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)** in support of peacekeepers. The air strikes resulted in limited damage to the Serbs and embarrassment for NATO and the UN. Occasional NATO air strikes in support of UNPROFOR continued throughout 1994, as Serb and Bosnian forces renewed their offensives and counteroffensives against each other. A series of large NATO air strikes against Serbian targets in November 1994 prompted the latter to hold several hundred peacekeepers as hostages. Personnel, including peacekeepers from Canada, **France**, **Great Britain**, the Netherlands, **Russia**, and Ukraine were either physically detained or prevented from leaving their garrisons as a means to force NATO to suspend air raids. At one airfield, peacekeepers were forced to lie on the runway to deter NATO bombing raids. The peacekeepers were gradually released or allowed to depart their garrisons.

On 30 November 1994, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali announced that the UN might withdraw from the area unless a ceasefire was successfully implemented. At the same time, the **United States** began backing away from its call for the use of force against the Serbs. NATO projected that it would need to deploy up to 50,000 soldiers to safely withdraw the 23,000 UN peacekeepers if they were

ordered to depart the divided country. The Security Council established the mission as a separate **peacekeeping** operation on 31 March 1995, to be known as the United Nations Protection Force. This new operation should not be confused with the earlier operation operating under the same name between February 1992 and March 1995. The mission operated for nine months as an independent mission with its own force commander but reported to a **special representative** and theater commander assigned to the **United Nations Peace Forces**, a headquarters unit.

UN peacekeepers faced many difficulties during their tenure in **Bosnia and Herzegovina**, including fighting around **Bihac** and the massacre of Bosnian Muslim men and boys by Serbs in **Srebrenica**. Following the signing of the Dayton Accords, the United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina officially transitioned into the **United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH)** on 20 December 1995. NATO fielded the **Implementation Force** to take over the security duties of the United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Manpower for all three UNPROFOR operations is officially rolled up into a total of 38,599 military personnel, 803 civilian police officers, and 4,632 international and local civilian staff. There were 167 fatalities among UNPROFOR personnel in all three areas. The force was funded through **special assessment**; however, it is difficult to determine the exact costs for each location due to UN insistence to include all three UNPROFOR missions, as well as their follow-on operations after 1995, in a single budgetary total. The UN reports the total cost between January 1992 and March 1996 as \$4.6 billion. *See also* BRIQUEMONT, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL FRANCIS; MACKENZIE, BRIGADIER-GENERAL LEWIS; MORILLON, GENERAL PHILIPPE; ROSE, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR MICHAEL; SAFE AREAS.

**UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE IN CROATIA.** *See* UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE (UNPROFOR).

**UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE IN MACEDONIA.** The **United Nations (UN)** originally deployed the **United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)** in the newly established state of **Croatia**, which seceded from the former **Yugoslavia** in 1991.

As civil war spread throughout the area, the mission expanded, as peacekeepers were dispatched to **Bosnia and Herzegovina** and then **Macedonia**. The Security Council altered the structure of UNPROFOR with Resolution 871 on 4 October 1993. The UN reorganized UNPROFOR into a headquarters with three subordinate operations under it, including the United Nations Protection Force in Croatia, **United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina**, and United Nations Protection Force in Macedonia. The commanders of the three latter missions reported to the UNPROFOR **force commander** situated in Croatia. The United Nations Protection Force in Macedonia was unique in that it was the first to use what is known as preventative **peacekeeping**. The headquarters was located in Skopje.

The United Nations Protection Force in Macedonia consisted of one battalion of approximately 700 personnel, 35 military observers, and 26 civilian police officers. The mission of the observers and combat unit was to patrol Macedonia's border with the new Yugoslavia to ensure that ethnic conflict did not spill over into the former state. The civilian police officers assigned with the operation monitored the Macedonian police. Company-sized contingents were initially provided by Finland, Norway, the **United States**, and Sweden. In 1994, the United States increased its contingent to allow the transfer of at least one Scandinavian company to the United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The UN replaced the United Nations Protection Force in Macedonia with the **United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP)** on 31 March 1995. UNPREDEP's force commander reported to the **special representative** and a theater commander with the **United Nations Peace Forces** headquarters in Croatia.

Manpower for all three UNPROFOR operations is officially rolled up into a total of 38,599 military personnel, 803 civilian police officers, and 4,632 international and local civilian staff. There were 167 fatalities among UNPROFOR personnel in all three areas. The force was funded through **special assessment**; however, it is difficult to determine the exact costs for each location due to UN insistence to include all three UNPROFOR missions, as well as their follow-on operations after 1995, in a single budgetary total. The UN reports the total cost between January 1992 and March 1996 as \$4.6 billion.

**UNITED NATIONS REGIONAL CENTRE FOR PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY FOR CENTRAL ASIA (UNRCCA).**

The United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA) is directed by the Department of Political Affairs of the **United Nations (UN)** and is not technically a **peacekeeping** operation. The UN mandated the office on 10 December 2007, to coordinate the organization's efforts to promote conflict prevention diplomacy within Central Asia. UNRCCA, headquartered in Turkmenistan, is manned by seven international and 13 local civilians.

**UNITED NATIONS SECURITY FORCE (UNSF).**

The **United Nations (UN)** established the **United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA)** to administer West Irian (New Guinea), maintain law and order, and protect individual rights. At the same time, the **secretary-general** developed the United Nations Security Force (UNSF) to provide security for UNTEA. UNSF consisted of 1,500 peacekeepers from **Pakistan**, as well as U.S. aircraft and crews and Canadian support personnel. The mission of UNSF included maintaining law and order and building a new local police force. The advance contingent of UNSF, including 340 personnel, arrived in West Irian on 3 October 1962, followed by the remainder of the peacekeepers on 5 October 1962. After the successful completion of the mission, UNSF personnel were replaced by soldiers from **Indonesia** during April 1963. UNSF, along with UNTEA, officially departed West Irian on 1 May 1963. Indonesia and the Netherlands financed UNSF and UNTEA. Taxes collected by UNTEA during the administration of the territory by the UN were applied to the funds owed by the two states.

**UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE BALKANS (UNSCOB).**

The Greek civil war, which began during World War II, intensified following Greece's liberation from the Germans as communist guerrilla forces challenged the former government. The **United States** persuaded the **United Nations (UN)** to establish the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB). Although not a **peacekeeping** operation in the classic sense of the term, UNSCOB resembled several observation missions that would be fielded by the UN in future decades. The purpose of UNSCOB

included observing whether Greece's communist neighbors were still providing aid to the rebel forces. The international organization envisioned the participants in UNSCOB as being from **China, France, Great Britain**, the United States, and the Soviet Union, along with **Australia**, Brazil, Mexico, the Netherlands, **Pakistan**, and Poland. The Soviet Union and Poland declined to participate in UNSCOB due to the nature of the conflict. The remaining states deployed a total of approximately 40 observers to Greece. The observers were reduced and eventually withdrawn in 1954, following the resolution of the Greek civil war in favor of the pro-Western government.

**UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.** This group, also known as the Committee of Thirty-Four, is a committee of the General Assembly of the **United Nations (UN)**. The committee, consisting of 34 member states, was established by Resolution 2006 (XIX) in 1965. The purpose of the organization is to review and provide advice to the General Assembly on the conduct and financing of **peacekeeping** operations.

**UNITED NATIONS STABILIZATION MISSION IN HAITI (MINUSTAH).** Political problems after the tainted 2000 presidential election in **Haiti** continued to grow, until fighting forced President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to depart the country in February 2004. On 29 February 2004, the **United Nations (UN)** Security Council mandated the **Multinational Interim Force Haiti**, pending the arrival of a UN **peacekeeping** mission. The Security Council mandated the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) on 30 April 2004, with Resolution 1542. MINUSTAH's mandate includes supporting the government in maintaining a secure environment for the peace process, helping with the monitoring and restructuring of the police, assisting in disarmament and demobilization programs, helping restore and maintain the rule of law and public safety, protecting civilians as well as UN personnel and equipment, supporting the political process, assisting the government in conducting elections at all levels, and promoting and monitoring human rights.

MINUSTAH personnel have been involved in many incidents with Haitians. The worst occurred on 6 July 2005, when a MINUSTAH ground operation resulted in many casualties among the local

populace. The circumstances surrounding the incident have not been sorted out due to accusations and counteraccusations about the role and numbers of victims. As of March 2010, MINUSTAH consists of approximately 7,032 troops, 2,025 police officers, and 1,900 international and local civilians. Major contributors of personnel include Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, **China**, Guatemala, **India**, Jordan, Nepal, **Nigeria**, **Pakistan**, Peru, the Philippines, Senegal, Sri Lanka, and Uruguay. There have been 152 fatalities among MINUSTAH personnel as of March 2010, which includes 96 personnel who were killed in the devastating January 2010 earthquake. The MINUSTAH earthquake fatalities included **Special Representative** and Head of Mission Hédi Annabi of Tunisia and Deputy Special Representative Luiz Carlos da Costa of Brazil. Much of the MINUSTAH operations shifted to earthquake survivor support as international aid flowed into the country. The annual cost of the mission, not including special funding following the earthquake, is \$611.75 million.

**UNITED NATIONS STAND-BY ARRANGEMENTS SYSTEM (UNSA).** The United Nations Stand-By Arrangements System (UNSA) is a program of the **United Nations (UN)** to establish a **rapid reaction force** for **peacekeeping** operations. UN member states participate at four different levels. At the first level, they list their military capabilities for peacekeeping support with the UN. The next level involves completing a detailed planning data sheet on their capabilities. The third level includes the signing of a memorandum of understanding between the UN and the member state related to providing military units on short notice for peacekeeping missions. The fourth level, introduced for participation beginning in 2002, goes one step further than signing a memorandum, by actually earmarking specific units and permitting UN reviews of their training and preparations for short-notice deployments. *See also* PARTICIPATING STATES AGREEMENT.

**UNITED NATIONS SUPPORT MISSION IN HAITI (UNSMIH).** The **United Nations (UN)** Security Council mandated the United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH) on 28 June 1996, with Resolution 1063, to replace the **United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH)**. UNSMIH's mandate included assisting **Haiti** in profes-

sionalizing its police force. The operation would also help ensure a stable and secure environment and assist with institution building and national reconciliation. UNSMIH began operations in June 1996 and was extended until June 1997, when it was replaced with the **United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti**. The maximum authorized strength of UNSMIH was 1,300 military personnel, 225 civilian police officers, and more than 250 international and local civilian personnel. There were no fatalities between July 1996 and July 1997. UNSMIH was financed by **special assessment** and some voluntary donor contributions of personnel. The total operation cost approximately \$56.1 million. *See also* MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN HAITI; UNITED NATIONS CIVILIAN POLICE MISSION IN HAITI (MIPONUH); UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER GROUP FOR THE VERIFICATION OF THE ELECTIONS IN HAITI (ONUVEH).

**UNITED NATIONS TEMPORARY EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY (UNTEA)**. The Netherlands granted independence to **Indonesia** in 1949; however, a dispute remained over the sovereignty of West New Guinea, also known as West Irian. The two states brought the West Irian dispute to the **United Nations (UN)** in 1954. The debate continued without settlement until 1962, when Indonesia dispatched paratroopers to West Irian. All parties finally signed an agreement on 15 August 1962. The disputants agreed to allow the UN to assume the administration of West Irian until 1 May 1963. The global body would establish what became known as the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) to administer the area, maintain law and order, and protect individual rights. At the same time, **Secretary-General U Thant** developed the **United Nations Security Force (UNSF)** to provide security for UNTEA. The secretary-general also assigned military observers to assist UNTEA in its mission.

**Major-General Indar Jit Rikhye** of **India** was selected to head the military observers assigned to UNTEA. Major-General Rikhye arrived in West Irian with 21 military observers from six states (Brazil, **India**, Ireland, **Nigeria**, Sri Lanka, and Sweden). All of the observers were detached from duty with either the **United Nations Emergency Force I** or the **United Nations Truce Supervision Organization** and arrived within days of the signing of the original



agreement. The observers assisted in the cease-fire and also helped resupply scattered Indonesian troops in the jungle. Collection of the Indonesian troops on West Irian was completed by 21 September 1962. Administrative transfer of West Irian to UNTEA occurred on 1 October 1962. The UN transferred administrative control of West Irian to Indonesia on 1 May 1963. The Netherlands and Indonesia split the costs for funding UNTEA. Taxes collected by the authority during the administration of the territory by the UN were applied to the funds owed by the two states.

**UNITED NATIONS TRANSITION ASSISTANCE GROUP (UNTAG).** Following World War I, the victorious Allied powers stripped **Germany** of its colonies. **South Africa** assumed responsibility for the area known as Southwest Africa. After World War II, the **United Nations (UN)** placed these former German colonies under its International Trusteeship System; however, South Africa refused to comply with UN requirements to schedule Southwest Africa for independence. The situation intensified as the local inhabitants formed the Southwest African People's Organization (SWAPO) and initiated a military campaign against the South African military from base camps in Angola. The Security Council passed Resolution 435 on 29 September 1978, which contained provisions for a settlement on Namibia developed by the Contact Group according to the terms of their Proposal for a Settlement on the Namibian Situation. Besides calling for the independence of Namibia, the resolution also proposed the establishment of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) with an initial 12-month mandate.

The Security Council envisioned using UNTAG to assist the **secretary-general's special representative** in ensuring that the Namibians were given the opportunity for free and fair elections. The original proposal for UNTAG estimated that its strength would include 7,500 personnel, which would consist of six combat battalions, each with three line companies. There would be one combat battalion in reserve. UNTAG would also have 200 military observers and 360 police monitors. The estimated cost was \$700 million.

The 1978 peace proposals collapsed due to linkage with the Angolan civil war. In 1988, South Africa, Cuba, and **Angola** signed the Tripartite Agreement, witnessed by the **United States** and Soviet

Union. This document linked the withdrawal of the Cubans from Angola with independence for Namibia. On 16 January 1989, the Security Council reaffirmed Resolution 435 and asked Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim to reevaluate UNTAG for cost-cutting measures. The secretary-general's response was approved by the Security Council in Resolution 632 on 16 February 1989. The 1989 proposal for UNTAG left the total strength at 7,500, but the UN would only deploy 4,650 personnel to Namibia. The combat elements would include three combat battalions, each consisting of five line companies. Four combat battalions would be held in reserve in their home countries. The reserve battalions account for the difference in the UNTAG total and deployed strength. Military observers would be increased to 300, while police monitors would be raised in number to 500. The secretary-general estimated that the entire operation would cost \$416 million. UNTAG's mission included monitoring the cease-fire, the reduction and withdrawal of the South African military from Namibia (Walvis Bay excluded), the return of SWAPO guerrillas, the conduct of local security and police forces, and the election process.

UNTAG claimed manpower contributions from more than 50 UN members. The combat battalions deployed to Namibia came from Finland, Kenya, and Malaysia. The Finns deployed to the northeast, the Malaysians to the northwest, and the Kenyans to the center and south. The reserve battalions were on alert in Bangladesh, Togo, Venezuela, and **Yugoslavia** and were on a seven-day notice for deployment to Namibia in case they were needed. Military observers arrived from 14 countries, police monitors from 24 countries, and election observers from 28 countries. It is interesting to note that **Switzerland**, despite its strict neutrality, provided a civilian medical unit and three civilian aircraft with crews.

The military component of UNTAG included the combat battalions and military observers. The three battalions provided an element of military security for UNTAG and the civilians of Namibia. The military observers monitored the cease-fire and the confinement of the South African military and SWAPO guerrillas in base camps. UNTAG consisted of both a civilian and military component. The two components reported to Special Representative Matti Ahtisaari of Finland and were considered equal in authority in the UN chain of command. The civilian component comprised six divisions, including

the special representative's office, the United Nations Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL), an independent jurist, an office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the electoral division, and an administrative division.

UNTAG divided Namibia into seven police districts, within which UNCIVPOL manned 49 police stations. Nearly two-thirds of the UNCIVPOL personnel were posted in the northern areas of Namibia due to the intensity of the guerrilla campaigns compared to southern areas of the state. The independent jurist's office provided advice on the release of political prisoners and detainees. UNHCR handled all issues dealing with the repatriation of refugees, including reception and resettlement. The electoral division coordinated the efforts to register voters and monitor the election process. Despite early breaches of the cease-fire, UNTAG's mission can be listed as an unqualified success. Cost-cutting measures and voluntary contributions reduced the 1989 estimate of \$416 million to a final tab for the UN of \$383 million.

**UNITED NATIONS TRANSITION MISSION IN HAITI (UNTMIH).** The **United Nations (UN)** Security Council mandated the United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH) on 30 July 1997, to replace the **United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH)**. The mandate of the operation included assisting the Haitian National Police (HNP) in its efforts to professionalize itself. The UN envisioned UNTMIH as a tool for training the HNP in crowd control, rapid reaction, and government security. UNTMIH completed its mission in **Haiti** during November 1997 and was replaced by the **United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti**.

The maximum authorized strength of UNTMIH was 250 civilian police officers and 50 military personnel. Eleven states contributed personnel to the mission, and there were no fatalities between August and November 1997. Canada and **Pakistan** provided the military personnel. UNTMIH was financed by **special assessment** and some voluntary donor contributions. The total operation cost approximately \$20.6 million. *See also* MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN HAITI; UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN HAITI (UNMIH); UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER GROUP FOR THE VERIFICATION OF THE ELECTIONS IN HAITI (ONUVEH).

**UNITED NATIONS TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION IN EAST TIMOR (UNTAET).** The **United Nations (UN)** Security Council mandated the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), located in **Indonesia**, on 25 October 1999 with Resolution 1272, to replace the **United Nations Mission in East Timor**. UNTAET's broad mandate included providing security and maintaining law and order, establishing an effective governmental administration, aiding in the development of civil and social services, ensuring the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance, supporting the capacity-building for self-government, and assisting in the establishment of conditions for sustainable development. In February 2000, the **International Force in East Timor** transferred command of military operations to UNTAET. The East Timorese voted on a Constituent Assembly on 30 August 2001, which then drafted a new constitution on 22 March 2002. East Timor became the independent state of Timor-Leste on 20 May 2002. The Security Council mandated a new **peacekeeping** operation, the **United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor**, on 17 May 2002, with a mandate to provide assistance to the government during a transitional period. The maximum authorized strength of UNTAET was 9,150 soldiers, 1,640 civilian police officers, 118 military observers, and 2,482 international and local civilian staff. Thirty countries provided military personnel, and 40 states provided police officers to UNTAET, which had 17 fatalities during the duration of the operation. The administration cost the UN approximately \$477 million annually.

**UNITED NATIONS TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION IN EASTERN SLAVONIA, BARANJA, AND WESTERN SIRMIMUM (UNTAES).** On 12 November 1995, an agreement provided for the peaceful integration of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium into the country of **Croatia**. The **United Nations (UN)** Security Council established the United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) on 15 January 1996. UNTAES was mandated to supervise and facilitate the demilitarization of the region, monitor the voluntary and safe return of refugees, contribute to peace in the region

through its presence, establish a temporary police force, and organize and assist in the election process. UNTAES completed its mission in January 1998. The maximum authorized strength of UNTAES was 2,346 soldiers, 97 military observers, and 404 civilian police officers. Thirty counties provided personnel for the administration. *See also* UNITED NATIONS CONFIDENCE RESTORATION MISSION IN CROATIA (UNCRO); UNITED NATIONS MISSION OF OBSERVERS IN PREVLAKA (UNMOP).

**UNITED NATIONS TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY IN CAMBODIA (UNTAC).** The Cambodian civil war ravaged that country since 1970, when General Lon Nol ousted the government of Prince Norodom Sihanouk. In 1975, a group known as the Khmer Rouge, led by Pol Pot, forced General Lon Nol to surrender the government to them. In 1978, the Vietnamese army intervened in Cambodia to help oust the Khmer Rouge, who was conducting massacres across the state. The civil crisis settled into a war between the Khmer Rouge and other rebel groups fighting against the Vietnamese-backed government. On 23 October 1991, the belligerents agreed to what is known as the Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, also referred to as the Paris Agreement. The **United Nations (UN)** Security Council supported the agreement and proposed the fielding of a **peacekeeping** operation to oversee the disarming and election process. The world body envisioned a mission similar to the one carried out by the highly successful **United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG)** in Namibia. The organization initially deployed the **United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC)** to begin the oversight of the peace process, while **Secretary-General** Javier Pérez de Cuéller planned the larger operation. The Security Council approved the formation of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) with Resolution 745 on 28 February 1992. UNTAC officially became operational on 15 March 1992 and absorbed UNAMIC.

In June 1993, UNTAC's maximum strength reached approximately 19,200 personnel, which included armed peacekeepers, police monitors, election observers, and civilian administrators. Combat battalions arrived from Bangladesh, Bulgaria, **France**, Ghana, **India**, **Indonesia**, Malaysia, the Netherlands, **Pakistan**, Tunisia, and Uru-

guay. Other UNTAC personnel deployed from Algeria, Argentina, **Australia**, Austria, Belgium, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, **Germany**, **Great Britain**, Ireland, Italy, **Japan**, New Zealand, **China**, the Philippines, Poland, **Russia**, Senegal, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand, and the **United States**. UNTAC's seven-fold mission included the administration of Cambodia until the election, verification of the withdrawal of all "foreign forces" (meaning the Vietnamese army), supervision of the cease-fire, disarmament of factions, oversight of the police, repatriation of refugees, and the general rehabilitation of the country. The location and removal of mines fell under the latter category.

UNTAC's organization basically paralleled that of its predecessor, UNTAG. **Yasushi Akashi** served as the **special representative**, and Lieutenant-General John Sanderson held the position of UNTAC **force commander**. Both men arrived in Cambodia on 15 March 1992. The UN divided the country into 11 sectors, with a combat battalion assigned to each. The smallest sector, around Phnom Phenh, hosted the battalion from Ghana and one from Indonesia. The latter battalion was designated as the Force Reserve for UNTAC. A second Indonesian battalion oversaw another sector to the north. The Indonesians, from 2 to 13 March 1992, were the first of the combat units to arrive in Cambodia. Deployment of the combat battalions continued through July 1992. The authority also contained a naval unit known as the Maritime Operational Group. The latter group included 137 naval observers who served on specially marked patrol boats of the Cambodian government. UNTAC established cantonment sites in Cambodia to host disarming factions.

The peacekeeping mission faced many difficulties, including the refusal of the Khmer Rouge to disarm, the assassination of UNTAC election observers, the detainment of observers, and the questionable performance of some of the contingents. In particular, the Japanese were criticized for desertion of their posts during periods of crisis. One Japanese team reportedly took its vehicle and drove to the Japanese embassy in Thailand. The Bulgarians have been accused of smuggling, aiding prostitution rings, drunkenness, and even excessive rowdy behavior on their return flights. One account relates that stewardesses had to seek refuge in the cockpit to escape from returning Bulgarian peacekeepers. Seventy-eight personnel died

while carrying out UNTAC's mission. The election was completed in May 1993, and Akashi and Sanderson departed in September 1993. Brigadier-General Tuswandi of India assumed command of the operation and the remaining contingents during the same month. UNTAC completed its withdrawal from Cambodia in November 1993. The administration cost the global body approximately \$2 billion between November 1991 and November 1993.

**UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION (UNTSO).** The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) is often credited with being the first **United Nations (UN) peacekeeping** operation, eight years before the mandating of the **United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I)**; however, its originators did not intend to establish a peacekeeping operation as we now think of the term. The Truce Commission overseeing the cease-fire between **Israel** and its Arab neighbors requested the deployment of neutral military observers on 21 May 1948, to assist with monitoring the military situation. **Ralph J. Bunche** asked the UN to approve the dispatch of 21 observers from each of the member states (Belgium, **France**, and the **United States**) of the Truce Commission, as well as five senior officers from Sweden. In addition, 51 guards from the UN headquarters in New York were also dispatched to assist the military observers, whose number was later increased to 93. A Soviet request for participation was denied. The military observers were unarmed and investigated alleged violations of the cease-fire between Israel and its neighbors.

The original group of observers departed the area at the end of a four-week cease-fire. Following renewed hostilities, a new cease-fire opened the way for a return of the neutral observers. Bunche, now the acting mediator following his predecessor's assassination by Jewish terrorists, concluded four armistice agreements between Israel and its neighbors. The Security Council, on 11 August 1949, adjusted the mandate of UNTSO to match these agreements and thus establish what became known as the **Mixed Armistice Commissions**. The commander of UNTSO was given the title of chief of staff and now responded directly to the **secretary-general**. The headquarters for UNTSO was established in Jerusalem. Following the 1956 war, UNTSO personnel assisted the peacekeepers assigned to UNEF I. Due to

their presence in the area, personnel from UNTSO acted as the initial contingent for UNEF I until the arrival of peacekeepers from states pledged to fill the new mission. General Burns, the chief of staff of UNTSO, was named by the secretary-general as the first **force commander** of UNEF I.

By the Six-Day War in 1967, all four of the Mixed Armistice Commissions had been unilaterally renounced by Israel; however, the presence of UNTSO peacekeepers on the Arab side of the borders provided the UN with personnel to immediately monitor the cease-fire at the conclusion of the conflict. The UNTSO personnel served as the only peacekeepers between Israel and its neighbors during the years between the Six-Day War and the Yom Kippur War of 1973. During the outbreak of the latter war, two peacekeepers in the Suez Canal area were killed in the Egyptian attack on Israeli forces. The UN dispatched the **United Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF II)** to the Sinai Peninsula following the conclusion of a cease-fire between **Egypt** and Israel. UNTSO personnel, later organized as the **Observer Group Egypt**, were assigned to assist UNEF II in its duties. The UNTSO also organized the **Observer Group Golan** to assist the **United Nations Disengagement Observer Force**, the **Observer Group Lebanon** to support the **United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon**, and the **Observer Group Beirut**. Following the withdrawal of UNEF II and its replacement by the **Multinational Force and Observers**, UNTSO remained in the Sinai Peninsula to assist the latter peacekeeping organization. Because of their availability, UNTSO personnel have been used to help in the initial fielding of several other UN peacekeeping missions.

The strength of UNTSO as of March 2010 is 151 military observers, 97 international civilians, and 130 local staff. Twenty-three states provide observers for UNTSO, and there have been 50 fatalities among UNTSO personnel between June 1948 and March 2010. UNTSO is one of only two current UN peacekeeping operations funded from the regular budget of the organization (the other mission is the **United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan**). UNTSO costs approximately \$66.22 million annually.

**UNITED NATIONS VERIFICATION MISSION IN GUATEMALA (MINUGUA).** The Guatemalan government endured a



lengthy conflict with Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) until successful negotiations brought a truce to the struggle in 1994. The General Assembly of the **United Nations (UN)** established the Human Rights Verification Mission in September 1994, to monitor human rights and refugee issues in Guatemala after the truce. In December 1996, the belligerents concluded a peace agreement. On 20 January 1997, the Security Council mandated the fielding of a small military observer group for attachment to the Human Rights Verification Mission by adopting Resolution 1094. The new combined mission received a new name—the United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) on 1 April 1997. The military observers assigned to MINUGUA were tasked to verify the cease-fire agreement and mandated for an initial three months.

The military observers deployed to six verification zones to monitor the demobilization of the URNG. The UN established two concentric circles around each URNG **assembly point** to separate the demobilizing forces from government troops. Individual MINUGUA peacekeepers were assigned to monitor government units. The peacekeepers successfully disarmed URNG fighters and reported their completed mission to the Guatemalan government on 14 May 1997. With the completion of its mandate, the military observers initiated a withdrawal from the country on 17 May 1997, and the last element departed 10 days later. The maximum authorized strength of MINUGUA was 145 military observers and 43 civilian police officers. Eighteen states contributed personnel to the mission without any fatalities. MINUGUA cost the UN approximately \$4.57 million.

**UNITED NATIONS YEMEN OBSERVATION MISSION (UN-YOM).** A crisis erupted in Yemen following a coup against the Royal government of the state in September 1962. Yemen, which withdrew from a federation with **Egypt** in December 1961, faced a civil war situation with a new Revolutionary government backed by Egypt against the recently ousted guerrilla forces of the former Royal government. The Soviet Union recognized the new government, and Egypt dispatched a large military force to bolster the Revolutionary government in the civil war. Saudi Arabia, which shares a border with Yemen, opted to send support to the former Royalists. The **United Nations (UN)** tackled the problem when faced with the deci-

sion of whether to accept a Royalist or Revolutionary delegation at its headquarters in New York. King Hussein of Jordan recommended the deployment of a **peacekeeping** operation to the area. The king, naturally favoring a situation that could help another government based on royalty, had turned down an offer of peacekeepers in his own state only four years earlier. **Secretary-General U Thant** dispatched Undersecretary-General **Ralph J. Bunche** to the area. Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt agreed to accept the terms for a settlement offered by the UN. Saudi Arabia would end its aid to the Royalists and not permit the group to operate from Saudi territory. In return, Egypt would withdraw its forces from Yemen. The UN would then establish a **demilitarized zone** along the Saudi–Yemeni border. This zone would extend for 20 miles on each side of the border, and a peacekeeping operation would then assume observation of the area. Saudi Arabia and Egypt agreed to fund the operation.

The Security Council mandated the United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM) in Resolution 179 on 11 June 1963, and the secretary-general appointed **Lieutenant-General Carl C. von Horn** of Sweden to serve as the first **force commander** of the operation. Von Horn held the position of chief of staff of the **United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)** prior to his new assignment. The personnel assigned to UNYOM, which was envisioned as a short duration mission, were detailed from UNTSO and the **United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I)**. A 114-man unit from **Yugoslavia**, dispatched from UNEF I, formed the core of the new operation. The other original peacekeepers of UNYOM represented **Australia**, Canada, Denmark, Ghana, Norway, and Sweden. In January 1964, additional personnel arrived from the states of **India**, Italy, the Netherlands, and **Pakistan**. All of the contingents remained with UNYOM for its duration, except Australia, which withdrew its military observers in November 1963. The UNYOM maximum strength was 189 personnel.

UNYOM conducted ground and air patrols of the demilitarized zone and set up checkpoints along the roads and trails crossing the area. The mandate of UNYOM permitted observation of the demilitarized zone but not the border between Yemen and the British-dominated South Arabian Federation or the nondemarcated frontier between Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Arms continued to reach Royalist

forces across these areas outside of UNYOM's mandate. In addition, Egypt did not completely remove its forces from Yemen. In August 1964, Saudi Arabia announced that it would cease funding its half of the UNYOM budget, and Egypt agreed to the termination of the peacekeeping operation.

UNYOM officially ended its operations on 4 September 1964. The Royalist forces and the new government settled their problems after the withdrawal of UNYOM. The Yemen peacekeeping operation is interesting in UN history due to the methods of financing and staffing the mission. UNYOM was financed by the two states in the Middle East that had intervened in the Yemeni civil war. Non-UN funding makes peacekeeping more acceptable to the Security Council since most operations operate under deficit conditions. The total cost of UNYOM was \$1.8 million. In addition, personnel assigned to UNYOM were detailed from existing peacekeeping operations, allowing the Security Council to simply request a state's permission to transfer personnel and not supply additional soldiers to staff a UN peacekeeping force.

**UNITED NATIONS ZIMBABWE FORCE.** In 1977, **Great Britain** and the **United States** recommended the establishment of a **United Nations (UN) peacekeeping** operation to oversee a proposed peace process in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. The force, included in the Anglo-American Proposals for a Settlement in Rhodesia, would supervise a cease-fire, support the civil authorities, and act as a liaison between the Rhodesian armed forces and the liberation forces of the Zimbabwe African People's Union and Zimbabwe African National Union. Andrew Young, U.S. ambassador to the UN, David Owen, then the British foreign secretary, and General Olusegun Obasanjo, then Nigerian head of state, discussed the proposed force in a meeting held in Lagos, where **Nigeria** agreed to supply the bulk of the peacekeeping contingent. The peacekeeping mission never deployed to Zimbabwe due to the failure of the peace process in the state. In 1979, the **Commonwealth Monitoring Force in Zimbabwe** deployed in response to a successful **Commonwealth**-negotiated peace initiative and accomplished the mission originally detailed for the aborted UN operation.

**UNITED STATES.** During the **Cold War**, the United States, as well as the other four permanent members of the **United Nations (UN)** Security Council (**China, France, Russia, and Great Britain**), provided very few soldiers to **peacekeeping** missions to maintain the perception of UN operational neutrality. For example, the **United Nations Truce Supervision Organization** is one of the few UN peacekeeping missions fielded prior to 1990 with U.S. soldiers on the ground as observers; however, during this period the United States offered significant transportation and logistical resources to UN peacekeeping operations and generally paid approximately 25 percent of nearly every mission due to the UN funding formula. This assistance led to a long feud with the UN over the peacekeeping funding issue. The United States has argued for decades that the cost of transporting peacekeepers from other countries should count toward its total funding assessment of an operation. The United States has also repeatedly declared that the peacekeeping funding formula is biased and not reflective of the economic growth in many Third World states. The United States did develop and/or contribute troops to several notable unilateral and noninternational organization-mandated peacekeeping operations during the Cold War, including **Multinational Forces I** and **Multinational Forces II** in **Lebanon** and the **Multinational Force and Observers** between **Egypt** and **Israel**.

After the end of the Cold War, the United States initially became more involved in UN peacekeeping and briefly provided considerable manpower to support operations in **Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Somalia**; however, the problems encountered by the UN in the former **Yugoslavia**, **Somalia**, and **Rwanda** between 1992 and 1995 persuaded U.S. politicians to discontinue large-scale participation in UN peacekeeping missions. In 2001, the United States ranked 14th (first among Security Council permanent members) when compared to all UN members for manpower contributions to peacekeeping operations mandated by the global organization. In 2010, the United States ranked 70th. The United States currently provides small numbers of military observers to many UN peacekeeping operations but still refrains from dispatching large units.

During the 1990s, the United States turned more to regional peacekeeping operations. These missions are fielded by international

organizations in which the United States has greater direct control over policy. For example, under the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization**, the United States has contributed large numbers of troops in support of the **Implementation Force**, **Kosovo Force**, and **Stabilisation Force** fielded in the former Yugoslavia. Following the invasion of **Iraq** in 2003, the United States organized the **Multinational Force in Iraq** and was also a major planner of the **International Security Assistance Force** in **Afghanistan**. The United States continues to provide troops for regional missions and contributes significantly to the training and logistical support of African peacekeeping forces.

U.S. participation in post–Cold War peacekeeping operations is clearly a product of policy under each presidential administration. President George H. W. Bush (1989–1993) led the United States during the transition from the Cold War to the post–Cold War world. President Bush made the first move to place greater numbers of U.S. forces into UN peacekeeping operations by participating in Somalia, which proved to be a public relations problem for his successor, President Bill Clinton (1993–2001). U.S. participation in peacekeeping increased under President Clinton as the United States agreed to provide troops for missions in the former Yugoslavia, yet, along with the rest of the world, chose to remain out of **Rwanda**. President George W. Bush (2001–2009) tended to keep the United States out of major UN operations and turned more to “peacebuilding” and “peace support operations” that followed U.S. military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Initially, President Bush also decreased U.S. support for the training and funding of such peacekeeping contingents as those in Africa; however, this policy began to alter as the administration learned the benefits of encouraging other states to deploy peacekeepers in support of U.S. foreign policy objectives.

In 2003, European states informed the United States that the crisis in **Liberia** was an U.S. problem. Wary of landing U.S. Marines in Liberia, President Bush opted to persuade **Nigeria** and the **Economic Community of West African States** to field the **Economic Community of West African States Mission in Liberia**. After 2003, U.S. funding for the training and support of African peacekeepers increased. The administration of President Barak Obama (2009–) has tended to follow a similar policy of remaining out of UN peacekeep-

ing operations, partially due to continuing U.S. commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, but it did announce in early 2009 that it intended to increase support for African peacekeeping missions.

**UNITED STATES MULTINATIONAL FORCES (USMNF).** *See* MULTINATIONAL FORCES I (MNF I); MULTINATIONAL FORCES II (MNF II).

**UNITED STATES SINAI SUPPORT MISSION (USSSM).** *See* MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS (MFO).

**UNITING FOR PEACE RESOLUTION.** The official name of this **United Nations (UN)** General Assembly document is General Assembly Resolution 377(V) of 3 November 1950. This resolution cleared the way for important issues deadlocked by a veto in the Security Council to be considered by the General Assembly, where the veto does not exist. Also known as the Acheson Plan, the resolution was first applied when the Security Council deadlocked on action during the **Korean War**. In 1956, **Great Britain** and **France** seized the Suez Canal, recently nationalized by **Egypt**, in cooperation with an attack by **Israel** across the Sinai Peninsula. The **United States** and Soviet Union drafted separate resolutions demanding the withdrawal of the invading forces. Great Britain and France elected to use their Security Council vetoes to block these resolutions. In turn, **Yugoslavia** suggested that the issue be moved to the General Assembly under the provisions of the 1950 resolution. The General Assembly, meeting for the first time in an emergency special session, passed Resolution 997(ES-1), which called for a cease-fire, the removal of all forces to the original armistice line, and the reopening of the Suez Canal. Further discussion between **Secretary-General** Trygve Lie and **Lester B. Pearson** of Canada led to the establishment of the **United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I)** to support and monitor the cease-fire.

Following the successful deployment of UNEF I, use of this method is often known as the Uniting for Peace Procedure. For example, the General Assembly applied this procedure on 14 January 1980, when the Security Council deadlocked on the issue of **Afghanistan**. The General Assembly asked for the withdrawal of all foreign

(i.e., Soviet) troops from Afghanistan. The eventual peace process in Afghanistan, negotiated with the assistance of the UN, resulted in the establishment of the **United Nations Good Offices in Afghanistan and Pakistan** in 1988. *See also* ADVISORY COMMITTEE.

**URQUHART, BRIAN.** Urquhart filled the post of undersecretary-general for special political affairs at the **United Nations (UN)** between 1971 and 1986. In this capacity, he headed the global organization's **peacekeeping** efforts. Before assuming his position in 1971, Urquhart worked under **Ralph J. Bunche**, who held the same post. **Marrack Goulding** succeeded Urquhart in the chief peacekeeping post in 1986.

– V –

**VIETNAM.** *See* INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF CONTROL AND SUPERVISION (ICCS).

**VILNA INTERNATIONAL FORCE.** In October 1920, the **League of Nations** proposed the establishment of the Vilna International Force to assist the Vilna Plebiscite Commission and the **Vilna Military Commission** in preparing for the **Vilna Plebiscite**. Colonel Chardigny, the commander of the military commission, requested 1,000 soldiers from the league to maintain order in the area and guard railroad lines. **France, Great Britain,** and Spain immediately offered two companies of infantry and one machine-gun section apiece, while Belgium stated that it would provide one infantry company and one machine-gun section on the condition that the force be truly international, with the costs borne by either the league or the contingent providers. The **secretary-general** requested each member of the League Council, except Brazil and **Japan**, to contribute to the international force. Each state was asked to provide two companies of infantry, one machine-gun section, and officers with knowledge of Polish or Russian. He also agreed that the league should reimburse the contingents from the organization's 1922 budget. Lithuania and Poland would be requested to fund the civilian administrative related expenses of the force.

In November, the League Council elected to increase the size of the operation to 1,800 personnel, selected Danzig as the logistics base for the mission, named Colonel Chardigny as the military commander, and expanded the request for military personnel by soliciting Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden to each provide 100 soldiers and a machine-gun section. British soldiers serving with the **League of Nations Plebiscite Forces** in Danzig were earmarked for the operation, along with French troops assigned to the league forces in Memel. The other contingents would arrive by sea at Danzig and then transfer overland to Vilna. Norway and Sweden agreed to participate on the condition that their soldiers volunteer for the assignment. Denmark and the Netherlands gave tentative approvals to the operation pending review by their parliaments. In addition, Spain confirmed its willingness to contribute a contingent, and Greece stepped forward to provide 50 soldiers for the international effort. The French government offered to handle the organization and logistics for the multinational unit.

Before the league could field the Vilna International Force, Lithuania withdrew its approval, citing Russian opposition to having soldiers of the former Allied powers so close to its border. The league canceled the Vilna International Force in accordance with Lithuania's demands. The force set a number of precedents for future **peacekeeping** operations. First, the Scandinavian states raised volunteer units and forwarded the tab to the league. Second, one state—France—dominated the logistics system. Third, the force faced “great power” opposition from **Russia**, which ultimately doomed the operation.

**VILNA MILITARY COMMISSION.** The **League of Nations** appointed five military officers under the command of French Colonel Chardigny to form the Vilna Military Commission in 1920. Representatives from **Great Britain**, **France**, Italy, **Japan**, and Spain faced the task of overseeing the withdrawal of regular and irregular military forces from Vilna and preparing for the arrival of the aborted **Vilna International Force**. The commission was eventually responsible for two neutral zones between Polish and Lithuanian forces. The first extended 250×15 kilometers between the Lithuanians and irregular Polish soldiers, while the second stretched 100×10 kilometers between Lithuanian forces and the official Polish army. The



commission remained in Vilna for a year to ensure calm after the plebiscite proposal was dropped.

**VILNA PLEBISCITE.** Following World War I, a dispute arose over whether the newly formed states of Poland or Lithuania should control the city of Vilna. Although Vilna was the historic capital of Lithuania, the majority of the city's population was ethnic Poles. To complicate matters, Lithuanian and Russian troops occupied the city in July 1920, before the latter retired the next month in the wake of a Polish offensive during the Russian–Polish war. Poland addressed the issue at the **League of Nations**, which requested the neutralization of all Lithuanian territory in the Russian–Polish war, set a demarcation line that left Vilna in Lithuania (but did not settle the territorial issue), and established the **Vilna Military Commission** to oversee the withdrawal of both sides from the provisional line and prepare the area for a plebiscite.

Polish irregular forces moved into Vilna despite the agreement and occupied the city in October. Clashes between Polish and Lithuanian forces continued through November before the Vilna Military Commission persuaded the two parties to accept an armistice and withdraw behind a neutral zone. The league requested that the two sides accept a plebiscite and proposed the establishment of a **Vilna International Force** to oversee the process. After the initial planning of the force, Lithuania withdrew its support for the multinational operation due to opposition from **Russia**, which did not want soldiers of the former Allied powers so close to its border. Without military support, the league dropped the idea of a plebiscite and returned the issue to the disputing parties and a mediator. Poland retained Vilna and renamed the city Wilno.

**VON HORN, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL CARL C.** Von Horn, a Swedish officer, was the chief of staff of the **United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)** between March 1958 and July 1960 and from January 1961 to May 1963. Between his two UNTSO assignments, he was named as the first **force commander** of the **United Nations Operation in the Congo** and held that position from July to December 1960. In July 1963, von Horn became the first force commander of the **United Nations Yemen Observation Mis-**

sion. He held that position until resigning in August 1963, following a major falling-out with **Secretary-General** U Thant. Von Horn reportedly charged that the operation was undermanned and short of supplies and equipment. **Major-General Indar Jit Rikhye**, the military adviser to the secretary-general, reported that despite physical hardship, morale of the peacekeepers was high. Disagreements between force commanders and secretaries-general are also evident in the **United Nations Protection Force** in the former **Yugoslavia**.

– W –

**WEST EUROPEAN UNION (WEU).** The West European Union (WEU) began as a grouping of the European members of the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)**. Although the WEU cooperates closely with NATO, it is a separate organization with its own agenda. The WEU signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania on 5 April 1993, to assist the three states in enforcing the **United Nations (UN)**-imposed embargo on Serbia. The WEU provided 10 patrol boats, manned by 270 personnel, to assist in embargo operations on the Danube River. Italy was selected to coordinate the WEU operation. At the January 1994 NATO summit, attendees voted to give their support to the budding needs for strengthening the European-led defense. NATO members approved working with the WEU as the defense component of the new **European Union (EU)** and agreed to make NATO assets available to the organization. A joint WEU/NATO exercise was first held in February 2000, to test the arrangements for WEU-led missions with NATO assets. The WEU lacks its own standing forces and military command structure. Members and associate members could designate conventional forces for use by the WEU during a crisis situation, including the deployment of peacekeepers. This list is known as the **Forces Answerable to the West European Union**. The WEU currently describes itself as an assembly that “examines and supports intergovernmental activities at the European level in all areas of European security and defense, including cooperation on defense equipment. Following the transfer of the WEU’s operational activities to the EU, the assembly’s main focus is to scrutinize the EU’s European

Security and Defence Policy while continuing to monitor the implications of the WEU's collective defense commitment under Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty, as well as cooperation with NATO under Article IV, which establishes an organic link with the Atlantic Alliance. The assembly pays particular attention to such issues as **peacekeeping** operations in the Balkans, the Middle East, and Africa." *See also* AMSTERDAM TREATY; MULTINATIONAL PROTECTION FORCE (FMP); PETERSBERG MISSIONS.

**WEST IRIAN.** *See* INDONESIA.

**WESTERN SAHARA.** *See* UNITED NATIONS MISSION FOR THE REFERENDUM IN WESTERN SAHARA (MINURSO).

– Y –

**YEMEN.** *See* UNITED NATIONS YEMEN OBSERVATION MISSION (UNYOM).

**YUGOSLAVIA.** Yugoslavia formed in 1918 around the Allied country of Serbia and former territories of the collapsed Austro-Hungarian Empire. After World War II, the multiethnic country evolved into a state dominated by Marshal Josip Tito, who held together the vastly different regions by force. After Tito's death in 1980, Yugoslavia faced increasing ethnic tensions and demands for greater autonomy from its regions. Conflicts in **Croatia** and Slovenia erupted, with ethnic Serbians being supported by the Serbian heartland of Yugoslavia. Both regions declared independence in 1991, intensifying the conflict and introducing **United Nations (UN)** peacekeepers the following year. The **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)** later fielded missions in Croatia and other areas of the former Yugoslavia. **Macedonia** declared independence at the end of 1991 and became the recipient of the UN's first preventive-style **peacekeeping** operation, to be followed later by missions mandated by the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)**, **European Union (EU)**, and OSCE. **Bosnia and Herzegovina** declared independence in 1992, resulting in a bitter civil war. Peacekeepers from the UN, NATO, EU, and OSCE deployed to the country in a series of

operations in support of the peace process. Clashes with **Kosovo** nationalists beginning in 1996 resulted in a NATO military intervention in 1999 and a 2008 declaration of independence. In 2006, Montenegro announced its independence, leaving Serbia the sole remaining entity of the former Yugoslavia.

– Z –

**ZAHLE.** Zahle is located on the eastern edge of the Bekáa Valley in eastern **Lebanon**. The town was the site of intense fighting between the Syrian elements of the **Arab Deterrent Force (ADF)** and Christian militia starting in December 1980. By April 1981, the ADF, consisting of 2,500 Syrian troops, initiated a siege of the town and its Christian forces. **Israel** became involved in the fighting by providing direct support to the Christian forces in Zahle. Two Syrian helicopters were shot down by the Israeli air force near Zahle. In response, **Syria** placed anti-aircraft batteries in the valley, a move that would lead to an intense confrontation during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon two months later. The Christian forces later departed Zahle following negotiations.

**ZAIRE.** *See* CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE; FRANCE.

**ZEPA.** *See* SAFE AREAS.

**ZHAO, JINGMAN.** Zhao became the first Chinese **force commander** of a **United Nations (UN) peacekeeping** operation on 17 September 2007. He headed the **United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)**. He also served in the **United Nations Iraq–Kuwait Observation Mission** as chief liaison officer from April 1996 to April 1997, and in MINURSO as UN military observer from September 1991 to June 1992.

**ZIMBABWE.** *See* COMMONWEALTH MONITORING FORCE IN ZIMBABWE (CMF); COMMONWEALTH OBSERVER GROUP; UNITED NATIONS ZIMBABWE FORCE.



## **Appendix**

### **Examples of Peacekeeping Mandates**

1. United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) (1963– )
2. United Nations Observer Mission Uganda–Rwanda (UNOMUR) (1993–1994)
3. United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) (2007– )

#### **MANDATE OF THE UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS (UNFICYP)**

The Security Council,

Noting that the present situation with regard to Cyprus is likely to threaten international peace and security and may further deteriorate unless additional measures are promptly taken to maintain peace and to seek out a durable solution,

Considering the positions taken by the parties in relation to the Treaties signed at Nicosia on 16 August 1960,

Having in mind the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and its Article 2, paragraph 4, which reads: “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”

1. Calls upon all Member States, in conformity with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, to refrain from any action or threat of action likely to worsen the situation in the sovereign Republic of Cyprus, or to endanger international peace;
2. Asks the Government of Cyprus, which has the responsibility for the maintenance and restoration of law and order, to take all additional measures necessary to stop violence and bloodshed in Cyprus;
3. Calls upon the communities in Cyprus and their leaders to act with the utmost restraint;
4. Recommends the creation, with the consent of the Government of Cyprus, of a United Nations peacekeeping force in Cyprus. The composition and size of the force shall be established by the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Governments of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, and United Kingdom. The commander of the force shall be appointed by the Secretary-General and report to him. The Secretary-General, who shall keep the Governments providing the force fully informed, shall report periodically to the Security Council on its operation;
5. Recommends that the function of the force should be, in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions;
6. Recommends that the stationing of the force shall be for a period of three months, all costs pertaining to it being met, in a manner to be agreed upon by them, by the Governments providing the contingents and by the Government of Cyprus. The Secretary-General may also accept voluntary contributions for that purpose;
7. Recommends further that the Secretary-General designate, in agreement with the Government of Cyprus and the Governments of Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom, a mediator, who shall use his best endeavours with the representatives of the communities and also with the aforesaid four Governments, for the purpose of promoting a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the problem confronting Cyprus, in

accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, having in mind the well-being of the people of Cyprus as a whole and the preservation of international peace and security. The mediator shall report periodically to the Secretary-General on his efforts;

8. Requests the Secretary-General to provide, from funds of the United Nations, as appropriate, for the remuneration and expenses of the mediator and his staff.

*Source: United Nations Security Council Resolution 186 (1964).*

### **MANDATE OF THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION UGANDA–RWANDA (UNOMUR)**

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolution 812 (1993) of 12 March 1993,

Taking note of the interim report of the Secretary-General dated 20 May 1993 (S/25810 and ADD.1),

Also taking note of the requests of the Governments of Rwanda and Uganda for the deployment of United Nations observers along their common border as a temporary confidence-building measure (S/25355, S/25356, S/25797),

Emphasizing the need to prevent the resumption of fighting in Rwanda that could have adverse consequences on the situation in Rwanda and on international peace and security,

Stressing the need for a negotiated political solution, in the framework of the agreements to be signed by the parties in Arusha, in order to put an end to the conflicts in Rwanda,

Paying tribute to the efforts of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania to promote such a political solution,



Taking note of the joint request of the Government of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) concerning the establishment of a neutral force in Rwanda (S/25951),

Stressing the importance of the ongoing negotiations in Arusha between the Government of Rwanda and the RPF, and expressing its readiness to consider assistance to the OAU in the implementation of the agreements as soon as they are signed.

1. Welcomes with appreciation the report of the Secretary-General (S/25810 and ADD.1);
2. Decides to establish the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) that will be deployed on the Ugandan side of the border, for an initial period of six months, as set out in the report of the Secretary-General (S/25810 and ADD.1), and subject to review every six months;
3. Decides that UNOMUR shall monitor the Uganda/Rwanda border to verify that no military assistance reaches Rwanda, focus being put primarily in this regard on transit or transport by roads or tracks which could accommodate vehicles of lethal weapons and ammunition across the borders, as well as any other material which could be of military use;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to conclude with the Government of Uganda, before the full deployment of UNOMUR, a status of mission agreement, including the safety, cooperation, and support the Government of Uganda will provide to UNOMUR;
5. Approves the dispatching of an advance party within fifteen days of the adoption of this resolution or as soon as possible after the conclusion of the status of mission agreement and the full deployment within thirty days of the arrival of the advance party;
6. Urges the Government of Rwanda and the RPF strictly to respect the rules of international humanitarian law;
7. Further urges the Government of Rwanda and the RPF to refrain from any action that could contribute to tension;

8. Welcomes the decision of the Secretary-General to support the peace efforts of the OAU by putting two military experts at its disposal with a view to assisting the Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG), in particular through logistic expertise to help expedite deployment of the enlarged NMOG to Rwanda;
9. Urges the Government of Rwanda and the RPF to conclude quickly a comprehensive peace agreement;
10. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the results of the Arusha peace talks;
11. Further requests the Secretary-General to report on the contribution the United Nations could make to assist the OAU in the implementation of the above-mentioned agreement and to begin contingency planning in the event that the Council decides such a contribution is needed;
12. Also requests the Secretary-General to report to the council on the implementation of the present resolution within sixty days of the deployment of UNOMUR;
13. Decides to remain actively seized to the matter.

*Source: United Nations Security Council Resolution 186 (1993).*

## **MANDATE OF THE UNITED NATIONS–AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN DARFUR (UNAMID)**

### **Resolution 1769 (2007)**

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 5727th meeting,  
on 31 July 2007**

The Security Council,

*Recalling* all its previous resolutions and presidential statements concerning the situation in Sudan,

*Reaffirming* its strong commitment to the sovereignty, unity, independence, and territorial integrity of Sudan, and to the cause of peace, and

*expressing its determination* to work with the Government of Sudan, in full respect of its sovereignty, to assist in tackling the various problems in Darfur, Sudan,

*Recalling* the conclusions of the Addis Ababa high-level consultation on the situation in Darfur of 16 November 2006 as endorsed in the communiqué of the 66th meeting of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union held in Abuja on 30 November 2006 as well as the communiqué of 79th meeting of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union on 22 June 2007, *recalling* the statement of its President of 19 December 2006 endorsing the Addis Ababa and Abuja agreements, *welcoming* the progress made so far and *calling* for them to be fully implemented by all parties without delay and for all parties to facilitate the immediate deployment of the United Nations Light and Heavy Support packages to the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) and a Hybrid operation in Darfur, for which back-stopping and command and control structures will be provided by the United Nations, and *recalling* that cooperation between the UN and the regional arrangements in matters relating to the maintenance of peace and security is an integral part of collective security as provided for in the Charter of the United Nations,

*Reaffirming* also its previous resolutions 1325 (2000) on women, peace, and security, 1502 (2003) on the protection of humanitarian and United Nations personnel, 1612 (2005) on children and armed conflict and the subsequent conclusions of the Security Council Working Group on Children in Armed Conflict pertaining to parties to the armed conflict in Sudan (S/2006/971), and 1674 (2006) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, as well as *recalling* the report of its Mission to Addis Ababa and Khartoum from 16 to 17 June 2007,

*Welcoming* the report of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission of 5 June 2007,

*Commending* in this regard the agreement of Sudan that the Hybrid operation shall be deployed in Darfur, as detailed in the conclusions of the high-level AU/UN consultations with the Government of Sudan in Addis Ababa on 12 June 2007 and confirmed in full during the Council's meeting with the President of Sudan on 17 June in Khartoum,

*recalling* the Addis Ababa Agreement that the Hybrid operation should have a predominantly African character and the troops should, as far as possible, be sourced from African countries, *commending* the efforts of the African Union for the successful deployment of AMIS, as well as the efforts of member states and regional organisations that have assisted it in its deployment, *stressing* the need for AMIS, as supported by the United Nations Light and Heavy Support Packages, to assist implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement until the end of its mandate, *calling upon* the Government of Sudan to assist in removing all obstacles to the proper discharge by AMIS of its mandate; and *recalling* the communiqué of the 79th meeting of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union of 22 June to extend the mandate of AMIS for an additional period not exceeding six months until 31 December 2007,

*Stressing* the urgent need to mobilise the financial, logistical, and other support and assistance required for AMIS,

*Welcoming* the ongoing preparations for the Hybrid operation, including the putting in place of logistical arrangements in Darfur, at United Nations Headquarters and the African Union Commission Headquarters, force and police generation efforts and ongoing joint efforts by the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union to finalise essential operational policies, and *further welcoming* action taken so that appropriate financial and administrative mechanisms are established to ensure the effective management of the Hybrid,

*Reiterating* its belief in the basis provided by the Darfur Peace Agreement for a lasting political solution and sustained security in Darfur, *deploring* that the Agreement has not been fully implemented by the signatories and not signed by all parties to the conflict in Darfur, *calling* for an immediate cease-fire, *urging* all parties not to act in any way that would impede the implementation of the Agreement, and *recalling* the communiqué of the second international meeting on the situation in Darfur convened by the African Union and United Nations Special Envoys in Tripoli from 15 to 16 July 2007,

*Noting with strong concern* ongoing attacks on the civilian population and humanitarian workers and continued and widespread sexual violence, including as outlined in the Report of the Secretary-General and

the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on the Hybrid Operation in Darfur and the report of the Secretary-General of 23 February 2007, *emphasising* the need to bring to justice the perpetrators of such crimes and *urging* the Government of Sudan to do so, and *reiterating* in this regard its condemnation of all violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in Darfur,

*Reiterating* its deep concern for the security of humanitarian aid workers and their access to populations in need, *condemning* those parties to the conflict who have failed to ensure the full, safe, and unhindered access of relief personnel to all those in need in Darfur as well as the delivery of humanitarian assistance, in particular to internally displaced persons and refugees, and *recognising* that, with many citizens in Darfur having been displaced, humanitarian efforts remain a priority until a sustained cease-fire and inclusive political process are achieved,

*Demanding* that there should be no aerial bombings and the use of United Nations markings on aircraft used in such attacks,

*Reaffirming* its concern that the ongoing violence in Darfur might further negatively affect the rest of Sudan as well as the region, *stressing* that regional security aspects must be addressed to achieve long-term peace in Darfur, and *calling* on the Governments of Sudan and Chad to abide by their obligations under the Tripoli Agreement of 8 February 2006 and subsequent bilateral agreements,

*Determining* that the situation in Darfur, Sudan continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

1. *Decides*, in support of the early and effective implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement and the outcome of the negotiations foreseen in paragraph 18, to authorise and mandate the establishment, for an initial period of 12 months, of an AU/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) as set out in this resolution and pursuant to the report of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission of 5 June 2007, and *further decides* that the mandate of UNAMID shall be as set out in paragraphs 54 and 55 of the report of the Secretary-

General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission of 5 June 2007;

2. *Decides* that UNAMID, which shall incorporate AMIS personnel and the UN Heavy and Light Support Packages to AMIS, shall consist of up to 19,555 military personnel, including 360 military observers and liaison officers, and an appropriate civilian component, including up to 3,772 police personnel and 19 formed police units comprising up to 140 personnel each;

3. *Welcomes* the appointment of the AU–UN Joint Special Representative for Darfur Rodolphe Adada and Force Commander Martin Agwai, and *calls* on the Secretary-General to immediately begin deployment of the command and control structures and systems necessary to ensure a seamless transfer of authority from AMIS to UNAMID;

4. *Calls* on all parties to urgently facilitate the full deployment of the UN Light and Heavy Support Packages to AMIS and preparations for UNAMID, and *further calls* on member states to finalise their contributions to UNAMID within 30 days of the adoption of this resolution and on the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission to agree on the final composition of the military component of UNAMID within the same time period;

5. *Decides* that:

- (a) no later than October 2007, UNAMID shall establish an initial operational capability for the headquarters, including the necessary management and command and control structures, through which operational directives will be implemented, and shall establish financial arrangements to cover troops costs for all personnel deployed to AMIS;
- (b) as of October 2007, UNAMID shall complete preparations to assume operational command authority over the Light Support Package, personnel currently deployed to AMIS, and such Heavy Support Package and hybrid personnel as may be deployed by that date, in order that it shall perform such tasks under its mandate as its resources and capabilities permit immediately upon transfer of authority consistent with subparagraph (c) below;

(c) as soon as possible and no later than 31 December 2007, UNAMID, having completed all remaining tasks necessary to permit it to implement all elements of its mandate, will assume authority from AMIS with a view to achieving full operational capability and force strength as soon as possible thereafter;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Council within 30 days of the passage of this resolution and every 30 days thereafter, on the status of UNAMID's implementation of the steps specified in paragraph 5, including on the status of financial, logistical, and administrative arrangements for UNAMID and on the extent of UNAMID's progress toward achieving full operational capability;

7. *Decides* that there will be unity of command and control which, in accordance with basic principles of peacekeeping, means a single chain of command, *further decides* that command and control structures and backstopping will be provided by the United Nations, and, in this context, *recalls* the conclusions of the Addis Ababa high-level consultation on the situation in Darfur of 16 November;

8. *Decides* that force and personnel generation and administration shall be conducted as set out in paragraphs 113–115 of the report of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission of 5 June 2007, and *requests* the Secretary-General to put in place without delay the practical arrangements for deploying UNAMID, including submitting to the General Assembly recommendations on funding and effective financial management and oversight mechanisms;

9. *Decides* that UNAMID shall monitor whether any arms or related material are present in Darfur in violation of the Agreements and the measures imposed by paragraphs 7 and 8 of resolution 1556 (2004);

10. *Calls* on all Member States to facilitate the free, unhindered, and expeditious movement to Sudan of all personnel, as well as equipment, provisions, supplies, and other goods, including vehicles and spare parts, which are for the exclusive use of UNAMID in Darfur;

11. *Stresses* the urgent need to mobilise the financial, logistical, and other support required for AMIS, and *calls* on member states and re-

gional organisations to provide further assistance, in particular to permit the early deployment of two additional battalions during the transition to UNAMID;

12. *Decides* that the authorised strength of UNMIS shall revert to that specified in resolution 1590 (2005) upon the transfer of authority from AMIS to UNAMID pursuant to paragraph 5(c);

13. *Calls* on all the parties to the conflict in Darfur to immediately cease all hostilities and commit themselves to a sustained and permanent cease-fire;

14. *Demands* an immediate cessation of hostilities and attacks on AMIS, civilians and humanitarian agencies, their staff and assets and relief convoys, and *further demands* that all parties to the conflict in Darfur fully cooperate with AMIS, civilians and humanitarian agencies, their staff and assets and relief convoys, and give all necessary assistance to the deployment of the United Nations Light and Heavy Support Packages to AMIS, and to UNAMID;

15. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations:

(a) *decides* that UNAMID is authorised to take the necessary action, in the areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities in order to:

(i) protect its personnel, facilities, installations, and equipment, and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its own personnel and humanitarian workers,

(ii) support early and effective implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, prevent the disruption of its implementation and armed attacks, and protect civilians, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Sudan,

(b) *requests* that the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Government of Sudan, conclude within 30 days a status-of-forces agreement with respect to UNAMID, taking into consideration General Assembly resolution 58/82 on the scope of legal protection under the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel and General Assembly resolution 61/133 on the Safety and Security of Humanitarian Personnel and the Protection of United Nations Personnel, and *decides*



that pending the conclusion of such an agreement the model status-of-forces agreement dated 9 October 1990 (A/45/594) shall provisionally apply with respect to UNAMID personnel operating in that country;

16. *Requests* the Secretary-General to take the necessary measures to achieve actual compliance in UNAMID with the United Nations zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse, including the development of strategies and appropriate mechanisms to prevent, identify, and respond to all forms of misconduct, including sexual exploitation and abuse, and the enhancement of training for personnel to prevent misconduct and ensure full compliance with the United Nations code of conduct, and to further take all necessary action in accordance with the Secretary-General's Bulletin on special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse (ST/SGB/2003/13) and to keep the Council informed, and urges troop-contributing countries to take appropriate preventive action, including the conduct of predeployment awareness training and, in the case of forces previously deployed under AU auspices, post-deployment awareness training, and to take disciplinary action and other action to ensure full accountability in cases of such conduct involving their personnel;

17. *Calls* on all concerned parties to ensure that the protection of children is addressed in the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, and *requests* the Secretary-General to ensure continued monitoring and reporting of the situation of children and continued dialogue with parties to the conflict toward the preparations of time-bound action plans to end recruitment and use of child soldiers and other violations against children;

18. *Emphasises* there can be no military solution to the conflict in Darfur, *welcomes* the commitment expressed by the Government of Sudan and some other parties to the conflict to enter into talks and the political process under the mediation, and in line with the deadlines set out in the roadmap, of the United Nations Special Envoy for Darfur and the African Union Special Envoy for Darfur, who have its full support, *looks forward* to these parties doing so, *calls* on the other parties to the conflict to do likewise, and *urges* all the parties, in particular the non-signatory movements, to finalise their preparations for the talks;

19. *Welcomes* the signature of a Joint Communiqué between the Government of Sudan and the United Nations on Facilitation of Humanitarian Activities in Darfur, and *calls* for it to be fully implemented and on all parties to ensure, in accordance with relevant provisions of international law, the full, safe, and unhindered access of relief personnel to all those in need and delivery of humanitarian assistance, in particular to internally displaced persons and refugees;

20. *Emphasises* the need to focus, as appropriate, on developmental initiatives that will bring peace dividends on the ground in Darfur, including, in particular, finalising preparations for reconstruction and development, return of internally displaced persons to their villages, compensation, and appropriate security arrangements;

21. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Council for its consideration no later than every 90 days after the adoption of this resolution on progress being made on, and immediately as necessary on any obstacles to:

- (a) the implementation of the Light and Heavy Support Packages and UNAMID,
- (b) the implementation of the Joint Communiqué between the Government of Sudan and the United Nations on Facilitation of Humanitarian Activities in Darfur,
- (c) the political process,
- (d) the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement and the parties' compliance with their international obligations and their commitments under relevant agreements, and
- (e) the cease-fire and the situation on the ground in Darfur;

22. *Demands* that the parties to the conflict in Darfur fulfill their international obligations and their commitments under relevant agreements, this resolution, and other relevant Council resolutions;

23. *Recalls* the reports of the Secretary-General of 22 December 2006 (S/2006/1019) and 23 February 2007 (S/2007/97) which detail the need to improve the security of civilians in the regions of eastern Chad and northeastern Central African Republic, *expresses* its readiness to support this endeavour, and *looks forward* to the Secretary-General

reporting on his recent consultations with the Governments of Chad and CAR;

24. *Emphasises* its determination that the situation in Darfur shall significantly improve so that the Council can consider, in due course and as appropriate, and taking into consideration recommendations of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union, the drawing down and eventual termination of UNAMID;

25. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

*Source: United Nations Security Council Resolution 1769 (2007).*

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## I. INTRODUCTION

Peacekeeping has attracted the interest of scholars since the early years of the United Nations (UN), and a large body of literature on the field exists in the forms of books, articles, and Internet websites. Originally, much of this literature was focused exclusively on one particular peacekeeping operation.



In recent years, the literature has tended to shift toward comparative studies reviewing several operations, but there is still a considerable body of material examining broad surveys of the field as a whole. Since this is a select bibliography, only English-language sources are included. There are many useful Internet sites to complement the large number of books and articles on peacekeeping; however, website addresses can and do change without warning. Therefore, all website addresses listed in this introduction will include the name of the sponsoring organization. If a website has changed its address, researchers can perform an Internet search for the host organization.

*Historical Dictionary of Multinational Peacekeeping, 3rd Edition*, stands practically alone as a consistently updated single-source overview of the field of peacekeeping. Similar volumes were released in the latter half of the 1990s, but none have been updated to reflect the changing missions since the opening of the 21st century. The same point applies to bibliographies. Two extensive peacekeeping bibliographies were published in 1992 and 1999 but not updated. This situation seems to reflect the increased interest in peacekeeping during the 1990s, as problems in Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda brought greater attention to the field. In each crisis, peacekeepers faced situations for which they were not mandated, manned, armed, or prepared to handle. As international organizations regrouped and applied new techniques to peacekeeping (including phasing deployments, relying on lead states to field more aggressive operations, providing operations with more robust rules of engagement, and deploying regionally mandated peacekeepers followed by rehatting them as UN peacekeepers), problems associated with the missions have tended to be reduced but certainly not eliminated. This is partially reflected by the decrease in media coverage of peacekeeping operations despite their increase in numbers since the mid-1990s. A reduction in consistently updated single-source research guides (encyclopedias and bibliographies) followed, although it would be difficult to make a direct correlation between the two points.

The reduction in updated single-source research aids can also be seen with online peacekeeping bibliographies. In 2004, there were four very good online peacekeeping bibliographies published. By 2010, only one had been updated since that year. As of 2010, even the online peacekeeping bibliography at the UN's Dag Hammarskjöld Library ([www.un.org/Depts/dhl/pkeep.htm](http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/pkeep.htm)) has not been updated since 2002. The U.S. Army's War College Library, colocated with the army's Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, maintains an updated online peacekeeping bibliography at [www.carlisle.army.mil/library/bibs/peace09.pdf](http://www.carlisle.army.mil/library/bibs/peace09.pdf). The document, updated in July 2009, is useful but lacks many of the more important published sources, especially those related to regionally mandated peacekeeping operations.

Two good annual reviews of peacekeeping operations exist. The first is *The Annual Review of Global Peace Operations*, prepared by the Center on Inter-

national Cooperation at New York University. This book presents a review of most peacekeeping operations in the field during the year of the publication's release. Thus, while the annual edition is a good review for currently deployed operations, the missions are removed upon their completion. The other source is the *SIPRI Yearbook*, updated annually by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). This publication includes a section on currently mandated peacekeeping operations with basic information related to mandates, costs, numbers, and sponsoring international organizations rather than full reviews. Operations are not included in the *SIPRI Yearbook* once they are completed.

In 2009, a new journal devoted exclusively to peacekeeping operations entered the market to join *International Peacekeeping*, which emerged as a peacekeeping-related journal in 1994 at the height of the 1990s interest in peacekeeping. The new publication, the *Journal of International Peacekeeping*, evolved from an annual review known as *International Peacekeeping: The Yearbook of International Peace Operations*, which can also be traced to an origin in 1994.

Why do some peacekeeping operations work and others fail? Many scholars have tackled this question over the past few decades. One of the best works to examine this question is *Why Peacekeeping Fails*, by Dennis C. Jett. Jett compares the failure of UN peacekeeping in Angola and its success in Mozambique, while analyzing why missions with similar backgrounds would have different outcomes. Despite the increasing age of this book, the lessons it details are still highly applicable to currently planned peacekeeping operations. Other studies that tackle the questions behind success and failure include *Africa's First Peacekeeping Operation: The OAU in Chad, 1981–1982*, by Terry M. Mays; "Conditions for Success in Peacekeeping Operations," by Paul F. Diehl in his edited volume entitled *The Politics of International Organizations; Understanding Peacekeeping*, 2nd edition, by Alex Bellamy and Paul D. Williams; *Twenty-First Century Peace Operations*, edited by William J. Durch; and *Does Peacekeeping Work?: Shaping Belligerents' Choices after Civil War*, by Virginia Page Fortna.

Published material on peacekeeping has altered its focal points, as peacekeeping itself has developed and increased in numbers since 1948. The early works published in the 1950s and 1960s tended to focus on case studies or provide broad reviews of peacekeeping as it was slowly maturing under the UN. The latter material offers analysis, speculation, and prediction by scholars as they watched post–World War II peacekeeping go through its infancy. Some of the most interesting studies from this period include *International Military Forces*, by Lincoln P. Bloomfield; *United Nations Forces: A Legal Study*, by Derek Bowett; *United Nations Experience with Military Forces: Political and Legal Aspects*, by Ruth B. Russell; *Peacekeeping by UN Forces*, by Arthur Lee Burns and Nina Heathcote; and *A United Nations Peace Force*, edited by

William Frye. *Soldiering for Peace*, by Carl Von Horn, is a classic firsthand account that emerged from these two decades.

Books and articles released in the 1970s and 1980s also included many UN case studies; however, there were enough current and past operations available by this time for authors to more effectively offer comparisons of missions. Comparison studies from this period include *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: A Military and Political Appraisal*, by James Boyd; *The Blue Berets: The Story of the United Nations Peacekeeping Forces*, by Michael Harbottle; *Peacekeeping on the Arab–Israeli Fronts: Lessons from Sinai and Lebanon*, by Nathan A. Pelcovits; and *United Nations Peacekeeping: Legal Essays*, edited by Antonio Cassese. During the same two decades, the material examining peacekeeping as a general field began to change from broad perspective reviews to more specific and narrow topics as the number of missions increased. Worthy examples include *Financing the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, by M. R. Kazimi; *Financing the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: The Need for a Sound Financial Basis*, by Susan R. Mills; and *Peace Soldiers: The Sociology of a United Nations Military Force*, by Charles C. Moskos. *A Life in Peace and War*, by Brian Urquhart, is an example of a firsthand account released during these two decades.

The post–Cold War generation of peacekeeping literature includes many case studies of such controversial UN missions as those in Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda. For nearly 30 years, the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) was the most researched UN peacekeeping operation due to its controversies, including a high casualty rate, constantly changing mandate, and relation to the Article 19 financial crisis. Since 1992, the UN operations in Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda have captured the world’s attention as examples of peacekeeping “gone wrong.” Academic scholarship shifted to these recent problems, and ONUC is now “ancient history.” There was a tremendous growth in peacekeeping research after 1992 to reflect the increasing number of controversial missions immediately after the Cold War. Some of the better books to emerge on these areas include *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda*, by Roméo Dallaire; *Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda*, by Michael N. Barnett; *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*, by John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley; and *Peacekeeping Fiascoes of the 1990s: Causes, Solutions, and U.S. Interests*, by Frederick H. Fleitz. Although included in this paragraph, the first two books were released in the opening two years of the 21st century.

The decade of the 1990s also produced detailed examinations of many topics that received little or no attention between 1948 and 1990. For example, most of the works on training, use of maritime assets, rules of engagement, policing,

issues of humanitarian intervention, and the role of peacekeeping in human rights protection emerged after the post-1990 increase in peacekeeping operations after the Cold War.

By the opening of the 21st century, peacekeeping literature shifted from the numerous case studies of the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Rwanda to a greater emphasis on multimission comparisons. Scholars have tended to offer these comparisons as a means to determine what is and is not working well in peacekeeping operations since the dawn of the 21st century. Some of these works include *Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations*, edited by William J. Durch; *Peace Operations: Trends, Progress, and Prospects*, edited by Donald C. F. Daniel, Patricia Taft, and Sharon Wilhara, and *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars*, by Lise Morjé Howard.

Case studies of non-UN peacekeeping operations began to slowly appear after 1990 as missions mandated by regional international organizations increased in number. Books offering detailed examinations of regional peacekeeping operations include *The Arab League and Peacekeeping in Lebanon*, by Istvan Pogany; *Africa's First Peacekeeping Operation: The OAU in Chad, 1981-1982*, by Terry M. Mays; *The Pretense of Peacekeeping: ECOMOG, West Africa, and Liberia (1990-1998)*, by Klass van Walraven; *The Commonwealth Observer Group in Zimbabwe*, by Steven Chan; *Nigerian Peacekeeping Policy: The Application of Peacekeeping as a Foreign Policy Tool, 1960-1990*, by Terry M. Mays; *Regional Peacekeepers: The Paradox of Russian Peacekeeping*, edited by John Mackinlay and Peter Cross; *Peacekeeping in Africa: ECOMOG in Liberia*, edited by Karl P. Magyar and Earl Conteh-Morgan; and *Liberia's Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and Regional Security in West Africa*, by Adekeye Adebajo.

Internet-based sources can be split into two categories: official sites of international organizations and sites associated with research institutes. International organizations that have mandated peacekeeping operations tend to include information on these missions; however, the amount and type of material varies greatly. These sites are excellent for reviewing official documents related to missions including their mandates; however, it should be noted that these organizations also have their own particular biases, and this is reflected in the types of analysis and documents offered to researchers via their sites. The international organizations offering the most abundant information include the UN ([www.un.org](http://www.un.org)), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ([www.nato.int](http://www.nato.int)), European Union (EU) ([www.europa.eu](http://www.europa.eu)), and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) ([www.osce.org](http://www.osce.org)). Each organization includes general information on its peacekeeping operations and also offers unique web pages on its current missions that are updated on a regular basis. Other international organizations that offer some peacekeeping related information on their websites include the African Union (AU) ([www](http://www)

.african-union.org), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) ([www.ecowas.int](http://www.ecowas.int)), and Organization of American States (OAS) ([www.oas.org](http://www.oas.org)). The Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), a peacekeeping operation mandated by the peace agreement between Egypt and Israel, rather than an international organization, has its own website at [www.mfo.org](http://www.mfo.org).

Research institutes and related organizations with websites that include peacekeeping-related material and sometimes online bulletins and other publications include the United States Institute of Peace ([www.usip.org](http://www.usip.org)), Partnership for Effective Peace Operations ([www.effectivepeacekeeping.org](http://www.effectivepeacekeeping.org)), Réseau Francophone de Recherche sur les Opérations de la Paix at the Université de Montréal ([www.operatonspaix.net](http://www.operatonspaix.net)), Pearson Peacekeeping Centre ([www.peaceoperatons.org](http://www.peaceoperatons.org)), Australian National University's Centre for International Governance and Justice ([www.cigi.anu.edu.au](http://www.cigi.anu.edu.au)), Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) ([www.sipri.org](http://www.sipri.org)), African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes ([www.accord.org.za](http://www.accord.org.za)), International Peace Academy ([www.ipacademy.org](http://www.ipacademy.org)), Institute for International Law of Peace and Armed Conflict ([www.rhur-uni-bochum.de](http://www.rhur-uni-bochum.de)), Institute for Security Studies ([www.iss.co.za](http://www.iss.co.za)), Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research ([www.fsk.ethz.ch](http://www.fsk.ethz.ch)), International Peace Research Institute (PRIO) ([www.prio.no](http://www.prio.no)), and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations ([www.carlisle.army.mil](http://www.carlisle.army.mil)). Peacekeeping training centers with websites include the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre (Canada) ([www.peaceoperatons.org](http://www.peaceoperatons.org)), Ecole de Maintien de la Paix (Mali) ([www.empbamako.org](http://www.empbamako.org)), and Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (Ghana) ([www.kaiptc.org](http://www.kaiptc.org)).

Although peacekeeping is a well-covered topic in academic literature, gaps in the available research still exist. Most case studies examine the larger controversial UN operations and ignore the many small successful missions fielded by the world body; however, one can learn as much about peacekeeping from why a small mission succeeded as why a large operation encountered trouble. Despite the fact that there has been an increase in studies dedicated to the larger African-, NATO-, and EU-mandated peacekeeping operations in recent years, there is still a general lack of literature on non-UN missions. Since 2002, regional bodies have outpaced the UN in mandating peacekeeping operations by a 2-to-1 margin, yet these are in need of additional detailed research.

## II. GENERAL

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